Russian troops converged on the Narva fortress for a very long time and in an extremely disorganized manner. The timing for the hike was extremely unfortunate - it was autumn and it was constantly raining. Due to bad weather, carts with ammunition and food constantly broke down. The supply was poorly organized, because of this the soldiers and horses were constantly malnourished - this led to the death of the horses by the end of the campaign.
By the beginning of hostilities, Peter 1 expected to gather about 60 thousand soldiers, but due to the above problems, 2 large detachments with a total number of more than 20 thousand soldiers did not have time to approach. In total, by the beginning of hostilities near Narva, Peter 1 had at his disposal from 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers and 195 artillery pieces.
The garrison of the Narva fortress consisted of only 1,900 soldiers, 400 of whom were militia. The Narva fortress was located on the banks of the Narva River, on the other bank there was another fortress called Ivangorod. Both fortresses were connected by a bridge and this allowed the defenders to move from fortress to fortress during a siege.
To avoid replenishing the fortress with provisions and soldiers, Peter 1 had to besiege both fortresses, and this stretched his army and made it weaker. To protect against attack from the rear, Peter 1 built a defense line of 2 shafts with a length of more than 7 kilometers.
On the last day of October, Russian artillery began daily shelling of the Narva fortress. But due to the fact that the ammunition lasted only 2 weeks and the caliber of the guns was too small, the fortress suffered virtually no losses.
Before the approach of the main forces of the Swedish king, Peter did not know the exact number of soldiers in Charles’s army. According to captured Swedes, an army of 30 to 50 thousand soldiers was moving towards the Russian army. But Peter 1 could not confirm the words of the prisoners, because Sheremetev’s detachment of 5 thousand people, which was sent to cover the Russian troops from the Swedes, did not conduct reconnaissance and did not engage in serious battles with the Swedish army. The day before the battle, Peter 1 leaves the army, leaving command to the Dutch general Duke de Croix.
There is a version that Peter did not expect such a quick attack from the Swedes and left the army to come with reinforcements and surround the Swedish army.
Russian generals understood that Charles would attack with his main forces from the west, so the Russian army prepared a defensive line seven and a half kilometers long. One of the main mistakes of the Russian commander was the decision to place the entire army in a line between the ramparts for the entire length of the defensive ramparts - more than 7 km. It did Russian army very vulnerable if the defense line is breached. The Swedish king deployed his army in 2 lines.
On the night of November 30, 1700, the Swedish army moved towards the Russian troops. The Swedes tried to maintain silence so as not to be noticed until the last minute. The Russian army saw Charles's army only at 10 o'clock in the morning.
It was snowing heavily that day. Thanks to this, Charles’s troops managed to make a surprise attack and break through the defenses of the Russian army. Although the Russians had numerical superiority, this did not help them because the troops were too stretched.
Soon the Russian defense line was broken through in 3 places. Panic began in the ranks of the Russian army. The main part of the soldiers began to run away from the battlefield in the hope of being saved, but many drowned in the river. Foreign officers of the Russian army began to surrender.
Only the right flank, which was defended by the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments, as well as the Lefortovo regiment, did not retreat and continued to resist the Swedes. On the left flank, the division under the command of the Russian general Weide Adam Adamovich also successfully repelled the attacks of the Swedes. The battle continued until nightfall, but the Swedish army was never able to put the flanks of the Russian army to flight; there was no communication between the surviving flanks.
The next morning, the remaining generals decided to begin negotiations with Charles XII about the surrender of the Russian army. Prince Yakov Dolgorukov agreed on the passage of the Russian army without weapons and banners to the other side of the river.
The next day, December 2, General Weide’s division also capitulated. On the same day, the surviving Russian army left the shores of Narva. From the Russian army after the Battle of Narva, the Swedes were left with:
The Russian army lost more than 7,000 people wounded and killed. The Swedes lost only 677 killed and 1,250 wounded. Seven hundred people remained in captivity, including 10 generals, 10 colonels, as well as other officers and soldiers.
The army of Peter 1 suffered a severe defeat at the very beginning of the Northern War. Almost all the artillery was lost, a huge number of soldiers were killed and wounded, and the officers.
This defeat near Narva in Europe was perceived as a sign of the incapacity of the Russian army, and the Swedish army began to be feared even more. But there were also advantages in this battle near Narva. This victory of the Swedes allowed Peter 1 to carry out a number of military reforms to replenish the army with new regular troops and Russian command personnel, because. Karl hoped that the Russian army would no longer be able to provide worthy resistance for the next few years.
The Battle of Narva is one of the most remarkable in the chronicle of the battles of Peter I. In fact, it was the first major battle young Russian state. And although it ended rather unsuccessfully for both Russia and Peter I, the significance of this battle is difficult to overestimate. It showed everything weak sides Russian army and raised many unpleasant questions about weapons and logistics. The subsequent solution to these problems strengthened the army, making it one of the most victorious at that time. And this began with the battle of Narva. We will try to talk briefly about this event in our article.
The beginning of the Russian-Swedish confrontation can be considered the conflict that flared up over the conclusion of the thirty-year Turkish peace. The process of concluding this agreement could have been disrupted due to strong Swedish resistance. Having learned about such opposition, the tsar ordered the expulsion of the Swedish ambassador Kniper-Krona from Moscow, and ordered his representative in Sweden to declare war on this kingdom. At the same time, Peter I agreed to end the matter peacefully on the condition that the Swedes cede the Narva fortress to him.
Charles XII found this treatment outrageous and took countermeasures. By his order, all property of the Russian embassy was confiscated, and all representatives were arrested. In addition, the King of Sweden ordered the property of Russian merchants to be seized, and they themselves to be used for hard work. Almost all of them died in captivity and poverty. Karl agreed to war.
Peter I found this situation unacceptable. However, he allowed all Swedes to leave Russia and did not seize their property. This is how the Northern War began. The Battle of Narva was one of the first episodes of this conflict.
Trying to break through to the shores of the Baltic, Russian troops had been besieging Narva since August 1700. Six regiments of the Novgorod governor, Prince Trubetskoy, were sent to the Swedish fortress; in addition, to strengthen the positions of the Russian army, Count Golovin’s cavalry and the remaining regiments of his division were redeployed directly to Narva. The fortress was subjected to numerous bombings. which led to serious fires several times. The Russians were in no hurry to storm the well-defended walls, hoping for a quick surrender of Narva.
But soon they felt a shortage of gunpowder and shells, the supply of provisions had worsened, and there was a smell of treason. One of the captains, who had Swedish roots, broke his oath and went over to the enemy’s side. The Tsar, in order to avoid a repetition of such cases, dismissed all foreigners who held command posts and sent them into the depths of Russia, rewarding them with ranks. On November 18, Peter I personally went to Novgorod to oversee the delivery of military supplies and provisions. The continuation of the siege was entrusted to the Duke de Croix and Prince Ya. F. Dolgorukov.
It should be noted that the Battle of Narva in 1700 was designed for active offensive actions - Russian troops occupied positions suitable only for active retreat, but not for defense. The advanced units of Peter's divisions were stretched along a thin line almost seven kilometers long. The artillery was also not in place - due to an acute shortage of shells, it was in no hurry to take up its positions near the bastions of Narva.
Taking advantage of the absence of the king, hiding behind a blizzard and fog, they went on the offensive. Charles XII created two strike groups that managed to break through the Russian defenses in the center and on one of the flanks. The decisive offensive confused the Russians: many foreign officers of Peter’s troops, led by de Croix, went over to the enemy’s side.
The Battle of Narva showed all the weaknesses of the Russian army. Nasty military training and the betrayal of the command completed the defeat - the Russian troops fled.
The Russians were retreating... A large number of people and military equipment randomly flowed towards the dilapidated bridge on the Narva River. Under the enormous weight, the bridge collapsed, drowning many people under its rubble. Seeing the general flight, the cavalry of the boyar Sheremetev, who occupied the rear guards of the Russian positions, succumbed to general panic and began to cross Narva by swimming.
The Battle of Narva was actually lost.
Only thanks to the steadfastness and courage of two separate regiments - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky - the Swedish offensive was blocked. They stopped panicking and successfully repelled the onslaught of the royal troops. The surviving regiments were gradually joined by the remnants of the remaining Russian units. Several times Charles XII personally led the Swedes to attack, but each time he had to retreat. As night fell, hostilities subsided. Negotiations began.
The Battle of Narva ended in defeat for the Russians, but the core of the army survived. Despite the difficult situation of Peter's troops, Charles XII was not confident in the unconditional victory of the Swedes, so he accepted the terms of the peace treaty. The opponents entered into an agreement according to which Russian troops were allowed to retreat.
When floating to the other side of Narva, the Swedes captured several officers and took away all the weapons. The shameful peace that began lasted about four years. Only the next battle of Narva, in 1704, made it possible for the Russian army to even the score in this war. But that's a completely different story.
The Battle of Narva showed the complete backwardness of the Russian army, its weak experience even in the face of a small enemy army. In the battle of 1700, only about 18 thousand people fought on the side of the Swedes against the thirty-five thousand strong Russian army. Lack of coordination, poor logistics, poor training and outdated weapons are the main reasons for the defeat in Narva. After analyzing the reasons, Peter I concentrated his efforts on combined arms training, and sent the best of his generals to study military affairs abroad. One of the priority tasks was the rearmament of the army the latest designs military equipment. Within a few years, the military reforms of Peter I led to the fact that the Russian army became one of the strongest in Europe.
At the beginning, before the approach of the main Swedish military forces, Peter the Great had no idea about their numbers. According to the captured Swedes, an army of thirty to fifty thousand soldiers was approaching the Russian army. However, the tsar could not confirm these facts, since Sheremetyev’s detachment (about five thousand people), sent to cover the Russian army, did not enter into major battles and did not go out on reconnaissance. The day before the decisive battle, the ruler of Russia left his army, transferring authority to the Duke de Croix. Researchers put forward the version that Peter himself did not expect a quick Swedish attack and for this reason went for reinforcements.
At the same time, it was clear to the Russian general that the Swedes would attack with their main forces from the western side and therefore they prepared a defensive line that was more than seven kilometers long. But one of the most important mistakes of the Russian command was to deploy the entire army along the entire length of the aforementioned rampart, which made it quite easy prey. Charles lined up his army in two lines.
On the night of November 30, 1700, the Swedish army advanced against the Russian army. At the same time, they tried to move as quietly as possible until the camp itself. The Russian army managed to see the enemy only at ten in the morning, as heavy snow began to fall at night. The Swedes managed to break through the Russian defense line.
And although the Russian army had actual numerical superiority, the spread of troops along the perimeter became a fundamental factor. Very soon the defense line was broken in three places and panic came to the ranks of the Russian army (many fled, some drowned in the river, etc.). Foreign officers of the Russian army began to surrender.
Only on the right flank, protected by the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, together with the Lefortovo regiment, was resistance to the enemy. The left flank also stood to the death under the command of General Weide. This battle continued until late at night, however, the Swedish army did not manage to completely put the flanks of the Russian army to flight. But the connection between them was broken.
The next morning, the surviving generals decide to begin negotiations with Charles the Seventh about the defeat of the Russian army. Prince Dolgorukov, thanks to his diplomatic skills, negotiates the transfer of the unarmed Russian army to the other side of the river. The next day (December 2) Heide's division also capitulated.
Narva was the first serious defeat of a rising nation, which knew how to turn even defeats into instruments of victory. K. Marx.
On September 23, 1700, the first Russian regiments, numbering 10 thousand people, reached Narva. The main concentration of troops was completed only by mid-October. The king ordered the placement of batteries and siege operations. The bombardment of the fortress began on October 20 and continued for two weeks without any effect - exactly as long as there was enough gunpowder, cannonballs and bombs. Peter I (1672 – 1725)
Meanwhile, Charles XII approached Narva as unexpectedly as he approached Copenhagen. Having received news of the approach of the enemy, Peter then leaves from near Narva, transferring command of the army to Duke von Krui, who had just been hired into Russian service. The Swedish army concentrated at Narva on November 18. The battle took place the next day. Charles XII (1682-1718) Duke von Kruy
The location of the Russian camp was aimed at the siege of Narva, so its fortifications stretched out in a thin line seven miles long. Before the start of the battle, heavy snow fell, which allowed the Swedes to approach the positions of the Russian troops unnoticed. The swift attack of the Swedes caused general panic.
B.P. Sheremetyev, together with his cavalry, rushed to swim across the Narova, losing over a thousand people during the crossing. The bridge along which the infantrymen from A. M. Golovin’s division were fleeing collapsed, and many of the fugitives immediately sank to the bottom. Von Krui and foreign officers in Russian service hastened to surrender. Only two guards regiments and the Lefortovo regiment showed resilience and retained their combat effectiveness in this general confusion. B. P. Sheremetyev (1652-1719) A. M. Golovin (1667-1720)
At night there was a lull and negotiations on surrender began. the beginning of the war, the very first contact with the enemy ended in a crushing defeat for the Russian troops. Near Narva, the Russians lost six thousand people killed, drowned, or starved to death and all their artillery, 135 guns of various calibers. The army lost almost all of its senior officers. And this despite the fact that there were several times fewer Swedes near Narva than Russians: under the command of Charles XII there were 8-12 thousand people, while the Russian army numbered 35-40 thousand.
To Petru, Narva clearly showed the backwardness of the country and the low combat effectiveness of the army. Narva was a cruel school from which one had to learn lessons - learn and teach to win. The siege of Narva began again in late May 1704, but proceeded sluggishly: there was no siege artillery. The shelling of the fortress began only after cannons and mortars were delivered from Dorpat and St. Petersburg. The commandant of Narva was the same Horn who commanded the garrison of the fortress in 1700. Much has changed since then in the Russian army, but Horn, like his master Charles XII, had the same ideas about it. The Narva commandant believed that the same poorly trained and poorly armed Russian army stood at the walls of the fortress as four years ago.
Peter took Menshikov's advice and equipped several Russian regiments in Swedish uniforms. They moved towards Narva from the side where the besieged were expecting help from the Swedish general Schlippenbach. A staged battle unfolded near the walls of the fortress between the “Swedes”, commanded by Peter, and the Russian troops. Horn heard the sounds of artillery and rifle fire, and he looked at the “battlefield” for a long time through a telescope, but did not notice the catch. The blue uniforms of soldiers and officers, yellow and white standards of the Swedish army were visible. Confident that the long-awaited “sikurs” had approached Narva, Horn ordered an attack on the Russian troops from the rear and thereby help “his own” make their way to the fortress. Together with the detachment, the civilian population left the garrison, hoping to profit from all sorts of goods from the Russian convoy.
The military ruse was a success. The Swedes, lured out of the fortress, were successfully attacked and suffered significant losses. Laconically, without boasting, Peter informed his friends about the victory. Using a play on the words “Narva” - “abscess,” he wrote to Kikin: “I can’t write Inova, just that Narva, which has been abscessing for 4 years, has now, thank God, burst, about which I will say in more detail myself.”
Only four winters separated the first Narva from the second, but how strikingly different they were from each other! Then the Russian army was capable of engaging in “infant play”; now it has entered the period of adolescence. Then she was defeated, now she triumphed in victory.
The siege of Narva by Russian troops is the first step in Peter I’s struggle for access to the Baltic Sea. On September 8, 1700, after concluding a truce with Turkey, Russia declared war on Sweden. In early September, the Russian army, numbering 35 thousand people, advanced and soon besieged Narva.
The choice of Narva was not accidental. The geographical location of the city allowed those who owned it to exercise control not only in the Neva River basin, but also in the Gulf of Finland, and therefore the entire Baltic region. Having taken Narva, it was easier for Russian troops to return lost Ingria and Ingria.
After the triumphant victory over Denmark and the signing of the Peace of Traventhal, Charles XII returned to his homeland, deciding to deal with Augustus the following spring. The unexpected news of the invasion of Russian troops into the Swedish provinces infuriated the king. Charles's indignation knew no bounds because of the treachery of Peter, who until recently, through his ambassadors, had sworn sincere friendship and good neighborliness. The king equipped 16,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, and at the head of the army he headed by sea to Livonia.
Narva was a fortress, which was defended by about 2,000 soldiers under the command of commandant G. Gorn. The approach of Russian troops to the fortress forced him to organize a militia, which included about 4,000 armed townspeople. Narva was defended by 400 guns.
Severe autumn storms and bad weather prevented the Swedes from concentrating forces and resources. Peter understood that the arrival of Charles with the army could dramatically complicate his plans, so he hurried with the assault. On October 20, the bombardment of Narva began with all 173 guns. The fire did not bring the desired result, and the Russians also ran out of gunpowder.
Spurred on by news of Karl's approach, the king takes decisive action. The attack of two rifle regiments, unexpected for the defenders, allowed the Russians to gain a foothold near the fortress walls. However, the success was temporary - the next morning, without receiving reinforcements, the archers fled. Peter’s rage was extinguished only after every tenth retreater was hanged. However, the first failures in the assault and the Tsar’s inadequate reaction to them had a painful effect on the Russian army. It turned out that the troops were completely untrained in the rules of a siege and did not know where to begin the assault.
Meanwhile, it became known that Charles and his army had landed in the Gulf of Riga in Pernau and were on the march towards Narva. Soon news of the next failure arrived. Not far from Narva stood the city of Wesenberg. Its capture would allow the Russians to block the path of the Swedish troops. Sent by B.P. Sheremetev and his cavalry were unable to dislodge the Swedish garrison from the city. Moreover, the Russian military camp deployed in the vicinity of Wesenberg was unexpectedly attacked by secretly approaching Swedish battle formations. The Russian cavalry fled, opening a direct path to the main forces of Charles XII.
The unpreparedness and confusion in the Russian troops worsened even more after Peter left the Russian positions, leaving the troops under the command of Duke Charles de Croix, who had served primarily in the Austrian army. The tsar's trust in foreign generals and officers subsequently had a detrimental effect on the outcome of the battle. There was no trained Russian command corps, and foreign military specialists were in no hurry to shed blood for a foreign and, from their point of view, “barbaric” country.
Why, at a moment of extreme tension, did Peter leave the army, entrusting command to a foreign duke? It is absurd to accuse Peter of cowardice; throughout his combat life, he more than once proved enviable courage and courage in the most dangerous moments. This question is answered by historian S.M. Soloviev, who wrote: “reckless daring, the desire to be exposed to useless danger was completely not in the character of Peter, which is why he was so different from Charles XII. Peter could have left the camp at the news of Charles’s approach, having become convinced that remaining was dangerous and useless, that his presence could be useful elsewhere. This was a man who was least capable of being guided by false shame.”
On November 19, 1700 the main battle took place. Croix deployed Russian troops in a long 7-kilometer line. This did not go unnoticed in the Swedish camp, as well as the fact that the Russian formation was not covered by artillery, which remained in its previous positions opposite Narva. Having assessed the situation, Charles organized shock fists, forming his infantry into narrow columns, placing them opposite the center of the Russian position. Thus, the king ensured the numerical superiority of the Swedes in the direction of the main attack. The Swedish infantry was supported by artillery according to plan. The plan also included capturing the bridge over the Narva River and blocking the retreat routes of Russian troops. The Swedish cavalry had the task of breaking through behind enemy lines and completing the operation.
On the day of the battle, thick wet snow fell with a piercing wind. Well-trained and battle-hardened Swedish grenadiers rushed to the Russian positions. Poor visibility allowed Charles's soldiers to suddenly appear in front of the Russian positions. Having discharged their baguettes, the Swedes rushed into hand-to-hand combat, in which they were unsurpassed.
The Russian return salvo was ineffective in stopping the onslaught of the attackers. The Russians, who were less prepared for hand-to-hand combat and had no combat experience, were unable to hold back the pressure of the Swedes after a short fight. The power of foreign officers over soldiers was lost. The troops became uncontrollable. The hired foreign officers surrendered and went over to the enemy's side. A panicky mood spread like lightning to Russian units. Uncontrollable crowds of soldiers rushed to the bridge, which, under the weight of those running, collapsed into the icy waters of the river. Sheremetev's cavalry, which had a chance to strike the flanks of the Swedish formation and turn the tide of the battle, treacherously rushed to flee. Having lost his courage and control over his troops, the Duke of Croix surrendered. Thirty officers followed his shameful example. Only two regiments - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky - retained their courage and steadfastness. Their stubborn resistance caused alarm in Charles. Despite the fact that their commander, Colonel Blumberg, defected to the Swedes at the beginning of the battle, the regiments did not flinch. Fencing themselves with slingshots and carts, they steadfastly defended themselves and repulsed all the attacks of the Swedes. Deprived of leadership, the disorganized army lost its ability to resist. Generals A. Golovin, Prince Y. Dolgoruky and I. Buturlin who remained with the Russian units were forced to enter into negotiations with Karl.
The agreement between the parties provided for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian units while preserving light small arms. The artillery went to the Swedes. However, the Swedish side violated the terms of the agreement and disarmed some Russian formations. Some of the officers were taken prisoner, which also contradicted the agreement. Russian losses amounted to 8,000 people. The senior officers, including 10 generals and the Duke of Croix himself, were captured.
On November 21, the opening ceremony took place Swedish troops to Narva. On the occasion of the victory, a thanksgiving prayer service was held in the temple. The celebrations were accompanied by the roar of guns. Commandant of the Narva garrison G.R. Gorn received the rank of general. The victory was immortalized in 14 commemorative medals.
The defeat of Russia at Narva had enormous foreign policy significance, from which the country could not recover until 1709. For Europe, Russia has ceased to exist as a powerful power. Russian ambassadors were subjected to all sorts of ridicule and humiliation. Satirical medals were passed from hand to hand, on which the Russian Tsar was depicted running in panic and throwing away weapons. European poets compared Charles to Alexander the Great and predicted great feats for him, and artists and medalists glorified the hero on canvas and in plastic.
The defeat at Narva was of great instructive significance. The battle showed the weaknesses of the Russian army, its poor training in military affairs, the lack of trained middle and senior officers, the disorganization of supplies, etc.
The victory of the experienced and excellently trained Swedish army was natural.
The defeat gave a powerful impetus to reforms and prompted titanic work. Subsequently, Peter wrote: “When we received this misfortune, then captivity drove away laziness, and forced us to hard work and art day and night.”
