In the last year, it has become more and more clear that neoconomics is the best way to model economic processes and reveal the nature of what is happening in the financial sector and macroeconomics. Oleg Grigoriev was able to demonstrate the power of a new way of understanding economic and political processes. This has led to the emergence of false neoconomists - people who sanctify their purely economic ideas by claiming that these ideas supposedly follow from neoconomics. This can already be not only read in articles or heard during webinars, but also reaches the population from TV screens. The purpose of this note is to dispel the seven most frequently heard false claims of these pseudo-neoconomists.
This is wrong. Neoconomics clearly shows that desire alone is not enough and that the greater intelligence of specialists can do nothing with a much more labor-intensive system of division of labor. 3 billion people can build a system with a much deeper division of labor than 120-140 million inhabitants of Russia, no matter how smart the inhabitants of Russia may be, and no matter how stupid those 3 billion may be. This is the reason for the tragedy of the USSR with everything its intellectual potential and human capital.
The task set is meaningless not only within the framework of neoconomics, but also Marxism and classical political economy. But it is standard within the framework of the economics view of the economy. False neoconomists must realize that it is not a matter of the desire of individuals or large elite groups or even the entire population, but of the peculiarities of the interaction between developed and emerging markets. And then it is necessary to set not the task of import substitution in a single country, which is classical for economics, but a different task, a task of a completely different scale. A global challenge.
This is wrong. Import substitution, according to the neoconomic model of interaction between developed and emerging markets, is an accelerated version of the suicide of the developing market, the elite of the state and the entire layer of specialists. Moreover, within the framework of neoconomics, it is clearly shown that the economic bloc of the Russian government after the collapse of the USSR acts very reasonably and rationally, constantly considering various options for import substitution and refusing to try to implement them.
This is wrong. Anyone can use neoconomics for their own purposes, developing the parts of neoconomics they need for themselves or for other people. The way of embedding one's knowledge into the general neoconomic is through the expansion of the system of neoconomics narrative models and through the standard portals of interaction of narratives.
A good, though not complete, analogy is the Wikipedia expansion scheme: there are articles, articles have concepts, for each concept you can write your own article about this concept and link from the original article. That is, if something is missing in neoconomics for a person, then he can prescribe narratives for himself according to concepts of interest or expand existing narratives to suit his needs and through this expand general knowledge or his personal knowledge.
This is wrong. Neoconomics only looks like a theory. In reality, by construction, it is only a generalization of the practical experience of a certain number of highly qualified specialists, an understanding of this experience. That's what narratives are for - to collect experience on a topic in the form of a coherent set of interacting facts. In turn, the facts themselves are also stories-narratives. And on these narratives there is a private model, the essence of which is not a theory, but an understanding of the phenomenon.
Accordingly, the opposition of one's experience and neoconomics only shows a person's misunderstanding of the neoconomic approach, misunderstanding of neoconomics and the falsity of sanctifying one's statements through neoconomics.
This is wrong. One of the essential differences between neoconomics and all other ways of understanding economic processes is the consideration of volitional acts of participants in the economic system. Both group and personal.
Economicism and Marxism are based on abstract ideal-rational people. Non-idealities are introduced non-modelly and with great difficulty. So far, no one has managed to introduce real groups of influence.
In the neoconomic model, one can naturally introduce groups with common interests or models of specific individuals who use the economy for their political or personal interests. This is done in standard ways, and not through "pianos in the bushes." And this allows you to build models that are very close to real ones. Perhaps even take into account the possibility of such strong-willed decisions as the annexation of Crimea or Maidan.
If a person does not understand this and does not know how to introduce the personal interests of the participants in the economic process, then he is a false neoconomist. If he tries to introduce Rothschilds and Rockefellers, "changers" and "interest-bearers" into the model, then this also causes some bewilderment.
This is wrong. Both the lectures on the interaction of developed and developing economies, and the book, and Grigoriev's seminars clearly indicate that regional systems of the division of labor are a false hope. Any neoconomist understands and realizes the reason for this, no matter how hard it is for him to understand the consequences of this conclusion of neoconomics for Russia. I also recommend the webinar Discussion of Mikhail Khazin and Oleg Grigoriev: "On import substitution and other disagreements." The reason for the illusory nature of hope is the same reason why import substitution is impossible - more than a billion workers are needed for relative success, plus special conditions such as the secular isolation of this billion+.
This is wrong. Neoconomics shows how and why the dollar became an international means of payment and why gold and other currencies had to be abandoned. Moreover, within the framework of neoconomics, the dollar will remain the main international means of payment as long as it can buy a larger list of goods than any other currency. The USA sells more than 50% of the world's list of exported goods. And yet, false neoconomists are still trying to seduce people with the possibility of creating regional currencies and even offer the ruble, yuan or other, sometimes new, currency options that include a peg to gold for their role.
Economic theory. Version 1.0. Lecture notes
Lecture 1. Introductory, part 1
* We are talking about a new theoretical approach to economics that has matured for quite a long time. It coincided well with the current crisis, the process of which is developing in accordance with his prediction within the framework of this approach, which thus has a connection with reality.
* What work has been done? It all started back in the USSR, when, after graduating from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, O.V. Grigoriev received good scientific guidance in the person of Ac. VI Danilov-Danilyan, a well-known economist in the past, now less known as the director of the Institute of Water Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Many regret that he left the economy, which suffered heavy losses in connection with this. In the early 1980s the Danilov-Danilyan group worked out the problem of dependence on raw materials, which became relevant in the 1970-1980s. It was about the fact that in the centralized system of capital investments that existed in the system of the planned economy of that time, the phenomenon was observed that an increasing share of capital investments was directed to the fuel and energy complex; at the same time, it was obvious that the remaining share of investments directed to other sectors of the economy, firstly, was declining, and secondly, it caused an extremely negative phenomenon in the rest of the economy. That is, the rest of the sectors are degrading. In the USSR, the question arose that soon only this sector would remain in the country.
* Decisions on investments were made on the basis of methods [calculating] the effectiveness of capital investments, which were written according to market principles. One of the authors is prof. Novozhilov - was an ardent supporter of the Austrian market school, and maintained a high level of science in the academic economy of that time. It was clear that the degradation of other sectors was dictated by market principles. When perestroika came and the transition to a market economy was discussed, the Danilov-Danilyan group treated this with horror, because they believed that if this trend could be somehow changed under a planned economy, then during the transition to a market economy, when all decisions are made exclusively on market principles, we will get what, in the end, happened in the country in 2012.
* At the same time, it was clear that in capitalist countries, market principles, under approximately the same "oil" conditions, did not lead to the fact that the United States became someone's raw material appendage, but retained and even developed other technologies, except for the fuel and energy complex, moreover, enough rapidly, which eventually made it possible to abandon the production of oil and even buy it abroad, incl. in USSR.
* There are two answers to this problem: 1) in fact, in the United States and in the West in general, strategic decisions are not made on the basis of market principles (a conspiratorial view of the nature of things). Indeed, there are quite a few examples of such decisions in these countries. For example, in the US, a soldered vacuum tax was introduced to move from vacuum tubes to transistors for the development of microelectronics. The argument against this answer is that, whatever the think tank and the US government, compared to the government of the USSR, it was an insignificant force, since such prominent bodies as the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences played a leading role in the Land of Soviets, "nine" defense industries, people from which made decisions. Chairman of the State Planning Commission N. Gaidukov was a native of the oil industry, but on the whole, it is unlikely that he alone acted against these expert-regulatory structures. And yet, the whole crowd of these structures could not resist the usual market logic. There was a big question about what mechanisms exist in the US, given the knowledge that multinational companies buy elections, have their lobbyists everywhere and make decisions based on market principles.
* After perestroika, these questions turned from theoretical into practical ones. Heated discussions about the problems of turning the country into a raw materials appendage were conducted in the authorities in the 1990s, and various attempts were made to this end, which each time ended in failure. The experience of developing countries was also considered, many of which tried to overcome their dependence on raw materials and develop their own industry. These experiments ended mostly in failure. The experiments that were going on also showed signs of impending collapse, which happened to many of them (Argentina, Mexico, etc., including those that had a restart, like in Brazil).
* Preliminary conclusion 2) was quite bold and was that all national economies are different, and they have some invisible factors in which market factors lead to different results in different cases. It was a challenge to traditional economic theory, which asserts the equality of all economies in the world, with the exception of private differences; that is, for example, nothing prevents Romania (Argentina, Indonesia, China, etc.) from reaching the level of the USA, except for laziness, greed, etc. of things. The whole theory of modernization suggests that, apart from obstacles from the citizens of the states themselves, there are no other obstacles in the economy to increase the level of well-being.
* If economies differ, by what factor? In 2002, during a private meeting, O. V. Grigoriev came up with the idea of the level of division of labor. It was a kind of speculative construction, which made it possible to fit the numerous factors considered earlier into a fairly simple scheme. In connection with it, several problems arise. First of all, doubts arose about whether such an idea was the "invention of the bicycle", discovered long ago by someone earlier. The doubts were serious due to the fact that the division of labor as the proposed explanation was not only not new, but one of the basic concepts in economics. Suffice it to say that A. Smith begins his presentation of his ideas with this concept. Any economist will talk about the division of labor, for example, that "Russia must take its place in the international system of division of labor." However, why did O. Grigoriev see the division of labor as a construction explaining the fundamental difference between economies, while other economists did not, although everything seems to be quite simple here? Everything that was necessary for the conclusions was contained in a small classic text by A. Smith.
* Since the time of A. Smith, something has happened to the concepts and structure of the theory, after which the division of labor has become not a tool, but a figure of speech. I had to revise the evolution of economic theory. When it became clear that this economic discovery not only was not the "invention of the bicycle", but also clarified a lot, a discussion on this topic began. How to measure this factor? The first thing that catches your eye is the number of professions, about which, as a factor in the difference between rich and poor countries, the Norwegian economist E. Reinert also spoke. Indeed, in the USSR, in comparison with the "West", the level of division of labor was less, unlike the latter, and the mass of people began to receive a mass of new professions (for example, the word "merchandiser" outside of Moscow still causes a smile).
Economic theory. Version 1.0. Lecture notes
Lecture 1. Introductory, part 1
* We are talking about a new theoretical approach to economics that has matured for quite a long time. It coincided well with the current crisis, the process of which is developing in accordance with his prediction within the framework of this approach, which thus has a connection with reality.
* What work has been done? It all started back in the USSR, when, after graduating from the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University, O.V. Grigoriev received good scientific guidance in the person of Ac. VI Danilov-Danilyan, a well-known economist in the past, now less known as the director of the Institute of Water Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Many regret that he left the economy, which suffered heavy losses in connection with this. In the early 1980s the Danilov-Danilyan group worked out the problem of dependence on raw materials, which became relevant in the 1970-1980s. It was about the fact that in the centralized system of capital investments that existed in the system of the planned economy of that time, the phenomenon was observed that an increasing share of capital investments was directed to the fuel and energy complex; at the same time, it was obvious that the remaining share of investments directed to other sectors of the economy, firstly, was declining, and secondly, it caused an extremely negative phenomenon in the rest of the economy. That is, the rest of the sectors are degrading. In the USSR, the question arose that soon only this sector would remain in the country.
* Decisions on investments were made on the basis of methods [calculating] the effectiveness of capital investments, which were written according to market principles. One of the authors is prof. Novozhilov - was an ardent supporter of the Austrian market school, and maintained a high level of science in the academic economy of that time. It was clear that the degradation of other sectors was dictated by market principles. When perestroika came and the transition to a market economy was discussed, the Danilov-Danilyan group treated this with horror, because they believed that if this trend could be somehow changed under a planned economy, then during the transition to a market economy, when all decisions are made exclusively on market principles, we will get what, in the end, happened in the country in 2012.
* At the same time, it was clear that in capitalist countries, market principles, under approximately the same "oil" conditions, did not lead to the fact that the United States became someone's raw material appendage, but retained and even developed other technologies, except for the fuel and energy complex, moreover, enough rapidly, which eventually made it possible to abandon the production of oil and even buy it abroad, incl. in USSR.
* There are two answers to this problem: 1) in fact, in the United States and in the West in general, strategic decisions are not made on the basis of market principles (a conspiratorial view of the nature of things). Indeed, there are quite a few examples of such decisions in these countries. For example, in the US, a soldered vacuum tax was introduced to move from vacuum tubes to transistors for the development of microelectronics. The argument against this answer is that, whatever the think tank and the US government, compared to the government of the USSR, it was an insignificant force, since such prominent bodies as the State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences played a leading role in the Land of Soviets, "nine" defense industries, people from which made decisions. Chairman of the State Planning Commission N. Gaidukov was a native of the oil industry, but on the whole, it is unlikely that he alone acted against these expert-regulatory structures. And yet, the whole crowd of these structures could not resist the usual market logic. There was a big question about what mechanisms exist in the US, given the knowledge that multinational companies buy elections, have their lobbyists everywhere and make decisions based on market principles.
* After perestroika, these questions turned from theoretical into practical ones. Heated discussions about the problems of turning the country into a raw materials appendage were conducted in the authorities in the 1990s, and various attempts were made to this end, which each time ended in failure. The experience of developing countries was also considered, many of which tried to overcome their dependence on raw materials and develop their own industry. These experiments ended mostly in failure. The experiments that were going on also showed signs of impending collapse, which happened to many of them (Argentina, Mexico, etc., including those that had a restart, like in Brazil).
* Preliminary conclusion 2) was quite bold and was that all national economies are different, and they have some invisible factors in which market factors lead to different results in different cases. It was a challenge to traditional economic theory, which asserts the equality of all economies in the world, with the exception of private differences; that is, for example, nothing prevents Romania (Argentina, Indonesia, China, etc.) from reaching the level of the USA, except for laziness, greed, etc. of things. The whole theory of modernization suggests that, apart from obstacles from the citizens of the states themselves, there are no other obstacles in the economy to increase the level of well-being.
* If economies differ, by what factor? In 2002, during a private meeting, O. V. Grigoriev came up with the idea of the level of division of labor. It was a kind of speculative construction, which made it possible to fit the numerous factors considered earlier into a fairly simple scheme. In connection with it, several problems arise. First of all, doubts arose about whether such an idea was the "invention of the bicycle", discovered long ago by someone earlier. The doubts were serious due to the fact that the division of labor as the proposed explanation was not only not new, but one of the basic concepts in economics. Suffice it to say that A. Smith begins his presentation of his ideas with this concept. Any economist will talk about the division of labor, for example, that "Russia must take its place in the international system of division of labor." However, why did O. Grigoriev see the division of labor as a construction explaining the fundamental difference between economies, while other economists did not, although everything seems to be quite simple here? Everything that was necessary for the conclusions was contained in a small classic text by A. Smith.
* Since the time of A. Smith, something has happened to the concepts and structure of the theory, after which the division of labor has become not a tool, but a figure of speech. I had to revise the evolution of economic theory. When it became clear that this economic discovery not only was not the "invention of the bicycle", but also clarified a lot, a discussion on this topic began. How to measure this factor? The first thing that catches your eye is the number of professions, about which, as a factor in the difference between rich and poor countries, the Norwegian economist E. Reinert also spoke. Indeed, in the USSR, in comparison with the "West", the level of division of labor was less, unlike the latter, and the mass of people began to receive a mass of new professions (for example, the word "merchandiser" outside of Moscow still causes a smile).
* However, a deeper question was primary - not about how to measure, but about what this very level of division of labor will be measured in relation to. It was clear that this was not applicable to the national economy, because, if we take, for example, the division of labor system (SRT) of the United States, then it is not closed by the borders of this country, and is generally global. In the United States, the profession of metallurgist almost disappeared, as well as everything connected with the peasantry. Then, perhaps, to tie this concept to the firm? It is possible, but, again, this is not the level. The issue remained open and was not resolved for eight years. At the same time, there was already terminology and results, including forecasts that came true. But there was no basis for this activity. In 2010, it became clear what the concept of the level of division of labor applies to.
* Actually, in the economy there were initially two bases (object of research) for the application of economic concepts: the national economy, which is dealt with by "political economy" and, subsequently, the micro-level (individual), which is dealt with by "economics". When another basis for the applicability of economic concepts was formulated, such a discourse was called "neoconomics". After the change of object, in fact, the neoconomic group had to radically revise the history of economic doctrines. The process ended relatively recently.
* On the structure of the course of lectures. In view of the fact that in neoconomics there is another object that requires a high level of abstraction for its presentation, the initial introduction of basic concepts would not lead to an understanding of the results of such work, and it would be necessary, when building a complete picture, to repeat what has already been said a second time , but passed on deaf ears and was forgotten. Therefore, in this first lecture, the basic concepts will be vaguely given, and in the next two lectures, a case will be considered, a specific example of how the division of labor factor works to explain some phenomena in the real economy, for which even orthodox economics has no solutions on n. XXI century, although the orthodoxy itself considers these phenomena do not have satisfactory solutions: this is the interaction of developed and developing states, and in general the problem of economic growth. Therefore, later, when the transition to working with abstract concepts is made, a reference to a specific example will be in front of your eyes. After the introduction of additional abstract concepts, additional content will be produced. This is the structure of the course.
Those who know me are aware that, in general, I share the views of O.V. Grigoriev on the economy. In this regard, I decided to say a few words about some differences in the approaches of Khazin and Grigoriev.
In the texts of Khazin, written under the influence of the half-mad Devyatov, there is a lot of all sorts of conspiracy dregs, which I don’t even consider it necessary to disassemble. But if we analyze, let's say, an adequate part of them, then what confuses me most of all is the use of the term "global project", which, as it were, hints that someone, somewhere, once consciously designs or designed it. Meanwhile, it is obvious to me that capitalism has developed not according to someone's premeditated plan, but, so to speak, "historically". Thousands of different influential people in different countries over the centuries have been solving their specific problems, involuntarily forming institutions that have developed into a system, and a system that is constantly evolving and changing to the malice of the bottom. Grigoriev claims, in my opinion, rightly, to explain the principles of this system, emphasizing that before that they worked in practice, but were never formulated explicitly. Khazin, with his "global projects", began to claim that the principles were originally laid down by someone, which weakly correlates with reality and leads to a crooked path of conspiracy theories.
Moreover, the trick is that some principles of capitalism were really voiced, but did not correspond to real practice, while others worked, but were not voiced. Here, as in any organization, there are formal instructions, but there is everyday work, which management often does not quite understand (if it has never worked in this structure in lower positions). At the same time, if everything is done "according to the charter", then the work will get stuck, it is not for nothing that they call it an Italian strike.
So at the global level, the benefits of free trade and the protection of private property are declared, but in practice something completely different works, and if you try to bring practice in line with theory, then everything goes awry. Khazin concludes from this that the real laws were originally invented, but hidden by some puppeteers. Grigoriev, instead of conspiracy fantasies, is trying to bring theory into line with practice.
Some decent economic analytics from Alexander Vinogradov
Everything will be free there, everything will be high there
There, probably, it will not be necessary to die at all
- Egor Letov - Everything goes according to plan
The past week was the first time that I did not see patriotic sadness regarding the composition of the new government in my standard information flow. They got used to it, probably, with Dmitry Medvedev at the head, and with Vitaly Mutko in construction, and with Dmitry Patrushev in agriculture (not to be confused with his father Nikolai Patrushev - he, as before, remained the Secretary of the Security Council). This can be understood - we need to live somehow, leaving behind numerous explanations of what happened, from “this government will be more manageable” to “it is temporary and it will not last long”, as well as a noticeable apology for the already emerging Russian neo-feudalism. In general, the dust has settled, "the Maslenitsa is over, the Great Lent has begun." And if so, then it is quite possible to talk about the prospects for the next six years.
Generally speaking, we should have stopped at this moment, thought and summed up the results of the previous six-year period - but there was very little of this in the press. This is due, in my opinion, to the fact that the previous six-year period was inextricably linked with the May decrees and, of course, one can flaunt quite correct maxims like "the decrees were implemented by 90%", but this, unfortunately, is not enough. The point here is that these decrees were transformed into 218 specific instructions to the government, and many of them are tasks like "hold an event", "prepare a plan" and the like. Obviously, this is something that is easy to do, and the percentage of completion is growing. But, for example, there are no 25 million high-performance jobs - in reality, it fluctuates at the level of 16-18 million, while the maximum - 18.28 million - was reached in 2014, although, of course, these 25 million should be created by 2020, i.e. there is still time. The growth of real wages in 2018 by 2011 was supposed to be 40-50% - in reality it is only 9.2% at the end of 2017. Further, the volume of investments requested in the decrees at the level of 27% of GDP does not want to deviate from the level of 20-21%. The share of high-tech products in GDP at 25.6% in 2018 is also extremely doubtful, since it barely rose from 19.7% in 2011 to 22.1% in 2017. A related indicator, although not included in the decrees - the share of innovative products - on the contrary, has decreased, and in a number of key industries - from mechanical engineering to chemistry and metallurgy - it has collapsed to a minimum in 12 years, and in general, in terms of the level of innovation, Russian industry occupies the penultimate place. in Europe, surpassing only Romania. In general, the picture in terms of key actual (and not paper!) indicators turns out to be very unsightly, and, as far as one can understand, no one really wants to focus on it. Well, yes, they didn’t master it, with whom it doesn’t happen, but the new plans are wonderful, aren’t they?
They are, of course, impressive beyond measure. Here you have a growth in per capita GDP by one and a half times, and an increase in life expectancy, and a halving of the poverty rate, and a variety of affordable housing, and an increase in labor productivity by at least 5% per year, and even a tenfold increase in the cargo turnover of the Northern Sea Route. In total, these are about 150 goals and objectives of varying degrees of complexity and magnitude (six years ago there were about 190 of them) - in other words, the basic ground for the next version of the May decrees is quite solid. However, a natural question arises - how much does this generally correspond to reality?
Here I must once again point out the features of the economic model existing in the Russian Federation. There is nothing particularly cunning and mysterious here, this is a classic monocultural rental model of interaction between the local economy and the developed world. On this incoming cash flow, through market (private demand from beneficiaries) and non-market (fiscal-budgetary) mechanisms, a local non-tradable sector of the economy was formed, grew and strengthened, i.e. everything that cannot be imported, from construction to hairdressing services, also rose production oriented to the domestic market.
The formation of this system took place in the zero years and was accompanied by the corresponding policy of the Central Bank - the so-called. currency regulation, the essence of which is to maintain a fairly rigid ratio of the amount of local money in the country and gold and foreign exchange reserves. This type of policy is characteristic of developing countries, especially those who are trying to restore their economies after certain experiments. This is its main advantage - this kind of linking allows you to stabilize the country's monetary system, in the event of a previous catastrophe, reduce very high inflation, restart production chains and economic processes in general. The downside is its riskiness: with an increase in cash inflow into the country, noticeable economic growth begins, actual import substitution begins (an increase in household income makes it profitable to invest in the production of previously imported goods). The formation and expansion of the same non-tradable sector is also taking place, but, in the negative, this growth is accompanied by serious inflation (at the level of about 10%, which, of course, is quite tolerable - but it has a clear negative impact on production chains, creating threats to businesses, especially low-margin ones). ) and the likely formation of bubbles (systems with positive feedback) in various markets, usually in the stock and construction markets. This, again, is tolerable - it turns out that when this incoming flow is reduced, for one reason or another, a sharp collapse of the economy begins. Bubbles deflate, assets become cheaper, their owners go bankrupt, and investments made with the expectation of further growth do not pay off.
This is exactly what we observed in the period 2002-2007. The influx of money, inflation, bubbles, economic growth, the replenishment of state reserves (how could it be without it) - and the general feeling that life is getting better, and that this will continue in the future. The fairy tale ended with the fall in oil prices in 2008 - suffice it to say that the state spent about $200 billion to support the domestic economy. On the other hand, during the period of 2009-2014, the Central Bank made a transition to a new form of monetary policy, inflation targeting, breaking this tight link between local and external money. As a result, the inflation target was achieved quite successfully (we will not touch on the issue of inflation for the poor, the growth of government tariffs, and so on), it became almost invisible, the role of the exchange rate as a damper increased - but another effect was that the country's economy stopped quickly respond either to the growth of incoming cash flow (that is, the rise in oil prices), or to its reduction.
I remember that about 7-8 years ago, before some kind of elections, United Russia came to them with the slogan "The goal is stability, the principle is responsibility." I will not say anything about the second part, but the first was implemented quite clearly. This stability, however, is not that very reliable (more on this below), but the fact remains. This means, among other things, that even positive external conditions (the same oil price is now quite high) do not turn into economic growth, as it was 12 years ago. They turn into increased capital outflows: $19.8 billion in 2016, $31 billion in 2017 and already $21 billion in the first 4 months of this year. The economy from this, in general, is neither hot nor cold.
Slavophiles and nihilists are coming;
Both have clean nails.
For if they do not converge in the theory of probability,
They converge in untidiness.
Already, the liberals in the person of Navalny began to tell us fairy tales about the dominance of private houses in "beautiful Russia of the future" as they say. A private house is certainly good, but that's "where is Zin's money" to start and maintain all this happiness. In illusions on this topic, "patriots" and "Westernizers" now agreed. Only some see in a private house a return to the mythical village pastoral, and the second is the embodiment of hipster illusions about the future. Below is a good text by Alexander Shurygin with an analysis of the issue.
Review of the collection of articles “Dom. Private Housing and Private Life in Modern Russia.
The topic of settlement and spatial development is at the forefront of public discussions. One of the signs of the growing popularity of the topic, as well as the emerging interest in it on the part of the liberal-hipster community, is the publication on the Inliberty website of a collection of texts under the general title “Home. Private Housing and Private Life in Modern Russia. The first issue in the collection is a kind of Message from the “President of the Beautiful Russia of the Future” A.A. Navalny, which proclaims the main ideology of the publication: "Russia must change the format of its daily life and make a civilizational choice in favor of low-rise buildings." It seems that instead of the ideologist of the creative class, Richard Florida, who left the pedestal with his comfortable urban environment, the progressive public has a new idol. This is a well-known publicist, propagandist of "de-Moscowization" Yuri Vasilyevich Krupnov. True, for some reason his name is not mentioned in the collection. Apparently, Yuri Vasilyevich, unlike Richard Florida, is not good with PR. But we will correct this defect.
It is Yuri Krupnov who for 15 years (and maybe more) has been preaching the idea that Russians should move out of big cities, acquire individual houses and private planes, settling in the wide expanse of our country. Otherwise, the dreams of Margaret Thatcher and Madeleine Albright will come true, 15 million people will live in Russia, and the country will lose the natural wealth of Siberia. As for the topic of individual housing construction, back in 2003 Yu.V. Krupnov published a whole book with the title “House in Russia. National idea”, in which long before A.A. Navalny and others presented ideas very similar to those in the collection on the Inliberty website.
Krupnov's ideas could be treated as the benevolent wishes of a patriot-converter, but the growth of their popularity in the creative-hipster environment indicates that it makes sense to analyze in detail the pros and cons of this concept. In our case, of course, from the position of Neoconomics.
In itself, the idea of low-rise construction and the fight against 25-30-story anthills (or, as our colleague A. Vinogradov likes to say, “tigers”) as the dominant type of dwelling is correct. Of course, nothing but the greed of developers and the omnivorous consumers, the dominance of "tiger-anthills" can not be explained. One of the key problems of our housing sector is the fact that, during the transition to the market, we retained the dominance of essentially Soviet apartments as the main supply on the housing market (what A.V. Bokov calls “New Old Housing”). The fact that an apartment in an MKD as an object of ownership is an incomprehensible thing, since it is not tied to the land, has already been discussed many times from all sides, so the argument that only individual home ownership is able to create a true class of owners sounds quite intelligible and convincing. Therefore, the general pathos of the authors of the collection of articles is generally justified.
However, this fully justified view is accompanied by a number of profound misconceptions.
The first and most important of these is due to the fact that supporters of deurbanization believe that new communication technologies provide an opportunity for remote work, and this, in turn, refutes “outdated” economic models, such as the New Economic Geography and other “agglomeration” theories. . As dezurbanists believe, a person armed with a computer with the Internet can live in the middle of the taiga and be as successful and wealthy as a resident of a metropolis. Such conversations have been heard for more than a dozen years, and things are still there. You can attribute everything to the inertia of the settlement systems, saying that simply not everyone who has access to remote work has realized the advantage of their position and that is the only reason they are crowded into megacities, instead of leaving to live in the conditional Vologda Oblast.
In fact, there are other reasons as well. First, it is the availability and variety of goods and services. If you're making big (and not necessarily big) money, you need to have a place to spend it. And not just one, but many different places. Only a high concentration of the population makes it possible to create not rural grocery stores with bread, salt and matches, but full-fledged trade formats and, most importantly, the infrastructure serving them. Secondly, despite phones and Skype, an educated person should be able to maintain personal contacts with his colleagues, attend professional forums and congresses, and move around the world with minimal transport costs. To quote the American economist Edward Glaser, who wrote in his book The Triumph of the City about Silicon Valley and Bangalore, the world's key centers of the IT industry: “Although companies in this industry could work remotely, they have become the most striking examples of the benefits of geographic concentration. Engineers and inventors who could easily communicate electronically are paying for some of the most expensive real estate in America so they can meet each other in person.”
()
