Option 1.
Choose the correct answer:
1) the formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies - the formation of the Provisional Government - the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne - the abdication of the leader. book Mikhail.
2) the formation of the Provisional Government - the formation of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies - the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne - the abdication of the leader. book Mikhail.
3) The abdication of Nicholas II from the throne - the abdication of the leader. book Mikhail - the formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies - the formation of the Provisional Government.
4) The abdication of Nicholas II from the throne - the abdication of the leader. book Mikhail - the formation of the Provisional Government - the formation of the Petrograd Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.
2. The first composition of the Provisional Government mainly included:
1) Social Democrats 2) Cadets and Octobrists 3) Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks 4) non-party people
3. Indicate the slogan that was put forward by the Bolsheviks in April 1917, withdrawn in July and proclaimed again in September:
1) “No support for the Provisional Government!”
2) “All power to the Soviets!”
3) “Peace to the nations!”
4) “All power to the Constituent Assembly!”
4. The peace treaty with Germany was signed:
5. A. The head of the Provisional Government was
B. The head of the Provisional Government was
1) only A is true 2) only B is true 3) both A and B are true 4) both A and B are false
6. Formation of the Volunteer Army in 1917. began:
1) Cheka employees 2) military experts 3) military commissars 4) soldiers’ committees
Choose the correct answers
8. The first events of the Soviet government:
1) elimination of class division
2) adoption by the Constituent Assembly of the “Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People” 3) separation of church from state and school from church
4) introduction of universal suffrage
5) proclamation of a democratic parliamentary republic
9. The policy of “war communism” did not imply:
1) material interest of employees
3) progressive income tax
4) universal labor conscription
5) naturalized salary
10. Basic principles of the NEP:
7) creation of concessions
Insert in place of blanks
12. Teams
13. What are we talking about?
“Now, when a desperate struggle is going on for public control over the distribution of food and to deprive speculators of the opportunity to fantastically inflate prices for leftover food, all the large markets of Petrograd are also closed... During our stay in Petrograd, free travel was introduced. Before this, a ticket cost two or three rubles - a hundredth of the cost of one egg... Many returned to the village..."
Control testing on the topic:
“The beginning of the civil war. Economic and political crisis."
Option2.
Choose the correct answer:
1. Determine the correct sequence of events:
2) 2nd Congress of Soviets - dissolution of the Constituent Assembly - Brest Peace - adoption of the Constitution of the RSFSR.
3) 2nd Congress of Soviets - dissolution of the Constituent Assembly - adoption of the Constitution of the RSFSR - Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
4) dissolution of the Constituent Assembly - adoption of the Constitution of the RSFSR - 2nd Congress of Soviets - Brest-Litovsk Peace.
2. The main result of the February Revolution:
1) proclamation of the republic 3) solution of the land issue
2) overthrow of the monarchy 4) resolution of the national crisis
3. A. He was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet
B. He was elected Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet
1) only A is true 2) only B is true 3) both A and B are true 4) both A and B are false
4. In the “April Theses” (article “On the tasks of the proletariat in this revolution”) he outlined a plan:
1) arming the proletariat to suppress the Kornilov rebellion
2) peaceful transfer of power to the Bolsheviks
3) armed uprising in Petrograd
4) the country’s gradual withdrawal from the world war
5. Under the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Peace, Russia lost territories:
1) Poland, parts of Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus
2) parts of Latvia, Belarus, Transcaucasia and all of Lithuania, Poland
3) Finland, Estonia, Belarus, Transcaucasia
4) parts of Latvia, Belarus, Transcaucasia and all of Lithuania, Poland, Finland, Estonia
6. The rebel peasant army in southern Ukraine was led by:
7) Control over commanders and political education was carried out by:
Choose the correct answers
8. Main activities of the Provisional Government:
1) solution to the agrarian issue
2) introduction of a new national government system
3) introduction of democratic freedoms of citizens
4) establishment of an 8-hour working day
5) fulfillment of international obligations
9. The features of the policy of “war communism” include:
1) nationalization of industrial enterprises
2) material interest of workers
3) surplus appropriation
4) freedom of trade
5) universal labor conscription
Choose multiple correct answers
10. Basic principles of the NEP:
1) denationalization of part of medium and small industry
2) material incentive in production
3) equal pay
4) multi-party political system
5) admission of private capital into the economy
6) universal labor conscription
7) creation of concessions
Insert in place of blanks
11.The main front in the spring of 1919 was _________________________.
The white army was advancing here ___________________________________.
The group of troops of the Red Army was commanded by _______________________.
12. Workers' Faculty- This ___________________________.
13. What are we talking about?
For many years, Soviet ideologists presented this event as “an anti-Soviet rebellion, prepared by the Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists and Mensheviks associated with the White Guards and foreign interventionists,” arguing that it was an attempt at monarchical restoration. The rebels demanded re-election of the Soviets, freedom of speech, legalization of political parties, and freedom of trade.
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Global crisis of the world economy: causes, features and possible ways to overcome
or an abstract of a dissertation for the academic degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences, specialty 08.00.14 – World Economy of the Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education “North Caucasus Academy of Public Service” |
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And at the same time performing worship. They often have to provide advice on issues of religion and customs of the population of those regions where troops are stationed. In addition, their functions include organizing relations with local religious and charitable organizations.
All-Russian Military Bureau commissioners headed by K.K. Yurenev was established on April 8, 1918 [
] . The order of the RVSR of December 5, 1918 established that the leadership of all political work of the front and rear, as well as the distribution of all party forces mobilized to work in the Red Army, belongs to the All-Russian Military Bureau commissioners, acting in the closest contact and according to the directives of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
On April 18, 1919, by order of L. Trotsky, the Political Department of the RVSR was established, to which all the functions of the disbanded All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars were transferred.
On May 15, the Political Department was transformed into the Political Directorate of the RVSR, which acted as the military department of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). On May 31, 1919, member of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) I. T. Smilga was appointed head of the new body.
The commissars supervised the activities of the command of military units and supervised propaganda work. In addition to basic political functions, the commissioners participated in administrative and economic management. By the beginning of 1920, there were more than three thousand commissars in the Red Army. According to Trotsky:
In the person of our commissars... we have received a new communist order of samurai, which - without caste privileges - knows how to die and teaches others to die for the cause of the working class.
“The political instructor is worse than the enemy” - propaganda leaflet from the Finnish War, Finland, 1940.
At this time, the Red Army took part in the conflicts near Lake Khasan (July 29 - August 11, 1938) and on the Khalkhin Gol River (May 11 - August 31, 1939), and made a campaign in Western Ukraine and Belarus (17-28 September 1939), fought against Finland (November 30, 1939 - March 12, 1940), entered the Baltic republics (June 15-21, 1940) and Bessarabia (June 28-30, 1940) At the same time , the educational level of political workers remained quite low. People's Commissar Timoshenko, in his final speech at a meeting of senior command staff in December 1940, said: “The general and military-political training of many leading political workers is unsatisfactory. Most of political staff army (73 percent) does not have military training...The majority (77 percent) of the political personnel of the reserve do not have military education.” The Institute of Military Commissars was abolished at the urgent request of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, who took office. At the same meeting with the senior command staff of the Red Army, People's Commissar Timoshenko said: “There is still a lot of formalism and bureaucracy in party political work. Instead of living, concrete work, many political workers among the masses are engaged in excessive administration, excessive enthusiasm for paper leadership, and some political workers, not understanding the essence of the ongoing activities in the Red Army, have taken the position of neutral observers and very timidly, timidly get involved in the political education of soldiers and commanders . Some of them regarded the Resolution on strengthening unity of command as a limitation of functions and a derogation of their role. There were also facts when individual political workers, in connection with the implementation of unity of command, even took the path of counteracting these measures.”
The institution of military commissars was re-introduced (or rather, restored) on July 16, 1941, based on a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. On July 9, the State Defense Committee Resolution “On Members of the Military Councils of Armies” was adopted. Even earlier, on June 27, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the selection of communists to strengthen party political influence in the regiments.” According to this resolution, the regional party committees were obliged to select and send more than 18 thousand communists and the best Komsomol members to the active army as political fighters. Three days later, the Politburo ordered the regional committees of 26 regions to select another 23 thousand communists and Komsomol members within three days and transfer them to the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Defense. During the first 6 months of the war, 100 thousand political fighters were sent to the active army. Their main task was “to mobilize army and navy personnel for a decisive and selfless struggle against the Nazi invaders.”
Stalin was partly forced to abolish the institution of military commissars by the huge shortage of commanders created after the defeats and failures of the initial period of the war. For example, only in the encirclement near Kiev in the summer of 1941, the Red Army lost about 60 thousand command personnel. According to some sources, the institution of military commissars was also abolished at the insistence of many military leaders. For example, in the fall of 1942, Konev, in a conversation with Stalin, raised the question of eliminating the institution of military commissars in the Red Army, arguing that this institution was not needed now. The main thing that is needed in the army now, he argued, is unity of command. Konev said: “Why do I need a commissar when I was one myself! I need an assistant, a deputy for political work in the troops, so that I can be calm about this part of the work, and I can handle the rest anyway. The command staff has proven their devotion to the Motherland and does not need additional control, and in the institution of military commissars there is an element of mistrust of our command personnel.” According to the memoirs of contemporaries, Marshal Zhukov “... really wanted to remove political workers from the army. In his opinion, they are only corrupting the Armed Forces. Zhukov in a narrow circle called them spies and more than once said...: “How long can you tolerate them? Or do we not trust the officers?”
The role of political workers during the Great Patriotic War is assessed differently. Some publications show them as an exclusively destructive force, emphasizing their political supervisory functions and arguing that they only prevented commanders from leading units. At the beginning of the war, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, political propaganda departments (departments) in the fronts and armies were transformed into political departments (departments). Without the commissioner's signature, not a single order had legal force. This undermined the unity of command in the army and revived dual power, which was destructive for wartime. Other sources speak of the important role of commissars in uniting military personnel and organizing units. Military commissars led political agencies, as well as party and Komsomol organizations of military units. They “with a firm hand imposed revolutionary order and military discipline in the troops...”. At the very beginning of the war, the previously elected secretaries of party organizations were replaced by party organizers appointed by political bodies. Military commissars were accountable only to higher military commissars and the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. In turn, from July 17, 1941, according to the decree of the State Defense Committee, the commissioners of special departments in the regiment and division were simultaneously subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the commissar of the regiment and division, respectively. Members of the Military Councils of armies and fronts, in addition, controlled the work of the military prosecutor's office and the tribunal. The commissioners also directed and supervised the activities of the barrage detachments.
Objectively, during this war, most of the political workers had a special, including military, education. Some, such as the battalion commissar of the Leningrad Front I. I. Pogorelov, having received 2 or more higher educations, in pre-war times led secondary schools or even entire GoRONO (City Departments of Public Education) of the People's Commissariat of Education of the USSR with the award of the honorary title Honored School Teacher of the RSFSR, while the majority of the Red Army soldiers and non-political commanders of the Red Army did not even have a complete secondary education behind them. Often in battle, political workers set an example for the soldiers and took command in the event of the death of commanders. The losses of political workers were no less than those of other categories of officers, which completely refutes the sometimes expressed opinion that “the commissars sat in dugouts while the rest went into battle.” For example, in 1943, the losses in killed and wounded among political workers of fronts, armies and formations alone amounted to about 2 thousand people. Among the 11,603 Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded this title during the Great Patriotic War, there were 211 political workers. According to other sources, among the political workers who were awarded the title of Hero of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, members of the Military Councils of fronts, fleets, armies, heads of political departments of armies, there were 7 people, and all political workers who received the title of Hero of the USSR, starting from the head of the political department of the division (deputy division commander on the political side) and ending with deputy political instructors of companies - a total of 342, including sergeants and privates who performed these positions - 41 people.
German leaflet from World War II.
German propaganda used a prejudiced attitude towards political workers of the Red Army for its own purposes. Thus, leaflets calling for surrender were based on the keywords “Jews” and “commissars” ( on illus.):
The bearer of this, not wanting senseless bloodshed for the interests of Jews and commissars, leaves the defeated Red Army and goes over to the side of the German Armed Forces.
The opinion that political workers during the Great Patriotic War should not have worn the emblems of the military branch is unfounded:
| Team and political The composition on the buttonholes bears the emblems of their branch of the army. - from NKO order No. 226 of July 26, 1940 |
In fact, this chapter is devoted not only and not so much to the political officer (deputy commander for political affairs) in the sense of the Soviet era, but to his modern analogue - the deputy commander for educational work. The name aims to pay tribute to the fact that in the modern army such an officer is called a political officer in the old fashioned way, as well as to the fact that it was in the USSR that the figure of an educator and ideological controller of the command first appeared in the troops.
We inherited this position from our so recent and so distant past. The political officer, along with the commander, was the leading figure of the unit, starting with the company. His tasks included the ideological indoctrination of personnel and political control over the commander. In the late USSR, the political officer did not have direct influence on the commander, however, he had some personnel powers, giving the commander recommendations along the party line, which invariably played a crucial role in the fate of the commander’s career. Officially, the political officer was simply a deputy commander, but in reality he had enormous opportunities. His strength lay in the fact that he was not so much an army officer as an authorized representative of the CPSU. As a result, the political officer was not constrained by relations within a given military unit and depended on its commander to an insignificant extent. He also depended little on the high army command. For him there was only one highest authority - in the person of senior officials in the party, as well as the internal rules for the functioning of the party as a special social structure. Also of the greatest importance to him were the relationships within the primary party cell, which was invariably present in any military unit, uniting party officers and soldiers.
The main task of the political officer in the late period of the USSR was the ideological indoctrination of personnel. The principles of selection for the position of political officer played a huge role in this - they usually became a party combat officer who had gone through combat operations and had proven himself well as a fighter. The political officer had to inspire respect in the soldiers, and who else can inspire more respect than a man who has gone through all the circles of hell? Often, an officer became a political officer who, for some reason, could not continue to fight - he was seriously wounded, suffered psychological stress, or even a breakdown. Practice has shown that such an approach to the formation of the institution of political officers is extremely effective: in addition to respect from the soldiers, he also enjoyed respect from the unit commander and, as a recent soldier, had the psychological potential to influence the commander. However, this direction of recruiting political officers was not the only one. Officers who had received a special political education, as well as non-military party activists, could also get into these positions. The latter, however, happened only in the first decades of the existence of the USSR.
Of course, the position of political officer has changed historically in the USSR. Immediately after the revolution, commissars, as political officers were initially called, were supposed to exercise control over non-party officer commanders. This was a logical and effective step in the revolutionary transformation of society and the class struggle, because the tsarist officers were the pillars of the monarchy in the Russian Empire, the real ruling stratum, so there was an urgent need to level their significance and control their every step. It got to the point that in order to issue an order, the commander needed the sanction of the commissar; the latter could even take over command if he saw the commander’s actions as a threat to the party line. It was equally necessary to carry out educational work among the soldiers themselves in order to transform them from a dumb herd into a social class with some rights. The soldiers needed to be instilled with consciousness, a sense of responsibility and shown the importance of their hard work for the interests of the country and the party.
Obviously, as real communism was built in the country, this importance of the commissars came to naught. Global control over commanders began to hinder rather than help, so already during the Great Patriotic War, attempts were being made to move away from it. The most important step in this matter was the famous Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 9, 1942 “On the establishment of complete unity of command and the abolition of the institution of military commissars in the Red Army.” Of course, the commissars were not eliminated completely, but they were soon replaced by the institution of political officers themselves, that is, deputy commanders for political affairs. Now they were mainly engaged in educational work, led party cells in the troops and acted as conductors of the political guidelines of the party government. They no longer hung a sword of Damocles over the commanders, however, they retained some functions of control over them on behalf of party cells until the collapse of the USSR, just as the leaders of party cells at enterprises and institutions had the same functions in relation to their official leadership. The difference in the position of the later political officers from the commissars is that formally, unit commanders could now order their subordinates independently, without the sanction of the political officer, that is, the political officers moved away from formal participation in the command of the unit. However, to effectively carry out orders, the commander still needed a political officer who could mobilize the employees in the unit of party members to carry out the order so that they would set an example for other soldiers. Some personnel powers of political officers were also preserved, when his career depended on their opinion regarding the political and professional suitability of the commander.
In addition to the institution of political officers, in Soviet times there were Special Departments in units. In fact, the Soviet secret service, the KGB, penetrated the army through the Special Department. The task of the department's officers was to combat dissent and crime. Both were provided by a single branched system of informants created by such an officer. And if the political officer in relation to the soldiers was engaged in educational work, in relation to the commander he became his “shadow”, in exceptional situations able to replace him and dictate his will - the will of the party, then the officers of the Special Department represented the KGB in the army, and their tasks included maintaining parts of order, as well as the implementation of some party guidelines; Moreover, they were endowed with real, one might even say, concentrated power, however, not official, but deep power.
Thanks to all these factors, the Special Department officer was able to completely control the units under his command, tracking the slightest intentions and aspirations of the soldiers. This ensured a monolithic order in the army, thereby making hazing completely humane - not allowing its extremes to manifest itself. After all, hazing itself is natural and ineradicable, but the forms of its manifestation can be diametrically opposed: from the most severe bullying of young people and complete contempt for them, to support and assistance to young people in mastering the peculiarities of army life. But which form will exist depends, among other things, on whether the existing social organization of the army can ensure order. The special department thus acted as a guarantor of order in the troops.
The people working in the Special Department were more investigators than politicians or military personnel. They carried out their activities according to the rules of investigative work and had an appropriate way of thinking. In addition, they, like political officers, represented a special structure in the army - the special service, therefore there was a special demand from them, and their interests were a continuation of the interests of the special service, that is, establishing and maintaining order in units, up to monitoring the state of minds.
During the destruction of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its army, the positions of political officers and special officers were abolished. Instead, a certain single position appeared - the position of deputy commander for educational work at the battalion or regiment level with several subordinate officers (one for each large company). At the same time, the status of this deputy was closer to the status of the political officer, so in units, in colloquial use, he is still called the political officer by both soldiers and officers, right up to the command of the unit.
In our time, the political officer is no longer a member of the party and, accordingly, no longer controls the unit commander, dealing exclusively with the education of personnel. However, for some incomprehensible reasons, the authorities expanded his powers and instructed him, in addition to ideological indoctrination itself, to also deal with the fight against crime. At first glance, this decision looks logical: since you are engaged in the education of personnel, it means that you must educate them in such a way that the soldiers do not commit crimes. However, life shows that such an approach is simply the height of absurdity. No matter how people are raised, they will still commit crimes, because, in addition to their official upbringing, there is also an unofficial upbringing associated with the assimilation of the basic rules of behavior among their own kind at the everyday level. Official education in the army does not abolish hazing, does not abolish regulations, does not abolish the hardships of service and various humiliations. Therefore, the expectation that people, having listened to the political officer, will suddenly stop educating their subordinates using harsh methods, using them for personal interests, mocking them, means not just a failure to take into account social realities, but is something akin to schizophrenic delirium.
To what has been said, it should be added that the institution of political officers is still formed from officers who have visited hot spots, and not from professional investigators. Not only are such officers not accustomed to acting according to the rules of investigative work, but also the nature of their work has little in common with the principles of the activities of the intelligence services. Political officers as military officers, flesh and blood of the collective, are hostile towards informants, therefore they cannot build their own system of denunciation.
Also, the institute of political officers in our time is formed from graduates of the relevant military departments of civilian universities, that is, from jackets. Typically, jackets are appointed to the level of company political officers, and their immediate leader is a soldier who has already been to hot spots at the level of deputy battalion commander. Needless to say, the political jacket officers do not have any special authority among the personnel, nor do they have any investigative training at all, at best having a specialized legal education.
Investigative work for political officers is complicated by the fact that not only are they not members of the all-powerful party, but they are also not members of the special service of modern Russia, the FSB. Thus, everything has been done to isolate the political officer within a specific military unit as much as possible. He is no longer a member of any external army structure that has its own interests, rules of internal life and clear requirements for active members, within the framework of which he would be asked for the number of crimes solved, and not at all for their absence, like the high army command.
This results in the following situation. The political officer, according to the top management, must educate the personnel and do this in such a way that no crimes are committed in the unit. It turns out that he has a vested interest in minimizing the number of crimes. And immediately he is entrusted with carrying out investigative actions on the identified crimes. Thus, political officers were given a very real opportunity to ensure the formal absence of crimes even though they clearly exist - simply to hide such facts. Political officers, therefore, find themselves interested in concealing crimes to an even greater extent than unit commanders, and have real opportunities for this. On the other hand, they turn out to be whipping boys in the unit; the command easily turns the tables on them when hazing is detected: they say, the political officer does not educate the personnel well enough, and we have absolutely nothing to do with it.
Therefore, there is nothing to be surprised that the existing institution of deputy commanders for educational work fights crime in the unit ineffectively. He's simply not doing his job. To be completely precise, it allows you not to fight crimes, but to hide them as effectively as possible.
At the same time, special officers of a higher level (division) still exist. They represent the modern FSB intelligence service in the troops, however, their tasks are somewhat different from those in the USSR. Now special officers deal with serious crimes in the troops and, if they concern issues of hazing and monitoring the situation in the unit, then only if hazing led to deaths. Their influence on the base units is close to zero, as is their involvement in crime prevention. At best, they establish contact with political officers through their line in order to receive information about the situation in the unit through them.
So, if maintaining order in the troops has been delegated to political officers, it would be advisable to combine them with the intelligence service of modern Russia - the FSB. At the same time, it is necessary to form an institute of political officers not from officers who have visited and suffered in hot spots, but from professional investigators. And if we are to fully develop this direction of social organization, then it would be more expedient to separate the functions of the political officer and investigative work in the troops, creating special investigative departments in the army and giving them exclusive powers. Moreover, they should be subordinate not to the army command, but to the prosecutor’s office or the FSB, the latter is even preferable. In any case, such special investigators must be part of the structure of army units and be permanently located on the territory of the unit in order to establish and maintain a system of informants on the spot.
At the same time, I do not rule out that this position of political officers was created artificially in order to allow the unit commanders themselves to determine which facts of crimes should be advertised and which should be hidden. Thus, the authorities show confidence in the officers, giving them a tool for maintaining order in the unit. But in this case, the institution of political officers represents a half-measure and should be continued by giving officers the right to execute and pardon soldiers, at least reducing attention to non-statutory methods of maintaining order in a unit by the officers themselves within the framework of the regulations. The ability of unit commanders to turn the tables on political officers when hazing is detected in a unit completely degrades him as an officer. Note, an honored military officer! There is a contradiction: trust in the command of the unit, while the political officer is obviously being put under attack, cannot in any way be called trust in the officers in general. A natural question arises: is it a matter of trust?
When constructing socially, it is necessary to keep in mind that the introduction of the institution of political officers was a contradictory phenomenon, with obvious negative consequences. It was not without reason that during the Great Patriotic War in the USSR, a decree appeared on the restoration of unity of command in the troops, and over time, the powers of the political officer were somewhat curtailed. The fact is that the presence of a political officer somewhat undermines the status of the officer, who finds himself under the control of the party cell in the unit. And if any soldier can complain about an officer to the political officer and the action of such an officer turns out to be the subject of proceedings at a meeting of the party cell of the military unit, then the authority of the officer will obviously be diminished. For specifically army discipline, the real and absolute power of the officer is simply necessary, who alone should determine the fate of the soldier in a subordinate unit. Even in the USSR, where strict party discipline was developed, the creation of army discipline and its combination with party discipline in the army remained a problem. It was not without reason that the officers of the imperial season considered the discipline of the Red Army to be insufficient - the institution of political officers had a lot of credit for this. Of course, over time, it was possible to find some acceptable limits for party intervention in the command, which was expressed in the transition from the system of commissars to the system of political officers, but it was during the USSR that a rule was laid down that constrained the hands of officers, according to which they must combat hazing using humane education methods for personnel. During the time of the Russian Empire, this kind of crazy restrictions did not exist, and the discipline of the units and the officers themselves was higher.
And at the same time performing worship. They often have to provide advice on issues of religion and customs of the population of those regions where troops are stationed. In addition, their functions include organizing relations with local religious and charitable organizations.
All-Russian Military Bureau commissioners headed by K.K. Yurenev was established on April 8, 1918 [
] . The order of the RVSR of December 5, 1918 established that the leadership of all political work of the front and rear, as well as the distribution of all party forces mobilized to work in the Red Army, belongs to the All-Russian Military Bureau commissioners, acting in the closest contact and according to the directives of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
On April 18, 1919, by order of L. Trotsky, the Political Department of the RVSR was established, to which all the functions of the disbanded All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars were transferred.
On May 15, the Political Department was transformed into the Political Directorate of the RVSR, which acted as the military department of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). On May 31, 1919, member of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) I. T. Smilga was appointed head of the new body.
The commissars supervised the activities of the command of military units and supervised propaganda work. In addition to basic political functions, the commissioners participated in administrative and economic management. By the beginning of 1920, there were more than three thousand commissars in the Red Army. According to Trotsky:
In the person of our commissars... we have received a new communist order of samurai, which - without caste privileges - knows how to die and teaches others to die for the cause of the working class.
“The political instructor is worse than the enemy” - propaganda leaflet from the Finnish War, Finland, 1940.
At this time, the Red Army took part in the conflicts near Lake Khasan (July 29 - August 11, 1938) and on the Khalkhin Gol River (May 11 - August 31, 1939), and made a campaign in Western Ukraine and Belarus (17-28 September 1939), fought against Finland (November 30, 1939 - March 12, 1940), entered the Baltic republics (June 15-21, 1940) and Bessarabia (June 28-30, 1940) At the same time , the educational level of political workers remained quite low. People's Commissar Timoshenko, in his final speech at a meeting of senior command staff in December 1940, said: “The general and military-political training of many leading political workers is unsatisfactory. Most of political staff army (73 percent) does not have military training...The majority (77 percent) of the political personnel of the reserve do not have military education.” The Institute of Military Commissars was abolished at the urgent request of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, who took office. At the same meeting with the senior command staff of the Red Army, People's Commissar Timoshenko said: “There is still a lot of formalism and bureaucracy in party political work. Instead of living, concrete work, many political workers among the masses are engaged in excessive administration, excessive enthusiasm for paper leadership, and some political workers, not understanding the essence of the ongoing activities in the Red Army, have taken the position of neutral observers and very timidly, timidly get involved in the political education of soldiers and commanders . Some of them regarded the Resolution on strengthening unity of command as a limitation of functions and a derogation of their role. There were also facts when individual political workers, in connection with the implementation of unity of command, even took the path of counteracting these measures.”
The institution of military commissars was re-introduced (or rather, restored) on July 16, 1941, based on a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. On July 9, the State Defense Committee Resolution “On Members of the Military Councils of Armies” was adopted. Even earlier, on June 27, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the selection of communists to strengthen party political influence in the regiments.” According to this resolution, the regional party committees were obliged to select and send more than 18 thousand communists and the best Komsomol members to the active army as political fighters. Three days later, the Politburo ordered the regional committees of 26 regions to select another 23 thousand communists and Komsomol members within three days and transfer them to the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Defense. During the first 6 months of the war, 100 thousand political fighters were sent to the active army. Their main task was “to mobilize army and navy personnel for a decisive and selfless struggle against the Nazi invaders.”
Stalin was partly forced to abolish the institution of military commissars by the huge shortage of commanders created after the defeats and failures of the initial period of the war. For example, only in the encirclement near Kiev in the summer of 1941, the Red Army lost about 60 thousand command personnel. According to some sources, the institution of military commissars was also abolished at the insistence of many military leaders. For example, in the fall of 1942, Konev, in a conversation with Stalin, raised the question of eliminating the institution of military commissars in the Red Army, arguing that this institution was not needed now. The main thing that is needed in the army now, he argued, is unity of command. Konev said: “Why do I need a commissar when I was one myself! I need an assistant, a deputy for political work in the troops, so that I can be calm about this part of the work, and I can handle the rest anyway. The command staff has proven their devotion to the Motherland and does not need additional control, and in the institution of military commissars there is an element of mistrust of our command personnel.” According to the memoirs of contemporaries, Marshal Zhukov “... really wanted to remove political workers from the army. In his opinion, they are only corrupting the Armed Forces. Zhukov in a narrow circle called them spies and more than once said...: “How long can you tolerate them? Or do we not trust the officers?”
The role of political workers during the Great Patriotic War is assessed differently. Some publications show them as an exclusively destructive force, emphasizing their political supervisory functions and arguing that they only prevented commanders from leading units. At the beginning of the war, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, political propaganda departments (departments) in the fronts and armies were transformed into political departments (departments). Without the commissioner's signature, not a single order had legal force. This undermined the unity of command in the army and revived dual power, which was destructive for wartime. Other sources speak of the important role of commissars in uniting military personnel and organizing units. Military commissars led political agencies, as well as party and Komsomol organizations of military units. They “with a firm hand imposed revolutionary order and military discipline in the troops...”. At the very beginning of the war, the previously elected secretaries of party organizations were replaced by party organizers appointed by political bodies. Military commissars were accountable only to higher military commissars and the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. In turn, from July 17, 1941, according to the decree of the State Defense Committee, the commissioners of special departments in the regiment and division were simultaneously subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the commissar of the regiment and division, respectively. Members of the Military Councils of armies and fronts, in addition, controlled the work of the military prosecutor's office and the tribunal. The commissioners also directed and supervised the activities of the barrage detachments.
Objectively, during this war, most of the political workers had a special, including military, education. Some, such as the battalion commissar of the Leningrad Front I. I. Pogorelov, having received 2 or more higher educations, in pre-war times led secondary schools or even entire GoRONO (City Departments of Public Education) of the People's Commissariat of Education of the USSR with the award of the honorary title Honored School Teacher of the RSFSR, while the majority of the Red Army soldiers and non-political commanders of the Red Army did not even have a complete secondary education behind them. Often in battle, political workers set an example for the soldiers and took command in the event of the death of commanders. The losses of political workers were no less than those of other categories of officers, which completely refutes the sometimes expressed opinion that “the commissars sat in dugouts while the rest went into battle.” For example, in 1943, the losses in killed and wounded among political workers of fronts, armies and formations alone amounted to about 2 thousand people. Among the 11,603 Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded this title during the Great Patriotic War, there were 211 political workers. According to other sources, among the political workers who were awarded the title of Hero of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, members of the Military Councils of fronts, fleets, armies, heads of political departments of armies, there were 7 people, and all political workers who received the title of Hero of the USSR, starting from the head of the political department of the division (deputy division commander on the political side) and ending with deputy political instructors of companies - a total of 342, including sergeants and privates who performed these positions - 41 people.
German leaflet from World War II.
German propaganda used a prejudiced attitude towards political workers of the Red Army for its own purposes. Thus, leaflets calling for surrender were based on the keywords “Jews” and “commissars” ( on illus.):
The bearer of this, not wanting senseless bloodshed for the interests of Jews and commissars, leaves the defeated Red Army and goes over to the side of the German Armed Forces.
The opinion that political workers during the Great Patriotic War should not have worn the emblems of the military branch is unfounded:
| Team and political The composition on the buttonholes bears the emblems of their branch of the army. - from NKO order No. 226 of July 26, 1940 |
Job title Commissioner did not always have the above meaning; For example:
All-Russian Military Bureau commissioners headed by K.K. Yurenev was established on April 8, 1918. The order of the RVSR of December 5, 1918 established that the leadership of all political work of the front and rear, as well as the distribution of all party forces mobilized to work in the Red Army, belongs to the All-Russian Military Bureau commissioners, acting in the closest contact and according to the directives of the Central Committee of the RCP (b).
On April 18, 1919, by order of L. Trotsky, the Political Department of the RVSR was established, to which all the functions of the disbanded All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars were transferred.
On May 15, the Political Department was transformed into the Political Directorate of the RVSR, which acted as the military department of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). On May 31, 1919, member of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) I. T. Smilga was appointed head of the new body.
The commissars supervised the activities of the command of military units and supervised propaganda work. In addition to basic political functions, the commissioners participated in administrative and economic management. By the beginning of 1920, there were more than three thousand commissars in the Red Army. According to Trotsky:
In the person of our commissars... we have received a new communist order of samurai, which - without caste privileges - knows how to die and teaches others to die for the cause of the working class.
Commissars in the Red Army had enormous rights and privileges: the commissar of a unit could and was obliged to participate in the development, discussion and adoption of combat plans, and his rights in relation to the personnel of the unit were not inferior to the rights of the commander. If a non-partisan unit commander was suspected of disloyalty, the commissioner had the right to take command, removing the commander from office, and, if necessary, arresting him. On the one hand, such extensive powers were necessary, since a significant part of the command positions in the Red Army were occupied by former officers of the Russian Imperial Army (tsarist army), either who voluntarily entered the service or were forced into it by taking their loved ones hostage (the so-called military experts). The state leadership needed guarantees that these commanders would not be able to turn their weapons against Soviet power. On the other hand, in many cases this de facto dual power led to negative consequences, since the commissars, who usually did not have a special military education, simply prevented the commanders from properly managing the units.
The institution of military commissars was re-introduced (or rather, restored) on July 16, 1941, based on a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Even earlier, on July 9, 1941, the GKO Resolution “On Members of the Military Councils of Armies” was adopted. Even earlier, on June 27, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the selection of communists to strengthen party political influence in the regiments.” According to this resolution, the regional party committees were obliged to select and send more than 18 thousand communists and the best Komsomol members to the active army as political fighters. Three days later, the Politburo ordered the regional committees of 26 regions to select another 23 thousand communists and Komsomol members within three days and transfer them to the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In the first 6 months of the war alone, 100 thousand political fighters were sent to the active army. Their main task was “to mobilize army and navy personnel for a decisive and selfless struggle against the Nazi invaders.”
In most armies of the world, the educational function is performed by the institution of military chaplains. The activities of chaplains are primarily aimed at providing spiritual assistance to military personnel. Moreover, in various countries, chaplains are clergy (priests) who assist the unit commander in educational work through participation in the life of the military team and at the same time perform divine services. In addition to spiritual guidance and providing moral support to military personnel, the task of chaplains is to help overcome stressful situations that constantly arise in the army. They also provide the necessary advice to commanders on issues of religion and customs of the population of those regions where troops are stationed. In addition, their functions include organizing relations with local religious and charitable organizations.
In 2002, military universities resumed training officer educators in the following military specialties: 360200 - “Moral and psychological support of troops (forces)”, 360202 - “Information and educational work”, 360203 - “Military social work”, with assignment of the qualification “Teacher-Psychologist”. The duration of training in these specialties is five years, the first graduates entered the army in 2007. On May 30, 2007, the State Secretary-Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General N.A. Pankov, signed order No. 25 “On the establishment of the Day of Educational Specialist in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” This professional holiday is celebrated on September 11, the day the Charter of the Cadet Land Corps was approved in 1766, which first introduced the positions of educational officers.
In addition to the general military insignia corresponding to the rank (without the emblem of the branch of service), political workers wore scarlet stars with a hammer and sickle on their sleeves until 1941.
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