Traditional military history tends to operate on a large scale - commanders in chief give orders, troops carry out operations that end in success or failure. The historian’s gaze rarely wanders from the map of the theater of operations and goes “down” to individual parts. In this article we will look at the typical actions of Russian infantry companies and battalions in the Balkans in 1877–1878 and the problems faced by soldiers and officers.
More than a hundred infantry regiments and rifle battalions participated on the Russian side in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878. They were the main participants in such remarkable events as the crossing of the Danube at Sistovo, the first Trans-Balkan campaign of the Advance Detachment of General I.V. Gurko, defense of Shipka, capture of Lovchi and three assaults on Plevna. We will not analyze specific battles, but we will try to give examples illustrating typical actions and problems of Russian infantry in field battles of 1877–1878.
The fight began long before contact or even eye contact with the enemy. The troops were reorganized from marching formation to combat formation at a distance of effective artillery fire (usually about 3,000 steps). The regiment advanced with two battalions in the first line and one battalion in reserve, or vice versa - with one battalion in front. The second option made it possible to retain more reserves, which means the commander expanded his ability to fend off unexpected attacks. It was more advantageous for commanders to position themselves together with reserves so as not to lose control of the battle, but this was not always observed. So, Colonel I.M. Kleinhaus, the hero of the first assault on Plevna on July 8, 1877, died while in the forefront of his Kostroma regiment. General M.D. Before the assault on the Green Mountains on the outskirts of Plevna, Skobelev asked his subordinate Major General V.A. Tebyakin, who commanded the Kazan regiment, was in reserve, but he could not resist the temptation to personally lead his regiment into the attack and was killed by a grenade.
Here it is worth making a digression, which will serve as a “guiding thread” in our story. Contrary to popular belief, by the 1870s the Russian military was well aware that rifled rifles and new artillery systems were capable of creating an insurmountable fire curtain. In this regard, tactical changes became necessary - for example, the transition to thinner formations. No less clearly the question arose of how to protect people from fire without losing control of the battle.
The Russian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. Each battalion was divided into five companies, one of which was called a rifle company. Usually it was this company that formed a rifle chain ahead of the battalion formation - the fighters scattered forward at a distance of 2–5 steps from each other. The remaining companies formed in close columns behind the rifle chain.
Ordinary formation of a battalion. Author's diagram
As a rule, four closed companies lined up in a checkerboard pattern, with a rifle chain in front. Thus, three battle lines were obtained - a chain, the first two companies (1st battle line) and the second two companies (2nd battle line). The intervals between columns in one battle line rarely exceeded the length of the columns along the front, and the distance between the chain and the 1st battle line was clearly specified by the regulations - exactly 300 steps. Such strictness was determined by the concern that the 1st battle line had time to come to the aid of the chain in the event of a threat, but practice showed that the distance was chosen poorly. Firstly, the proximity of the 1st line to the chain led to unnecessary losses; secondly, the 1st line gravitated towards the chain, which led to the thickening of the latter and premature consumption of reserves. Colonel A.N. Kuropatkin noted this mistake with the Kazan regiment during the battle for Lovcha on August 20–22, 1877.
After the war in the Balkans, some Russian military leaders proposed increasing the authorized distance to 500–600 steps, but at the insistence of the then military authorities, the new instructions stated that the chain, 1st and 2nd lines should determine the distance themselves. In general, the formation of the battalion was characterized by excessive density, and the three battle lines often “crept” onto each other.
Specialists, including a participant in the Russian-Turkish War, Major General L.L. Zeddeler, Soviet theorist A.A. Svechin and modern American researcher B.W. Manning, they criticized the scattering of just one company into a chain. From their point of view, in this case the battalion used only 1/5 of its firepower, but in practice, even one company did not always develop its fire at full strength, since long-range shooting was not welcomed in the Russian army. "Good infantry is stingy with fire", - quoted General M.I. Dragomirov of the prominent French theorist Marshal T.-R. Bujeau, - Frequent shooting is a means by which cowards try to drown out the feeling of fear in themselves.”.
Controlling an infantry chain and its fire was not an easy task, so they tried to appoint the most intelligent and competent officers to the rifle company - however, their capabilities were limited. The officer could more or less control what was happening within a radius of 20 steps; the rest of the space was not covered by his voice and was often hidden from his sight. Horns, once the symbol of light infantry specializing in loose formation, were considered unusable by the 1870s. During maneuvers, they tried to use whistles to give signals, but they apparently were not used in battle - commands were usually given by voice, and private commanders, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers repeated it and passed it on. The difficulties of control are clearly visible from the description of the battle on Shipka on August 11, 1877, which was fought by companies of the Oryol Infantry Regiment:
“[...] the handful of those fighting became smaller and smaller every hour; in some places the chain was so thin that one person occupied a space of 20 or more steps. Entire columns were threatening to encircle the right flank, and therefore by six o’clock this flank began to move back, followed by the center. It was positively impossible to control the chain on such rough terrain as the present one: the voice was drowned out by the thunder of shots, and even a tenth of the chain, hidden by bushes, did not notice the signs being given. Thus the involuntary retreat began, albeit step by step.”
A lot depended on the company commander in battle - usually much more than on the battalion commander, who, after introducing his battalion into the battle line, usually lost the opportunity to influence events and joined one of the companies. The company commander had to manage his chain, make many independent decisions, adapt to the terrain, maintain contact with other companies, take care of his flanks - all this was hampered by a lot of circumstances inevitable in any battle.
First of all, company commanders often died and were wounded, so they were recommended to familiarize their subordinates with combat missions and appoint several deputies in advance. If the company commander was out of action, the company was faced with a serious problem, characteristic of the entire Russian army. The fact is that everything in the company was controlled by its commander (often through the heads of platoon and squad commanders). Thus, junior commanders (warrant officers and staff captains) lost their initiative, authority and command skills. Different units dealt with this problem in different ways - for example, in the 14th Division, which became famous during the crossing of the Danube and the defense of Shipka, strict transmission of orders throughout the command chain and the initiative of junior officers were cultivated, and the replacement of retired commanders was practiced. As a result, the companies of this division continued to accurately carry out their tasks even in the event of injury or death of commanders.
Russian troops at Plevna, drawing by a contemporary.
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The second circumstance that added difficulties to the company commander was the problem of reinforcements. Even during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, it was noted that pouring reinforcements into the chain often leads to mixing of units and a complete loss of control over them. The best minds of the Russian army began to solve this problem, but the disputes did not subside either before the campaign in the Balkans or after it. On the one hand, the solution was to form a strong chain right away, on the other hand, in this case its density increased, and hence the losses from fire. In addition, military personnel who, after many years of peaceful service, came under fire, were faced with an unpleasant discovery - real combat is much more chaotic and incomprehensible than the orderly lines in textbooks and on the parade ground. The rush of adrenaline into the blood, the whistle of bullets and the roar of cannonballs, the sight of falling comrades completely changed the perception of the battle.
For years, the military has tried to bring order and structure to the chaos of combat. This approach can be conditionally called “the Jomini way” (G. Jomini is a Swiss theorist of the 1810–1830s, who did not lose his authority in the 1870s). K. von Clausewitz, on the contrary, emphasized that war is an area of danger, physical stress, uncertainty and chance, which is useless to fight. Russian military theorist General G.A. Leer, relying on the works of Jomini, proposed replenishing the chain strictly from the “native” part. In turn, Dragomirov, one of the most attentive Russian readers of Clausewitz, suggested that one should come to terms with the mixing of units and accustom soldiers to it while still on maneuvers.
The circuit had to perform the following tasks:
In order to successfully carry out these tasks, the chain had to advance as systematically as possible, observing the statutory 300 steps of distance from the 1st battle line. At the same time, under fire, the movement of the chain slowed down, and the speed of the rear companies, on the contrary, increased - hence the very “pushing” from the 1st battle line, which Kuropatkin criticized.
A chain attack was usually carried out in sections: one section of the chain (for example, a squad) advanced, and the other supported it with fire. To conduct such an offensive, coordination and mutual support were required; section commanders had to have a good eye so as not to come under fire from neighbors and correctly calculate the dash (it should not tire the fighters too much, the recommended distance was no more than 100 steps). The slightest obstacle or uneven terrain served as cover for the chain, but one had to know how to use the terrain. Kuropatkin describes such an incident that occurred in the battle for Lovcha:
“We had to run 500-600 steps through the valley completely openly. The first barrier from enemy bullets on the path of the regiment's advance was a mill with several dozen trees surrounding it. Some people ran across the valley, as they say, in one breath; others, taking advantage of small ridges of pebbles formed by the flow of water [of the Osma River], lay down behind them, the rear ones joined those previously lying down, and in some places dense ranks of those lying down were formed. But these closures provided poor protection from enemy fire, directed from two thousand steps and therefore striking at a large angle. […] Meanwhile, there was no need to run through this space. It was worth moving further through the gardens, then passing through the outskirts of the city and, finally, reaching the very mill mentioned above. The difference was that instead of a chord we would have to describe an arc.”
Attack of the Pskov regiment on the Gyuldiz-Tabiya redoubt in the battle of Shandornik on November 17, 1877.
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Fire could only be opened on the command of an officer. He usually ordered the best marksmen to fire test shots to determine the height of the sight, then the height was communicated to the soldiers and the command was given to open fire. The officer had to ensure that no wasted shots were fired, the soldiers correctly set the scope on their rifles, and it was changed on time and correctly. To do this, it was necessary to know who could be trusted with test shots, to be able to determine the distance to the target, and finally, to correctly select the target itself.
In addition, the officer decided what type of fire to use. At a distance of 300–800 steps they fired single shots and quite rarely. It was recommended to open fire from a distance of 800 steps, since it was believed that from this distance there was a chance of hitting a single person. Sometimes, if a suitable target presented itself (such as an artillery battery or a dense formation of enemy infantry), a volley would be fired on command. If it was necessary to carry out intensive shelling, but did not want to waste a lot of cartridges, they gave the command “frequent fire” and added the number of cartridges that needed to be fired. This technique was criticized because the officer could not control the actual number of cartridges used by the soldiers. Finally, the officer could give the command to lie down. In general, a commanding commander was considered to be one who controlled his unit even under heavy fire.
It was not easy to raise the soldiers lying behind cover and move them forward. In addition, the requirement to protect people from fire conflicted with the need to control the troops. Kuropatkin continues his story about the battle for Lovcha:
“In vain one young officer shouted in a hoarse voice “forward”, “hurray”, and waved his saber; the crowd [hidden behind the mill] was not yet disposed to follow him, and the young man, running forward with several soldiers, did not have time to run a few steps when was already killed."
It was not in vain that Dragomirov cited Bugeaud’s aphorism regarding the connection between shooting and cowardice. He and other military authorities believed that the desire of soldiers to open fire at long range must be restrained. The standard ammunition load was a rather meager 60 rounds, and the sight on the Krnka rifle could be set to a distance of no more than 600 steps (for non-commissioned officers and soldiers of rifle battalions - 1200 steps). The soldier risked shooting all the ammunition before his part reached the so-called decisive distances (800–300 steps), not to mention the fact that firing served as a convenient excuse not to move forward. Shooting training ended at a distance of 1,500 steps - from this distance it was already difficult to distinguish a separate person, and in battle the fire was usually directed at the haze from enemy shots. Nevertheless, the temptation of long-range shooting was great, especially since the Turks actively used fire from long distances (from a distance of 2000 steps it became sensitive).
The Russian army also had its apologists for long-range fire. One of them, Baron Zeddeler, called for the introduction of long-range shooting into the regulations as a special and effective type of combat fire. In his opinion, long-range shooting should be carried out across squares, relying not on accuracy, but on the mass of lead fired at a time. This type of shooting was occasionally used by Russian troops, as was another type of long-range fire - flip shots. The bullets, fired in a long arc, fell behind the earthworks that the Turks loved so much. “A shifting, distant and, moreover, concentrated fire will, perhaps, again push the shovel to its rightful place.”, - believed Colonel V.F. Argamakov. After the war, most military authorities accepted long-range fire as a legitimate weapon in the hands of commanders, but urged caution in its use. Instructions for company and battalion training, published immediately after the war, required the use of it "with extreme caution" and argued that the low fire is still “belongs to the main importance in battle”.
The experience of the war of 1877–1878 rather confirmed this conclusion. In the Advance Detachment, which successfully operated beyond the Balkans in the initial period of the war, General I.V. Gurko forbade the infantry to shoot from long distances so as not to waste time. Colonel D.S. Naglovsky, who participated in Gurko’s raids, enthusiastically described the actions of the 4th Infantry Brigade, which used to advance, “without firing a single cartridge until they come within half the distance of their rifle shot to the Turks”, that is, 600 steps. The Oryol regiment, which captured Mount Bedek near Shipka just at the time when Gurko’s detachment was operating on the other side of the ridge, did not fire for a more prosaic reason - “they spared the cartridges, and there was little hope of delivering them due to the remoteness of Gabrov, where the cartridge boxes were located”.
Was the lack of ammo really a serious problem? Statistics compiled by the Ordnance Department show that during the 1877–1878 campaign, the regiment rarely fired more than 30 rounds of ammunition in a single battle. However, this is only the “average temperature in the hospital”: one company of the regiment could stand in reserve for the entire battle and not fire a single shot, while the other could be in a chain, conduct an intense firefight and experience an acute shortage of ammunition. Nevertheless, the statistics allow us to make some interesting observations. For example, it is striking that rifle battalions usually expended much more ammunition than infantry regiments. This is explained both by the specialization in firing, and by the fact that rifle battalions most often went ahead of infantry regiments, started a battle, and therefore remained under fire longer. A kind of record was set by the 13th Infantry Battalion of the 4th Infantry Brigade, which used 122 rounds per rifle in the battle of Shipka-Sheynov (December 27–28) - twice the standard ammunition.
General M.D. Skobelev in the battle of August 30, 1877 near Plevna.
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Among the infantry regiments, the Vladimir Regiment had the highest consumption of ammunition in one case during the third assault on Plevna on August 30–31 - 91 shots per rifle (however, this is an exceptional case). For example, such an intense battle as the battle for Gorny Dubnyak on October 12 required the guards regiments to consume 25–30 rounds of ammunition per rifle. The Life Guards Jaeger Regiment, which attacked neighboring Telish on the same day, fired 61 shots per barrel, which significantly exceeded the “normal level.” During the first assault on Plevna on July 8, the Kostroma regiment was severely short of ammunition (the consumption was more than 56 rounds per person), which was the reason for Colonel I.F. Write to Tutolmin in a report:
“The Kostroma regiment retreated, firstly because there was no ammunition, and secondly because there was no reserve”.
Moving in dashes and hiding behind the folds of the terrain, the chain approached the enemy at close range, and the bulk of the battalion advanced behind it. Oddly enough, at a distance of 800–300 steps, the fire, as a rule, was felt less - many bullets were already flying over their heads. This meant that the Turks sensed the proximity of the enemy, forgot to adjust the sights on their rifles, and shot without aiming or even leaning out from behind cover. Firing from a rifle raised overhead was not uncommon for Turkish infantry. The attackers, on the contrary, increased their fire, bringing it to the limit. According to peacetime calculations, from a distance of 400 steps, about half of the bullets should have hit the target.
Although the excitement also affected the attackers, a distance of 400–200 steps was considered decisive. At this stage of the battle, a “game of nerves” began, which most often determined the winner. You could increase your chances of success by covering the flank of enemy positions, and this technique was actively used. Thus, the 4th Infantry Brigade partially captured the Turkish position in the battle near the village of Uflani at the southern foot of Shipka on July 4, 1877. Caught in the crossfire, the Turks wavered and began to retreat randomly - the battle did not have to be brought to a bayonet fight.
Covering the flank had its own characteristics. It was not easy to force the chain involved in the shooting to change front. Therefore, envelopment was more often carried out by approaching reinforcements, which were attached to the flank of the chain and occupied an enveloping position. The enemy could do the same - in this case, the tactics textbooks recommended not to pull the front of the chain back, but to send reinforcements, which should not be attached to the side of the threatened units, but stand as a ledge behind them. Then the enemy units covering the Russian flank came under indirect or even longitudinal fire - as General Leer said, “Whoever bypasses is bypassed”.
Accepting envelopment and countering it by turning the front and sending reinforcements.
Dragomirov M.I. Tactics manual. St. Petersburg, 1879
It was when the chain approached the enemy at 400–200 steps that the 1st and 2nd lines had the legal right to catch up with it, join the chain and intensify its fire, preparing, if necessary, for a bayonet strike. In practice, this often happened by itself, against the will of the bosses. The chain stopped, and the 1st and 2nd battle lines approached it, forming one or two dense masses of fighters (the second - if it was possible to maintain the order of attack).
In the 1870s, it was believed that fire alone could not force a stubborn enemy to retreat. However, the Turks were not classified as stubborn opponents - indeed, they often retreated during shelling, and it did not come to a bayonet fight. For example, General Skobelev, when crossing the Imitli Pass in December 1877, used a rifle company armed with captured Peabody-Martini rifles, and it forced the Turks to leave their positions. Of course, the Russian troops also had to retreat - in such cases they suffered the heaviest losses. The soldiers lost their composure and rushed back headlong; the officers could no longer stop the confusion, and sometimes they themselves fled. During the unsuccessful second assault on Plevna on July 18, 1877, the Serpukhov regiment suffered terrible losses - the regiment commander, two of the three battalion commanders, and many officers and lower ranks were killed or wounded. Only a handful of several dozen soldiers, two officers and one banner remained in the ranks - apparently, the Serpukhovites suffered most of the losses during the retreat.
Putting it all together, it is worth noting that the basis for successful infantry combat tactics was a reasonable balance between keeping fighters from fire and controlling the unit. Company commanders and other commanders were required to have good tactical training, initiative, the ability to make decisions in extreme situations, and personal authority over the soldiers.
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At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian army was considered the best in Europe (and therefore in the world). The Russian infantry was armed with the best examples of small arms and artillery in Europe, and in combination with the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier and the “Suvorov school”, this made the Russian army the strongest military force on the continent. The experience of the Italian and Swiss companies of Suvorov, the Mediterranean campaign of Ushakov showed that Russian military art is at the highest level and is not inferior to the French, and in a number of points it is superior. It was at this time that A.V. Suvorov developed the principles of strategic interaction between theaters of war. In his opinion, the main method of war was a strategic offensive. It should be noted that Suvorov’s ideas and actions were carefully studied in France. We can say that Napoleon Bonaparte was to a certain extent a “student” of Suvorov, adopting his offensive style of combat, maneuver warfare.
Suvorov applied the basic tactical ideas that the Russian army would later use: attack on a broad front (battle on the Adda River on April 15-17, 1799), counter battle (Battle of Trebbia on June 6-8, 1799), actions in loose formation and columns (battle at Novi on August 1, 1799). In almost every battle, Suvorov acted as an innovator. Determination, speed, pressure, clear calculation and the highest fighting spirit of Suvorov’s “miracle heroes” brought Russia one victory after another.
Subsequently, the foundations laid by P. A. Rumyantsev and A. V. Suvorov were used by other Russian commanders. Thus, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov can be called a student of these two great Russian commanders, the general of the “Suvorov school” was Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration and a number of other heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. It must be said that the defeat at Austerlitz, as well as the unsuccessful results of the anti-French campaigns of 1805, 1806-1807, were associated primarily not with the shortcomings of the Russian army, the training of its command staff and soldiers, but with geopolitical reasons. Russia and Emperor Alexander followed the lead of their allies (Austria, England, Prussia) and played someone else's game. Alexander listened to the Austrian allies and brought the army into the Battle of Austerlitz, although Kutuzov was against this battle. Even earlier, the Austrians did not expect Russian troops and invaded Bavaria, as a result they suffered a heavy defeat. Kutuzov, preserving the army, was forced to make an amazing march-maneuver stretching 425 km from Braunau to Olmutz, during which he inflicted a number of defeats on individual parts of Napoleon’s army. In 1806, Prussian soldiers made a similar mistake. Fully confident in their invincibility, they did not wait for Russian troops and suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of Jena and Auerstedt. The Russian army quite successfully held back the enemy's onslaught; a number of battles ended in a draw. This is despite the fact that the French army was led by Napoleon (after the death of Suvorov, the best commander in Europe), and the Russian army did not have a leader of this level. Russia did not suffer a crushing military defeat; both armies were exhausted. And this takes into account the fact that Russia could not concentrate all its main forces against the enemy - the Russian-Persian War (1804-1813) and the Russian-Turkish War (1806-1812) were going on.
By the War of 1812, the Russian army and navy were not inferior to the armed forces of France in the field of weapons, combat training, organization and application of advanced methods of war.
Organization, structure of the army
Infantry. In the organization of the Russian infantry in 1800 - 1812. Several stages can be distinguished. In 1800-1805 - this is the time of restoration of the organization, which complied with the principles of linear tactics. Emperor Paul reformed the infantry, reducing the number of chasseur units and increasing the number of musketeer regiments. In general, the infantry was reduced from almost 280 thousand people to 203 thousand. The Military Commission of 1801 worked to establish uniformity of the infantry in order to improve control in peace and war. For this purpose, a three-battalion composition was established in all regiments (jaeger, grenadier and musketeer regiments), each battalion had four companies. At the same time, the grenadier and jäger regiments had a homogeneous composition. The musketeer regiments were reinforced with grenadier battalions to increase their striking power.
Grenadiers were heavy infantry and were considered the striking force of the infantry. Therefore, the tallest and physically strongest recruits were traditionally taken into the grenadier units. Overall, the total number of grenadiers was relatively small. Linear (medium) infantry were musketeers. Musketeer regiments were the main type of Russian infantry. The light infantry were represented by rangers. The rangers often operated in loose formation and engaged in fire combat at the maximum distance. That is why some of the rangers were armed with rare and expensive rifled weapons (fittings) for that period. The Jaeger units usually selected people of small stature, very agile, and good shooters. One of the main tasks of light infantry in battles was to destroy officers and non-commissioned officers of enemy units with well-aimed fire. In addition, it was welcomed if the soldiers were familiar with life in the forest and were hunters, since rangers often had to perform reconnaissance functions, be on advanced patrols, and attack enemy outposts.
According to the peacetime staff, the musketeer and grenadier regiments had 1928 combatant and 232 non-combatant soldiers, according to the wartime staff - 2156 combatant and 235 non-combatant soldiers. The Jaeger regiments had a single staff - 1385 combatant and 199 non-combatant soldiers. According to the states of 1803, the army had 3 guards regiments, 1 guards battalion, 13 grenadiers, 70 musketeer regiments, 1 musketeer battalion, 19 ranger regiments. There were 7.9 thousand soldiers and 223 officers in the guard, 209 thousand soldiers and 5.8 thousand officers in the field troops. Then some transformations took place, as a result, by January 1, 1805, the infantry consisted of 3 guards regiments, 1 guards battalion, 13 grenadier regiments, 77 infantry (musketeer) regiments and 2 battalions, 20 chasseur regiments and 7 naval regiments. The number of guards (excluding marines) is set at 8 thousand people, field troops - 227 thousand people.
The second period of transformation covers 1806-1809. At this time, the number of infantry, in particular the Jaeger units, was increased. In 1808, the infantry included 4 guards regiments, 13 grenadier regiments, 96 infantry (musketeer) and 2 battalions, 32 chasseur regiments. According to the states, there were 11 thousand people in the guard, 341 thousand in the field troops with 25 thousand lifting horses. True, the shortage numbered 38 thousand people.
In the third period of transformation - 1810-1812, the restructuring of the infantry was completed. The quantitative and qualitative composition of the infantry was significantly changed and began to meet modern requirements. The grenadier regiments now had 3 fusilier (infantry) battalions, each battalion had 4 companies (3 fusiliers and 1 grenadier). Musketeer (infantry) regiments had 3 infantry battalions, each battalion had 3 musketeer companies and 1 grenadier company. Only the Life Grenadier Regiment had 3 grenadier battalions from grenadier companies. A three-battalion structure was also introduced into the Jaeger regiments: each battalion consisted of 3 Jaeger companies and 1 grenadier company. This established the unity of the line infantry.
By mid-1812, the Russian infantry had: 6 guards regiments and 1 battalion, 14 grenadier regiments, 98 infantry, 50 chasseurs, 4 naval regiments and 1 battalion. The total number of the guard increased to 15 thousand people, and the field infantry to 390 thousand.
The basic tactical unit of the infantry was the battalion. The highest tactical infantry formation was a division composed of two linear (medium) and one Jaeger brigades. The brigades had two regiments. Later, two-divisional corps with attached units appeared.
Cavalry. Similar processes (reforms) took place in the cavalry. Emperor Paul disbanded the carabinieri, horse-grenadier and light-horse regiments. The total number of cavalry was reduced from 66.8 thousand people to 41.7 thousand people. The transformations practically did not affect the tactical cavalry, which provided direct support to the infantry, but the strategic cavalry suffered greatly. In 1801, the Military Commission came to the conclusion that it was necessary to strengthen the strategic cavalry, which ensured dominance in the theater of military operations. It was decided to increase the number of dragoon regiments and strengthen the light cavalry.
The composition of the regiments did not change. Cuirassier and dragoon regiments each had 5 squadrons, two companies per squadron. The hussar regiments had 10 squadrons, 5 squadrons per battalion. They just added one reserve squadron to the cuirassier and dragoon regiments (it will soon be reduced to half strength), and two reserve squadrons to the hussar regiments (will be reduced to one). According to the staff of 1802, the cuirassier regiments had 787 combatants and 138 non-combatants; dragoons - 827 combatants and 142 non-combatants; hussars - 1528 combatants and 211 non-combatants.
In subsequent years, the total number of cavalry grew, the number of dragoons, hussars and lancers increased due to the formation of new regiments and the transformation of cuirassiers. The predominant type of cavalry became dragoons, who could make deep marches and solve tactical problems on the battlefield. The number of light cavalry was increased, which made it possible to conduct reconnaissance to a considerable depth. The number of cavalry regiments increased from 39 in 1800 to 65 in 1812. The number of guards regiments increased, in the same years, from 3 to 5, dragoons from 15 to 36, hussars from 8 to 11. Lancer regiments began to be formed, in 1812 there were 5 of them. The number of cuirassier regiments from 1800 to 1812. decreased from 13 to 8. The regular strength of the cavalry in 1812 was 5.6 thousand people in the guard, 70.5 thousand in the field troops.
The measures taken did not completely solve the problem of matching the cavalry with battle tactics using columns and loose formation. The ratio of cavalry regiments to infantry regiments was approximately 1:3, it would be more correct to be 1:2, so that there would be 1 cavalry regiment for every two infantry regiments. True, they wanted to cover this gap at the expense of the Cossack cavalry. The Cossacks could conduct both tactical and deep (strategic) reconnaissance and act as part of infantry formations. The total number of Cossack troops in 1812 was 117 thousand people. The Cossack regiments were five hundred strong, only two regiments had 1 thousand horsemen each. With the help of the Cossack forces, the number of cavalry could be increased to 150-170 thousand people.
At the beginning of the war, the Don Army deployed 64 regiments and 2 horse artillery companies. In addition, already during the war, the Don Army gave 26 regiments. The Black Sea Army provided 10 regiments, but only one hundred actually fought (as part of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment), the rest of the units carried out border service. The Ukrainian, Ural, and Orenburg Cossack troops allocated 4 regiments each. The Astrakhan and Siberian troops carried out border service. The Bug and Kalmyk troops each gave 3 regiments, etc.
In many ways, the combat effectiveness of cavalry depended on its mounted composition. In 1798, it was decided to purchase 120 horses annually for each dragoon and cuirassier regiment, and 194 for the hussars. The service life of a horse was 7 years. For the annual replenishment of 4 guards and 52 army regiments, 7 thousand horses were required. Subsequent growth of the cavalry was hampered by a shortage of horses. Therefore, non-combatant horses were often used in reserve squadrons. To solve this problem, the government even allowed the supply of horses, not recruits, to the army, and increased purchase prices. At the beginning of 1812, a cuirassier horse cost 171 rubles 7 kopecks (in 1798 it was 120 rubles), a dragoon horse - 109 rubles 67 kopecks (in 1798 - 90 rubles), a hussar horse - 99 rubles 67 kopecks (in 1798 - 60 rubles ). By the beginning of 1813, the cost of horses had increased even more - to 240 - 300 rubles. Donations provided some help - in 1812, 4.1 thousand horses were received.
The horse composition of the Russian army was better than the French. The horses were distinguished by greater endurance and better adaptability to local conditions. Therefore, there were no cases of mass death of horses in the Russian army, despite serious difficulties in supplying forage, especially during the period of retreat.
Cavalry regiments were united into higher tactical formations: divisions and corps. The cavalry division had three brigades, two regiments in each brigade. The cavalry corps had two cavalry divisions. In 1812, 16 cavalry divisions were formed: 3 cuirassiers (two brigades each), 4 dragoons, 2 horse-jaegers, 3 hussars and 4 uhlans (three brigades each).
Artillery. According to the state of 1803, the artillery consisted of 15 battalions: 1 guards, 10 light, 1 cavalry and 3 siege. Number - 24.8 thousand soldiers and officers. The artillery also underwent a number of changes. By 1805, the artillery had: 1 guards battalion (4 infantry and 1 horse artillery companies), 9 artillery regiments of two battalions each (the battalion had 2 battery companies with field guns and 2 light companies with regimental guns), 2 cavalry battalions (each 5 mouths each). The War of 1805 showed that the number of artillery parks needed to be increased. Therefore, this year 2 artillery regiments and 6 companies were formed, and in 1806 another 8 regiments and 4 cavalry companies were formed.
The lowest tactical unit was an artillery company, and the highest was a brigade, which was attached to the division. In 1806, the regimental and field artillery were consolidated into 18 brigades; in 1812 there were already 28 of them (according to the number of infantry and cavalry divisions). In addition, 10 reserve and 4 reserve brigades, and 25 companies were formed. The Guards brigade consisted of 2 foot batteries, 2 light and 2 horse companies, field brigades - 1 battery and 2 light companies. The reserve brigades had different compositions. The reserve brigades had 1 battery and 1 horse company, plus 4 pontoon companies.
Battery (heavy) companies had 12 guns: 4 half-pound unicorns, 4 twelve-pound guns of medium proportion and 4 twelve-pound guns of small proportion. In addition, each brigade was given 2 three-pound unicorns. The light company had 12 guns: 4 twelve-pound unicorns and 8 six-pounders. The mounted companies also had 12 cannons: 6 twelve-pound unicorns and 6 six-pounders.
To achieve greater maneuverability and independence, each company had its own convoy for transporting ammunition and a field forge. Each gun carried 120 ammunition: 80 cannonballs or grenades, 30 grapeshot and 10 firebrands (incendiary shell). The number of gun servants was 10 people for a light gun and 13 for a heavy gun. There was an officer for every two guns.
By 1812, the field artillery had 1,620 guns: 60 guards artillery guns, 648 battery guns, 648 light guns and 264 horse guns. In addition, there were 180 siege artillery pieces. The artillery personnel numbered about 40 thousand people.
Corps of Engineers. By the beginning of the 19th century, the engineering troops included: 1 pioneer (sapper) regiment and 2 pontoon companies. According to the staff of 1801, the engineer regiment had 2 miners and 10 pioneer companies, each numbering 150 people. The regiment had 2.4 thousand people and more than 400 lifting horses. Two pontoon companies had 2 thousand combatant and non-combatant soldiers, more than 300 combatant and lifting horses. Each company served 8 depots with 50 pontoons each.
The military commission of 1801, having examined the state of the engineering troops, came to the conclusion that the number of engineering companies was insufficient. In 1803, the second pioneer regiment was formed. Taking into account the fact that the need to connect artillery units and engineering formations was soon realized, in 1806, when forming artillery brigades, they began to include a pioneer company each. Pioneer regiments began to consist of three battalions. In 1812, the regiments each had 3 battalions of four companies, the number of pioneer companies was increased to 24. The regiment's staff consisted of 2.3 thousand people.
In 1804, a pontoon regiment of 2 thousand people was created. The regiment consisted of two battalions of four companies and had 16 depots of 50 pontoons each. Typically, pontoon companies were stationed in fortresses. In 1809, there were 62 fortresses in the Russian Empire: 19 of the first class, 18 of the second, 25 of the third. They were served by an engineering staff of 2.9 thousand people. Each fortress had one artillery company (or half-company) and an engineering team.
By the beginning of 1812, the Russian army numbered 597 thousand people: 20 thousand guards, 460 thousand field and garrison troops, 117 thousand irregular troops.
To be continued…
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INFANTRY TACTICS
Russian military doctrine at the beginning of the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna was based on Peter the Great’s Charter of 1716. It, in turn, was largely a translation of the “Institutions for Combat for the Present Time” of 1708 - a tactical manual that united the experience of the first half of the Northern War.
Following the example of the Anglo-Dutch troops, infantry battalions deployed in a line of four ranks, and soldiers were trained to fire in rows or platoons, according to the modern Prussian system. In 1831, Prussian military advisers appeared in the army, who were supposed to help implement the latest Prussian infantry regulations of 1726. The battalions were divided into four divisions, each of which, in turn, was divided into two platoons. The soldiers were still lined up in four ranks, but the last one did not fire, but was used to fill gaps in the formation. If there were grenadiers left with the battalion (they were often taken to form combined grenadier regiments), they took a place on the right flank of the battalion line. A new Prussian invention - “cadent” marching (with the whole foot beating the step) - did not appear in the Russian army until 1755.
General Pyotr Semenovich Saltykov, who commanded the main forces of the Russian army in the battles of Palzig and Kunersdorf. This popular and talented commander was dismissed in the winter of 1759–1760. because of illness. (Suvorov Museum, St. Petersburg)
During the period of Minich's campaigns against the Turks, much attention was paid to fire combat, and the Russian infantry was trained in shooting in an offensive "karakol". This method was abolished in General Fermor’s “Dispositions for Military Preparations and Advances during the General Battle against the Turks,” published in 1736, which provided for a combination of offensive and defensive tactics. Fermor understood that the firing of ranks of entire companies or battalions would automatically stop after a short time due to the thick smoke caused by the use of black powder. The Disposition recommended firing by platoons under the command of knowledgeable officers; only in this case could the firing on the battlefield continue for as long as desired.
After Empress Elizabeth ascended the throne in 1740, Prussian tactics were largely abandoned - the queen demanded a return to the tactical doctrines introduced by Peter the Great. This next episode of the fight against German dominance in the army led to the appearance in 1746 of a new infantry manual, written by Field Marshal Lassi: “Drill Regulations for an Infantry Regiment for the Russian Imperial Army.” Although the regulations retained many of Peter's ideas, the new view of fire combat was retained in the document, with the addition of the requirement that bayonets be fixed when fighting in deployed lines. This was a consequence of experience gained in battles against Turkish light cavalry, when the bayonet was seen as a good defense against cavalry.
The next and most significant change in the Russian infantry regulations occurred in 1755, during the Shuvalov army reform. "Description of Infantry Regimental Formation" was a revision of the new and advanced infantry regulations of the Prussian army. Shuvalov consulted with both Russian and Austrian tactical experts, but the resulting document became one of the most complex infantry regulations of the Russian army, which also appeared just before the start of the Seven Years' War. As a result, at least until 1759, infantry commanders, due to insufficient experience, were not able to apply the provisions of the new regulations in the troops.
Battle of Palzig, July 23, 1759. The Russian army is in dense defensive formations in two lines, artillery covering the only possible approach to its positions, as shown in the plan. The Russians were victorious largely due to careful positioning and the use of reserves from the Observational Corps. (From the author's collection)
The main formation of the battalion was still four ranks, but it was complicated by the fact that when approaching the enemy up to 70 steps it was recommended to change into three ranks. In a four-rank formation, the first two ranks dropped to their knees when firing; when lined up in three ranks, only the first one took a knee. The Prussian system of dividing a battalion into four divisions, eight half-divisions and 16 platoons was considered convenient for increasing control over soldiers on the battlefield. The battalion's grenadiers were placed on both flanks, and a reserve of three platoons was located at a distance of 25 fathoms (about 50 meters) behind the battalion line. The reserve was assigned the same role as the fourth rank, which did not engage in shooting, according to the regulations of 1731; in the period from 1740 to 1755, no reserve was allocated.
In practice, the Shuvalov regulations revealed a number of shortcomings, including rapid stops in the firing of platoons - a problem that the Prussians also faced. “Our muskets and cannon responded, but, of course, not in a volley, but to tell the truth, in great disorder, but they fired much more often than the enemy,” wrote a contemporary. This rate of fire, supposedly three Russian shots for every two Prussian, was a direct consequence of the old Petrine doctrine, revived by Munnich and Fermor. Firepower and close ranks under enemy fire throughout the Seven Years' War remained the cornerstones of Russian military practice, and not the bayonet strike, as historians of the later period believed.
The experience gained in the first battles of the war was the basis for Fermor's second manual of 1758 - “General Disposition for the Battle of the Enemy.” This document required “to open fire in a platoon at the command of officers, aiming at half the height of the enemy. When the Prussians come closer, open fire in divisions and continue the battle with bayonets, until, with the help of God and through the courage of the Russian army, the enemy is defeated and expelled from the battlefield.”
Prussian regulations required shooting without aiming at the middle of the enemy’s formation, but Fermor’s instructions were more practical; in this case, a much higher percentage of the bullets should have hit the target. Higher shooting accuracy, coupled with a higher rate of fire, gave Russian soldiers a significant advantage in fire combat, which was usually fought at a distance of 50–70 steps.
Emperor Peter III, husband of Catherine II, is depicted in this engraving in the uniform of a cavalry company commander. After the death of Empress Elizabeth, Peter III intended to enter into an alliance with Frederick the Great - this decision cost him the throne and his life: Peter was killed as a result of a conspiracy led by his wife, Empress Catherine. (From the collection of Walter Yarborough Jr.)
The weakness of the Russian army lay elsewhere, and this weakness largely negated the advantages. A British observer reported that "Russian troops... cannot, under any circumstances, act in haste." The tediously prescribed techniques for changing formations and maneuvering almost in a state of lethargy led to the fact that Russian troops could barely move on the battlefield. A Russian eyewitness noted that at Gross-Jägersdorf, “our army stood in formation throughout the entire battle, with the first rank sitting on its knee.” The Prussians noted that “... although they [the Russians] have a linear formation, an infantry regiment is hardly able to level the line in less than an hour, and even then there is always a lot of confusion.” By 1759 the situation had improved somewhat, and with the adoption of Fermor's charter, the deployment of the column in a line was facilitated.
The movement of troops in large divisional columns was adopted by the Russian infantry during the Munich campaigns against the Turks, and this practice continued in the early years of the Seven Years' War. This formation was unusual for approaching the enemy, but the cramped battlefield at Zorndorf (1758) forced the troops into columns, so that Prussian artillery shots punched huge gaps in the ranks. Although Shuvalov's instructions recommended the use of battalion columns as an offensive formation, Russian commanders on the battlefield continued to deploy their units in a line, since with such a formation the entire battalion could fire. After reaching the position, the entire line opened salvo fire, and then continued the attack, trying to expel the enemy from the battlefield with bayonets. In 1761, during the Kolberg campaign, a brigade formation was adopted, in which two battalions moved in columns, forming a moving square, and the soldiers had to either deploy the front of the square when danger appeared, or, if necessary, turn into a line. This provided greater mobility on the battlefield compared to the first years of the Seven Years' War.
The principles of army formation on the battlefield also underwent changes during the war. At the beginning of the century, it was customary to deploy infantry in two lines, and the third line remained behind them, forming a reserve. The infantry was covered from the flanks by cavalry. If we do not take into account the huge columns formed during the war with the Turks, then the first improvement can be considered the formation of two main lines with the allocation of a small intermediate line of regimental reserves. The cavalry still remained on the flanks, with the infantry relying on firefighting and mobile field fortifications (slingshots) to prevent a frontal cavalry attack. At Palzig (1759), the Russian army chose to build field fortifications in order to disrupt the enemy’s formation, and a second line of mixed reserves was ready to support the troops in the event of an enemy breakthrough.
Empress Catherine II the Great (reign 1762–1796). After the overthrow of her husband Peter III, Catherine reigned as an absolute monarch and continued to strengthen her army. Almost immediately after the end of the Seven Years' War, its troops were involved in a long war with Turkey (1768–1774). (From the collection of Walter Yarborough Jr.)
Another important innovation during the war was the use of light infantry in the Russian army. During the siege of Kolberg (1761), two battalions of five companies were formed. They had to provide cover, operating independently in small groups, relying mainly on marksmanship. During the reign of Catherine the Great, the idea would be supported and the light infantry would develop into a special branch of the army, but in 1761 their units were intended only to confront the Prussian riflemen in the Kolberg area.
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ELITE INFANTRY, Pg. 130
In addition to the Guards infantry, the Russian army had other elite units. The first among them in 1914 were 16 grenadier regiments. Four more regiments were formed in 1917 (from the 17th to the 20th). Other regiments were added to these, as well as several battalions formed from veterans or distinguished and decorated infantrymen.
Rice. 1
Grenadier regiments
At first, recruits were selected based on height and physical characteristics. Selection for the 1st and 13th regiments, known as Life Grenadiers, was even more difficult. In 1914, soldiers of the Grenadier Regiments wore uniforms that resembled those of their line infantry counterparts. Their marching caps had visors and imperial cockades. However, sometimes peacetime versions were worn at the front - without a visor and with bright bands, as well as caps (closer to the end of the war. - Note ed.). In the grenadiers
The regiments wore uniforms of a greenish khaki color and tunics - on some, a cut on the chest could have a red edging (in particular, for officers), as well as trousers or breeches of a khaki color. Grenadiers wore waist belts with characteristic buckles (frombronze or white metal, depending on the color of the regimental buttons), on which the emblem in the form of a flaming grenada was applied. Most ordinary regiments had a double-headed eagle on their buckle. For most privates, the equipment consisted of a rolled up overcoat and two pouches, each holding 30 rounds. The officers carried revolversin a brown holster with a pull cord (silver) attached to the handle.
The main characteristic feature of the regiment were shoulder straps with colored edging and encryption. The colored side of the shoulder straps in the grenadier regiments was bright yellow. It served as a backing for the gold braid on officer's shoulder straps in the first twelve regiments and for the silver in the remaining eight. The encodings on the shoulder straps of lower ranks were red, and on the officer's shoulder straps they were gold or silver, depending on the color of the regimental buttons. The buttons in the first twelve regiments were gold, the remaining eight were silver.
The rank insignia did not differ from ordinary infantry (a combination of stars and stripes). The color of the edging is indicated in the table.
Wartime changes included the introduction of the Adrian helmet with eagle cockade, a Russian-made helmet, and a cap.
In August 1914, in the 8th regiment, the monogram of the Duke of Mecklenburg was replaced by the letter “M” (in honor of Moscow). In the spring of 1917, in several regiments it was decided to replace the monograms of royalty with letters that were related to the name of the regiment. For example, in the 12th
The letter “A” was chosen for the Astrakhan regiment (in honor of the city of Astrakhan).
Soldiers of the grenadier artillery and engineering units (part of the grenadier divisions. - Note ed.) wore scarlet shoulder straps, rather than yellow ones like their infantry counterparts.
Other parts
The growth in the number of elite units towards the end of the war is poorly reflected in the documents. In the summer of 1917, the hasty formation of “shock battalions” or “death battalions” was underway.
Many of them continued to exist after the Bolsheviks seized power. The battalions had different emblems, but most often a skull was used as such.
INFANTRY
Russia had a huge army and numerous infantry. Therefore, it had to be equipped practically and economically.
Fig.2
Years of change
The equipment and uniform of the Russian infantry changed little between 1914 and 1917 (with a few fairly significant exceptions), which cannot be said about the first years of the 20th century. Partly due to the spirit of reform that reigned in Europe at that time, and partly due to the emperor’s personal interest in military uniforms, long before the outbreak of war in August
1914 several large-scale uniform reforms were carried out in Russiainfantrymen. The defeat by Japan required prompt changes to the uniform. Russian troops fought with their eastern neighbor in white or dark green (and even black) uniforms. Despite the fact that the uniform of ordinary soldiers and non-commissioned officers was quite simple and economical, it was not always practical. In 1906, the Russian Ministry of War promptly tested several options for khaki-colored uniforms and in 1907 decided to switch to uniforms, trousers and caps in khaki greenish tint. Due to supply problemsand the influence of climatic conditions it was very difficult to maintain the desired shade.
Most Russian infantry uniforms would have been a greenish-brown color, but after washing and as a result of bleaching, trousers and uniforms could take on a color very close to beige. The uniform was produced in different cities of the empire in five sizes. Initially, the uniform was made from cotton and cloth (for winter uniforms) with a stand-up collar. The uniform was seen quite often until 1912, when it began to be gradually abandoned, but it could be seen on soldiers during the war.
Shoulder straps
Shoulder straps were fastened on the shoulders to a uniform or tunic. As a rule, they were rigid and bilateral. One side was colored, the other was khaki. On both sides there was usually a regimental number or a monogram if the regiment had a chief - a member of the imperial family or a foreign monarch. Sometimes the khaki side was left blank.The colored side could be of two colors depending on the regiment's place in the division or brigade. The regiments of the first brigade of the division wore red shoulder straps, and the second brigade wore blue ones.Regimental insignia on shoulder straps (numbers and monograms) were yellow on red shoulder straps and white on blue shoulder straps. On the khaki side, the insignia was painted in yellow.
Non-commissioned officers had transverse dark orange stripes on their shoulder straps (ensigns had yellow or white metal braid). Officers wore hard shoulder straps of the same color as their subordinate soldiers and non-commissioned officers. A gold or silver braid was applied to the officer's shoulder straps and insignia (a combination of stars and gaps) were attached. On khaki-colored shoulder straps, the codes were bronze. Losses among officers forced the transition to less obvious signs oncepersonalities, including soft shoulder straps instead of hard ones. Volunteersflying) wore shoulder straps with edging made of woven black-orange-whitecord. In regiments that, as of 1914, had chiefs who were members of the German or Austro-Hungarian imperial families (for example, the 6th Libau Infantry of Prince Friedrich Leopold of Prussia), their monograms were removed from the shoulder straps and replaced with regimental numbers.
Other differences
In winter, Russian infantrymen wore wool overcoats of various shades from gray to grayish-brown. They were generally single-breasted (1911 model) or hook-and-loop (1881 model) with cuffs. The overcoat was often used as a blanket. As a rule, it was rolled up together with a raincoat and worn over the shoulder (usually both ends were tied and stuffed into a bowler hat). When the overcoat was put on, the cloak-tent was also worn rolled up over the shoulder. When the temperature dropped to -5°C, soldiers were allowed to put on a bashlyk (hood). It was tied at the front with long ribbons that were tucked into the waist belt. The cap itself hung freely on the soldier’s back. Sometimes they wore shoulder straps on the overcoat, slightly larger in size than the shoulder straps on the tunic. Awards and regimental badges were worn on the chest of a uniform or overcoat.
Hats
Infantrymen wore caps of a style introduced in 1907 and modified in 1910. They were khaki in color with a black visor (usually painted green or brown) and lost their shape after a while. Officers wore stiffer caps with a chin strap, and non-commissioned officers sometimes did too. Ordinary soldiers did without chin straps. On the front of the cap was an oval-shaped imperial cockade (the center is black, then there are concentric stripes of orange (or gold), black and orange). Non-commissioned officers' cockades were larger and had a wide silver stripe along the edge. The officer's cockade was similar to the non-commissioned officer's, but had jagged edges and a more convex front. In winter they wore hats made of fur or wool. Such hats were called papakhas and could be of various shapes and colors (usually gray or brown). The papakha had a khaki top and an imperial cockade on the front. In addition, it had flaps that covered the neck and ears, giving them the protection needed during the Russian winter. The design of the hat turned out to be so successful that it was used for most of the 20th century.
There are some misunderstandings in the picture "Infantry Cockades"!!!
Since 1916, the Russian army began to use French Adrian helmets with a cockade in the form of a double-headed eagle, but they, as a rule, went to elite regiments and officers. The steel helmet (Solberg model 1917) was developed and produced in 1917 by the Solberg and Holmberg company in Helsinki (in those years Finland was part of
Grenadiers
The grenadier regiments described above were not the only ones in the Russian army. In the fall of 1915, the selection of soldiers into assault groups, armed primarily with grenades, began. At first, groups of 10 people were formed from these grenadiers in each company, which were attached to the regimental headquarters. By the end of 1915, most infantry and rifle regiments had grenadier platoons of 50 soldiers armed with carbines, grenades, daggers and axes. In February 1916, they could be distinguished by a red (sometimes blue) patch in the form of a grenade on the left sleeve of their uniform (tunic) or overcoat.
Later, after the creation of special grenadier courses, this simple emblem was replaced with a more elaborate one. Soldiers who completed the course could wear an emblem in the form of a grenade with a red or blue flame (depending on the color of the shoulder straps) on a black background with a white cross. In the rifle regiments the flame was crimson in color. Officers and guardsmen had gold or metal crosses at the base of the grenada.
Special Purpose Shelves
It seemed to the Western allies that Russia, while experiencing a shortage of weapons, seemed to have an excess of personnel. Therefore, they demanded that she send troops to other theaters of war. In the spring of 1916, one brigade was transferred to France. It was formed from volunteers and organizationally consisted of the 1st and 2nd special purpose regiments. Later the 3rd and 5th brigades were formed, and the 2nd and 4thThe brigades were sent to Thessaloniki at the end of 1916 to take part in the battles on the Macedonian front.
These regiments wore khaki uniforms or tunics in the Russian style with khaki-colored shoulder straps, sometimes with white piping (Fig. 2). Sometimes regimental numbers were indicated on them, usually in Roman numerals. However, in some parts the regimental numbers indicatein Arabic numerals, which was a violation of existing rules.
Volunteer shoulder straps had black, orange and white trim. It was customary to wear loose trousers. Most of the soldiers kept their black leather boots.
Soldiers arriving in France had waist belts and backpacks and received French khaki helmets (with or without the double-headed eagle). The Russians were also given French canvas backpacks and pouches for cartridges for Lebel riflesand Berthier. Quite often they had French belt equipment. Outside of combat, bayonets were carried in sheaths that were attached to the waist belt.
In 1917, after Nivelle's offensive, which was accompanied by huge losses, and because of rumors of a revolution that had begun in Russia, Russians in France began to show signs of disobedience. Those involved in the riots were exiled to Algeria. Those who remained loyal were partially disarmed or convinced to join the Russian Legion. Legion sragathered in France at the end of 1917 and in 1918, after which it was dissolved. Some of the soldiers returned to Russia, others settled in France.
The special forces regiments in Macedonia were disarmed and disbanded. Many of their soldiers chose to join the Serbs or return home.
Russian Legion
Legionnaires wore uniforms similar to those of other special purpose regiments (Fig. 2), but over time they became more and more similar to the French. Most of the soldiers wore khaki uniforms and overcoats like Moroccan infantrymen (the legion operated as part of the Moroccan division). In the corners of the collar of the legionnaires there were the letters “LR”, edged with two strips of blue braid. The legion used French insignia as well as French equipment. Legionnaires may have received helmets with the abbreviation LR, but most likely continued to wear their old helmets, but without the imperial eagle. On the sleeves of many soldiers there was a patch in the form of the Russian white-blue-red flag. The fighters of the Estonian company that fought as part of the legion could have a patch in the form of the Estonian flag on their sleeves. Officers may have worn dark blue trousers or breeches.
Provisional Government
The abdication of the king caused far-reaching changes in the army. Its impact on the type of uniform was not so significant. The imperial eagles were cut off from the buckles of waist belts, and the same fate befell the eagles on Hadrian's helmets (sometimes only the crowns located above the eagles were cut off). Cockades on caps were sometimes replaced with stripes in the colors of the national flag (white-blue-red.
Disintegration began in the army itself. The Provisional Government, hoping to hold the front and concentrate reliable fighters in units capable of carrying out an offensive, tried to form “shock battalions” or “death battalions.”
In individual armies, battalions were also formed from soldiers awardedSt. George's Cross. They were called "St. George's battalions" and had the same uniform as the line infantry, but with characteristic shoulder straps. Latestwere entirely orange or black, or a basic color, but edged
intertwined with black and orange cord. Officer's breeches were orange and blackstripes, with piping of the same color trimming the cuffs and, sometimes, the placket of the uniform. Awards were worn on the chest. Soldiers and officers of the “shock battalions” wore characteristic emblems on the sleeves of their uniforms and greatcoats and often decorated their hats
metal cockades in the shape of a skull. In other parts, skull emblems were attached to shoulder straps. The fighters of the female “death battalion” that defended the Winter Palace from the Bolsheviks wore uniforms, a description of which is contained in the section on the white armies that participated in the Civil War.
Fig.4
Romanian soldiers
Russia has opened its doors to many foreign volunteers. Among them were Serbs, Romanians and Poles, but the Czechs undoubtedly received the greatest fame. The Romanians were equipped with Russian uniforms, but replaced the cockade with a blue, yellow and red patch. The Poles also wore Russian uniforms, but in 1917 they began wearing headdresses with the Polish eagle and possibly buttonholes, as well as eagle stripes on the sleeves of their uniforms.
Polish soldiers
First, the Puławski Legion was formed from Poles. The Polish infantrymen were equipped in Russian uniforms with shoulder straps with the yellow inscription “1LP” on them. In addition, three lancer squadrons were formed, dressed in khaki uniforms and dark blue breeches. The lancers' uniform was trimmed with red, blue or yellow piping (depending on the squadron number). Dress uniforms hadlapels. The blue breeches had stripes (red for the first regiment, white for the second regiment and yellow for the third). The cuffs of their uniforms and the bands of their caps were the same color. Later, the infantry became part of the Polish Rifle Brigade and received a cockade with a white Polish eagle. A smaller Polish Legion was formed in Finland in 1917.
Other national military units were formed that same year, but most of them became involved in the wars of independence against the Red and White armies.
Czechoslovak soldiers
Czechs and Slovaks are still considered the most famous foreigners who fought in the Russian army. Most of them were prisoners of war who were captured by the Russians while fighting in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia and the Ukraine. Others were already living in Russia or had joined the Serbs and fled to Russia after the defeat of the Serbian army in 1915. At first, the Russians were reluctant to form units from prisoners of war, since this was contrary to the Geneva Convention. In 1914, a reserve battalion (druzhina) was formed from ethnic Czechs and Slovaks, who were Russian subjects. The second battalion was formed in 1915. At the beginning of 1916, both battalions became part of the Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment, on the basis of which thea brigade and then a division were deployed. When the Provisional Government came to power, the Czechoslovak Corps was formed from all available units and volunteers from among prisoners of war. At first, the Czechoslovakian regiment, in all likelihood, was equipped in Russian uniform, but with a diagonal red and white patch that appeared in 1917 instead of a cockade on the band of the cap. Stripes instead of cockades also appeared on Adrian's hats and helmets. At the beginning of 1918, the shoulder straps were replaced by stripes in the form of a shield on the left sleeve of the uniform and overcoat. The chevrons on the shield showed the rank of its owner, and the number under the chevrons showed the unit in which he served.
In the confusion that reigned in Russia at the end of 1917, surplus uniforms were thrown into action, and the Czechoslovaks used what they could find. Only in 1918, when they sided with the Allies and turned their arms against the Bolsheviks, trying to break out of Russia, did they manage to receive uniforms and formalize insignia and unit emblems. For this reason, more information about the Czechs and Slovaks can be found in the section on the White armies that fought during the Civil War.
The Russian army in 1812 consisted of several branches of the military. The main and most numerous of them were infantry. In Russia in the 19th century it was often called infantry.
Infantry General
Types of infantry
In the 19th century, there were several types of infantry troops. The basis of the land army was line infantry, or, as it was called in Russia before 1811, musketeer. She was supposed to fight in close formation, armed with smooth-bore muzzle-loading guns - fusees. There was also light infantry, which in the Russian Empire was represented by huntsmen. She conducted operations in loose formation and was equipped with the best small arms. Heavy infantry- grenadiers - initially included specially selected soldiers trained in throwing grenades.
Infantry composition
The main tactical unit was regiment. Each infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. The exception was the Preobrazhensky Infantry Regiment, which consisted of four battalions. And each battalion in turn consisted of four mouths.
Each company was divided into two platoons. In the grenadier company, the 1st platoon was made up of grenadiers, the 2nd platoon was made up of riflemen. At the head of the company was the company commander.
Two regiments made up brigade: Jaeger, Grenadier or Infantry. Four brigades formed division. The infantry division consisted of various branches of troops. It became a combined arms formation of a permanent composition, including a certain number of units, according to the staff. Two divisions made one infantry corps.
According to To the highest rescript of October 12, 1810 The Russian infantry had the following composition: “Guards: 4 regiments and 2 battalions (Finland Life Guards and Guards crew) - 15 battalions. Army: 141 regiments and 2 training battalions - 425 battalions.” There were 440 battalions in total. In 1810 and 1811, the armed forces were replenished with newly formed units of troops. The army infantry was strengthened by 23 regiments.
At the beginning of 1812, the Russian army already had 514 infantry battalions. Among them are 19 guards battalions, 492 army battalions consisting of 164 regiments, 3 training grenadier battalions.
Private of the Odessa and non-commissioned officer of the Simbirsk infantry regiments
Soldier training
Great importance was attached to the training of soldiers. The regiment commander himself was obliged to gather officers from himself or from the battalion commanders, “as often as he deemed necessary to interpret all the rules of the recruiting school, company and battalion training.” It was also necessary to teach all this to non-commissioned officers and “demand that they themselves be able to accurately do everything that relates to soldiers’ rifle techniques for firing and marching.”
All these rules and lessons were written in Military regulations on infantry service, published in 1811. Every soldier must be able to stand correctly, wield and act with a gun, wield a sword, march and “make turns and generally all movements.” Constant lessons and training were supposed to reinforce these skills.
Chief officer and private of the Butyrka Infantry Regiment
The training concerned not only military skills, but also the soldier’s state of mind: “The composure and calm appearance of a superior should serve as an example to his subordinates; order in the ranks can only be maintained when the soldier acts calmly and freely,” the Charter stated.
Initially, soldiers were trained at a recruit school. It was divided into three parts. The first part included everything “that a recruit without a gun should be taught.” The soldier had to learn to stand correctly, improve his posture, make turns and learn the marching step. The second part contained gun techniques and caricatures. The third part contained “the rules of marching in front and in rows, the rules of alignment and entry.”
Special attention was paid to shooting: “For successful training in shooting, it is prescribed in each battalion to have several wooden shields, painted black, two arshins and three quarters high, an arshin wide, along the middle of which a white strip four arshins wide should be drawn across and the same strip along the upper end of the shields.” Having installed such a shield, the soldiers had to learn to shoot at 40 fathoms (about 85 m), then at 80 fathoms (about 170 m) and finally at 120 fathoms (about 256 m).
Chief officer of the Belozersk infantry regiment
Russian infantry tactics
As for the tactics of the Russian infantry during the War of 1812, there is a tendency to move away from the previously customary formation on the battlefield in a deployed formation - a “line”. It is being replaced by a battalion “column from the middle”, or “column in attack”(this term was borrowed from French military vocabulary).
This new combat tactic had many advantages and strengths. First of all, it had a narrower front (in comparison with the usual, “deployed” formation), which allowed the “column” to more easily maintain order when the battalion moved across the battlefield and to maneuver faster. She could also almost freely take other forms of formation: turn around in a line or curl up in a square. And, finally, the deep close formation that this “column” formed increased the feeling of mutual support for the people who composed it.
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Chronicle of the day: The French retreated from the Dinaburg fortress
First Western Army
The French stopped trying to capture the bridge fortification of the Dinaburg fortress. The patrols of the combined hussar regiment and the team of Colonel Rodionov's Don Cossack Regiment exchanged fire with the retreating French rearguard.
Third Observation Army of General Tormasov
The commander of the vanguard of the Third Observational Army, Count Lambert, decided to conduct reconnaissance of the troops located against him in the Duchy of Warsaw. For this purpose, two squadrons of the Alexandria Hussars crossed the river. Western Bug and attacked the village of Gorodok. While these demonstrative military actions were taking place, General Lambert crossed the Western Bug near the town of Ustilug and occupied the city of Grubeshov. From documents found in Grubeshov, Lambert established that there were few enemy regular troops in the Duchy of Warsaw and retreated to Brest-Litovsk.
Person: Karl Osipovich Lambert
Karl Osipovich Lambert(1773-1843) - count, cavalry general. He was one of the most outstanding cavalry generals of the Alexander era. Karl Osipovich belonged to an old French aristocratic family. His father was a major general, inspector of cavalry divisions in the French service. Catherine II herself invited their family to Russia. In 1793, Karl Lambert was accepted as a second major in the Kinburn Dragoon Regiment. Soon he took part in the battles of Kholm, Maciovice and the storming of Prague, for which he was awarded the Order of St. George 4th grade. Already in 1796, he commanded a Cossack regiment and was promoted to colonel, but two years later he was forced to resign due to illness.
In 1800, Lambert even left Russian service and returned to France, but with the accession of Alexander I he returned to Russia. He took an active part in the military campaign against Napoleon in 1806-1807. In the battle of Charnov on December 11, 1806, Lambert “encouraged his subordinates with an example of fearlessness, and courageously repelled the enemy with huntsman posts several times, and was wounded in the leg.” For this he was awarded the Order of St. George 3rd degree. Later he received the Order of St. Vladimir 3rd degree and St. Anna 1st degree.
In 1812, Lambert commanded a cavalry corps as part of Tormasov's 3rd reserve observation army. He proved himself in the battle near Kobrin, for which he was awarded a golden saber with diamonds, which was awarded to the military as a sign of special distinction, for personal courage and dedication. After the battle of Gorodechno, Lambert was promoted to lieutenant general. He knocked the enemy out of Nesvizh, Novosverzhen and Minsk, and took Borisov in battle. In this battle, he was seriously wounded, but refused to leave the battlefield: “I’m staying with you here too,” he told the rangers who were taking him off his horse, “either I’ll die, or I’ll wait until you find an apartment for me in Borisov.” The injury was serious, and he had to undergo treatment for two years.
He returned to the army in early March 1814 and was awarded the Order of St. for his participation in the capture of Paris. Alexander Nevsky.
On May 30, 1843, Karl Osipovich Lambert died “from bullet exhaustion and old age,” as his epitaph says.
Napoleon and the big world: a lady's question
June 29 (July 11), 1812
The decision to leave the Drissa camp
Person: Karl Wilhelm Toll
Foreigners in Russian service: introduction
