Under the threat of the final collapse of the already destroyed by war and revolution agriculture [see article Decree on Land 1917 and its consequences ] Bolsheviks at the beginning of 1921 they abandoned the methods war communism and at Lenin’s suggestion they move to NEP. Armed men who scoured for bread and ravaged the peasantry food squads are being liquidated. Committees were liquidated even earlier. Prodrazverstka and forced requisitions of grain in the countryside are replaced by a legally established agricultural tax in kind (" tax in kind"). The peasantry is allowed free sale of bread and other agricultural products.
The new economic policy immediately had an extremely favorable impact on the national economy of the country and on agriculture in particular. The peasantry gained an interest in labor and confidence that the products of their labor would not be requisitioned by the authorities or forcibly purchased from them for next to nothing. Agriculture was restored within the first 5 years, and the country overcame famine. The sown area exceeded pre-war sizes, bread production per capita turned out to be almost equal to pre-revolutionary levels; The number of livestock was also 16% higher than before the revolution. Gross agricultural output in 1925-1926 was 103% compared to the 1913 level.
During the NEP period, noticeable qualitative changes also occurred in agriculture: the specific gravity industrial crops, sowing grasses and root crops; the peasantry is carrying out a number of agricultural activities, the multi-field system is becoming widespread, agricultural machinery and chemical fertilizers are beginning to be used on an ever larger scale; The yield of all crops and livestock productivity are rapidly increasing.
The free development of Russian agriculture promised good prospects. However, the leaders of the Communist Party could not allow further development agriculture of the country on the old principles, on the principles of private property and personal initiative. The communist leaders understood well that a strengthened peasantry could become a strong economic and political force capable of leading to the elimination of the communist regime, and, therefore, the communist party in Russia.
Collectivization. Russia on blood
The idea of a communist restructuring of agriculture was born in the bowels of the Bolshevik Party long before this party came to power. During the period of the revolutionary struggle against the tsarist and then the provisional government, the Bolsheviks, using the anti-landowner sentiments of the peasantry and their desire for the division of landowners' lands, pushed this peasantry to revolutionary actions and considered them as their ally. Having seized power, the Bolsheviks deepened the revolution, transformed it from “petty-bourgeois” to “socialist” and now consider the peasantry as a reactionary, anti-proletarian class.
Lenin directly believed that privately owned peasant farming was a condition for the restoration of capitalism in Russia, that peasant “ small production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a massive scale.”
In order to finish off the remnants of capitalism in Russia, undermine its foundation and forever eliminate the threat of “capitalist restoration”, Lenin puts forward the task of restructuring agriculture on a socialist basis - collectivization:
“While we live in a country of small peasants, there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This needs to be remembered. Anyone who has carefully observed the life of the village, in comparison with the life of the city, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter is based on small-scale farming, and to undermine it, there is one way - to transfer the country’s economy, including agriculture, to a new technical basis, to the technical basis of modern large-scale production... We realized this, and we will bring the matter to the point that the economic moved from small-peasant to large-scale industrial."
In 1923, Lenin's work " About cooperation" In this pamphlet and in other pre-death works, Lenin directly poses the question: “Who will win?” Will the private sector defeat the public sector and thereby deprive the socialist state of its material base, and, therefore, liquidate the socialist state itself, or, conversely, will the public sector defeat and absorb private owners and thereby, having strengthened its material base, eliminate any possibility of capitalist restoration?
Agriculture at that time seemed to be a sea of private individual peasant farms. Here private initiative and the right of private property completely dominated. According to Lenin, with the help of production cooperation (collectivization) of small private peasant farms, it was possible and necessary to carry out a socialist reorganization of the countryside and thereby subordinate the country's agriculture to the interests of the socialist state.
“The power of the state over all major means of production, the power of the state in the hands of the proletariat, the union of this proletariat with many millions of small and small peasants, ensuring the leadership of this proletariat in relation to the peasantry, etc.... Isn't this all that is necessary to build a socialist society? This is not yet the construction of a socialist society, but this is everything necessary and sufficient for this construction.”
As a faithful student and successor of Lenin’s work, Stalin immediately and completely accepted Lenin’s point of view, considering Lenin’s cooperative plan for transferring the peasantry to the socialist path of development the only the right decision question To eliminate the threat of the restoration of capitalism, according to Stalin, it was necessary
“...strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, strengthening the alliance of the working class and the peasantry...translation of everything National economy on a new technical base, mass cooperation of the peasantry, the development of economic councils, limiting and overcoming the capitalist elements of the city and countryside."
The question of restructuring agriculture in a socialist way and the ways and methods of this restructuring was practically already raised a year after the introduction of the NEP, namely at the XI Party Congress, in March and April 1922. It is then touched upon and discussed at XIII Congress party (1924), at the XIV Party Conference and XIV Party Congress (1925), at the III All-Union Congress of Soviets (1925) and received its final permission to XV Party Congress in December 1927.
A. Rykov, N. Skrypnik and I. Stalin at the XV Congress of the CPSU(b)
All the statements of the leaders of communism and all the party decisions of that period leave no doubt that collectivization was undertaken by the Bolsheviks mainly for political, and not at all economic, reasons . In any case, the main goal of this restructuring was the desire to “finish off the remnants of capitalism and forever eliminate the threat of restoration.”
Having established full state control over the peasantry, the Bolsheviks hoped to carry out without interference in the countryside any measures pleasing to the party and the communist government - economic, political, cultural - and thereby put both the country's agriculture and the entire peasantry at the service of communism.
In the promotion and approval of the idea of collectivization, however, economic arguments and considerations of communist leaders played an important role. In any case, Stalin’s economic arguments and statistical calculations in his report at the XV Party Congress officially became the final and most compelling arguments in favor of the collective farm restructuring of the countryside.
On XIV Party Congress The Bolsheviks set a course for rapid industrialization countries. In this regard, Soviet leaders made very increased demands on agriculture. According to Stalin, agriculture was to become a solid basis for industrialization. It was supposed to provide a large amount of grain for rapidly growing cities and new industrial centers. In addition, agriculture was required to large quantities: cotton, sugar beets, sunflowers, essential oils, leather, wool and other agricultural raw materials for growing industry. Then agriculture should provide grain and technical raw materials not only for domestic consumption, but also for export, which, in turn, should provide funds for the import of industrial equipment. Finally, agriculture must provide a colossal amount of labor for the rapidly growing industry.
Agriculture, built on old principles, according to the Soviet leaders, could not cope with these grandiose tasks. Stalin, in particular, pointed to a sharp deterioration in the country's grain balance, and a reduction in marketable grain production due to the liquidation of landowners' farms and restrictions and oppression undertaken by the communist government " kulaks».
Not allowing the thought of weakening the policy of oppression of the “kulaks”, Stalin saw a way out of the “crisis”, as it seemed to him, state of pre-collective farm agriculture
“...in the transition of small and dispersed peasant farms to large and united farms based on social cultivation of the land, in the transition to collective cultivation on the basis of new, higher technology... There are no other options.”
Since 1928, immediately after the decision of the XV Party Congress, a powerful campaign has been launched in the country to promote the “advantages” of the collective farm form of agriculture, in comparison with individual peasant agriculture. Thousands of brochures, articles, reports, and lectures are devoted to collectivization issues. In all the literature, in all the reports and speeches of the leaders, it was persistently proven that while maintaining the old order in the countryside, the country cannot solve the grain problem, cannot avoid the famine that threatens it, that in order to solve the national economic problems facing agriculture, agriculture must be restructured to a new higher technical base and that this can only be achieved by uniting small, dispersed peasant farms into large production units - collective farms.
Go to the collective farm. Soviet propaganda poster of the collectivization era
At the same time, it was proven that the collective farm form of agriculture should inevitably provide a number of enormous benefits and advantages both for the state and for the peasants themselves. In particular, it was argued that:
1) large consolidated plots of land are incomparably more convenient for the use and economic use of bulky and expensive machines, and that all these machines will be incomparably more accessible to a large agricultural enterprise than to small, economically weak peasant farms;
2) labor productivity in fully mechanized agricultural enterprises, such as collective farms, will inevitably rise by 2-3 times, work on collective farms will become easy and enjoyable;
3) on collective farms it will be incomparably easier to carry out all the necessary agricultural activities, to organize the matter in full accordance with the requirements of science - agronomy and livestock science. As a result, the productivity of all agricultural crops and animal productivity will increase by 2-3, or even 4 times;
4) collective farm restructuring of agriculture will ensure rapid and sharp increase harvests and an increase in livestock production, the country will in a short time be overwhelmed with bread, meat, milk and other agricultural products;
5) the profitability of agriculture will increase enormously; collective farms will be extremely profitable and rich enterprises; the incomes of the peasants will increase immeasurably and the peasants, having turned into collective farmers, will live a cultured, happy and prosperous life, forever freed from kulak bondage and exploitation;
6) the entire Soviet society will benefit enormously from collective farm restructuring; the city will be abundantly supplied with all agricultural products, industry will receive the enormous surplus of labor that is generated in the countryside thanks to mechanization; The peasantry, living a rich and happy life on collective farms, will easily join in with all the benefits of culture and will finally get rid of the “idiocy of village life.”
It is difficult to establish to what extent the leaders of communism themselves believed in all these fantastic “inevitable” benefits of collectivization; but it is well known that they were generous with promises. The creator and inspirer of the collective farm “epic” himself, Stalin, in his article “The Year of the Great Turning Point,” published in November 1929 in Pravda, wrote:
“...If the development of collective and state farms continues at an accelerated pace, then there is no doubt that in just three years our country will become one of the most grain-producing countries, if not the most grain-producing country in the world.”
In 1933, at the 1st Congress of Shock Collective Farmers, i.e. already when, with the help of the “increased rate of development of collective farms,” agriculture was ruined and the country was suffocating in the grip hunger, Stalin again promised:
“If we work honestly, work for ourselves, for our collective farms, we will achieve that in just 2-3 years we will raise collective farmers and former poor and former middle peasants to the level of the wealthy, to the level of people who enjoy an abundance of products and lead well cultural life".
These were communist forecasts and promises.
However, this noisy communist propaganda of collective farm advantages among the peasantry had no success and did not arouse any collective farm-cooperative enthusiasm. Artels and communes, intensively planted with the help of organized and financial measures by the government and the party, made up of the poor, workers stuck in the countryside after the revolution and other Soviet activists, turned out to be unviable and disintegrated without even existing for a year. Prosperous peasants, middle peasants and hardworking poor people, despite any persuasion, did not join these artels and communes, and even if they formed their own voluntary cooperatives, they were not at all similar to the future collective farms. Usually these were partnerships for joint cultivation or purchasing and marketing companies, in which neither land, nor livestock, nor any other property was socialized.
But even taking into account these rural cooperatives, which in no way satisfied the party and the government, in mid-1929 only 416 thousand peasant farms were united in collective farms out of more than 25 million farms in Russia at that time, or 1.7% all peasant households.
Collectivization in the USSR
Collectivization- the process of uniting individual peasant farms into collective farms (collective farms in the USSR). It was carried out in the USSR in the late 1920s - early 1930s (1928-1933). (the decision on collectivization was made at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)), in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
The goal of collectivization is the establishment of socialist production relations in the countryside, the elimination of small-scale commodity production to resolve grain difficulties and provide the country with the necessary amount of marketable grain.
The country's agriculture was disrupted by World War I and the Civil War. According to the All-Russian Agricultural Census of 1917, the working-age male population in the village decreased by 47.4% compared to 1914; the number of horses - the main draft force - from 17.9 million to 12.8 million. The number of livestock and sown areas decreased, and agricultural yields decreased. A food crisis has begun in the country. Even two years after the end of the civil war, grain crops amounted to only 63.9 million hectares (1923).
In the last year of his life, V.I. Lenin called, in particular, for the development of the cooperative movement. It is known that before dictating the article “On Cooperation,” V.I. Lenin ordered literature on cooperation from the library, among others there was book by A. V. Chayanov “Basic ideas and forms of organization of peasant cooperation” (M., 1919). And in the Lenin library in the Kremlin there were seven works by A.V. Chayanov. A. V. Chayanov highly appreciated V. I. Lenin’s article “On Cooperation.” He believed that after this Leninist work, “cooperation is becoming one of the foundations of our economic policy. During the NEP years, cooperation began to be actively restored. According to the memoirs of the former Chairman of the USSR Government A.S. Kosygin (he worked in the leadership of cooperatives until the early 1930s organizations in Siberia), “the main thing that forced him to “leave the ranks of cooperators” was that collectivization, which unfolded in Siberia in the early 30s, meant, paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, disorganization of a largely powerful, a cooperative network covering all corners of Siberia."
The restoration of pre-war grain sown areas - 94.7 million hectares - was achieved only by 1927 (the total sown area in 1927 was 112.4 million hectares against 105 million hectares in 1913). It was also possible to slightly exceed the pre-war level (1913) of productivity: the average yield of grain crops for 1924-1928 reached 7.5 c/ha. It was practically possible to restore the livestock population (with the exception of horses). Gross grain production by the end of the recovery period (1928) reached 733.2 million quintals. The marketability of grain farming remained extremely low - in 1926/27, the average marketability of grain farming was 13.3% (47.2% - collective and state farms, 20.0% - kulaks, 11.2% - poor and middle peasants). In the gross grain production, collective and state farms accounted for 1.7%, kulaks - 13%, middle peasants and poor peasants - 85.3%. The number of private peasant farms by 1926 reached 24.6 million, the average crop area was less than 4.5 hectares (1928), more than 30% of farms did not have the means (tools, draft animals) to cultivate the land. The low level of agricultural technology of small individual farms had no further prospects for growth. In 1928, 9.8% of the sown areas were plowed with a plow, three-quarters of the sowing was done by hand, 44% of grain harvesting was done with a sickle and scythe, and 40.7% of threshing was done by non-mechanical methods (flail, etc.).
As a result of the transfer of landowners' lands to the peasants, peasant farms were fragmented into small plots. By 1928, their number increased one and a half times compared to 1913 - from 16 to 25 million
By 1928-29 The share of poor people in the rural population of the USSR was 35%, middle peasants - 60%, kulaks - 5%. At the same time, it was the kulak farms that had a significant part (15-20%) of the means of production, including about a third of agricultural machines.
The course towards collectivization of agriculture was proclaimed at the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (December 1927). As of July 1, 1927, there were 14.88 thousand collective farms in the country; for the same period 1928 - 33.2 thousand, 1929 - St. 57 thousand. They united 194.7 thousand, 416.7 thousand and 1,007.7 thousand individual farms, respectively. Among the organizational forms of collective farms, partnerships for joint cultivation of land (TOZs) predominated; There were also agricultural cooperatives and communes. To support collective farms, the state provided various incentive measures - interest-free loans, the supply of agricultural machinery and implements, and the provision of tax benefits.
The transition to complete collectivization was carried out against the backdrop of an armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway and the outbreak of the global economic crisis, which caused serious concerns among the party leadership about the possibility of a new military intervention against the USSR.
At the same time, some positive examples of collective farming, as well as successes in the development of consumer and agricultural cooperation, led to a not entirely adequate assessment of the current situation in agriculture.
Since the spring of 1929, events aimed at increasing the number of collective farms were carried out in the countryside - in particular, Komsomol campaigns “for collectivization.” In the RSFSR, the institute of agricultural commissioners was created; in Ukraine, much attention was paid to those preserved from the civil war to the komnesams(analogous to the Russian commander). Mainly through the use of administrative measures, it was possible to achieve a significant increase in collective farms (mainly in the form of TOZs).
In the countryside, forced grain procurements, accompanied by mass arrests and destruction of farms, led to riots, the number of which by the end of 1929 numbered in the hundreds. Not wanting to give property and livestock to collective farms and fearing the repression that wealthy peasants were subjected to, people slaughtered livestock and reduced crops.
Meanwhile, the November (1929) plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the results and further tasks of collective farm construction,” in which it noted that the country had begun a large-scale socialist reorganization of the countryside and the construction of large-scale socialist agriculture. The resolution indicated the need for a transition to complete collectivization in certain regions. At the plenum, it was decided to send 25 thousand urban workers (twenty-five thousand people) to collective farms for permanent work to “manage the established collective and state farms” (in fact, their number subsequently almost tripled, amounting to over 73 thousand).
This caused sharp resistance from the peasantry. According to data from various sources cited by O. V. Khlevnyuk, in January 1930, 346 mass protests were registered, in which 125 thousand people took part, in February - 736 (220 thousand), in the first two weeks of March - 595 ( about 230 thousand), not counting Ukraine, where 500 were engulfed in unrest settlements. In March 1930, in general in Belarus, the Central Black Earth region, in the Lower and Middle Volga region, in the North Caucasus, in Siberia, in the Urals, in the Leningrad, Moscow, Western, Ivanovo-Voznesensk regions, in the Crimea and Central Asia 1,642 mass peasant protests were registered, in which at least 750-800 thousand people took part. In Ukraine at this time, more than a thousand settlements were already engulfed in unrest.
The severe drought that struck the country in 1931 and mismanagement of the harvest led to a significant decrease in the gross grain harvest (694.8 million quintals in 1931 versus 835.4 million quintals in 1930).
Despite this, local efforts were made to fulfill and exceed the planned norms for the collection of agricultural products - the same applied to the plan for grain exports, despite a significant drop in prices on the world market. This, like a number of other factors, ultimately led to difficult situation with food and hunger in villages and small towns in the east of the country in the winter of 1931-1932. The freezing of winter crops in 1932 and the fact that a significant number of collective farms approached the 1932 sowing campaign without seed material and draft animals (which died or were unfit for work due to poor care and the lack of feed, which were included in the general grain procurement plan), led to a significant deterioration in the prospects for the 1932 harvest. Across the country, plans for export supplies were reduced (by about three times), planned grain procurements (by 22%) and delivery of livestock (by 2 times), but this did not save the general situation - repeated crop failure (death of winter crops, lack of sowing, partial drought, a decrease in yield caused by a violation of basic agronomic principles, large losses during harvesting and a number of other reasons) led to severe famine in the winter of 1932 - spring of 1933.
Collective farm construction in the vast majority of German villages in the Siberian region was carried out as a result of administrative pressure, without sufficient consideration of the degree of organizational and political preparation for it. Dispossession measures were used in many cases as a measure of influence against middle peasants who did not want to join collective farms. Thus, measures aimed exclusively against kulaks affected a significant number of middle peasants in German villages. These methods not only did not contribute, but repelled the German peasantry from collective farms. It is enough to point out that of the total number of kulaks expelled administratively in the Omsk District, half were returned by the OGPU authorities from assembly points and from the road.
Management of the resettlement (timing, number and selection of resettlement sites) was carried out by the Sector of Land Funds and Resettlement of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR (1930-1933), the Resettlement Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR (1930-1931), the Sector of Land Funds and Resettlement of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR (Reorganized) (1931-1933) , ensured the resettlement of the OGPU.
The deportees, in violation of existing instructions, were provided with little or no necessary food and equipment in the new places of resettlement (especially in the first years of mass expulsion), which often had no prospects for agricultural use.
Import of agricultural machinery and equipment 1926/27 - 1929/30
Since the late 80s, the history of collectivization has included the opinion of some Western historians that “Stalin organized collectivization to obtain money for industrialization through the extensive export of agricultural products (mainly grain).” Statistics do not allow us to be so confident in this opinion:
In total, for the period 1926 - 33 grains were exported for 672.8 million rubles and equipment was imported for 306 million rubles.
USSR exports of basic goods 1926/27 - 1933
In addition, during the period 1927-32, the state imported breeding cattle worth about 100 million rubles. Imports of fertilizers and equipment intended for the production of tools and mechanisms for agriculture were also very significant.
USSR imports of basic goods 1929-1933
The results of the “activities” of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Agriculture and the long-term effect of the “left bends” of the first months of collectivization led to a crisis in agriculture and significantly influenced the situation that led to the famine of 1932-1933. The situation was significantly corrected by the introduction of strict party control over agriculture and the reorganization of the administrative and support apparatus of agriculture. This made it possible to abolish bread cards at the beginning of 1935; by October of the same year, cards for other food products were also eliminated.
The transition to large-scale social agricultural production meant a revolution in the entire way of life of the peasantry. In a short time, illiteracy was largely eliminated in the village, and work was carried out to train agricultural personnel (agronomists, livestock specialists, tractor drivers, drivers and other specialists). A new technical base was prepared for large-scale agricultural production; The construction of tractor factories and agricultural machinery began, which made it possible to establish mass production of tractors and agricultural machines. In general, all this made it possible to create a manageable, progressive agricultural system in a number of areas, which provided the raw material base for industry, minimized the influence of natural factors (drought, etc.) and made it possible to create the necessary strategic grain reserves for the country before
Chronology
In 1925, the XIV Congress of the RCP (b) stated that the question “who vs. whom” posed by Lenin at the beginning of the NEP was resolved in favor of socialist construction. XV Congress of the CPSU (b),
N.K. Krupskaya, M.I. Kalinin, K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny in the group of delegates to the XV Party Congress. 1927accomplished in December 1927, set the task, on the basis of further cooperation of the peasantry, to gradually transition peasant farms to large-scale production. It was planned to introduce collective cultivation of the land “based on the intensification and mechanization of agriculture, fully supporting and encouraging the sprouts of social agricultural labor.” His decisions also expressed a course for rapid development large machine socialist industry, capable of transforming a country from an agricultural one to an industrial one. The congress reflected the trend strengthening of socialist principles in the economy.
From NEP Russia there will be socialist Russia. Poster. Hood. G. Klutsis
In January 1928 I.V. Stalin proposed to expand construction collective farms And state farms.
IN 1929. party and state bodies make decisions on speeding up collectivization processes. The theoretical justification for speeding up collectivization was Stalin’s article “The Year of the Great Turning Point,” published in Pravda on November 7, 1929. The article stated that there had been a change in the mood of the peasantry in favor of collective farms and, on this basis, put forward the task of completing collectivization as quickly as possible. Stalin assured that on the basis of the collective farm system, our country in three years would become the most grain-producing country in the world, and in December 1929, Stalin made calls to establish collective farms, eliminate the kulaks as a class, not allow kulaks into the collective farm, and make dispossession integral part collective farm construction.
A special commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on collectivization issues developed a draft resolution that proposed solving the problem of collectivization of the “vast majority of peasant farms” during the first five-year plan: in the main grain-growing regions in two to three years, in the consuming zone in three to four years . The commission recommended that the main form of collective farm construction be considered agricultural artel, in which “the main means of production (land, implements, workers, as well as marketable productive livestock) are collectivized, while at the same time maintaining, under these conditions, the peasant’s private ownership of small implements, small livestock, dairy cows, etc., where they serve consumer needs needs of a peasant family."
January 5, 1930. a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “ On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction" As proposed by the commission, grain regions were delimited into two zones according to the completion date of collectivization. But Stalin made his own amendments, and the deadlines were sharply reduced. The North Caucasus, Lower and Middle Volga were supposed to basically complete collectivization “in the fall of 1930, or at least in the spring of 1931,” and the remaining grain-growing regions in “the fall of 1931, or at least in the spring of 1932.” Such a short deadline and the recognition of “socialist competition in organizing collective farms” were in complete contradiction with the instruction on the inadmissibility of “any kind of “decree” from above of the collective farm movement.” This created favorable conditions for the race for “100% coverage.”
As a result of the measures taken, the percentage of collectivization grew rapidly: if in June 1927 the proportion of peasant farms involved in collective farms was 0.8%, then by the beginning of March 1930 it was over 50%. The pace of collectivization began to outstrip the country's real capabilities in financing farms, supplying them with equipment, etc. Decrees from above, violation of the principle of voluntariness when joining a collective farm and other party-state measures caused discontent among the peasants, which was expressed in protests and even armed clashes.
Local party bodies tried to ensure the highest possible results using coercion and threats. This often resulted in unrealistic numbers. Thus, according to reports to the Central Committee from the Kharkov district, out of 420 farms, 444 were socialized. The secretary of one of the district committees in Belarus, in an urgent telegram to Moscow, reported that 100.6% of the farms were included in collective farms.
In his article “ Dizziness from success”, which appeared in “Pravda” March 2, 1930, Stalin condemned numerous cases of violation of the principle of voluntariness in the organization of collective farms, “bureaucratic decree of the collective farm movement.” He criticized excessive “zealousness” in the matter of dispossession, of which many middle peasants became victims. It was necessary to stop this “dizziness from success” and put an end to “paper collective farms, which do not yet exist in reality, but about the existence of which there are a lot of boastful resolutions.” The article, however, had absolutely no self-criticism, and all responsibility for the mistakes made was placed on the local leadership. The question of revising the very principle of collectivization was not raised.
The effect of the article that followed March 14th there was a resolution of the Central Committee “ On the struggle against the distortion of the party line in the collective farm movement”, had an immediate effect. A mass exodus of peasants from collective farms began (5 million people in March alone). Therefore, adjustments, at least initially, were made. Economic levers began to be used more actively. The main forces of the party, state and public organizations. The scale of technical reconstruction in agriculture has increased, mainly through the creation of state machine and tractor stations (MTS). The level of mechanization of agricultural work has increased significantly. In 1930, the state provided assistance to collective farms and provided them with tax benefits. But for individual farmers, agricultural tax rates were increased, and one-time taxes were introduced to be levied only on them.
In 1932, abolished by the revolution, it was introduced passport system, which established strict administrative control over the movement of labor in cities, and especially from villages to cities, turning collective farmers into a passportless population.
On collective farms, cases of grain theft and concealment from accounting were widespread. The state fought against the low pace of grain procurements and the concealment of grain through repression. August 7, 1932 The Law is adopted On the protection of socialist property”, written by Stalin himself. He introduced “as a measure of judicial repression for the theft of collective farm and collective property, the highest measure of social protection - execution with confiscation of all property and, in mitigating circumstances, replacement with imprisonment for a term of at least 10 years with confiscation of all property.” Amnesty for cases of this kind was prohibited. In accordance with this law, tens of thousands of collective farmers were arrested for unauthorized cutting of small quantities of ears of rye or wheat. The result of these actions was, mainly in Ukraine, mass famine.
The final completion of collectivization occurred by 1937. There were more than 243 thousand collective farms in the country, uniting 93% of peasant farms.
Over the years of the new economic policy, the share of wealthy peasant farms has increased. In market conditions “ fist” strengthened economically, which was a consequence of deep social stratification in the village. Bukharin’s famous slogan “Get rich!”, put forward in 1925, meant in practice the growth of kulak farms. In 1927 there were about 300 thousand of them.
In the summer of 1929, the policy towards the kulak became tougher: there followed a ban on accepting kulak families into collective farms, and with January 30, 1930. after the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “ On measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivization“large-scale violent actions began, expressed in confiscation of property, forced relocation, etc. Often the middle peasants also fell into the category of kulaks.
The criteria for classifying a farm as a kulak farm were defined so broadly that large farms and even poor peasants could be included under them. This allowed officials to use the threat of dispossession as the main lever for creating collective farms, organizing pressure from the declassed layers of the village on the rest of it. Dispossession was supposed to demonstrate to the most unyielding the inflexibility of the authorities and the futility of any resistance. The resistance of the kulaks, as well as part of the middle peasants and the poor, to collectivization was broken by the most severe measures of violence.
The literature provides various numbers of dispossessed people. One of the experts on the history of the peasantry, V. Danilov, believes that at least 1 million kulak farms were liquidated during dispossession. According to other sources, by the end of 1930, about 400 thousand farms were dispossessed (i.e., approximately half of the kulak farms), of which about 78 thousand were evicted to certain areas, according to other data - 115 thousand. Although the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of ) back on March 30, 1930, issued a resolution to stop the mass eviction of kulaks from areas of complete collectivization and ordered that it be carried out only on an individual basis; the number of evicted households in 1931 more than doubled - to almost 266 thousand.
Those dispossessed were divided into three categories. TO first referred to “ counter-revolutionary activist” - participants in anti-Soviet and anti-collective farm protests (they were subject to arrest and trial, and their families were subject to eviction to remote areas of the country). Co. second — “big fists and former semi-landowners who actively opposed collectivization” (they were evicted with their families to remote areas). And finally to third — “the rest of the fists”(she was subject to resettlement in special settlements within the areas of her previous residence). The compilation of lists of fists of the first category was carried out by the local department of the GPU. Lists of kulaks of the second and third categories were compiled locally, taking into account the recommendations of village activists and organizations of the village poor.
As a result, tens of thousands of middle peasants were subjected to dispossession. In some areas, from 80 to 90% of the middle peasants were condemned as “subkulak members.” Their main fault was that they shied away from collectivization. Resistance in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Don was more active than in the small villages of Central Russia.
Methods and forms of collectivization. Since the 1930s, the peoples of Russia have undergone a series of social transformations that took place in the general context of Stalin's policies and had a largely irreversible impact on their lives. The period of dispossession, collectivization, and the struggle against traditional foundations began.
Stalin's anti-peasant policy was aimed at suppressing the sense of ownership in the peasant, reducing him to the position of a “serf.” Forced collectivization could not take into account the huge diversity of conditions of peasant farming and people's livelihoods, and in relation to national regions - the peculiarities of customs and psychology. Under the guise of collectivization, the peasantry of the entire country was essentially declared another Civil War. In a disrupted market, the government was unable to find more effective methods to increase the pace of grain procurements and increase the peasant’s interest in his work.
Organizers of collective farms. 1930
The ideological justification for forced collectivization was the article by J.V. Stalin, “The Year of the Great Turning Point,” published on November 7, 1929. It stated that the middle peasants, who made up the majority of the peasants, joined the collective farms. In fact, collective farms then united about 5% of peasant farms. In the Altai Mountains in October 1929, 6.3% of farms were united in collective farms, and in the spring of 1930 - 80% of farms. The Altai peasant turned out to be completely unprepared for such a “leap”. It was provoked by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of January 5, 1930, “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction.” The resolution outlined the implementation of complete collectivization and, on this basis, the elimination of the kulaks as a class. It was assumed that collective and state farms would provide all the necessary food and therefore it would be possible to destroy the kulaks.
It was decided to complete complete collectivization mainly by the end of 1932, and in the most important grain regions - no later than the spring of 1931. 25 thousand communists were sent to the villages, forcing peasants to join collective farms with threats
The first members of the Bolshevik collective farm, Shebalinsky aimak
repression and dispossession. 14 people arrived in Gorny Altai - twenty-five thousand people from Leningrad, 10 people - workers from Ivanovo-Voskresensk. In the region, the process of collectivization was directly related to the transfer of the nomadic Altai population to a settled state, which further aggravated social tensions. Administratively, without regard for economic feasibility and the interests of the population, giant collective farms were established. Tens of miles away, without any preparatory work Altai farms gathered in one place.
Mass slaughter of livestock began. By March 15, 1930, the number of cattle in eight regions had decreased by 43, sheep by 35, and horses by 28%. About 150 Kazakhs migrated to China; in some places, collective farm organizers were killed and collective farm buildings were set on fire. The state continued to tighten policies. The so-called “dekulakization” destroyed a great many real owners of the land and undermined the faith of millions of peasants in socialism. Mass skirmishers expropriations Often those for whom the confiscated goods were intended spoke. It became simply profitable to be considered poor, because poverty was declared a class “dignity.” Wealthy peasants, who were, in fact, the breadwinners of the country, were usually classified as kulaks. Poor and middle peasants were arbitrarily enrolled and dispossessed into kulaks - all those who resisted forced collectivization. According to modern estimates, about a million peasant farms were dispossessed. In the region in 1929-1935. According to approximate data, more than 1.5 thousand people were arrested and exiled. Of the 5,750 people arrested in 1929-1946. peasants accounted for 3,773 people.
“... In the spring of 1930, when Anna A.’s family was deported, she already had two children. For the rest of her life she remembered the day when the village activists came to them. They were ordered to quickly gather. Anna and her husband began to pack their things, taking only clothes. And fellow villagers scurried around - poor people, activists, taking away, simply stealing food and things. They managed to leave their eldest son Peter with relatives, and took one-year-old Alexandra with them.
They were transported for a long time. We met on the way. There were people from Ust-Koksa, Ust-Kan, Kosh-Agach. We moved further and further north. They were transported along the Ob River on barges to Kolpashevo, a city in the very center of the Tomsk region, and then along the Ket River to Bely Yar. But they were dropped off not in the village, but in the remote taiga. What is the Tomsk taiga? First of all, these are swamps and swamps. In winter there was snow and -50 degree frosts, and in summer there were clouds of mosquitoes from which there was no escape.
Even the guards did not accompany them; the eldest of the repressed was appointed and the final destination was named. Having arrived at the place, everyone who could hold an ax in their hands, both men and women, set about building barracks. Nobody drove them, they themselves had to, using the “rights of collective farms”, build their own housing and utility rooms with their own hands, uproot the forest, drain the swamps.
A year later, only half of those who arrived remained alive. Old people and children especially died in large numbers. Anna's husband and newborn son died here. The dead were placed in a large hole and, when it was full, they were covered.
When the forces of these families built barracks, barnyards, warehouses, cleared up the forest and sown the land with wheat and barley, all the constant attributes of violence appeared - constant surveillance, prohibition of exit and movement, daily labor and food standards - everything, like in a real concentration camp. Anna worked as a milkmaid. Every day she poured several buckets of milk into flasks, not daring to bring her little daughter even a glass. And then the war began... Anna and her family were able to return to their homeland only in 1957.”
At the beginning of March 1930, J.V. Stalin published the article “Dizziness from Success.” It condemned excesses in collective farm construction, although what he called excesses constituted the essence of his agrarian policy. The leader laid the blame for these “excesses” on local leaders, and many were punished, although they were only executors of instructions from above. The artificially created collective farms immediately disintegrated. The level of collectivization in Oirotia dropped from 90% during the period of “complete collectivization” to 10% by the beginning of April 1930. But in the fall of 1930, the collectivization campaign resumed with the same force.
As of January 1932, the level of collectivization in the region was 49.7%. There is no doubt that collectivization ruined the village. Harvests fell to their lowest level since 1921, and livestock numbers were halved. Only in the 1950s. The country's agriculture has reached the level of NEP times.
Documentary evidence:
From the decision of the Shebalinsky aimak party committee “On the organizational and economic management of collective farms of the Beshpeltir village council”
The organization of collective farms of the nomadic and semi-nomadic population in the village council began in 1931/32. In 1933, 75% of poor and middle peasant farms were collectivized. But the weak leadership of the party cell and the aimkolkhoz union in the organizational and economic strengthening of collective farms led to poor organization of labor. Collective farms are dwarf. The collective farm “Kyzyl Cholmon” has 11 farms, the “Dyany Del” - 23, the collective farm “Five-Year Plan in 4 Years” - 27, and the “Kyzyl Oirot” - 62 farms. There are 185 able-bodied people on all 4 collective farms. Income in 1932 on the collective farm “Kyzyl Oirot” for 1 collective farmer was 78 rubles, on the collective farm “Five-Year Plan in 4 Years” - 90.72 kopecks, on the collective farm “Kyzyl Cholmon” - 130 rubles. Despite all possible assistance from aimak organizations, collective farms have not become stronger economically and there is no prospect for their further growth. Therefore, based on the consent of these collective farms and collective farmers, it was decided to organize one collective farm, “Kyzyl Oirot”.
Results and consequences of collectivization. Collectivization gave rise to mass famine. Researchers have proven that the cause of the famine that struck the main breadbasket of the Siberian region - Altai - was not only natural phenomena (drought that incinerated fields and meadows), but also socio-economic processes and, above all, collectivization. The famine was a natural result of accelerated transformations in agriculture and the forced confiscation of grain from peasants in order to fulfill unrealistic procurement plans. Trying to survive, the peasants were forced to secretly carry away spikelets and grain from collective farm fields and storage facilities. But in 1932, a law appeared, popularly called the “law of five ears of corn.” He punished any theft of collective farm property with imprisonment for a term of at least 10 years or execution by shooting with confiscation of property. Tens of thousands of people were convicted under this law. It was forbidden to even mention the famine. The authorities needed him to break the resistance of the peasantry.
Strengthening collective farms. In February 1935, the Charter of the agricultural artel was adopted. In accordance with its provisions, the regional authorities adopted a resolution to exempt 114 national collective farms of the Altai Mountains from mandatory supplies of grain and potatoes to the state in 1935. Collective farms in the Kosh-Agach and Ulagansky districts were completely, and in other areas, partially exempted from milk supplies. They began to issue sheep, cows, and horses for workdays. However, despite the benefits provided, many collective farms remained economically weak. Collective farmers, receiving livestock for workdays, often slaughtered it for food needs. Every tenth collective farmer's farm had no livestock at all.
The difficult situation in the Oirot village forced the government to adopt in 1936 a decree “On the procedure for distributing livestock according to workdays in Oirotia,” according to which the following principles of remuneration were established: collective farmers who did not fulfill the livestock development plan were allowed to distribute 15% of the amount saved among workdays offspring of sheep and cattle. Collective farms that fulfilled the plan received the right to distribute 40% of the young animals among workdays, and in case of overfulfillment, they were allowed to allocate an additional 50% of the offspring of young animals received in excess of the plan.
In 1938, more than 85% of the region's peasant farms were collectivized and 322 collective farms and 411 state farms were created. In agriculture, 48 tractors, 28 cars, and 16 combines were used. The average sown area of one collective farm was 156 hectares. In 1939, the region was included in the list of high mountain regions. This circumstance allowed the replacement of grain with meat when settling with the state for obligatory supplies. In July 1939, a new principle for their calculation was introduced. The old one was based on the sowing plan communicated to the collective farm and the actual number of livestock, while the new one was based on the amount of land assigned to the collective farm: arable land, vegetable gardens, pastures. This hectare-by-hectare principle was recognized to create a stable base for the calculation of government procurement. With the introduction of the new regulation, the level of grain deductions from the gross harvest increased, and the total volume of procurement increased significantly.
Breeding of deer and deer continued successfully in the region. Thus, in 1940, there were about 6 thousand animals on deer breeding state farms compared to 4.1 thousand at the beginning of 1938. This year, the Shebalinsky deer state farm fulfilled the plan for the delivery of antler products by 116.6% for deer and 121.8% for deer, and 99.5% of the products were sold as the first grade.
In the region's livestock farming, despite the organization of production on the basis of public means and tools, the introduction of collective methods of work and other innovations of socialism, extensive manual labor and transhumance keeping of livestock still prevailed. To successfully conduct this most labor-intensive industry, to use technical means, it was necessary to widely use the economic experience of the original livestock-raising population, to take into account the factors of the historically developed features of agriculture in the national regions of Siberia. However, all this was declared “relics of the past” and was completely destroyed. Many unresolved difficulties in the livestock industry are explained precisely by a disdainful attitude towards the people's economic experience.
However, even under these conditions, individual farms and workers achieved very good results. .
Collective farm grooms with a stallion of the English breed.
The small gold medal of the All-Russian Agricultural Exhibition (VSKHV) was awarded to M.U. Sogonokov - herder of the Kalinin collective farm of the Ulagan aimag, N.V. Bytysov - shepherd of the Kirov collective farm of the Ust-Kan aimag, N.N. Tikhonov - deputy head of the support fruit growing center named after Michurin. More than 70 people were included in the VSKhV Book of Honor. Among them were experienced farm managers M.I. Yabykova, O.M. Kozlova, field farmer A.S. Kazantseva. So, the milkmaid of the collective farm named after. VII Congress of Soviets U.K. Olkova, using new methods of milking cows of a local unimproved breed, milked 1648 liters at a rate of 1000 liters. Tana Marcina, a shepherd at the Tenginsky sheep farm in 1940, had amazing achievements: she received 127 lambs from 100 queens and managed to preserve them completely. And the shearing of wool in her flock amounted to 4 kg per sheep (later this worker became a Hero Socialist Labor). In the harsh conditions of the Kosh-Agach region, with year-round pasture keeping of sheep, the shepherd of the Kyzyl Maany collective farm, Ch. Koshkonbaev, during 1939-1940. retained all the livestock - a flock of 600 heads of high-breed sheep.
In 1940, under average yield at 12.7 centners per hectare, individual farms and teams achieved great results. Thus, S.N. Abramov’s unit of the Kirov collective farm in the Ust-Koksa aimag harvested 30 centners of oats per hectare. In the Oirot-Tur aimag, the work of the links of K.A. Podolyuk and Ya.I. Zyablitsky from the collective farm “Farmer” was indicative. They received a grain harvest of 28 quintals per hectare. Considering the difficult conditions for crop production, one can assume how much work it took the teams to achieve such results. Innovate experience These livestock breeders were widely promoted through regional newspapers and seminars. Party and Komsomol organizations carried out enormous work in this regard.
At the harvest
The financial situation of collective farmers in the late 1930s. Until mid-1939, there was a system of procurement prices that was unprofitable for livestock farms (which were the majority of collective farms in the Altai Mountains). It did not create material incentives for collective farmers. In July 1939, new legal standards for livestock production were brought to the collective farms of the region: milk yield - 1200 liters, wool shearing - 2.2 kg, from 100 sheep - 90 lambs, from 100 cows - 80 calves. According to the implementation of the 1940 plan, Gorny Altai was ranked among the best in the country. Milk yield was 3113 liters, wool yield was 2.8 kg. At the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition, the region was represented by 36 collective farms, 48 farms, and 335 leading producers.
In general, agriculture in the region in the late 1930s and early 1940s. developed unstably. As throughout the country, the consequences of the voluntarism of the collectivization period were felt, the most important lesson of which was the awareness of the futility and danger of “emergency” in agriculture.
Pay on collective farms was lower than on state farms. For one workday it was issued in 1940: 1.75 rubles, 1.42 kg of grain, 0.04 kg of potatoes. The cost of a workday was low, which was often the reason for non-compliance with the mandatory minimum workday, established in May 1939 at 80 workdays. Additional charges were provided in the amount of 2-3 workdays for each centner of grain and write-off of workdays for bad job. In 1940, the average annual output of an able-bodied collective farmer in the region was 274 workdays. On state farms the average wage was 342 rubles. The work of machine operators, livestock specialists and agronomists was more highly paid. Despite this, state farms also experienced a labor shortage, especially during the harvesting and fodder periods.
Personal farming provided the peasant with products that he did not receive on the collective farm or received in scanty quantities. According to the Charter of the Agricultural Artel of 1935, collective farmers could have a plot of land for personal use, the size of which ranged from 0.25 to 0.5 hectares, depending on the area, on which it was allowed to grow potatoes, vegetables, and fruits. Depending on the region, the number of livestock for personal use was determined. In livestock-raising areas, especially nomadic and semi-nomadic livestock farming, it was allowed to have from 4 to 8 cows, from 30 to 50 heads of sheep, an unlimited number of poultry and even horses and camels. In reality, collective farmers did not have such a quantity of livestock.
In 1940, the government established mandatory standards for the supply of products obtained from private households (meat, milk, wool) to the state. Agricultural tax rates were also determined: for Shebalinsky and Ongudaysky districts - 47 rubles, for Kosh-Agachsky and Ulagansky - 31, Elikmanarsky and Ust-Kansky - 44, Turachaksky and Choysky - 45, Oirot-Tursky and Ust-Koksinsky - 49. 49 farms were exempted from paying the tax based on decisions of the executive committees of the aimak councils due to their low supply of livestock. Of course, there were more such farms, but the number of preferential farms was limited.
As of January 1, 1938, out of 17,032 farms in the region, 2,323 did not have cows, and 5,901 farms were without sheep. The state provided all possible assistance, allowing collective farms to sell in 1938-1939. for the poor there are about 1,300 heads of cattle, 4 thousand lambs, 7 thousand piglets.
However, the general level of material security of the people was low. This was typical for the whole country. On the eve of the war, the country experienced a food and industrial crisis, which was generated by a whole complex of reasons. The main ones should be the undermining of the economy as a result of accelerated industrialization and forced collectivization, as well as the creation of an economic model practically devoid of material incentives to work and based on administrative dictate. The immediate reasons that aggravated the situation at the turn of 1930-1940 were accelerated militarization and mass repression. Rationing of basic products and manufactured goods in open trade remained even after the abolition of rationing in 1935-1936.
However economic development didn't stop. There was a gradual transformation of the local handicraft industry into a more technically developed and diversified production industry. Gorny Altai had great potential for the development and expansion of production related to both the processing of agricultural products and the development of deposits of mercury and marble. In the pre-war years, their development was just beginning. However, the region still remained predominantly an agricultural area with a focus on livestock farming. The workers of this industry achieved good results under the most difficult conditions. However, many problems in the lives of people and the economy of the region could not be solved due to the outbreak of the war.
The consequences of mistakes in carrying out socio-economic reforms are making themselves felt even now. The centuries-old structure of the village was broken, the peasant worker was alienated from the land. Faith in the unprecedented possibilities of socialism, based on the will of the Communist Party and the enthusiasm of the working people, turned into impoverishment and chronic shortages. The economic and military power of the state was created at the cost of the welfare of the people.
Questions and tasks:
1. Based on knowledge from the course of national history, answer the question: what were the reasons and goals of the collectivization of agriculture?
2. Using documentary materials, prove the forced and coercive nature of collectivization.
3. What are the results and consequences of collectivization for the further development of the region and the country as a whole?
4. Based family archive, memoirs of eyewitnesses of events, materials from the school local history museum, prepare a written work about the progress of collectivization in your area, village, about the history of the creation of a collective farm in your native village.
5. Work in groups. Answer the questions: a) was there an alternative to collectivization? b) why was collectivization accompanied by dispossession?
6. Develop a project " Tragic fate of the Gorno-Altai peasantry in the 1930s,” present its results using documentary sources.
| 2018-05-24 14:10:20
COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE USSR (briefly)
At the XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in December 1927, the policy of collectivization of the countryside was proclaimed. There were no specific deadlines or forms for its implementation.
OBJECTIVES OF COLLECTIVIZATION:
Overcoming the state’s dependence on individual peasant farms;
Elimination of the kulaks as a class;
Transfer of funds from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector;
Providing industry with labor due to the departure of peasants from the countryside.
REASONS FOR COLLECTIVIZATION:
a) The crisis of 1927. The revolution, civil war and confusion in the leadership led to a record low harvest in the agricultural sector in 1927. This jeopardized the cities' supplies, import and export plans.
b) Centralized management agriculture. It was very difficult to control millions of individual agricultural farms. This did not suit the new government, as it sought to take control of everything that was happening in the country.
PROGRESS OF COLLECTIVIZATION:
UNIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PEASANTS INTO COLLECTIVE FARMS.
The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 5, 1930 “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction” announced the terms of unification:
Volga region, North Caucasus - 1 year
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, black earth region - 2 years
Other areas - 3 years.
The main form of unification was collective farms, where land, livestock and equipment became common.
The most ideological workers were sent to the village. "Twenty-five thousanders" - workers of large industrial centers of the USSR, who, in pursuance of the decision Communist Party were sent to economic and organizational work on collective farms in the early 1930s. Then another 35 thousand people were sent.
New institutions were created to control collectivization - Zernotrest, Kolkhoz Center, Tractor Center, as well as the People's Commissariat of Agriculture under the leadership of Ya.A. Yakovleva.
LIQUIDATION OF THE KULASTAS AS A CLASS.
Fists were divided into three categories:
-Counter-revolutionaries. They were considered the most dangerous, exiled to concentration camps, and all property was transferred to the collective farm.
- Rich peasants. The property of such people was confiscated, and the people themselves, along with their families, were resettled to remote regions.
- Peasants with average income. They were sent to neighboring regions, having previously confiscated their property.
COMBATING EXCESSES.
Forced collectivization and dispossession led to massive peasant resistance. In this regard, the authorities were forced to suspend collectivization
On March 2, 1930, the newspaper Pravda published an article by I.V. Stalin, “Dizziness from Success,” where he accused local workers of excesses. On the same day, the Model Charter of the collective farm is published, where collective farmers are allowed to keep small livestock, cows, and poultry on their personal farmstead.
In the autumn of 1930, the collectivization process continued.
FAMINE OF THE EARLY 1930S.
In 1932-1933 severe famine began in collectivization areas.
REASONS: drought, livestock decline, increase in state procurement plans, backward technical base.
The peasants, seeing that government procurement plans were growing and therefore everything would be taken away from them, began to hide grain. Upon learning of this, the state took harsh punitive measures. All supplies were taken away from the peasants, dooming them to starvation.
At the height of the famine, on August 7, 1932, the Law on the Protection of Socialist Property, popularly known as the “law of five ears of corn,” was adopted. Any theft of state or collective farm property was punishable by execution, commuted to ten years in prison.
!Only in 1932, according to the law of August 7, more than 50 thousand people were repressed, 2 thousand of whom were sentenced to death
CONSEQUENCES OF COLLECTIVIZATION.
POSITIVE:
- State grain procurements increased by 2 times, and taxes from collective farms - by 3.5, which significantly replenished the state budget.
- Collective farms became reliable suppliers of raw materials, food, capital, and labor, which led to the development of industry.
- By the end of the 1930s, more than 5,000 MTS - machine-tractor stations - were built, which provided collective farms with equipment that was serviced by workers from the cities.
- Industrial leap, a sharp increase in the level of industrial development.
NEGATIVE:
- Collectivization had a negative impact on agriculture: grain production, livestock numbers, productivity, and the number of sown areas decreased.
- Collective farmers did not have a passport, which means they could not travel outside the village, they became hostages of the state, deprived of freedom of movement.
- An entire layer of individual peasants with their culture, traditions, and farming skills was destroyed. A new class came to replace it - the “collective farm peasantry.”
- Large human losses: 7-8 million people died as a result of hunger, dispossession, and resettlement. The incentives to work in the countryside have been lost.
- The formation of administrative-command management of agriculture, its nationalization.
Authors: Sattarov N. and B.
