Attenuation of acoustic (speech) signals at the border of the controlled zone to values that ensure the impossibility of their identification by reconnaissance means against the background of natural noise;
Attenuation of information electrical signals in VTSS connecting lines containing electroacoustic transducers (having a microphone effect) to values that ensure the impossibility of their identification by reconnaissance means against the background of natural noise;
Elimination (weakening) of the passage of HF interference signals to auxiliary technical means containing electroacoustic transducers (having a microphone effect);
Detection of emissions from acoustic bookmarks and side electromagnetic emissions from voice recorders in recording mode;
Detection of unauthorized connections to telephone lines.
Active methods protections are aimed at:
Creation of masking acoustic and vibration interference in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio at the border of the controlled area to values that ensure the impossibility of isolating an informational acoustic signal by reconnaissance means;
Creation of masking electromagnetic interference in VTSS connecting lines containing electroacoustic transducers (having a microphone effect), in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio to values that ensure the impossibility of isolating an information signal by reconnaissance means;
Electromagnetic suppression of voice recorders in recording mode;
Ultrasonic suppression of voice recorders in recording mode;
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Creation of targeted radio interference to acoustic and telephone radio signals in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio to values that ensure the impossibility of isolating an informational acoustic signal by reconnaissance means;
Suppression (disruption of functioning) of means of unauthorized connection to telephone lines;
Destruction (disablement) of means of unauthorized connection to telephone lines.
Attenuation of acoustic (speech) signals is carried out by sound insulation. The attenuation of informative electrical signals in HTSS lines and the exclusion (attenuation) of the passage of HF interference signals is carried out by the method of signal filtering.
Active methods for protecting acoustic information are based on the use of various types field generators, as well as the use of special technical means.
3.1. Soundproofing of premises
Soundproofing of premises is aimed at localizing sources of acoustic signals inside them and is carried out in order to exclude the interception of acoustic (speech) information via direct acoustic (through cracks, windows, doors, ventilation ducts etc.) and vibration (through enclosing structures, water, heat, gas supply, sewerage, etc.) channels.
Sound insulation is assessed by the amount of attenuation of the acoustic signal, which for solid single-layer or homogeneous fences at medium frequencies is approximately calculated by the formula /5/:
K og = 
, dB,
Where q p– weight of 1 m 2 fencing, kg;
f– sound frequency, Hz.
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Sound insulation of premises is ensured with the help of architectural and engineering solutions, as well as the use of special construction and finishing materials.
One of the weakest soundproofing elements enclosing the structures of designated premises are windows and doors. An increase in the soundproofing ability of doors is achieved by tightly fitting the door leaf to the frame, eliminating gaps between the door and the floor, using sealing gaskets, upholstering or lining the door leaves with special materials, etc. If the use of door upholstery is not enough to ensure sound insulation, then double doors are installed in the room , forming a vestibule. Internal surfaces vestibules are also lined with absorbent coatings.
The soundproofing ability of windows, like doors, depends on the surface density of the glass and the degree of pressing of the rebates. The sound insulation of single glazed windows is comparable to the sound insulation of single doors and is not sufficient for reliable protection information in the room. To ensure the required degree of sound insulation, double or triple glazing is used. In cases where it is necessary to provide increased sound insulation, windows of a special design are used (for example, a double window with the window opening filled with organic glass 20...40 mm thick). Window designs with increased sound absorption have been developed based on double-glazed windows with sealing of the air gap between the glasses and filling it with various gas mixtures or creating a vacuum in it.
To increase the sound insulation of a room, acoustic screens are used, installed along the path of sound propagation in the most dangerous (from an intelligence point of view) directions. The actions of acoustic screens are based on the reflection of sound waves and the formation of sound shadows behind the screen.
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Porous sound-absorbing materials are ineffective at low frequencies. Individual sound-absorbing materials constitute resonant absorbers. They are divided into membrane and resonator.
Membrane absorbers are a stretched canvas (fabric) or a thin plywood (cardboard) sheet, under which a well-damping material is placed (material with high viscosity, for example, foam rubber, sponge rubber, construction felt, etc.). In absorbers of this type, maximum absorption is achieved at resonant frequencies.
Perforated resonator absorbers are a system of air resonators (Helmholtz resonator), at the mouth of which damping material is located. Increasing the sound insulation of walls and partitions of premises is achieved by using single-layer and multi-layer (usually double) fences. In multilayer fencing, it is advisable to select layer materials with sharply different acoustic resistances (concrete - foam rubber). The level of the acoustic signal behind the fence can be approximately estimated using the formula /5/:
Where R c– level of the speech signal in the room (in front of the fence), dB;
S og– fence area, dB;
K og– sound insulation of the fence, dB.
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Special soundproof booths have been designed for confidential conversations. Structurally, they are divided into frame and frameless. In the first case, on metal carcass Sound-absorbing panels are attached. Cabins with two-layer sound-absorbing slabs provide sound attenuation up to 35...40 dB.
Frameless type cabins have higher acoustic efficiency (higher attenuation coefficient). They are assembled from ready-made multilayer panels connected to each other through soundproofing elastic gaskets. Such cabins are expensive to manufacture, but the sound level reduction in them can reach 50 ... 55 dB.
Related information.
Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.
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Moscow Department of Education
State Autonomous Educational Institution
secondary vocational education in Moscow
Polytechnic College No. 8
named after twice Hero of the Soviet Union I.F. Pavlova
COURSE PROJECT
SPECIALTY - 090905
"Organization and technology of information security"
Bytopic:Protection of acoustic (speech) information from leakage through technical channels
Course project completed
student group: 34OB(s)
Teacher: V.P. Zverev
Moscow 2013
Introduction
1.1 Acoustic information
Chapter 4. Safety precautions and workplace organization
4.1 Explanation of requirements for premises and workplaces
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
According to trends in the development of society, the most common resource is information, and, consequently, its value is constantly increasing. “Whoever owns the information owns the world.” This undoubtedly has an essence that expresses the current situation in the world. Since the disclosure of some information often leads to negative consequences for its owner, the issue of protecting information from unauthorized receipt is becoming increasingly acute.
Since for every defense there is a way to overcome it, to ensure proper information security it is necessary to constantly improve methods.
Information carried by a speech signal or speech information receives worthy attention of the attacking side. In the general case, speech information is a set consisting of semantic, personal, behavioral, etc. information. As a rule, semantic information is of greatest interest.
The problem of protecting confidential negotiations is solved comprehensively using various types of measures, including the use of technical means, this happens as follows. The fact is that the primary carriers of speech information are acoustic vibrations of the air environment created by the articulatory tract of the negotiator. Natural or by artificial means secondary carriers of speech information become vibrational, magnetic, electrical and electromagnetic vibrations in various frequency ranges, which “remove” confidential information from the meeting room. To eliminate this fact, these oscillations are masked by similar oscillations, which are masking signals in “suspicious” or identified frequency ranges. In this regard, known technical channels for leaking speech information, such as cable networks, are “closed” on an ongoing basis by various technical means. for various purposes, pipelines, enclosing building structures, windows and doors, side electromagnetic radiation (ESEM).
This entire complex of measures requires significant financial costs, both one-time (during construction or re-equipment office premises in order to meet the requirements information security), and current ones (for carrying out the above activities and for updating the fleet of monitoring equipment). These costs can reach several tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending on the importance of confidential information and the financial capabilities of office space owners.
The purpose of this thesis is a theoretical and practical consideration of methods and means of protecting acoustic (speech) information from leakage through technical channels.
Objectives of this course project:
· Identification of leakage channels and unauthorized access to resources
· Technical channels of information leakage
· Means of active protection of speech information from leakage through technical channels
The object of the study is the classification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
The subject of the research is organizational measures for the protection of speech information, equipment for searching for reconnaissance means and technical means for protecting acoustic information.
acoustic protection information
Chapter 1. Theoretical justification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
1.1 Acoustic information
Protected speech (acoustic) information includes information that is proprietary and subject to protection in accordance with the requirements of legal documents or requirements established by the owner of the information. This is, as a rule, restricted access information containing information related to state secret, as well as confidential information.
To discuss restricted access information (meetings, discussions, conferences, negotiations, etc.) are used special premises(offices, assembly halls, conference rooms, etc.), which are called dedicated premises (VP). To prevent the interception of information from these premises, as a rule, they are used special means protection, therefore, dedicated premises are in some cases called protected premises (SP).
As a rule, auxiliary technical means and systems (HTSS) are installed in dedicated premises:
* city automatic telephone communication;
* data transmission in the radio communication system;
* security and fire alarm;
* alerts and alarms;
* air conditioning;
* wired radio broadcast network and reception of radio and television programs (subscriber loudspeakers, radio broadcasting equipment, televisions and radios, etc.);
* electronic office equipment;
* electric clock equipment;
* control and measuring equipment, etc.
The allocated premises are located within the controlled zone (CA), which means a space (territory, building, part of a building) in which the uncontrolled presence of unauthorized persons (including visitors to the organization), as well as vehicles, is excluded. The border of the controlled zone may be the perimeter of the protected territory of the organization, the enclosing structures of the protected building or the protected part of the building, if it is located in an unprotected area. In some cases, the boundary of the controlled area may be the enclosing structures (walls, floor, ceiling) of the allocated room.
Protection of speech (acoustic) information from leakage through technical channels is achieved by carrying out organizational and technical measures, as well as identifying portable electronic devices interception of information (embedded devices) embedded in designated premises.
1.2 Technical channels of information leakage
Acoustic channel
The acoustic information leakage channel is implemented as follows:
· eavesdropping on conversations in open areas and indoors, being nearby or using directional microphones (there are parabolic, tubular or flat). The directionality is 2-5 degrees, the average range of the most common - tubular - is about 100 meters. Under good climatic conditions in open areas, a parabolic directional microphone can operate at a distance of up to 1 km;
· secret recording of conversations using a voice recorder or tape recorder (including voice-activated digital voice recorders);
· eavesdropping on conversations using remote microphones (the range of radio microphones is 50-200 meters without repeaters).
Microphones used in radio devices can be built-in or remote and have two types: acoustic (sensitive mainly to the action of sound vibrations in the air and designed to intercept voice messages) and vibration (converting vibrations that occur in various rigid structures into electrical signals).
Acoustoelectric channel
Acoustoelectric information leakage channel, the features of which are:
· ease of use (power supply is available everywhere);
· no problems with power supply to the microphone;
· the ability to retrieve information from the power supply network without connecting to it (using electromagnetic radiation power supply networks). Reception of information from such “bugs” is carried out by special receivers connected to the power network within a radius of up to 300 meters from the “bug” along the length of the wiring or to the power transformer serving the building or complex of buildings;
· possible interference on household appliances when using the electrical network to transmit information, as well as poor quality transmitted signal when large quantities operation of household appliances.
Prevention:
· transformer isolation is an obstacle to further transmission of information through the power supply network;
Telephone channel
A telephone information leakage channel for eavesdropping on telephone conversations (as part of industrial espionage) is possible:
· galvanic recording of telephone conversations (by contact connection of listening devices anywhere in the subscriber telephone network). Determined by deterioration of audibility and the appearance of interference, as well as with the help of special equipment;
· telephone-location method (by high-frequency imposition). A high-frequency tone signal is supplied through the telephone line, which affects the nonlinear elements of the telephone set (diodes, transistors, microcircuits), which are also affected by the acoustic signal. As a result, a high-frequency modulated signal is formed in the telephone line. Eavesdropping can be detected by the presence of a high-frequency signal in the telephone line. However, the range of such a system is due to the attenuation of the RF signal in a two-wire system. the line does not exceed one hundred meters. Possible counteraction: suppression of high-frequency signal in the telephone line;
· inductive and capacitive method of secretly recording telephone conversations (contactless connection).
Inductive method - due to electromagnetic induction arising during telephone conversations along the telephone line. A transformer is used as a receiving device for retrieving information, the primary winding of which covers one or two wires of the telephone line.
Capacitive method - due to the formation of an electrostatic field on the plates of the capacitor, changing in accordance with changes in the level of telephone conversations. As a receiver for telephone conversations, a capacitive sensor is used, made in the form of two plates that fit tightly to the telephone line wires.
Eavesdropping on conversations indoors using telephones is possible in the following ways:
· low-frequency and high-frequency method of recording acoustic signals and telephone conversations. This method is based on connecting listening devices to the telephone line, which transmit sound signals converted by a microphone along the telephone line at high or low frequencies. Allows you to listen to a conversation both when the handset is raised and lowered. Protection is carried out by cutting off the high-frequency and low-frequency components in the telephone line;
· use of telephone remote listening devices. This method is based on installing a remote listening device in elements of the subscriber telephone network by connecting it in parallel to the telephone line and turning it on remotely. A remote telephone eavesdropping device has two deconstructive properties: at the time of eavesdropping, the subscriber's telephone set is disconnected from the telephone line, and also when the telephone is on-hook and the eavesdropping device is turned on, the supply voltage of the telephone line is less than 20 Volts, while it should be 60.
1.3 Basic methods of obtaining acoustic information
The main reasons for information leakage are:
* non-compliance by personnel with norms, requirements, operating rules of the NPP;
* errors in the design of speakers and speaker protection systems;
* conducting technical and intelligence intelligence by the opposing side.
In accordance with GOST R 50922-96, three types of information leakage are considered:
*disclosure;
*unauthorized access to information;
*obtaining protected information by intelligence services (both domestic and foreign).
Disclosure of information means the unauthorized delivery of protected information to consumers who do not have the right to access the protected information.
Unauthorized access means the receipt of protected information by an interested subject in violation of the rights or rules of access to protected information established by legal documents or the owner, owner of the information. In this case, the interested party exercising unauthorized access to information may be: the state, entity, group individuals, including public organization, a separate individual.
Obtaining protected information by intelligence services can be carried out using technical means (technical intelligence) or undercover methods (undercover intelligence).
Composition of information leakage channels
|
Source KUI |
Name of KUI |
Description |
|
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Telephone lines Radiotelephone |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
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City and local radio broadcast |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver; Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
|
PC with full configuration |
Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
||
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Photo-optical detectors |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver; Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
|
Heating and ventilation system |
Acoustic |
Information leakage due to weak acoustic insulation (cracks, leaks, holes). Such leaks include: - cracks near embedded cable pipes, - ventilation, leaks of doors and door frames. Transfer of information through vibration through heating risers. |
|
|
Power supply system |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver; Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
|
3G mobile phone |
Acoustic |
Leak of information via radio channel. |
|
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Ceilings |
Acoustic |
Membrane energy transfer of speech signals through partitions due to low mass and weak signal attenuation. |
|
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Vibrating |
Information leakage by removing a useful signal from surfaces that vibrate during a conversation. |
||
|
Grounding system |
Electroacoustic |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver. |
Of all possible channels information leaks The greatest attraction for attackers are technical channels of information leakage, therefore it is necessary to organize concealment and protection against information leakage primarily through these channels. Since organizing the concealment and protection of acoustic information from leakage through technical channels is quite an expensive undertaking, it is necessary to conduct a detailed study of all channels, and apply technical means of protection precisely in those places where it is impossible to do without them.
Chapter 2. Practical justification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
2.1 Organizational measures for the protection of speech information
The main organizational measures to protect speech information from leakage through technical channels include:
* selection of premises for conducting confidential negotiations (dedicated premises);
* use of certified auxiliary technical means and systems (VTSS) in airspace;
* establishing a controlled zone around the airspace;
* dismantling of unused VTSS, their connecting lines and extraneous conductors in the VP;
* organization of regime and access control in the VP;
* disabling confidential negotiations of unprotected VTSS.
Premises in which confidential negotiations are expected to be conducted must be selected taking into account their sound insulation, as well as the enemy’s ability to intercept speech information via acousto-vibration and acousto-optical channels. As allocated, it is advisable to choose premises that do not have common enclosing structures with premises belonging to other organizations, or with premises to which there is uncontrolled access by unauthorized persons. If possible, the windows of designated premises should not overlook parking areas, as well as nearby buildings from which reconnaissance using lasers is possible. speaker systems.
If the border of the controlled zone is the enclosing structures (walls, floor, ceiling) of the allocated premises, a temporary controlled zone can be established for the period of confidential events, which excludes or significantly complicates the possibility of interception of voice information.
Only certified technical means and systems should be used in designated premises, i.e. past special technical checks for the possible presence of embedded embedded devices, special studies for the presence of acoustoelectric information leakage channels and having certificates of compliance with information security requirements in accordance with regulatory documents FSTEC of Russia.
All auxiliary technical means not used to ensure confidential negotiations, as well as extraneous cables and wires passing through the allocated premises must be dismantled.
Uncertified technical equipment installed in designated premises must be disconnected from connecting lines and power sources when conducting confidential negotiations.
During off-duty hours, allocated premises must be closed, sealed and placed under guard. During official hours, employees' access to these premises should be limited (according to lists) and controlled (visitation records). If necessary, these premises can be equipped with access control and management systems.
All work on IP protection (at the stages of design, construction or reconstruction, installation of equipment and information security equipment, certification of IP) is carried out by organizations licensed to operate in the field of information security.
When a VP is put into operation, and then periodically, it must be certified according to information security requirements in accordance with the regulatory documents of the FSTEC of Russia. Special examinations should also be carried out periodically.
In most cases, organizational measures alone cannot ensure the required efficiency of information protection and it is necessary to carry out technical measures to protect information. A technical event is an information protection event that involves the use of special technical means, as well as the implementation technical solutions. Technical events are aimed at closing channels of information leakage by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio in places where portable acoustic reconnaissance equipment or their sensors may be located to values that ensure the impossibility of isolating an information signal by reconnaissance means. Depending on the means used, technical methods of protecting information are divided into passive and active.
Passive methods of information protection are aimed at:
· weakening of acoustic and vibration signals to values that ensure the impossibility of their isolation by means of acoustic reconnaissance against the background of natural noise in their places possible installation;
· weakening of information electrical signals in the connecting lines of auxiliary technical means and systems that arose as a result of acousto-electric transformations of acoustic signals, to values that ensure the impossibility of their isolation by reconnaissance means against the background of natural noise;
· exclusion (weakening) of the passage of “high-frequency imposition” signals in HTSS, which incorporate electroacoustic transducers (having a microphone effect);
· weakening of radio signals transmitted by embedded devices to values that ensure the impossibility of their reception in places where receiving devices can be installed;
· weakening of signals transmitted by embedded devices via a 220 V power supply network to values that ensure the impossibility of their reception in places where receiving devices can be installed
Rice. 1 Classification of passive methods of protection
Speech (acoustic) signals are weakened by soundproofing rooms, which is aimed at localizing the sources of acoustic signals inside them.
Special inserts and gaskets are used for vibration isolation of heat, gas, water supply and sewerage pipes extending beyond the controlled area
Fig.2. Installation of special tools
In order to close acoustoelectromagnetic channels of speech information leakage, as well as information leakage channels created by hidden installation in the premises of mortgage devices with information transmission via radio channel, are used various ways shielding of designated premises
Installation of special low-frequency filters and limiters in VTSS connecting lines extending beyond the controlled area is used to eliminate the possibility of intercepting speech information from designated premises via passive and active acoustoelectric information leakage channels
Special low-frequency filters of the FP type are installed in the power supply line (socket and lighting network) of a dedicated room in order to exclude the possible transmission of information intercepted by network bookmarks through them (Fig. 4). For these purposes, filters with a cutoff frequency fгp ? 20...40 kHz and attenuation of at least 60 - 80 dB. Filters must be installed within the controlled area.
Fig.3. Installation of a special device - “Granit-8”
Rice. 4. Installation of special filters (FP type).
If it is technically impossible to use passive means of protecting premises or if they do not provide the required sound insulation standards, active methods of protecting speech information are used, which are aimed at:
· creation of masking acoustic and vibration noise in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio to values that ensure the impossibility of identifying speech information by means of acoustic reconnaissance in the places of their possible installation;
· creation of masking electromagnetic interference in the connecting lines of VTSS in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio to values that ensure the impossibility of isolating an information signal by reconnaissance means in possible places of their connection;
· suppression of sound recording devices (dictaphones) in recording mode;
· suppression of receiving devices that receive information from embedded devices via a radio channel;
· suppression of receiving devices that receive information from embedded devices via a 220 V electrical network
Fig.5. Classification of active methods of protection
Acoustic masking is effectively used to protect speech information from leakage through a direct acoustic channel by suppressing acoustic interference (noise) of reconnaissance microphones installed in such structural elements of protected premises as a door vestibule, ventilation duct, space behind suspended ceiling and so on.
Vibroacoustic masking is used to protect speech information from leakage along the acousto-vibration (Fig. 6) and acousto-optical (optoelectronic) channels (Fig. 7) and consists of creating vibration noise in the elements building structures, window glass, utilities, etc. Vibroacoustic camouflage is effectively used to suppress electronic and radio stethoscopes, as well as laser acoustic reconnaissance systems
Rice. 6.Creation of vibration interference
The creation of masking electromagnetic low-frequency interference (low-frequency masking interference method) is used to eliminate the possibility of intercepting speech information from designated premises via passive and active acoustoelectric information leakage channels, suppressing wired microphone systems that use VTSS connecting lines to transmit information at low frequencies, and suppressing acoustic jamming "telephone ear" type.
Most often this method used to protect telephone sets that contain elements that have a “microphone effect”, and consists of supplying a masking signal (most often of the “white noise” type) of the speech frequency range to the line when the telephone is on-hook (usually the main interference power concentrated in the frequency range of a standard telephone channel: 300 - 3400 Hz) (Fig. 8).
Rice. 7. Interference
The creation of masking high-frequency (frequency range from 20 - 40 kHz to 10 - 30 MHz) electromagnetic interference in the power supply lines (socket and lighting network) of a dedicated room is used to suppress devices receiving information from network bookmarks (Fig. 9).
The creation of spatial masking high-frequency (frequency range from 20 - 50 kHz to 1.5 - 2.5 MHz)* electromagnetic interference is mainly used to suppress devices for receiving information from radio bombs (Fig. 10).
Rice. 8. Creation of high frequency interference
Soundproofing of premises
Sound insulation (vibration insulation) of dedicated (protected) premises (VP) is the main passive method of protecting speech information and is aimed at localizing the sources of acoustic signals inside them. It is carried out in order to exclude the possibility of eavesdropping on conversations taking place in a dedicated room, either without the use of technical means, by unauthorized persons (visitors, technical personnel), as well as by employees of the organization who are not allowed to the information being discussed, when they are in the corridors and adjacent to the allocated premises ( unintentional eavesdropping), and by the enemy through direct acoustic (through cracks, windows, doors, technological openings, ventilation ducts, etc.), acousto-vibration (through enclosing structures, pipes engineering communications etc.) and acousto-optical (via window glass) technical channels of information leakage using portable means of acoustic (speech) reconnaissance.
As an indicator for assessing the effectiveness of sound insulation of allocated premises, verbal speech intelligibility is used, characterized by the number of correctly understood words and reflecting the qualitative area of comprehensibility, which is expressed in terms of the details of the compiled certificate about the conversation intercepted using technical intelligence means.
The process of speech perception in noise is accompanied by losses constituent elements voice message. In this case, speech intelligibility will be determined not only by the level of the speech signal, but also by the level and nature of external noise at the location of the reconnaissance equipment sensor.
The criteria for the effectiveness of speech information protection largely depend on the goals pursued in organizing the protection, for example: to hide the semantic content of an ongoing conversation, to hide the topic of an ongoing conversation, or to hide the very fact of negotiations.
Practical experience shows that drawing up a detailed report on the content of an intercepted conversation is impossible when verbal intelligibility is less than 60 - 70%, and a brief summary is impossible when verbal intelligibility is less than 40 - 60%. With verbal intelligibility less than 20 - 40%, it is significantly difficult to establish even the subject of an ongoing conversation, and with verbal intelligibility less than 10 - 20% this is practically impossible even when using modern methods noise reduction.
Considering that the level of the speech signal in a dedicated room can range from 64 to 84 dB, depending on the level of acoustic noise at the location of the reconnaissance facility and the category of the dedicated room, it is easy to calculate the required level of sound insulation to ensure effective protection speech information from leakage through all possible technical channels.
Sound insulation of premises is ensured with the help of architectural and engineering solutions, as well as the use of special construction and finishing materials.
When an acoustic wave falls on the boundary of surfaces with different specific densities, most of the incident wave is reflected. A smaller part of the wave penetrates the material of the soundproofing structure and propagates through it, losing its energy depending on the length of the path and its acoustic properties. Under the influence of an acoustic wave, the soundproofing surface undergoes complex vibrations, which also absorb the energy of the incident wave.
The nature of this absorption is determined by the ratio of the frequencies of the incident acoustic wave and the spectral characteristics of the surface of the soundproofing device.
When assessing the sound insulation of designated premises, it is necessary to separately consider the sound insulation of: the enclosing structures of the room (walls, floor, ceiling, windows, doors) and engineering support systems ( supply and exhaust ventilation, heating, air conditioning).
2.2 Equipment for searching technical means of reconnaissance
Multifunctional search device ST 033 "Piranha"
ST 033 "Piranha" is intended for carrying out operational measures to detect and localize technical means of secretly obtaining information, as well as to identify natural and artificially created channels of information leakage.
The product consists of a main control and display unit, a set of converters and allows operation in the following modes:
· high-frequency detector-frequency meter;
Microwave detector (Together with ST03.SHF)
· Wire line analyzer;
· IR radiation detector;
· detector of low-frequency magnetic fields;
· differential low-frequency amplifier (together with ST 03.DA);
· vibroacoustic receiver;
· acoustic receiver
Figure 9 - Multifunctional search device ST 033 "Piranha"
The transition to any of the modes is carried out automatically when the corresponding converter is connected. Information is displayed on a backlit graphic LCD display; acoustic control is carried out through special headphones or through a built-in loudspeaker.
It is possible to store up to 99 images in volatile memory.
Indication of incoming low-frequency signals is provided in oscilloscope or spectrum analyzer modes with indication of numerical parameters.
The ST 033 "Piranha" provides contextual help on the display depending on the operating mode. You can choose Russian or English.
ST 033 "Piranha" is made in a wearable version. To carry and store it, a special bag is used, designed for compact and convenient stowage of all elements of the kit.
Using ST 033 "Piranha" it is possible to solve the following control and search tasks:
1. Identification of the fact of operation (detection) and localization of the location of radio-emitting special technical means that create potentially dangerous radio emissions from the point of view of information leakage. These means primarily include:
· radio microphones;
· telephone radio repeaters;
radio stethoscopes;
· hidden video cameras with a radio channel for transmitting information;
· technical means of spatial high-frequency irradiation systems in the radio range;
· radio beacons for tracking systems for the movement of objects (people, vehicles, cargo, etc.);
· unauthorized use Cell Phones GSM, DECT standards, radio stations, radio telephones.
· devices that use data transmission channels using BLUETOOTH and WLAN standards to transmit data.
2. Detection and localization of the location of special technical means that work with radiation in the infrared range. These means primarily include:
· embedded devices for obtaining acoustic information from premises with its subsequent transmission via a channel in the infrared range;
· technical means of spatial irradiation systems in the infrared range.
3. Detection and localization of the location of special technical means that use wire lines for various purposes to obtain and transmit information, as well as technical means of information processing that create induction of informative signals onto nearby wire lines or the flow of these signals into the lines of the power supply network. Such means may be:
· embedded devices that use network lines to transmit intercepted information alternating current 220V and capable of operating at frequencies up to 15 MHz;
· PCs and other technical means of producing, reproducing and transmitting information;
· technical means of linear high-frequency imposition systems operating at frequencies above 150 kHz;
· embedded devices that use subscriber telephone lines, lines of fire and fire protection systems to transmit intercepted information burglar alarm with a carrier frequency above 20 kHz.
4. Detection and localization of the location of sources of electromagnetic fields with a predominance (presence) of the magnetic component of the field, routes for laying hidden (unmarked) electrical wiring, potentially suitable for installing embedded devices, as well as research of technical means that process speech information. Such sources and technical means usually include:
· output transformers of audio frequency amplifiers;
· dynamic loudspeakers of acoustic systems;
· electric motors of tape recorders and voice recorders;
5. Identification of the most vulnerable places from the point of view of the occurrence of vibroacoustic channels of information leakage.
6. Identification of the most vulnerable places from the point of view of the occurrence of acoustic information leakage channels.
Vibroacoustic receiver mode
In this mode, the product receives from an external vibroacoustic sensor and displays the parameters of low-frequency signals in the range from 300 to 6000 Hz.
The state of vibroacoustic protection of premises is assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively.
A quantitative assessment of the protection status is carried out based on the analysis of an oscillogram automatically displayed on the display screen, displaying the shape of the received signal and the current value of its amplitude.
A qualitative assessment of the state of protection is based on direct listening to the received low-frequency signal and analysis of its volume and timbre characteristics. For this, either the built-in loudspeaker or headphones are used.
Specifications
Acoustic receiver mode
In this mode, the product provides reception to an external remote microphone and displays the parameters of acoustic signals in the range from 300 to 6000 Hz.
The state of sound insulation of premises and the presence of vulnerable places in them from the point of view of information leakage are determined both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Quantitative assessment of the state of sound insulation of premises and identification of possible channels of information leakage are carried out based on the analysis of an oscillogram automatically displayed on the display screen, reflecting the shape of the received signal and the current value of its amplitude.
Qualitative assessment is based on direct listening to the received acoustic signal and analysis of its volume and timbre characteristics. For this, either the built-in loudspeaker or headphones are used.
Specifications
Are common specifications ST 033 "PIRANHA"
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High frequency detector-frequency meter |
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Operating frequency range, MHz |
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Sensitivity, mV |
< 2 (200МГц-1000МГц) 4 (1000MHz-1600MHz) 8 (1600MHz-2000MHz) |
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Dynamic range, dB |
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Frequency meter sensitivity, mV |
<15 (100МГц-1200МГц) |
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Frequency measurement accuracy, % |
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Wire Line Scanning Analyzer |
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Scan range, MHz |
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Sensitivity, at s/n 10 dB, mV |
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Scan step, kHz |
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Scanning speed, kHz |
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Bandwidth, kHz |
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Adjacent channel selectivity, dB |
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Detection Mode |
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Permissible network voltage, V |
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IR Radiation Detector |
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Spectral range, nm |
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Threshold sensitivity, W/Hz2 |
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Field of view angle, degrees. |
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Frequency band, MHz |
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LF magnetic field detector |
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Frequency range, kHz |
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Threshold sensitivity, A/(m x Hz2) |
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Vibroacoustic receiver |
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Sensitivity, V x sec2/m |
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Inherent noise in the band 300Hz-3000Hz, µV |
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Acoustic receiver |
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Sensitivity, mV/Pa |
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Frequency range, Hz |
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Oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer |
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Bandwidth, kHz |
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Input sensitivity, mV |
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Measurement error, % |
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Waveform output speed, s |
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Spectrogram output speed, s |
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Indication |
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Liquid crystal graphic display with a resolution of 128x64 pixels with adjustable backlight |
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Supply voltage, V |
6(4 batteries or AA batteries)/220 |
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Maximum current consumption, no more than mA |
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Current consumption in operating mode, no more than mA |
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Dimensions, mm |
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Main unit |
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Packing bag |
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Main unit |
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Delivery contents
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Name |
Quantity, pcs |
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1. Main control, processing and display unit |
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2. Active HF antenna |
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3. Wire Line Scanning Analyzer Adapter |
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4. Nozzle type "220" |
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5. Crocodile type nozzle |
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6. Needle type nozzle |
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7. Magnetic sensor |
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8. IR sensor |
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9.Acoustic sensor |
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10. Vibroacoustic sensor |
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11. Telescopic antenna |
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12. Headphones |
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13. AA battery |
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14. Shoulder strap |
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15. Main unit stand |
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16. Power supply |
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17. Bag - packaging |
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18. Technical description and operating instructions |
2.3 Technical means of protecting acoustic information from leakage through technical channels
Spatial noise generators
The GROM-ZI-4 noise generator is designed to protect premises from information leakage and prevent the removal of information from personal computers and PC-based local area networks. Universal noise generator range 20 - 1000 MHz. Operating modes: “Radio channel”, “Telephone line”, “Power network”
Main functionality of the device:
· Generating interference over the airwaves, telephone lines and electrical networks to block unauthorized devices transmitting information;
· Masking of side electromagnetic radiation from PCs and LANs;
· No need for adjustment to specific application conditions.
Noise generator "Grom-ZI-4"
Generator technical data and characteristics
· Field strength of interference generated over the air relative to 1 µV/m
· The voltage of the signal generated via the electrical network is relative to 1 µV in the frequency range 0.1-1 MHz - at least 60 dB;
· Signal generated via telephone line - pulses with a frequency of 20 kHz and an amplitude of 10V;
· Power supply 220V 50Hz.
The Grom 3I-4 generator is part of the Grom 3I-4 system together with the Si-5002.1 discone antenna
Parameters of the Si-5002.1 discone antenna:
· Operating frequency range: 1 - 2000 MHz.
· Vertical polarization.
· Directional pattern - quasi-circular.
· Dimensions: 360x950 mm.
The antenna can be used as a receiving antenna as part of radio monitoring complexes and in studying the strength of noise and pulse electric fields of radio signals with measuring receivers and spectrum analyzers
Telephone line protection equipment
"Lightning"
“Lightning” is a means of protection against unauthorized eavesdropping of conversations both on the telephone and indoors using devices operating on wire lines or power lines.
The operating principle of the device is based on the electrical breakdown of radioelements. When you press the “Start” button, a powerful short high-voltage pulse is supplied to the line, which can completely destroy or disrupt the functional activity of the information collection equipment.
Leakage protection devices through acoustic channels "Troyan"
Trojan Acoustic blocker of all information collection devices.
With the emergence of increasingly advanced devices for capturing and recording speech information, the use of which is difficult to detect with search technology (laser recording devices, stethoscopes, directional microphones, micro-power radio microphones with a remote microphone, wired microphones, modern digital voice recorders, radio bookmarks that transmit acoustic information over the electrical network and other communication and signaling lines at low frequencies, etc.), an acoustic masker often remains the only means that ensures guaranteed closure of all speech information leakage channels.
Principle of operation:
In the conversation area there is a device with external microphones (microphones must be at a distance of at least 40-50 cm from the device to avoid acoustic feedback). During a conversation, the speech signal is transmitted from the microphones to an electronic processing circuit, which eliminates the phenomenon of acoustic feedback (microphone - speaker) and turns the speech into a signal that contains the main spectral components of the original speech signal.
The device has an acoustic trigger circuit with an adjustable switching threshold. The acoustic release system (VAS) reduces the duration of exposure to speech interference on hearing, which helps reduce the effect of fatigue from exposure to the device. In addition, the battery life of the device increases. The speech-like interference of the device sounds synchronously with the masked speech and its volume depends on the volume of the conversation.
Small dimensions and universal power supply allow you to use the product in the office, car and any other unprepared place.
In the office, you can connect active computer speakers to the device to make noise in a large area, if necessary.
Main technical characteristics
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Type of generated interference |
speech-like, correlated with the original speech signal. The intensity of the interference and its spectral composition are close to the original speech signal. Each time the device is turned on, unique fragments of speech-like interference are presented |
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Range of reproduced acoustic frequencies |
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Device management |
using two external microphones |
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Audio amplifier output power |
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Maximum sound pressure from internal speaker |
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The voltage of the interference signal at the linear output depends on the position of the volume control and reaches the value |
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Product power |
from a 7.4 V battery. The battery is charged from a 220 V power supply using the adapter that is included with the product. |
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Battery full charge time |
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Capacity of the battery used |
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The continuous operation time when powered by a fully charged battery depends on the sound volume and is |
5 - 6 hours |
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Maximum current consumption at full volume |
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Product dimensions |
145 x 85 x 25 mm |
Equipment:
· Main unit,
· mains charging adapter,
· product passport with operating instructions,
Extension cord for computer speakers
· remote microphones.
Suppressor "Kanonir-K" for microphone listening devices
The product "CANNIR-K" is designed to protect the meeting place from means of collecting acoustic information.
Silent mode blocks radio microphones, wired microphones and most digital voice recorders, including voice recorders in mobile phones (smartphones). The product silently blocks the acoustic channels of mobile phones, which are located near the device on the emitter side. Blocking microphones of mobile phones does not depend on the standard of their operation: (GSM, 3G, 4G, CDMA, etc.) and does not affect the reception of incoming calls.
When blocking various means of picking up and recording speech information, the product uses both speech-like and silent ultrasonic interference.
In the speech-like interference mode, all available means of collecting and recording acoustic information are blocked.
A brief overview of voice recorder and radio microphone blockers available on the market:
· Microwave blockers: (storm), (noisetron), etc.
The advantage is the silent operation mode. Disadvantages: most modern digital voice recorders do not block the operation of voice recorders in mobile phones at all.
· Generators of speech-like signals: (fakir, shaman), etc.
They are effective only when the conversation volume level does not exceed the level of acoustic interference. Conversations have to be carried out in loud noise, which is tiring.
· Products (comfort and chaos).
The devices are very effective, but conversations have to be carried out in tight-fitting microtelephone headsets, which is not acceptable for everyone.
Main technical characteristics of the Kanonir-K product.
Power: rechargeable battery (15V. 1600mA.) (if the red LED goes out, you need to connect the charger). When the charger is connected, the green LED located near the “output” socket should light up. If the LED lights dimly or goes out, this indicates that the battery is fully charged. A bright LED indicates a low battery.
· Time to fully charge the battery - 8 hours.
· Current consumption in silent mode - 100 - 130 mA. In speech-like interference mode together with silent mode - 280 mA.
· The voltage of the speech-like noise signal at the linear output is 1V.
· Time of continuous operation in two modes simultaneously - 5 hours.
· The blocking range of radio microphones and voice recorders is 2 - 4 meters.
· Ultrasonic interference emission angle is 80 degrees.
· Dimensions of the product "CANNIR-K" - 170 x 85 x 35 mm.
The second chapter examined organizational measures for the protection of speech information, equipment for searching for technical reconnaissance means, and technical means for protecting acoustic information from leakage through technical channels. Since the use of technical means of protection is expensive, these means will not have to be used throughout the perimeter of the room, but only in the most vulnerable places. The equipment for searching technical means of reconnaissance and means of actively protecting information from leakage through vibroacoustic and acoustic channels were also considered. Since, in addition to technical channels for information leakage, there are other ways to steal information, these technical means must be used in conjunction with technical means of protecting information through other possible channels.
Chapter 3. Feasibility study
In this thesis project, the composition of material costs can be determined taking into account some features related to the installation of an acoustic and vibroacoustic protection system. In this case, since the work takes place on site, workshop and general plant expenses must be combined under a single name of costs. As initial information for determining the amount of all costs of Sb.com, rubles, you can use formula 2.
Sb.com = M + OZP + DZP + Unified Social Tax + SO + OHR + KZ
where M is the cost of materials;
WFP - basic salary for specialists participating in the development of the program;
DZP - additional salary for specialists participating in the development of the program;
UST - unified social tax;
CO - costs associated with the operation of equipment (depreciation);
OCR - general economic costs;
KZ - non-production (commercial) expenses.
The calculation of financial costs is calculated taking into account the route maps presented in Table 9.
Operating time
During the installation process, equipment such as a puncher, crimping tool, and tester was used. The table shows the consumables and equipment needed to create a network
Vibroacoustic protection equipment (vibroacoustic noise generator “LGSh - 404” and emitters for it in the amount of 8 pieces) and the Canonir-K microphone listening device suppressor were purchased by the customer and are not taken into account in the calculation of material costs.
Cost sheet
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Name Materials |
Unit |
Price per unit of measurement, rub. |
Quantity |
Amount, rub. |
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4. Self-tapping screws |
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6. Victory drill |
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8. Roulette |
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11. Phillips screwdriver |
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The volume of material costs for product M, rubles, is calculated using formula 3
М = У Рi · qi
where pi is the type of material i according to the quantity;
qi is the cost of specific unit i of material.
Calculation of the volume of material costs is calculated using the formula
M = 2+5+30+50+200+100=387 (rub.)
The calculation of the basic salary is carried out on the basis of the developed technological process of the work performed, which should include information:
On the sequence and content of all types of work performed,
On the qualifications of workers involved in performing certain types of work at all production stages (transitions, operations),
About the labor intensity of performing all types of work,
On the technical equipment of workplaces when performing work at all stages.
Since some preferential categories of employees and planned bonuses to the established tariffs for high-quality and timely completion of work may participate in the formation of the basic wage fund, correction factors are provided in the calculations. Their values are determined on the basis of increasing interest rates relative to the direct costs of paying wages to employees. It is recommended to choose increasing interest rates in the range from 20% to 40%; in this work it is selected based on an interest rate of 30%, or Kzp = 0.3.
To determine financial costs, it is necessary to attract an employee with appropriate qualifications for whom the monthly salary must be determined. An employee’s salary for similar work is 50,000 rubles per month, based on this we will determine the hourly tariff rate Hours rubles/hour using the formula
Development of a project for the technical component of a system for protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels in premises intended for holding meetings of the board of directors, official negotiations with clients, and working closed meetings.
course work, added 02/05/2013
Access control as the main method of protecting information by regulating the use of all information resources and its functions. Stages of searching for embedded devices to prevent leakage of speech information through acoustic and vibroacoustic channels.
abstract, added 01/25/2009
Description of the identified functional channels of information leakage. Methodological approaches to assessing the effectiveness of speech information protection. Calculation of the possibility of the existence of a natural acoustic channel for information leakage using the method of N.B. Pokrovsky.
course work, added 08/06/2013
Creation of a speech information protection system at an informatization facility. Ways to block acoustic, acousto-radio-electronic, acousto-optical, radio-electronic data leakage channels. Technical means of protecting information from eavesdropping and recording.
course work, added 08/06/2013
Features of speech signal propagation. Analysis of spectral characteristics. Development of a laboratory stand for the study of direct acoustic, vibration and acoustoelectric channels of speech information leakage and experimental methods.
thesis, added 10/27/2010
Project of the technical component of a speech information protection system at an informatization facility. Functional channels of information leakage. Calculation of the possibility of the existence of an acoustic channel of information leakage outside the premises using the Pokrovsky method.
course work, added 04/13/2013
Analysis of the main development of the technical design of the information security system and threats through electromagnetic and acoustic channels. Identification of possible channels of information leakage in the meeting room. Shielding: concept, main features, tasks.
course work, added 01/09/2014
Measures to counter information threats. Acoustic and vibroacoustic channels of speech information leakage. Types of radar reconnaissance. Classification of methods and means of protecting information from side-view radar stations.
presentation, added 06/28/2017
Technical methods used to prevent unauthorized connections. Active methods of protection against information leakage via an electroacoustic channel. The main methods of transmitting packets with voice information over a network in IP telephony, their encryption.
abstract, added 01/25/2009
The relevance of protecting information from leaks via an electromagnetic channel. Passive and active methods of protecting speech information in dedicated premises. Vibroacoustic masking technology. Design of an information security system at an enterprise.
Methods and means of protecting against leakage of confidential information through technical channels
Protection of information from leakage through technical channels is a set of organizational, organizational, technical and technical measures that exclude or weaken the uncontrolled release of confidential information outside the controlled area.
Protection of information from leakage via visual-optical channels
In order to protect information from leakage via the visual-optical channel, it is recommended:
· position the protected objects so as to prevent the reflection of light towards the possible location of the attacker (spatial reflections);
· reduce the reflective properties of the protected object;
· reduce the illumination of the protected object (energy restrictions);
· use means of blocking or significantly weakening reflected light: screens, screens, curtains, shutters, dark glasses and other obstructing environments, obstacles;
· use means of masking, imitation and others in order to protect and mislead the attacker;
· use means of passive and active protection of the source from the uncontrolled spread of reflected or emitted light and other radiation;
· camouflage protected objects by varying the reflective properties and background contrast;
· camouflage means for hiding objects can be used in the form of aerosol curtains and camouflage nets, paints, and shelters.
Protection of information from leakage via acoustic channels
The main measures in this type of protection are organizational and organizational-technical measures.
Organizational measures involve the implementation of architectural, planning, spatial and regime measures. Architectural and planning the measures provide for the imposition of certain requirements at the design stage of buildings and premises or their reconstruction and adaptation in order to eliminate or weaken the uncontrolled propagation of sound fields directly in the airspace or in building structures in the form of 1/10 of structural sound.
Spatial the requirements may include both the choice of the location of premises in spatial terms and their equipment with elements necessary for acoustic security, excluding direct or reflected sound propagation towards the possible location of an intruder. For these purposes, the doors are equipped with vestibules, the windows are oriented towards the territory protected (controlled) from the presence of unauthorized persons, etc.
Regime measures provide for strict control of the presence of employees and visitors in the controlled area.
Organizational and technical measures suggest passive(sound insulation, sound absorption) and active(sound suppression) activities.
The use of technical measures through the use of special protected means of conducting confidential negotiations (protected speaker systems).
To determine the effectiveness of protection when using sound insulation, sound level meters are used - measuring instruments that convert sound pressure fluctuations into readings corresponding to the sound pressure level.
In cases where passive measures do not provide the required level of security, active means are used. Active means include noise generators - technical devices that produce noise-like electronic signals. These signals are supplied to the corresponding acoustic or vibration transformation sensors. Acoustic sensors are designed to create acoustic noise indoors or outdoors, and vibration sensors are designed to mask noise in building envelopes.
Subsections:
Using the IR range to remove information from window glass and a circuit for protection - page 16
5. Frequency jammer as a way to protect against wiretapping. – p.23
Removing information from glass and fighting it
Laser acoustic reconnaissance equipment
In recent years, information has emerged that intelligence services in various countries are increasingly using remote ports of acoustic reconnaissance equipment to obtain unauthorized voice information.
Acoustic reconnaissance lasers are considered the most modern and effective, which make it possible to reproduce speech, any other sounds and acoustic noise during laser-location probing of window glass and other reflective surfaces.
To date, a whole family of laser acoustic reconnaissance tools has been created. An example is the SIPE LASER 3-DA SUPER system. This model consists of the following components:
Radiation source (helium-neon laser);
A receiver of this radiation with a noise filtering unit;
Two pairs of headphones;
Battery and tripod.
This is how this system works. Laser radiation is aimed at the window glass of the desired room using a telescopic viewfinder. An optical attachment allows you to change the divergence angle of the output beam; high stability of parameters is achieved through the use of an automatic control system. The model provides recording of speech information from double-glazed window frames with good quality at a distance of up to 250 m.
Physical basis of speech interception by laser microphones
Let us briefly consider the physical processes that occur when speech is intercepted using a laser microphone. The probed object - usually window glass - is a kind of membrane that vibrates with a sound frequency, creating a phonogram of a conversation.
The radiation generated by the laser transmitter, propagating in the atmosphere, is reflected from the surface of the window glass and modulated by an acoustic signal, and then perceived by a photodetector, which restores the reconnaissance signal.
In this technology, the modulation process is of fundamental importance. The sound wave generated by the acoustic signal source falls on the air-glass interface and creates a kind of vibration, that is, a deviation of the glass surface from its original position. These deviations cause reflection from the boundary.
If the dimensions of the incident optical beam are small compared to the length of the “surface” wave, then the superposition of various components of reflected light will be dominated by a zero-order diffraction beam:
Firstly, the phase of the light wave turns out to be modulated in time with the frequency of sound and uniform across the beam cross-section;
Secondly, the beam “oscillates” with the frequency of sound around the direction of the specular reflection.
The quality of received information is influenced by the following factors:
Parameters of the laser used (wavelength, power, coherence, etc.);
Parameters of the photodetector (sensitivity and selectivity of the photodetector, type of processing of the received signal, etc.);
Presence of protective film on windows;
Note.
When installing a layer of protective and a layer of tinting film, the level of glass vibration caused by acoustic (sound) waves is significantly reduced. It is difficult to detect glass vibrations from the outside, so it is difficult to isolate the sound signal in the received laser radiation.
Atmospheric parameters (scattering, absorption, turbulence, background illumination level, etc.);
The quality of processing of the probed surface (roughness and unevenness caused by both technological reasons and environmental influences - dirt, scratches);
Level of background acoustic noise;
Level of intercepted speech signal; specific local conditions.
Note
All these circumstances leave their mark on the quality of recorded speech, so data on reception from a distance of hundreds of meters cannot be taken at face value - these figures were obtained in testing conditions, or even by calculation.
From all of the above, we can conclude the following:
Laser acquisition systems exist and, when used correctly, are a very effective means of obtaining information;
Laser microphones are not a universal tool, since much depends on the conditions of use;
Not everything is a laser reconnaissance system, which is what the seller or manufacturer calls it;
Without qualified personnel, thousands and even tens of thousands of dollars spent on purchasing a laser microphone will be wasted;
Security teams must wisely evaluate the need to protect information from laser microphones.
The operating principle of a laser microphone is presented in 6.1.
Note
We all know the law of physics - “The angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection.” This means that you need to be strictly perpendicular to the window of the listening room. From the apartment opposite, you are unlikely to catch the reflected beam, since the walls of the building are usually, not to mention the windows, a little crooked and the reflected beam will pass by.
Before an important meeting, open the window slightly, and while spies are running around the neighboring buildings and looking for the reflected beam, you will probably have time to discuss all the important points, and if you change the position of the window every 5-10 minutes. (open, close), then all the desire to listen to you after such a marathon will pass.
The problem of countering the collection of information using laser radiation remains very relevant and at the same time one of the least studied in comparison with other, less “exotic” means of industrial espionage.
Note.
The sensitivity of the device can be increased by additional IR LEDs connected in parallel with VD1 of the transmitter (through its limiting resistors). You can also increase the receiver gain by adding a stage similar to the stage on A1.2. To do this, you can use the free op-amp of the A1 chip.
Structurally, the LED and photodiode are located so as to exclude direct contact of the IR radiation of the LED with the photodiode, but reliably receive reflected radiation.
The receiver is powered by two Krona batteries, the transmitter is powered by four R20 type elements with a total voltage of 6 V (1.5 V each).
In infrared devices with beam transmission and reception, the receiver and transmitter are usually used, although in most cases they at least have a common power source, or are even located next to each other (http://microcopied.ru/content/view/475/ 25/l/0/).
Therefore, if you add just one synchronization wire to the two wires going to the receiver from a common power source with the transmitter, you can get a wonderful device. It will operate on the principle of a synchronous detector and have such properties as: selectivity; noise immunity; possibility of obtaining large gain.
And this is without the use of multistage amplifiers with complex filters.
Indoors, even without the use of additional optics and powerful emitters, the device can be used as a security alarm, triggered when an infrared beam crosses at a distance from the emitter to the receiver of 3–7 m.
Moreover, the device does not respond to external illumination from extraneous sources, both constant (sun, incandescent lamps) and modulated (fluorescent lighting, flashlight).
By equipping the receiver with an LED, you can cover several tens of meters of distance in open space, having excellent noise immunity even when there is light snow. By using lenses on the receiver and transmitter simultaneously, it is possible to cover even greater distances, but there is the problem of accurately aiming the narrow transmitter beam at the receiver lens.
Transmitter Generator assembled on an integrated timer DA1 connected according to a multivibrator circuit. The multivibrator frequency is selected in the range of 20–40 kHz, but can be any. It is only limited from below by the size of capacitors C7, C8 and from above by the frequency properties of the timer.
The multivibrator signal through the switch on VT5 controls the LEDs of the transmitter VD2-VD4. The radiation power of the transmitter can be adjusted by changing the number of LEDs or the current through them using resistor R17. Since diodes operate in pulse mode, the amplitude value of the current through them can be set two to three times higher than the permanently permissible value.
Transmitter circuit
made on discrete elements VD1, VT1-VT4, R1-R12, according to the circuit used in many Soviet televisions. It can be successfully replaced with an imported integrated IR receiver, which also has an infrared filter. However, it is desirable that a digital signal is not generated at the receiver output, that is, its path would be linear.
Next, the amplified signal is supplied to the CMOS multiplexer DD1 and controlled by the timer signal DA1. At outputs 3.13 DD1 there is a useful anti-phase signal, which is amplified by a differential integrator at op-amp DA2. Elements R19, R20; C10, C11; R21, R22 of the integrator determine the signal amplification level, receiver bandwidth and response speed.
Note.
The integrator's ground level is determined by the zener diode VD5, and is selected as low as possible (but so that op-amp DA2 is not included in the limitation), since the useful signal at the output of DA2 will be positive.
Op-amp DA3 has a Schmitt trigger. Together with the peak detector on elements R24, VD6, R25, C12, it plays the role of a comparator to generate a response signal. The voltage drop across Diode VD6 reduces the peak voltage level by 0.4–0.5 V. This sets a “floating” alarm threshold, the value of which varies smoothly depending on the distance between the receiver and transmitter, the level of light, and interference. When the beam passes normally, the VD7 LED will light up; when the beam intersects, the LED goes out.
There are no special requirements for those used in the circuit. Elements can be replaced with similar imported or domestic ones. Resistor R25 is made up of two 5.1 MOhms in series. The VD1 photodiode with an amplifier must be placed in a metal grounded shield to prevent interference.
The setup circuit is not required, but care should be taken when testing the device. The transmitter signal may reach the receiver as a result of reflection from nearby objects and will not allow you to see the result of the circuit’s operation. It is most convenient to reduce the current of the emitter LEDs to fractions of a milliampere during debugging.
To operate the device as an IR alarm that operates when the beam crosses, you can connect an indication unit to the device. Switch SA2 selects the operating mode of the display unit. In the “ONE TIME” position, when the beam crosses, one sound signal with a duration of 1 s is generated. In the “CONSTANT” position, the sound signal sounds continuously until the unit is reset by the SA1 button.
In addition to operating the device in a mode where the emitter is directed at the receiver, you can direct them in one direction (of course, excluding the direct impact of the transmitter beam on the receiver).
Thus, an IR locator circuit will be implemented (for example, for a car parking sensor). If you equip the IR transmitter and receiver with collecting lenses and direct them, for example, at a window glass, then the reflected IR signal will be modulated with the frequency of sounds in the room.
To listen to such a signal at the DA2 output, you need to connect an amplitude detector with a low-frequency amplifier and replace C10, C11 with capacitors of 100 pF, resistors R21, R22 - 300 kOhm, R19, R20 - 3 kOhm.
In general, the possibility of obtaining a high level of gain depends on the capacitance of capacitors C10, C11 of the integrator. The larger the capacitor capacity, the more random noise is smoothed out and the more gain you can get. However, for this you have to sacrifice the performance of the device.
Methods for protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
Subsections:
1. Justification of criteria for the effectiveness of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels – page 1
2. Specially created technical channels for information leakage – p.7
3. Removing information from glass and fighting it (protection circuit) - page 13
Moscow Department of Education
State Autonomous Educational Institution
secondary vocational education in Moscow
Polytechnic College No. 8
named after twice Hero of the Soviet Union I.F. Pavlova
COURSE PROJECT
SPECIALTY - 090905
"Organization and technology of information security"
on the topic: Protection of acoustic (speech) information from leakage through technical channels
Course project completed
student group: 34OB(s)
Teacher: V.P. Zverev
Moscow 2013
Introduction
Chapter 1. Theoretical justification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
1 Acoustic information
2 Technical channels of information leakage
3 Basic ways to obtain acoustic information
Chapter 2. Practical justification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
1 Organizational measures for the protection of speech information
2 Equipment for searching technical means of reconnaissance
3 Technical means of protecting acoustic information from leakage through technical channels
Chapter 3. Feasibility study
Chapter 4. Safety precautions and workplace organization
1 Explanation of requirements for premises and workplaces
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
According to trends in the development of society, the most common resource is information, and, consequently, its value is constantly increasing. “Whoever owns the information owns the world.” This undoubtedly has an essence that expresses the current situation in the world. Since the disclosure of some information often leads to negative consequences for its owner, the issue of protecting information from unauthorized receipt is becoming increasingly acute.
Since for every defense there is a way to overcome it, to ensure proper information security it is necessary to constantly improve methods.
Information carried by a speech signal or speech information receives worthy attention of the attacking side. In the general case, speech information is a set consisting of semantic, personal, behavioral, etc. information. As a rule, semantic information is of greatest interest.
The problem of protecting confidential negotiations is solved comprehensively using various types of measures, including the use of technical means, this happens as follows. The fact is that the primary carriers of speech information are acoustic vibrations of the air environment created by the articulatory tract of the negotiator. By natural or artificial means, vibration, magnetic, electrical and electromagnetic oscillations in various frequency ranges become secondary carriers of speech information, which “remove” confidential information from the meeting room. To eliminate this fact, these oscillations are masked by similar oscillations, which are masking signals in “suspicious” or identified frequency ranges. In this regard, known technical channels for leakage of speech information, such as cable networks for various purposes, pipelines, enclosing building structures, windows and doors, and stray electromagnetic radiation (ESEM), are “closed” on an ongoing basis by various technical means.
This entire set of measures requires significant financial costs, both one-time (during the construction or refurbishment of office premises in order to meet information security requirements) and ongoing (for carrying out the above measures and for updating the fleet of monitoring equipment). These costs can reach several tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars, depending on the importance of confidential information and the financial capabilities of office space owners.
The purpose of this thesis is a theoretical and practical consideration of methods and means of protecting acoustic (speech) information from leakage through technical channels.
Objectives of this course project:
· Identification of leakage channels and unauthorized access to resources
· Technical channels of information leakage
· Means of active protection of speech information from leakage through technical channels
The object of the study is the classification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
The subject of the research is organizational measures for the protection of speech information, equipment for searching for reconnaissance means and technical means for protecting acoustic information.
acoustic protection information
Chapter 1. Theoretical justification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
1 Acoustic information
Protected speech (acoustic) information includes information that is proprietary and subject to protection in accordance with the requirements of legal documents or requirements established by the owner of the information. This is, as a rule, restricted access information containing information classified as state secrets, as well as information of a confidential nature.
To discuss restricted access information (meetings, discussions, conferences, negotiations, etc.), special rooms are used (offices, assembly halls, conference rooms, etc.), which are called dedicated rooms (VP). To prevent the interception of information from these premises, as a rule, special means of protection are used, therefore, dedicated premises are in some cases called protected premises (SP).
As a rule, auxiliary technical means and systems (HTSS) are installed in dedicated premises:
City automatic telephone communication;
Data transmission in a radio communication system;
Security and fire alarm systems;
Alerts and alarms;
Air conditioning;
Wired radio broadcasting network and reception of radio and television programs (subscriber loudspeakers, radio broadcasting equipment, televisions and radios, etc.);
Electronic office equipment;
Electric clock equipment;
Instrumentation equipment, etc.
The allocated premises are located within the controlled zone (CA), which means a space (territory, building, part of a building) in which the uncontrolled presence of unauthorized persons (including visitors to the organization), as well as vehicles, is excluded. The border of the controlled zone may be the perimeter of the protected territory of the organization, the enclosing structures of the protected building or the protected part of the building, if it is located in an unprotected area. In some cases, the boundary of the controlled area may be the enclosing structures (walls, floor, ceiling) of the allocated room.
Protection of speech (acoustic) information from leakage through technical channels is achieved by carrying out organizational and technical measures, as well as identifying portable electronic information interception devices (embedded devices) installed in designated premises.
2 Technical channels of information leakage
Acoustic channel
The acoustic information leakage channel is implemented as follows:
· eavesdropping on conversations in open areas and indoors, being nearby or using directional microphones (there are parabolic, tubular or flat). The directionality is 2-5 degrees, the average range of the most common - tubular - is about 100 meters. Under good climatic conditions in open areas, a parabolic directional microphone can operate at a distance of up to 1 km;
· secret recording of conversations using a voice recorder or tape recorder (including voice-activated digital voice recorders);
· eavesdropping on conversations using remote microphones (the range of radio microphones is 50-200 meters without repeaters).
Microphones used in radio devices can be built-in or remote and have two types: acoustic (sensitive mainly to the action of sound vibrations in the air and designed to intercept voice messages) and vibration (converting vibrations that occur in various rigid structures into electrical signals).
Acoustoelectric channel
Acoustoelectric information leakage channel, the features of which are:
· ease of use (power supply is available everywhere);
· no problems with power supply to the microphone;
· the ability to retrieve information from the power supply network without connecting to it (using electromagnetic radiation from the power supply network). Reception of information from such “bugs” is carried out by special receivers connected to the power network within a radius of up to 300 meters from the “bug” along the length of the wiring or to the power transformer serving the building or complex of buildings;
· possible interference on household appliances when using the electrical network to transmit information, as well as poor quality of the transmitted signal when household appliances operate a lot.
Prevention:
· transformer isolation is an obstacle to further transmission of information through the power supply network;
Telephone channel
A telephone information leakage channel for eavesdropping on telephone conversations (as part of industrial espionage) is possible:
· galvanic recording of telephone conversations (by contact connection of listening devices anywhere in the subscriber telephone network). Determined by deterioration of audibility and the appearance of interference, as well as with the help of special equipment;
· telephone-location method (by high-frequency imposition). A high-frequency tone signal is supplied through the telephone line, which affects the nonlinear elements of the telephone set (diodes, transistors, microcircuits), which are also affected by the acoustic signal. As a result, a high-frequency modulated signal is formed in the telephone line. Eavesdropping can be detected by the presence of a high-frequency signal in the telephone line. However, the range of such a system is due to the attenuation of the RF signal in a two-wire system. the line does not exceed one hundred meters. Possible counteraction: suppression of high-frequency signal in the telephone line;
· inductive and capacitive method of secretly recording telephone conversations (contactless connection).
Inductive method - due to electromagnetic induction that occurs during telephone conversations along the telephone line wire. A transformer is used as a receiving device for retrieving information, the primary winding of which covers one or two wires of the telephone line.
Capacitive method - due to the formation of an electrostatic field on the plates of the capacitor, changing in accordance with changes in the level of telephone conversations. As a receiver for telephone conversations, a capacitive sensor is used, made in the form of two plates that fit tightly to the telephone line wires.
Eavesdropping on conversations indoors using telephones is possible in the following ways:
· low-frequency and high-frequency method of recording acoustic signals and telephone conversations. This method is based on connecting listening devices to the telephone line, which transmit sound signals converted by a microphone along the telephone line at high or low frequencies. Allows you to listen to a conversation both when the handset is raised and lowered. Protection is carried out by cutting off the high-frequency and low-frequency components in the telephone line;
· use of telephone remote listening devices. This method is based on installing a remote listening device in elements of the subscriber telephone network by connecting it in parallel to the telephone line and turning it on remotely. A remote telephone eavesdropping device has two deconstructive properties: at the time of eavesdropping, the subscriber's telephone set is disconnected from the telephone line, and also when the telephone is on-hook and the eavesdropping device is turned on, the supply voltage of the telephone line is less than 20 Volts, while it should be 60.
3 Basic ways to obtain acoustic information
The main reasons for information leakage are:
Failure of personnel to comply with the norms, requirements, and operating rules of the NPP;
Errors in the design of NPPs and NPP protection systems;
Conducting technical and intelligence intelligence by the opposing side.
In accordance with GOST R 50922-96, three types of information leakage are considered:
Disclosure;
Unauthorized access to information;
Obtaining protected information by intelligence services (both domestic and foreign).
Disclosure of information means the unauthorized delivery of protected information to consumers who do not have the right to access the protected information.
Unauthorized access means the receipt of protected information by an interested subject in violation of the rights or rules of access to protected information established by legal documents or the owner, owner of the information. In this case, an interested party exercising unauthorized access to information may be: a state, a legal entity, a group of individuals, including a public organization, or an individual individual.
Obtaining protected information by intelligence services can be carried out using technical means (technical intelligence) or undercover methods (undercover intelligence).
Composition of information leakage channels
|
Source KUI |
Name of KUI |
Description |
|
Telephone lines Radiotelephone |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
|
|
City and local radio broadcast |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver; - Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
PC with full configuration |
Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
|
Photo-optical detectors |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver; - Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
Heating and ventilation system |
Acoustic |
Information leakage due to weak acoustic insulation (cracks, leaks, holes). Such leaks include: - cracks near embedded cable pipes, - ventilation, leaks of doors and door frames. - Transfer of information through vibration through heating risers. |
|
Power supply system |
Electroacoustic, PEMIN |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver; - Information leakage due to modulation of EM fields generated by the operation of household appliances by a useful signal. |
|
3G mobile phone |
Acoustic |
Leak of information via radio channel. |
|
Ceilings |
Acoustic |
Membrane energy transfer of speech signals through partitions due to low mass and weak signal attenuation. |
|
Vibrating |
Information leakage by removing a useful signal from surfaces that vibrate during a conversation. |
|
|
Grounding system |
Electroacoustic |
Information leakage due to acoustoelectric conversion in the radio broadcast line receiver. |
Of all the possible channels of information leakage, technical channels of information leakage are the most attractive to attackers; therefore, it is necessary to organize concealment and protection against information leakage primarily through these channels. Since organizing the concealment and protection of acoustic information from leakage through technical channels is quite an expensive undertaking, it is necessary to conduct a detailed study of all channels, and apply technical means of protection precisely in those places where it is impossible to do without them.
Chapter 2. Practical justification of methods and means of protecting speech information from leakage through technical channels
1 Organizational measures for the protection of speech information
The main organizational measures to protect speech information from leakage through technical channels include:
Selection of premises for confidential negotiations (dedicated premises);
Use of certified auxiliary technical means and systems (VTSS) in airspace;
Establishment of a controlled zone around the airspace;
Dismantling of unused VTSS, their connecting lines and extraneous conductors in the VP;
Organization of regime and access control in the VP;
Disabling confidential conversations of unprotected VTSS.
Premises in which confidential negotiations are expected to be conducted must be selected taking into account their sound insulation, as well as the enemy’s ability to intercept speech information via acousto-vibration and acousto-optical channels. As allocated, it is advisable to choose premises that do not have common enclosing structures with premises belonging to other organizations, or with premises to which there is uncontrolled access by unauthorized persons. If possible, the windows of designated premises should not overlook parking areas, as well as nearby buildings from which reconnaissance using laser acoustic systems is possible.
If the border of the controlled zone is the enclosing structures (walls, floor, ceiling) of the allocated premises, a temporary controlled zone can be established for the period of confidential events, which excludes or significantly complicates the possibility of interception of voice information.
Only certified technical means and systems should be used in designated premises, i.e. have passed special technical checks for the possible presence of embedded embedded devices, special studies for the presence of acoustoelectric information leakage channels and have certificates of compliance with information security requirements in accordance with regulatory documents of the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control of Russia.
All auxiliary technical means not used to ensure confidential negotiations, as well as extraneous cables and wires passing through the allocated premises must be dismantled.
Uncertified technical equipment installed in designated premises must be disconnected from connecting lines and power sources when conducting confidential negotiations.
During off-duty hours, allocated premises must be closed, sealed and placed under guard. During official hours, employees' access to these premises should be limited (according to lists) and controlled (visitation records). If necessary, these premises can be equipped with access control and management systems.
All work on IP protection (at the stages of design, construction or reconstruction, installation of equipment and information security equipment, certification of IP) is carried out by organizations licensed to operate in the field of information security.
When a VP is put into operation, and then periodically, it must be certified according to information security requirements in accordance with the regulatory documents of the FSTEC of Russia. Special examinations should also be carried out periodically.
In most cases, organizational measures alone cannot ensure the required efficiency of information protection and it is necessary to carry out technical measures to protect information. A technical event is an information protection event that involves the use of special technical means, as well as the implementation of technical solutions. Technical measures are aimed at closing channels of information leakage by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio in places where portable acoustic reconnaissance equipment or their sensors may be located to values that make it impossible for the reconnaissance device to isolate the information signal. Depending on the means used, technical methods of protecting information are divided into passive and active.
Passive methods of information protection are aimed at:
· weakening of acoustic and vibration signals to values that ensure the impossibility of their isolation by means of acoustic reconnaissance against the background of natural noise in the places of their possible installation;
· weakening of information electrical signals in the connecting lines of auxiliary technical means and systems that arose as a result of acousto-electric transformations of acoustic signals, to values that ensure the impossibility of their isolation by reconnaissance means against the background of natural noise;
· exclusion (weakening) of the passage of “high-frequency imposition” signals in HTSS, which incorporate electroacoustic transducers (having a microphone effect);
· weakening of radio signals transmitted by embedded devices to values that ensure the impossibility of their reception in places where receiving devices can be installed;
· weakening of signals transmitted by embedded devices via a 220 V power supply network to values that ensure the impossibility of their reception in places where receiving devices can be installed
Rice. 1 Classification of passive methods of protection
Speech (acoustic) signals are weakened by soundproofing rooms, which is aimed at localizing the sources of acoustic signals inside them.
Special inserts and gaskets are used for vibration isolation of heat, gas, water supply and sewerage pipes extending beyond the controlled area
Fig.2. Installation of special tools
In order to close acoustoelectromagnetic channels of speech information leakage, as well as information leakage channels created by hidden installation of embedded devices in premises with information transmission via radio channel, various methods of shielding selected premises are used
Installation of special low-frequency filters and limiters in VTSS connecting lines extending beyond the controlled area is used to eliminate the possibility of intercepting speech information from designated premises via passive and active acoustoelectric information leakage channels
Special low-frequency filters of the FP type are installed in the power supply line (socket and lighting network) of a dedicated room in order to exclude the possible transmission of information intercepted by network bookmarks through them (Fig. 4). For these purposes, filters with a cutoff frequency fgp ≤ 20...40 kHz and an attenuation of at least 60 - 80 dB are used. Filters must be installed within the controlled area.
Fig.3. Installation of a special device - “Granit-8”
Rice. 4. Installation of special filters (FP type).
If it is technically impossible to use passive means of protecting premises or if they do not provide the required sound insulation standards, active methods of protecting speech information are used, which are aimed at:
· creation of masking acoustic and vibration noise in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio to values that ensure the impossibility of identifying speech information by means of acoustic reconnaissance in the places of their possible installation;
· creation of masking electromagnetic interference in the connecting lines of VTSS in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio to values that ensure the impossibility of isolating an information signal by reconnaissance means in possible places of their connection;
· suppression of sound recording devices (dictaphones) in recording mode;
· suppression of receiving devices that receive information from embedded devices via a radio channel;
· suppression of receiving devices that receive information from embedded devices via a 220 V electrical network
Fig.5. Classification of active methods of protection
Acoustic masking is effectively used to protect speech information from leakage through a direct acoustic channel by suppressing acoustic interference (noise) of microphones of reconnaissance equipment installed in such structural elements of protected premises as a door vestibule, ventilation duct, space behind a suspended ceiling, etc.
Vibroacoustic masking is used to protect speech information from leakage through acousto-vibration (Fig. 6) and acousto-optical (optical-electronic) channels (Fig. 7) and consists of creating vibration noise in elements of building structures, window glass, utilities, etc. Vibroacoustic camouflage is effectively used to suppress electronic and radio stethoscopes, as well as laser acoustic reconnaissance systems
Rice. 6.Creation of vibration interference
The creation of masking electromagnetic low-frequency interference (low-frequency masking interference method) is used to eliminate the possibility of intercepting speech information from designated premises via passive and active acoustoelectric information leakage channels, suppressing wired microphone systems that use VTSS connecting lines to transmit information at low frequencies, and suppressing acoustic jamming "telephone ear" type.
Most often, this method is used to protect telephone sets that contain elements that have a “microphone effect”, and consists of supplying a masking signal (most often of the “white noise” type) of the speech frequency range (usually , the main interference power is concentrated in the frequency range of a standard telephone channel: 300 - 3400 Hz) (Fig. 8).
Rice. 7. Interference
The creation of masking high-frequency (frequency range from 20 - 40 kHz to 10 - 30 MHz) electromagnetic interference in the power supply lines (socket and lighting network) of a dedicated room is used to suppress devices receiving information from network bookmarks (Fig. 9).
The creation of spatial masking high-frequency (frequency range from 20 - 50 kHz to 1.5 - 2.5 MHz)* electromagnetic interference is mainly used to suppress devices for receiving information from radio bombs (Fig. 10).
Rice. 8. Creation of high frequency interference
Soundproofing of premises
Sound insulation (vibration insulation) of dedicated (protected) premises (VP) is the main passive method of protecting speech information and is aimed at localizing the sources of acoustic signals inside them. It is carried out in order to exclude the possibility of eavesdropping on conversations taking place in a dedicated room, either without the use of technical means, by unauthorized persons (visitors, technical personnel), as well as by employees of the organization who are not allowed to the information being discussed, when they are in the corridors and adjacent to the allocated premises ( unintentional eavesdropping), and by the enemy through direct acoustic (through cracks, windows, doors, technological openings, ventilation ducts, etc.), acousto-vibration (through enclosing structures, utility pipes, etc.) and acousto-optical (through window glass) technical channels of information leakage using portable means of acoustic (speech) reconnaissance.
As an indicator for assessing the effectiveness of sound insulation of allocated premises, verbal speech intelligibility is used, characterized by the number of correctly understood words and reflecting the qualitative area of comprehensibility, which is expressed in terms of the details of the compiled certificate about the conversation intercepted using technical intelligence means.
The process of speech perception in noise is accompanied by losses of the constituent elements of the speech message. In this case, speech intelligibility will be determined not only by the level of the speech signal, but also by the level and nature of external noise at the location of the reconnaissance equipment sensor.
The criteria for the effectiveness of speech information protection largely depend on the goals pursued in organizing the protection, for example: to hide the semantic content of an ongoing conversation, to hide the topic of an ongoing conversation, or to hide the very fact of negotiations.
Practical experience shows that drawing up a detailed report on the content of an intercepted conversation is impossible when verbal intelligibility is less than 60 - 70%, and a brief summary is impossible when verbal intelligibility is less than 40 - 60%. When verbal intelligibility is less than 20 - 40%, it is significantly difficult to establish even the subject of an ongoing conversation, and when verbal intelligibility is less than 10 - 20%, this is practically impossible even when using modern noise reduction methods.
Considering that the level of the speech signal in a dedicated room can range from 64 to 84 dB, depending on the level of acoustic noise at the location of the reconnaissance facility and the category of the dedicated room, it is easy to calculate the required level of its sound insulation to ensure effective protection of speech information from leakage according to all possible technical channels.
Sound insulation of premises is ensured with the help of architectural and engineering solutions, as well as the use of special construction and finishing materials.
When an acoustic wave falls on the boundary of surfaces with different specific densities, most of the incident wave is reflected. A smaller part of the wave penetrates the material of the soundproofing structure and propagates through it, losing its energy depending on the length of the path and its acoustic properties. Under the influence of an acoustic wave, the soundproofing surface undergoes complex vibrations, which also absorb the energy of the incident wave.
The nature of this absorption is determined by the ratio of the frequencies of the incident acoustic wave and the spectral characteristics of the surface of the soundproofing device.
When assessing the sound insulation of designated premises, it is necessary to separately consider the sound insulation of: the enclosing structures of the room (walls, floor, ceiling, windows, doors) and utility systems (supply and exhaust ventilation, heating, air conditioning).
2 Equipment for searching technical means of reconnaissance
Multifunctional search device ST 033 "Piranha"033 "Piranha" is designed to carry out operational measures to detect and localize technical means of secretly obtaining information, as well as to identify natural and artificially created channels of information leakage.
The product consists of a main control and display unit, a set of converters and allows operation in the following modes:
· high-frequency detector-frequency meter;
Microwave detector (Together with ST03.SHF)
· Wire line analyzer;
· IR radiation detector;
· detector of low-frequency magnetic fields;
· differential low-frequency amplifier (together with ST 03.DA);
· vibroacoustic receiver;
· acoustic receiver
Figure 9 - Multifunctional search device ST 033 "Piranha"
The transition to any of the modes is carried out automatically when the corresponding converter is connected. Information is displayed on a backlit graphic LCD display; acoustic control is carried out through special headphones or through a built-in loudspeaker.
It is possible to store up to 99 images in volatile memory.
Indication of incoming low-frequency signals is provided in oscilloscope or spectrum analyzer modes with indication of numerical parameters.
The ST 033 "Piranha" provides contextual help on the display depending on the operating mode. You can choose Russian or English.033 "Piranha" is made in a wearable version. To carry and store it, a special bag is used, designed for compact and convenient stowage of all elements of the kit.
Using ST 033 "Piranha" it is possible to solve the following control and search tasks:
Identification of the fact of operation (detection) and localization of the location of radio-emitting special technical means that create potentially dangerous radio emissions from the point of view of information leakage. These means primarily include:
· radio microphones;
· telephone radio repeaters;
radio stethoscopes;
· hidden video cameras with a radio channel for transmitting information;
· technical means of spatial high-frequency irradiation systems in the radio range;
· radio beacons for tracking systems for the movement of objects (people, vehicles, cargo, etc.);
· unauthorized cell phones of GSM, DECT standards, radio stations, cordless phones.
· devices that use data transmission channels using BLUETOOTH and WLAN standards to transmit data.
2. Detection and localization of the location of special technical means that work with radiation in the infrared range. These means primarily include:
· embedded devices for obtaining acoustic information from premises with its subsequent transmission via a channel in the infrared range;
· technical means of spatial irradiation systems in the infrared range.
3. Detection and localization of the location of special technical means that use wire lines for various purposes to obtain and transmit information, as well as technical means of information processing that create induction of informative signals onto nearby wire lines or the flow of these signals into the lines of the power supply network. Such means may be:
· embedded devices that use 220V AC power lines to transmit intercepted information and are capable of operating at frequencies up to 15 MHz;
· PCs and other technical means of producing, reproducing and transmitting information;
· technical means of linear high-frequency imposition systems operating at frequencies above 150 kHz;
· embedded devices that use subscriber telephone lines, lines of fire and security alarm systems with a carrier frequency of over 20 kHz to transmit intercepted information.
4. Detection and localization of the location of sources of electromagnetic fields with a predominance (presence) of the magnetic component of the field, routes for laying hidden (unmarked) electrical wiring, potentially suitable for installing embedded devices, as well as research of technical means that process speech information. Such sources and technical means usually include:
· output transformers of audio frequency amplifiers;
· dynamic loudspeakers of acoustic systems;
· electric motors of tape recorders and voice recorders;
5. Identification of the most vulnerable places from the point of view of the occurrence of vibroacoustic channels of information leakage.
Identification of the most vulnerable places from the point of view of the occurrence of acoustic information leakage channels.
Vibroacoustic receiver mode
In this mode, the product receives from an external vibroacoustic sensor and displays the parameters of low-frequency signals in the range from 300 to 6000 Hz.
The state of vibroacoustic protection of premises is assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively.
A quantitative assessment of the protection status is carried out based on the analysis of an oscillogram automatically displayed on the display screen, displaying the shape of the received signal and the current value of its amplitude.
A qualitative assessment of the state of protection is based on direct listening to the received low-frequency signal and analysis of its volume and timbre characteristics. For this, either the built-in loudspeaker or headphones are used.
Specifications
Acoustic receiver mode
In this mode, the product provides reception to an external remote microphone and displays the parameters of acoustic signals in the range from 300 to 6000 Hz.
The state of sound insulation of premises and the presence of vulnerable places in them from the point of view of information leakage are determined both quantitatively and qualitatively.
Quantitative assessment of the state of sound insulation of premises and identification of possible channels of information leakage are carried out based on the analysis of an oscillogram automatically displayed on the display screen, reflecting the shape of the received signal and the current value of its amplitude.
Qualitative assessment is based on direct listening to the received acoustic signal and analysis of its volume and timbre characteristics. For this, either the built-in loudspeaker or headphones are used.
Specifications
General technical characteristics of ST 033 "PIRANHA"
|
High frequency detector-frequency meter |
|
|
Operating frequency range, MHz |
|
|
Sensitivity, mV |
< 2 (200МГц-1000МГц) 4 (1000МГц-1600МГц) 8 (1600МГц-2000МГц) |
|
Dynamic range, dB |
|
|
Frequency meter sensitivity, mV |
<15 (100МГц-1200МГц) |
|
Frequency measurement accuracy, % |
|
|
Wire Line Scanning Analyzer |
|
|
Scan range, MHz |
|
|
Sensitivity, at s/n 10 dB, mV |
|
|
Scan step, kHz |
|
|
Scanning speed, kHz |
|
|
Bandwidth, kHz |
|
|
Adjacent channel selectivity, dB |
|
|
Detection Mode |
|
|
Permissible network voltage, V |
|
|
IR Radiation Detector |
|
|
Spectral range, nm |
|
|
Threshold sensitivity, W/Hz2 |
|
|
Field of view angle, degrees. |
|
|
Frequency band, MHz |
|
|
LF magnetic field detector |
|
|
Frequency range, kHz |
|
|
Threshold sensitivity, A/(m x Hz2) |
|
|
Vibroacoustic receiver |
|
|
Sensitivity, V x sec2/m |
|
|
Inherent noise in the band 300Hz-3000Hz, µV |
|
|
Acoustic receiver |
|
|
Sensitivity, mV/Pa |
|
|
Frequency range, Hz |
|
|
Oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer |
|
|
Bandwidth, kHz |
|
|
Input sensitivity, mV |
|
|
Measurement error, % |
|
|
Waveform output speed, s |
|
|
Spectrogram output speed, s |
|
|
Indication |
|
|
Liquid crystal graphic display with a resolution of 128x64 pixels with adjustable backlight |
|
|
Supply voltage, V |
6(4 batteries or AA batteries)/220 |
|
Maximum current consumption, no more than mA |
|
|
Current consumption in operating mode, no more than mA |
|
|
Dimensions, mm |
|
|
Main unit |
|
|
Packing bag |
|
|
Main unit |
|
Delivery contents
|
Name |
Quantity, pcs |
|
1. Main control, processing and display unit |
|
|
2. Active HF antenna |
|
|
3. Wire Line Scanning Analyzer Adapter |
|
|
4. Nozzle type "220" |
|
|
5. Crocodile type nozzle |
|
|
6. Needle type nozzle |
|
|
7. Magnetic sensor |
|
|
8. IR sensor |
|
|
9.Acoustic sensor |
|
|
10. Vibroacoustic sensor |
|
|
11. Telescopic antenna |
|
|
12. Headphones |
|
|
13. AA battery |
|
|
14. Shoulder strap |
|
|
15. Main unit stand |
|
|
16. Power supply |
|
|
17. Bag - packaging |
|
|
18. Technical description and operating instructions |
3 Technical means of protecting acoustic information from leakage through technical channels
Spatial noise generators
The GROM-ZI-4 noise generator is designed to protect premises from information leakage and prevent the removal of information from personal computers and PC-based local area networks. Universal noise generator range 20 - 1000 MHz. Operating modes: “Radio channel”, “Telephone line”, “Power network”
Main functionality of the device:
· Generating interference over the airwaves, telephone lines and electrical networks to block unauthorized devices transmitting information;
· Masking of side electromagnetic radiation from PCs and LANs;
· No need for adjustment to specific application conditions.
Noise generator "Grom-ZI-4"
Generator technical data and characteristics
· Field strength of interference generated over the air relative to 1 µV/m
· The voltage of the signal generated via the electrical network is relative to 1 µV in the frequency range 0.1-1 MHz - at least 60 dB;
· Signal generated via telephone line - pulses with a frequency of 20 kHz and an amplitude of 10V;
· Power supply 220V 50Hz.
The Grom 3I-4 generator is part of the Grom 3I-4 system together with the Si-5002.1 discone antenna
Parameters of the Si-5002.1 discone antenna:
· Operating frequency range: 1 - 2000 MHz.
· Vertical polarization.
· Directional pattern - quasi-circular.
· Dimensions: 360x950 mm.
The antenna can be used as a receiving antenna as part of radio monitoring complexes and in studying the strength of noise and pulse electric fields of radio signals with measuring receivers and spectrum analyzers
Telephone line protection equipment
"Lightning"
“Lightning” is a means of protection against unauthorized eavesdropping of conversations both on the telephone and indoors using devices operating on wire lines or power lines.
The operating principle of the device is based on the electrical breakdown of radioelements. When you press the “Start” button, a powerful short high-voltage pulse is supplied to the line, which can completely destroy or disrupt the functional activity of the information collection equipment.
Leakage protection devices through acoustic channels "Troyan"
Trojan Acoustic blocker of all information collection devices.
With the emergence of increasingly advanced devices for capturing and recording speech information, the use of which is difficult to detect with search technology (laser recording devices, stethoscopes, directional microphones, micro-power radio microphones with a remote microphone, wired microphones, modern digital voice recorders, radio bookmarks that transmit acoustic information over the electrical network and other communication and signaling lines at low frequencies, etc.), an acoustic masker often remains the only means that ensures guaranteed closure of all speech information leakage channels.
Principle of operation:
In the conversation area there is a device with external microphones (microphones must be at a distance of at least 40-50 cm from the device to avoid acoustic feedback). During a conversation, the speech signal is transmitted from the microphones to an electronic processing circuit, which eliminates the phenomenon of acoustic feedback (microphone - speaker) and turns the speech into a signal that contains the main spectral components of the original speech signal.
The device has an acoustic trigger circuit with an adjustable switching threshold. The acoustic release system (VAS) reduces the duration of exposure to speech interference on hearing, which helps reduce the effect of fatigue from exposure to the device. In addition, the battery life of the device increases. The speech-like interference of the device sounds synchronously with the masked speech and its volume depends on the volume of the conversation.
Small dimensions and universal power supply allow you to use the product in the office, car and any other unprepared place.
In the office, you can connect active computer speakers to the device to make noise in a large area, if necessary.
Main technical characteristics
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Type of generated interference |
speech-like, correlated with the original speech signal. The intensity of the interference and its spectral composition are close to the original speech signal. Each time the device is turned on, unique fragments of speech-like interference are presented |
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Range of reproduced acoustic frequencies |
300 - 4000 Hz |
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Device management |
using two external microphones |
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Audio amplifier output power |
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Maximum sound pressure from internal speaker |
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The voltage of the interference signal at the linear output depends on the position of the volume control and reaches the value |
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Product power |
from a 7.4 V battery. The battery is charged from a 220 V power supply using the adapter that is included with the product. |
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Battery full charge time |
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Capacity of the battery used |
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The continuous operation time when powered by a fully charged battery depends on the sound volume and is |
5 - 6 hours |
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Maximum current consumption at full volume |
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Product dimensions |
145 x 85 x 25 mm |
Equipment:
· Main unit,
· mains charging adapter,
· product passport with operating instructions,
Extension cord for computer speakers
· remote microphones.
Suppressor "Kanonir-K" for microphone listening devices
The product "CANNIR-K" is designed to protect the meeting place from means of collecting acoustic information.
Silent mode blocks radio microphones, wired microphones and most digital voice recorders, including voice recorders in mobile phones (smartphones). The product silently blocks the acoustic channels of mobile phones, which are located near the device on the emitter side. Blocking microphones of mobile phones does not depend on the standard of their operation: (GSM, 3G, 4G, CDMA, etc.) and does not affect the reception of incoming calls.
When blocking various means of picking up and recording speech information, the product uses both speech-like and silent ultrasonic interference.
In the speech-like interference mode, all available means of collecting and recording acoustic information are blocked.
A brief overview of voice recorder and radio microphone blockers available on the market:
· Microwave blockers: (storm), (noisetron), etc.
The advantage is the silent operation mode. Disadvantages: most modern digital voice recorders do not block the operation of voice recorders in mobile phones at all.
· Generators of speech-like signals: (fakir, shaman), etc.
They are effective only when the conversation volume level does not exceed the level of acoustic interference. Conversations have to be carried out in loud noise, which is tiring.
· Products (comfort and chaos).
The devices are very effective, but conversations have to be carried out in tight-fitting microtelephone headsets, which is not acceptable for everyone.
Main technical characteristics of the Kanonir-K product.
Power: rechargeable battery (15V. 1600mA.) (if the red LED goes out, you need to connect the charger). When the charger is connected, the green LED located near the “output” socket should light up. If the LED lights dimly or goes out, this indicates that the battery is fully charged. A bright LED indicates a low battery.
· Time to fully charge the battery - 8 hours.
· Current consumption in silent mode - 100 - 130 mA. In speech-like interference mode together with silent mode - 280 mA.
· The voltage of the speech-like noise signal at the linear output is 1V.
· Time of continuous operation in two modes simultaneously - 5 hours.
· The blocking range of radio microphones and voice recorders is 2 - 4 meters.
· Ultrasonic interference emission angle is 80 degrees.
· Dimensions of the product "CANNIR-K" - 170 x 85 x 35 mm.
The second chapter examined organizational measures for the protection of speech information, equipment for searching for technical reconnaissance means, and technical means for protecting acoustic information from leakage through technical channels. Since the use of technical means of protection is expensive, these means will not have to be used throughout the perimeter of the room, but only in the most vulnerable places. The equipment for searching technical means of reconnaissance and means of actively protecting information from leakage through vibroacoustic and acoustic channels were also considered. Since, in addition to technical channels for information leakage, there are other ways to steal information, these technical means must be used in conjunction with technical means of protecting information through other possible channels.
Chapter 3. Feasibility study
In this thesis project, the composition of material costs can be determined taking into account some features related to the installation of an acoustic and vibroacoustic protection system. In this case, since the work takes place on site, workshop and general plant expenses must be combined under a single name of costs. As initial information for determining the amount of all costs of Sb.com, rubles, you can use formula 2.
Sb.com = M + OZP + DZP + Unified Social Tax + SO + OHR + KZ
where M is the cost of materials;
WFP - basic salary for specialists participating in the development of the program;
DZP - additional salary for specialists participating in the development of the program;
UST - unified social tax;
CO - costs associated with the operation of equipment (depreciation);
OCR - general economic costs;
KZ - non-production (commercial) expenses.
The calculation of financial costs is calculated taking into account the route maps presented in Table 9.
Operating time
During the installation process, equipment such as a puncher, crimping tool, and tester was used. The table shows the consumables and equipment needed to create a network
Vibroacoustic protection equipment (vibroacoustic noise generator “LGSh - 404” and emitters for it in the amount of 8 pieces) and the Canonir-K microphone listening device suppressor were purchased by the customer and are not taken into account in the calculation of material costs.
Cost sheet
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Name of Materials |
Unit |
Price per unit of measurement, rub. |
Quantity |
Amount, rub. |
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3. Dowels |
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4. Self-tapping screws |
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5. Marker |
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6. Victory drill |
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8. Roulette |
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11. Phillips screwdriver |
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The volume of material costs for product M, rubles, is calculated using formula 3
М = Σ Рi · qi
where pi is the type of material i according to the quantity;
qi is the cost of specific unit i of material.
Calculation of the volume of material costs is calculated using the formula
M = 2+5+30+50+200+100=387 (rub.)
The calculation of the basic salary is carried out on the basis of the developed technological process of the work performed, which should include information:
about the sequence and content of all types of work performed,
on the qualifications of workers involved in performing certain types of work at all production stages (transitions, operations),
about the labor intensity of performing all types of work,
on the technical equipment of workplaces when performing work at all stages.
Since some preferential categories of employees and planned bonuses to the established tariffs for high-quality and timely completion of work may participate in the formation of the basic wage fund, correction factors are provided in the calculations. Their values are determined on the basis of increasing interest rates relative to the direct costs of paying wages to employees. It is recommended to choose increasing interest rates in the range from 20% to 40%; in this work it is selected based on an interest rate of 30%, or Kzp = 0.3.
To determine financial costs, it is necessary to attract an employee with appropriate qualifications for whom the monthly salary must be determined. An employee’s salary for similar work is 50,000 rubles per month, based on this we will determine the hourly tariff rate Hours rubles/hour using the formula
Ochas = Zprmes/Tmonth
Zprmes - monthly salary;
The hourly tariff rate is calculated using formula 4
Calculation of the basic salary, RUB, is determined by the formula
OZP = Zprobsch + Zprobsch * Kzp
where Zprobsch is direct wages;
Кзп - increasing reference coefficient.
To determine the basic salary, first of all, you should calculate the direct salary Zpri, rubles, which is determined by formula 6
Zpri = OM * Tr/D * t
where OM - official salary (per month);
Tp - time spent on developing a program stage (hours);
D - number of working days per month; - duration of the working day (hour);
Zpri - direct wages at the i-th transition.
The basis of information for calculating direct wages is the route map.
After determining direct wages for transitions, the total amount of direct wages Zpr.totch, rubles is determined according to formula 7
Zpr.total =
Operational transitions of the work performed
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Transition number according to route maps |
The name of the operation |
Operating time |
Employee qualification (category) |
Employee tariff rate |
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Transition 1 |
Preparatory |
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Transition 2 |
Blank |
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Transition 3 |
First editing room |
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Transition 4 |
Second editing room |
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Transition 5 |
Third editing room |
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Transition 6 |
Laying |
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Transition 7 |
Control |
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Transition 8 |
Connective |
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Transition 9 |
Tuning |
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Correction factor Kzp =0.3 |
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Total: OZP taking into account the correction factor 4097.99 |
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Let's determine the total salary based on all transactions
Zpr.total=284.0+284.0+615.3+284.0+568.0+426.0+123.0+284.0+284.0=3152.3 (rub)
Using the formula, we calculate the basic salary
OZP = 3152.3 + 3152.3*0.3 = 4097.99 (rub)
The calculation results are recorded in Table 11.
From Table 11 it can be seen that the OCP, taking into account the correction factor, amounted to 4097.99 rubles.
Additional wages are actual allowances to encourage the employee to complete his work on time, exceed the plan, and work with high quality.
Additional salary DZP, rubles, calculated by the formula
DZP = Kdzp * OZP
where Kdzp is the correction factor.
DZP taking into account the interest rate according to formula (8) we obtain
DZP = 4097.99 * 0.1 = 409.79 (rub.)
The unified social tax (contributions) includes monetary contributions to extra-budgetary funds: the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, the Social Insurance Fund of the Russian Federation, the Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund. When calculating the amount of the single social tax to extra-budgetary funds in this work, an interest rate of 34% should be used. from the income of the population, then KESN = 0.34. In this case, the income of the population should include the total accruals of wages and salaries. The unified social tax is calculated using the formula
ESN = KESN * (OZP + DZP)
Unified Social Tax = 0.34 * (4097.99 + 409.79) = 1532.64 (rub.)
where KESN is the VAT correction factor.
OHR = KOHR * OZP
OHR = 4097.99 * 1.5 = 6146.98 (rub.)
It is recommended to calculate general business costs based on the recommended interest rate interval (120 ¸ 180)% of the basic salary (BW), using the given adjustment factor (KOHR), formula 10. The interest rate is selected 150%, KOHR = 1.5.
The costs of maintaining and operating equipment (depreciation) are determined by formula (11). To calculate depreciation charges, the following information is used:
cost of equipment;
moral aging period (depreciation period);
straight-line depreciation method.
The linear method was chosen because of the equipment used in device repair, since the obsolescence of this equipment occurs much faster than physical equipment, which requires its constant modernization or replacement with more advanced devices. Equipment operating hours in accordance with route maps. Equipment depreciation costs are presented in the table.
Depreciation on equipment
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Name of device equipment |
Depreciation period, years |
Cost, rub. |
Actual time worked, minutes |
Actual costs for depreciation, rub. |
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1. Hammer |
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2. Tester |
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Actual costs for depreciation of CO, rubles, are determined by the formula
CO = (Equipment * Tf)/(Years * Months * Days * t)
where Oequipment is the cost of equipment (perforator 5000 rubles, tester 500 rubles);
Tf - actual time worked (perforator 60 minutes, tester 60 minutes);
Years - depreciation period (three years);
Months - number of months (12 months);
Days - number of working days per month (22 days); - duration of the working day (eight hours).
Let's determine the total actual costs for depreciation SOtot, rubles, using formula 12
COtotal = COtester + COperforator
SOtotal = 2.05 + 47.34 = 49.39 (rub.)
The total production cost is determined by the formula
Sbp.p = M + OZP + DZP + ESN + CO + OHR
Sbp.p = 387+4097.99+409.79+1532.64+49.39+6146.98=12623.79 (rub.)
KZ= Kk.z* Sbp.p
KZ = 12623.79 * 0.02 = 252.47 (rub.)
where Sbp.p is the total production cost.
The commercial cost of repair work on the Sb.com device, rubles, is determined by formula (15)
Sb.com = Sbp.p + KZ
Sb.com = 12623.79 + 252.47 = 12876.26 (rub.)
The commercial price Tscom, rubles, taking into account profitability, is determined by formula (16). Profitability for the industry is set at 25%, then Krent = 0.25.
Tscom = (Sb.com * Krent) + Sb.com
Tscom = (12876.26 * 0.25) + 12876.26 = 16095.32 (rub.)
where Krent is the profitability ratio.
Calculation of the price of an enterprise for organizing an acoustic and vibroacoustic protection system, taking into account profitability, is determined by formula (16)
The selling price, including VAT, is determined by formula (17). Value added tax, in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation, is set at 18%, then KVAT = 0.18.
Tsotp = (Tskom * KNDS) + Tskom
Tsotp = (16095.32 * 0.18) + 16095.32 = 18992.47 (rub.)
where KVAT is the VAT coefficient.
Calculation of the price of an enterprise for organizing a video surveillance system, taking into account VAT, is determined by formula (3.16)
The total cost of the acoustic and vibroacoustic protection system was calculated, the cost of which was 18,992.47 rubles.
Conclusion. During the installation process, a complete check of the device was carried out using various testing devices and subsequent elimination of the faults found. The final stage of organizing an acoustic and vibroacoustic protection system is checking the quality of the work performed and the correct functioning of the device. It is possible to reduce the cost of a network only by purchasing cheaper equipment.
Chapter 4. Safety precautions and workplace organization
1 Explanation of requirements for premises and workplaces
1. The premises in which the equipment of acoustics and vibration acoustics systems are located must comply with safety requirements, fire safety, current building codes and regulations (SNiP), State standards, PUE (electrical installation rules), PTE (technical operation rules) of consumers and PTB (safety rules) for the operation of consumers, as well as the corresponding requirements of sanitary and hygienic standards.
2. With regard to the danger of electric shock to people, the following are distinguished:
a) Premises with increased danger, characterized by the presence of one of the following conditions creating an increased danger:
· Dampness (relative humidity exceeds 75% for a long time);
· High temperature (t°C exceeds +35°C for a long time);
· Conductive dust;
· Conductive floors (metal, earthen, reinforced concrete,
· brick, etc.);
· Possibility of simultaneous contact of workers and grounded metal structures of the building on the one hand and to the metal housings of electrical equipment on the other;
b) Particularly dangerous premises, characterized by the presence of one of the following conditions creating a particular danger:
· Particular dampness (relative air humidity is close to 100%), i.e. the floor, walls, ceiling and equipment are covered with moisture;
· Chemically active environment that destroys insulation and live parts of electrical equipment;
· The simultaneous presence of two or more conditions of increased absence of signs related to increased and special danger.
1.3. When performing work outdoors, the degree of danger of electric shock is determined by the senior person in charge of the work at the place where it is performed, depending on the specific conditions.
4. Bare live parts of equipment accessible to accidental human touch must be provided with reliable barriers in cases where the voltage on them exceeds:
a) In areas with increased danger - 42 V;
b) In particularly dangerous rooms - 12 V.
5. Whether the possibility of danger and the ways in which its impact on workers can be prevented or reduced must be indicated with signal colors and safety signs in accordance with GOST.
6. Each team at the workplace must have a first aid kit and first aid supplies, as well as individual and collective protective equipment.
Work in attics, building walls, basements.
Before starting work in the attic, the foreman or foreman, together with a representative of the housing maintenance organization, check the reliability of the attic floors, the serviceability of the stairs to enter the attic and the sanitary condition of the premises.
In the absence of safe working conditions, it is prohibited to start work.
Work in the attic, basement (high-risk premises) is carried out by a team of at least 3 people with an electrical safety group of at least II. Permission to work is issued by the owner of the building (housing office, department of economic protection, REU, etc.).
When working in the attic, care must be taken to avoid falling into open, unguarded hatches, or injury from nails sticking out in beams and boards. If there is no lighting in the attic or basement, work must be done using the light of a portable electric lamp, voltage up to 42V, or a flashlight.
The use of open fire (candles, matches, etc.) and smoking is prohibited.
The team allowed to work in the attic must have the following personal protective equipment:
a) voltage indicator (TIN-1);
c) dielectric gloves, galoshes, boots;
d) safety glasses, helmet;
e) rechargeable (battery) flashlight;
f) first aid kit. help.
Laying cables in attics, basements and building walls
All cable inputs and outputs to the attic and basement must be protected with a metal sleeve from accidental mechanical damage, and also securely fastened to walls, wooden beams, etc.
Lay the cable in attics and basements so that it does not interfere with the passage through those. floor, performing any work by other operational services (telephone operators, antenna operators, mechanics, plumbers, electricians, radio technicians, etc.).
A) In high attics (gable sloping roof), the main cable is laid at a height of no less than 2 m 30 cm from the floor and is secured to the load-bearing support beams with a cable or metal strip (staples) preventing the cable from sagging.
b) Cable laying along the walls from the entrance to the attic, to the basement to the equipment installation site should be done with overhead brackets (metal/strip, etc.) with a distance of at least 350 mm from each other. When laying the cable parallel to the electric On the reins, the distance between them must be at least 250 mm. At intersections with electrical wires (cable), the television cable must be enclosed in an insulating tube. If it is necessary to lay the cable parallel to radio broadcasting and telephone (low-current) lines, the distance between them is at least 100 mm.
Also, the cable should be laid at least 1 m away from hot water supply pipes, heating pipes and ventilation ducts.
Installation of equipment inside buildings
Before starting work, the foreman or workman must determine the installation location of the equipment and its connection to the power supply network, and its grounding.
The equipment must be located in special metal cabinets with mandatory grounding or on mounting panels that also have a grounding element (bolt, washer, nut, etc.) in places with free and convenient access for installation and maintenance of the equipment. Also desirable are the factors of sufficient lighting and free space necessary to carry out the work.
The equipment should be located away from television, telephone, public service networks, etc. equipment at a distance of at least 2 meters to avoid induced interference.
In connection with the requirements of Mosproekt, power supplies should be located in electrical panels of buildings with mandatory grounding; hermetic power breakers are installed on mounting panels installed in basements, attics, etc., intended for fastening equipment, because basements, attics And. d. belong to the category of high-risk premises, and in case of accidents (break of water supply, sewerage, hot water supply, etc.) to the category of dangerous premises b) tools with insulating handles;
Equipment should be placed on mounting panels based on ease of installation and operation, as well as aesthetics. There should be convenient access to the mounting and adjustment components of the equipment.
The cables on the mounting panel must be secured so that:
a) Did not interfere with free access to the equipment;
b) They had an additional length reserve of no more than 1-2 additional cable cuts.
c) Must be marked: cable purpose, input, output.
Cables suitable (supplied) to the mounting panel or metal cabinet must also be secured to walls, beams, etc. and are protected by a metal sleeve, boxes, plastic or metal tubes, and must not interfere with the passage, approach and work near the mounting panel.
It is imperative to avoid crossing the input and output of the amplification equipment.
Trunk equipment of adjacent parallel lines (amplifiers, tie-in units, IGZ, power passes, adders, etc.)
It is prohibited to install the equipment:
a) In boiler rooms, on the roofs of buildings.
b) Near pipes: sewer, hot and cold water supply, gas, as well as on air ducts and ventilation ducts, etc.
c) Throughout the entire route, the cable must be laid in a straight line, without sagging and tightly adjacent to the wall.
d) In low attics and basements, the cable is laid either along the walls with the requirements specified above, or on a cable with mandatory reliable fastening of the cable to the strong structures of the attic, basement, and with mandatory cable tension.
e) When bending and turning the cable, observe the permissible bending radius of the cable (technical conditions for cable products).
e) When the cable is laid openly at a height of less than 2.3 m from the floor level or 2.8 m from the ground level, it must be protected from mechanical damage (metallic hose, metallic pipes, etc.)
g) Electrical wires (220V, 22V) must be protected with a metal sleeve (metal or plastic tubes), if electrical. the cable is mounted at a height of less than 2.3 m from the floor or 2.8 m from the ground along the entire length of its route along the attic or facade of the building, and if higher than 2.3 m from the floor and 2.8 m from the ground, then use Protecting pieces of metal hose up to 3 meters long from the installation site of equipment and cable entry into the attic or basement should be installed at a distance of at least 50 cm from each other.
Work in attics and basements at air temperatures above 50°C (indoors) is prohibited.
Cable laying in basements on trays (racks) must be carried out with mandatory cable fastening with a distance between fastenings of 1 m.
When pulling a cable through a low-current riser (between floors), the cable must be secured (with brackets, plastic ties, wire, etc.) on each odd-numbered floor with the obligatory laying out of the cable inside the low-current cabinet.
It is prohibited to pull the cable through the mortgages where the power cable distribution is located.
If it is not possible to lay cables along low-current risers (the embedded pipe or channel is overfilled or broken), a low-current riser must be laid with the obligatory permission and indication of the installation location and mandatory grounding of the riser by the owner of the building.
Conclusion
Upon completion of the work, the following conclusions can be drawn. Voice information in a protected area is of the greatest value, so it is necessary to pay close attention to its protection.
The main threats to information security during a meeting are: eavesdropping and unauthorized recording of speech information using embedded devices, laser eavesdropping systems, voice recorders, interception of electromagnetic radiation arising from the operation of sound recording devices and electrical appliances.
As the main organizational measures, it is recommended to check the premises before the meeting in order to assess the state of information security, control the access of meeting participants to the premises, and organize monitoring of the entrance to the allocated premises and the surrounding environment.
The main means of ensuring the protection of acoustic information during a meeting is the installation of various noise generators, blocking of embedded devices in the room, and sound insulation. As the main technical means of protecting information, it was proposed to install double doors, sealing the cracks in the windows with sound-absorbing material, installing technical means of information security in the room.
The main goal of the attacker is to obtain information about the composition, condition and activities of an object of confidential interests (company, product, project, recipe, technology, etc.) in order to satisfy his information needs. It is possible, for selfish purposes, to make certain changes to the composition of information circulating at an object of confidential interests. Such an action can lead to misinformation regarding certain areas of activity, accounting data, and the results of solving certain problems. A more dangerous goal is the destruction of accumulated information arrays in documentary or magnetic form and software products. The full amount of information about a competitor’s activities cannot be obtained only by one of the possible methods of accessing information. The more information capabilities an attacker has, the more success he can achieve in competition.
In the same way, methods for protecting information resources should represent a holistic set of protective measures
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