I am not sure that Lavrenty Pavlovich was so impeccable, but the fact that everything we know about Stalin and Beria was dissected by one of the most terrible figures of the era - Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev - is beyond doubt. In particular, Khrushchev undoubtedly bears direct responsibility not only for the organization of mass repressions in Moscow and Ukraine in 1937 (and most likely the scale of the repressions acquired despite the will of Stalin, which is confirmed by the well-known legend about the famous resolution “Be quiet, fool!” on the execution lists presented by Khrushchev ), but also for the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in Ukraine in 1941 and near Kharkov in 1942. Moreover, there are serious reasons to believe that the organization of the “Doctors’ Case,” as a result of which Stalin found himself without medical care, is also in one way or another connected with Khrushchev. And it is natural that, having come to power, Khrushchev did everything possible to whitewash himself in history and shift the blame onto Stalin and Beria, who, unlike him in reality, was a very large and successful statesman - just remember the leadership of the atomic project.
Originally posted by aloban75 at The truth about Beria. Breaking dogmas and stereotypes
60 years ago, on June 26, 1953, the outstanding statesman of the USSR, an outstanding organizer of the economy and science of the USSR, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, was vilely and treacherously killed.
On June 26, 1953, three tank regiments stationed near Moscow received an order from the Minister of Defense to load up with ammunition and enter the capital. The motorized rifle division also received the same order. Two air divisions and a formation of jet bombers were ordered to wait in full combat readiness for orders for a possible bombing of the Kremlin.
Subsequently, a version of all these preparations was announced: the Minister of Internal Affairs Beria was preparing a coup d'etat, which had to be prevented, Beria himself was arrested, tried and shot. For 50 years this version was not questioned by anyone.
An ordinary, and not so ordinary, person knows only two things about Lavrentiy Beria: he was an executioner and a sexual maniac. Everything else has been removed from history. So it’s even strange: why did Stalin tolerate this useless and gloomy figure near him? Afraid, or what? Mystery.
I wasn’t afraid at all! And there is no mystery. Moreover, without understanding the true role of this man it is impossible to understand the Stalinist era. Because in fact, everything was completely different from what the people who seized power in the USSR and privatized all the victories and achievements of their predecessors later came up with.
"Economic miracle" in Transcaucasia
Many people have heard about the “Japanese economic miracle”. But who knows about Georgian?
In the fall of 1931, the young security officer Lavrentiy Beria, a very remarkable personality, became the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia. In 20, he led an illegal network in Menshevik Georgia. In 23, when the republic came under the control of the Bolsheviks, he fought against banditry and achieved impressive results - by the beginning of this year there were 31 gangs in Georgia, by the end of the year there were only 10 of them left. In 25, Beria was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle. By 1929, he became both the chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia and the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in the region. But, oddly enough, Beria stubbornly tried to part with the KGB service, dreaming of finally completing his education and becoming a builder.
In 1930, he even wrote a desperate letter to Ordzhonikidze. “Dear Sergo! I know you will say that now is not the time to bring up the issue of studying. But what to do? I feel like I can’t do it anymore.”
In Moscow, the request was fulfilled exactly the opposite. So, in the fall of 1931, Beria became the first secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia. A year later he became the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee, in fact the owner of the region. And we really, really don’t like to talk about how he worked in this position.
Beria still got the same district. Industry as such did not exist. A poor, hungry outskirts. As you know, collectivization began in the USSR in 1927. By 1931, 36% of Georgian farms had been transferred to collective farms, but this did not make the population any less hungry.
And then Beria made a move with his knight. He stopped collectivization. Left the private owners alone. But on collective farms they began to grow not bread or corn, which were of no use, but valuable crops: tea, citrus fruits, tobacco, grapes. And this is where large agricultural enterprises justified themselves one hundred percent! Collective farms began to grow rich at such a speed that the peasants themselves flocked to them. By 1939, without any coercion, 86% of farms were socialized. One example: in 1930, the area of tangerine plantations was one and a half thousand hectares, in 1940 - 20 thousand. The yield per tree has increased, in some farms by as much as 20 times. When you go to the market to buy Abkhaz tangerines, remember Lavrenty Pavlovich!
In industry he worked just as effectively. During the first five-year plan, the volume of gross industrial output of Georgia alone increased almost 6 times. During the second five-year period - another 5 times. It was the same in the other Transcaucasian republics. It was under Beria, for example, that they began to drill on the shelves of the Caspian Sea, for which he was accused of wastefulness: why bother with all this nonsense! But now there is a real war between the superpowers over Caspian oil and over its transportation routes.
At the same time, Transcaucasia became the “resort capital” of the USSR - who then thought about the “resort business”? In terms of education level, already in 1938 Georgia took one of the first places in the Union, and in terms of the number of students per thousand souls it surpassed England and Germany.
In short, during the seven years that Beria held the post of “main man” in Transcaucasia, he so shaken up the economy of the backward republics that until the 90s they were among the richest in the Union. If you look at it, the doctors of economic sciences who carried out perestroika in the USSR have a lot to learn from this security officer.
But that was a time when it was not political talkers, but business executives, who were worth their weight in gold. Stalin could not miss such a person. And Beria’s appointment to Moscow was not the result of apparatus intrigues, as they are now trying to imagine, but a completely natural thing: a person who works in this way in the region can be entrusted with big things in the country.
Mad Sword of Revolution
In our country, the name of Beria is primarily associated with repression. On this occasion, allow me the simplest question: when did the “Beria repressions” take place? Date please! She's gone. The then chief of the NKVD, Comrade Yezhov, is responsible for the notorious “37th year”. There was even such an expression - “tight-knuckle gloves.” Post-war repressions were also carried out when Beria was not working in the authorities, and when he arrived there in 1953, the first thing he did was stop them.
When there were “Beria’s rehabilitations” - this is clearly recorded in history. And “Beria’s repressions” are in their purest form a product of “black PR”.
What really happened?
The country had no luck with the leaders of the Cheka-OGPU from the very beginning. Dzerzhinsky was a strong, strong-willed and honest person, but, extremely busy with work in the government, he abandoned the department to his deputies. His successor Menzhinsky was seriously ill and did the same. The main cadres of the “organs” were promoters from the Civil War, poorly educated, unprincipled and cruel; one can imagine what kind of situation reigned there. Moreover, since the late 20s, the leaders of this department were increasingly nervous about any kind of control over their activities:
Yezhov was a new person in the “authorities”, he started out well, but quickly fell under the influence of his deputy Frinovsky. He taught the new People's Commissar the basics of security service work directly “on the job.” The basics were extremely simple: the more enemies of the people we catch, the better; You can and should hit, but hitting and drinking is even more fun. Drunk on vodka, blood and impunity, the People's Commissar soon openly “swimmed.” He did not particularly hide his new views from those around him. “What are you afraid of? - he said at one of the banquets. - After all, all the power is in our hands. Whoever we want, we execute, whoever we want, we pardon: After all, we are everything. It is necessary that everyone, starting from the secretary of the regional committee, should walk under you: “If the secretary of the regional committee had to walk under the head of the regional department of the NKVD, then who, one wonders, should have walked under Yezhov? With such personnel and such views, the NKVD became mortally dangerous both for the authorities and for the country.
It is difficult to say when the Kremlin began to realize what was happening. Probably sometime in the first half of 1938. But to realize - they realized, but how to curb the monster?
The solution is to imprison your own man, with such a level of loyalty, courage and professionalism that he can, on the one hand, cope with the management of the NKVD, and on the other, stop the monster. Stalin hardly had a large choice of such people. Well, at least one was found.
Curbing the NKVD
In 1938, Beria, with the rank of Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, became the head of the Main Directorate of State Security, seizing control of the most dangerous structure. Almost immediately, right before the November holidays, the entire top of the People's Commissariat was removed and mostly arrested. Then, having placed reliable people in key positions, Beria began to deal with what his predecessor had done.
Chekists who went too far were fired, arrested, and some were shot. (By the way, later, having again become the Minister of Internal Affairs in 1953, do you know what order Beria issued the very first? On the prohibition of torture! He knew where he was going.
The authorities were thoroughly cleaned: 7,372 people (22.9%) were dismissed from the rank and file, and 3,830 people (62%) from the management. At the same time, they began to verify complaints and review cases.
Recently published data have made it possible to assess the scope of this work. For example, in 1937-38, about 30 thousand people were dismissed from the army for political reasons. 12.5 thousand were returned to service after the change of leadership of the NKVD. It turns out about 40%.
According to the most approximate estimates, since complete information has not yet been made public, up to 1941 inclusive, 150-180 thousand people out of 630 thousand convicted during the Yezhovshchina were released from camps and prisons. That is about 30 percent.
It took a long time to “normalize” the NKVD and it was not completely possible, although the work was carried out right up to 1945. Sometimes you have to deal with completely incredible facts. For example, in 1941, especially in those places where the Germans were advancing, they did not stand on ceremony with prisoners - the war, they say, would write everything off. However, it was not possible to blame it on the war. From June 22 to December 31, 1941 (the most difficult months of the war!) 227 NKVD employees were brought to criminal liability for abuse of power. Of these, 19 people received capital punishment for extrajudicial executions.
Beria also owned another invention of the era - the “sharashka”. Among those arrested there were many people who were very needed by the country. Of course, these were not poets and writers, about whom they shout the most and loudest, but scientists, engineers, designers, who primarily worked for defense.
Repression in this environment is a special topic. Who and under what circumstances imprisoned the developers of military equipment in the conditions of an impending war? The question is not at all rhetorical. Firstly, there were real German agents in the NKVD who, on real assignments from real German intelligence, tried to neutralize people useful to the Soviet defense complex. Secondly, there were no fewer “dissidents” in those days than in the late 80s. In addition, this is an incredibly quarrelsome environment, and denunciation has always been a favorite means of settling scores and career advancement.
Be that as it may, having taken over the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Beria was faced with the fact: in his department there were hundreds of arrested scientists and designers, whose work the country simply desperately needed.
As it is now fashionable to say - feel like a people's commissar!
There is a case before you. This person may or may not be guilty, but he is necessary. What to do? Write: “Liberate”, showing your subordinates an example of the opposite kind of lawlessness? Check things? Yes, of course, but you have a closet with 600 thousand things in it. In fact, each of them needs to be re-investigated, but there are no personnel. If we are talking about someone who has already been convicted, it is also necessary to get the sentence overturned. Where to start? From scientists? From the military? And time passes, people sit, war is getting closer...
Beria quickly found his bearings. Already on January 10, 1939, he signed an order to organize a Special Technical Bureau. The research topic is purely military: aircraft construction, shipbuilding, shells, armor steels. Entire groups were formed from specialists from these industries who were in prison.
When the opportunity presented itself, Beria tried to free these people. For example, on May 25, 1940, aircraft designer Tupolev was sentenced to 15 years in the camps, and in the summer he was released under an amnesty. Designer Petlyakov was granted amnesty on July 25 and already in January 1941 he was awarded the Stalin Prize. A large group of military equipment developers was released in the summer of 1941, another in 1943, the rest received freedom from 1944 to 1948.
When you read what is written about Beria, you get the impression that he spent the entire war catching “enemies of the people.” Yes, sure! He had nothing to do! On March 21, 1941, Beria became deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. To begin with, he oversees the People's Commissariats of the forestry, coal and oil industries, non-ferrous metallurgy, soon adding ferrous metallurgy here. And from the very beginning of the war, more and more defense industries fell on his shoulders, since, first of all, he was not a security officer or a party leader, but an excellent organizer of production. That is why he was entrusted with the atomic project in 1945, on which the very existence of the Soviet Union depended.
He wanted to punish Stalin's murderers. And for this he himself was killed
Two leaders
Already a week after the start of the war, on June 30, an emergency authority was established - the State Defense Committee, in whose hands all power in the country was concentrated. Naturally, Stalin became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. But who entered the office besides him? This issue is carefully avoided in most publications. For one very simple reason: among the five members of the State Defense Committee there is one unmentioned person. In the brief history of the Second World War (1985), in the index of names given at the end of the book, where such vital figures for victory as Ovid and Sandor Petofi are present, Beria is not present. I wasn’t there, I didn’t fight, I didn’t participate... So: there were five of them. Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov. And three commissioners: Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich. But soon the war began to make its own adjustments. Since February 1942, Beria, instead of Voznesensky, began to oversee the production of weapons and ammunition. Officially. (But in reality, he was already doing this in the summer of 1941.) That same winter, the production of tanks also fell into his hands. Again, not because of any intrigue, but because he did better. The results of Beria's work are best seen from the numbers. If on June 22 the Germans had 47 thousand guns and mortars against our 36 thousand, then by November 1, 1942 these figures were equal, and by January 1, 1944 we had 89 thousand of them against the German 54.5 thousand. From 1942 to 1944, the USSR produced 2 thousand tanks per month, far ahead of Germany.
On May 11, 1944, Beria became chairman of the GKO Operations Bureau and deputy chairman of the Committee, in fact, the second person in the country after Stalin. On August 20, 1945, he took on the most difficult task of that time, which was a matter of survival for the USSR - he became chairman of the Special Committee for the creation of an atomic bomb (there he performed another miracle - the first Soviet atomic bomb, contrary to all forecasts, was tested just four years later , August 20, 1949).
Not a single person from the Politburo, and indeed not a single person in the USSR, even came close to Beria in terms of the importance of the tasks being solved, in terms of the scope of powers, and, obviously, simply in terms of the scale of his personality. In fact, the post-war USSR was at that time a double star system: the seventy-year-old Stalin and the young - in 1949 he turned only fifty - Beria. Head of state and his natural successor.
It was this fact that Khrushchev and post-Khrushchev historians hid so diligently in holes of silence and under piles of lies. Because if on June 26, 1953, the Minister of Internal Affairs was killed, this still leads to a fight against the putsch, and if the head of state was killed, then this is the putsch...
Stalin's scenario
If you trace the information about Beria, wandering from publication to publication, to its original source, then almost all of it follows from Khrushchev’s memoirs. A person who, in general, cannot be trusted, since a comparison of his memories with other sources reveals an exorbitant amount of unreliable information in them.
Who hasn’t done “political science” analyzes of the situation in the winter of 1952-1953. What combinations were not thought of, what options were not calculated. That Beria was blocked with Malenkov, with Khrushchev, that he was on his own... These analyzes have only one sin - as a rule, they completely exclude the figure of Stalin. It is silently believed that the leader had retired by that time, was almost insanity... There is only one source - the memories of Nikita Sergeevich.
But why, exactly, should we believe them? And Beria’s son Sergo, for example, who saw Stalin fifteen times during 1952 at meetings devoted to missile weapons, recalled that the leader did not at all seem weakened in mind... The post-war period of our history is no less dark than pre-Rurik Russia. Probably no one really knows what was happening in the country then. It is known that after 1949, Stalin withdrew somewhat from business, leaving all the “turnover” to chance and to Malenkov. But one thing is clear: something was cooking. Based on indirect evidence, it can be assumed that Stalin was planning some kind of very big reform, first of all economic, and only then, perhaps, political. Another thing is clear: the leader was old and sick, he knew this very well, he did not suffer from a lack of courage and could not help but think what would happen to the state after his death, and not look for a successor. If Beria had been of any other nationality, there would have been no problems. But one Georgian after another on the throne of the empire! Even Stalin would not have done this. It is known that in the post-war years, Stalin slowly but steadily squeezed the party apparatus out of the captain's cabin. Of course, the functionaries could not be happy with this. In October 1952, at the CPSU Congress, Stalin gave the party a decisive battle, asking to be relieved of his duties as General Secretary. It didn’t work out, they didn’t let me go. Then Stalin came up with a combination that is easy to read: an obviously weak figure becomes the head of state, and the real head, the “gray cardinal,” is formally in a supporting role. And so it happened: after Stalin’s death, the lack of initiative Malenkov became the first, but Beria was really in charge of politics. He not only carried out an amnesty. For example, he was responsible for a resolution condemning the forced Russification of Lithuania and Western Ukraine; he also proposed a beautiful solution to the “German” question: if Beria had remained in power, the Berlin Wall simply would not have existed. Well, and along the way, he again took up the “normalization” of the NKVD, launching the process of rehabilitation, so that Khrushchev and the company then only had to jump on an already moving locomotive, pretending that they had been there from the very beginning.
It was later that they all said that they “disagreed” with Beria, that he “pressured” them. Then they said a lot of things. But in fact, they completely agreed with Beria’s initiatives.
But then something happened.
Calmly! This is a revolution!
A meeting of either the Presidium of the Central Committee or the Presidium of the Council of Ministers was scheduled for June 26 in the Kremlin. According to the official version, the military, led by Marshal Zhukov, came to see him, members of the Presidium called them into the office, and they arrested Beria. Then he was taken to a special bunker in the courtyard of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District troops, an investigation was carried out and he was shot. This version does not stand up to criticism. Why - it will take a long time to talk about this, but there are many obvious stretches and inconsistencies in it... Let's just say one thing: none of the outside, uninterested people saw Beria alive after June 26, 1953. The last person to see him was his son Sergo - in the morning, at the dacha. According to his recollections, his father was going to stop by a city apartment, then go to the Kremlin for a meeting of the Presidium. Around noon, Sergo received a call from his friend, pilot Amet-Khan, who said that there had been a shootout at Beria’s house and that his father, apparently, was no longer alive. Sergo, together with member of the Special Committee Vannikov, rushed to the address and managed to see broken windows, knocked out doors, a wall dotted with traces of bullets from a heavy machine gun.
Meanwhile, members of the Presidium gathered in the Kremlin. What happened there? Wading through the rubble of lies, bit by bit recreating what happened, we managed to roughly reconstruct the events. After Beria was dealt with, the perpetrators of this operation—presumably these were military men from Khrushchev’s old, Ukrainian team, whom he dragged to Moscow, led by Moskalenko—went to the Kremlin. At the same time, another group of military men arrived there. It was headed by Marshal Zhukov, and among its members was Colonel Brezhnev. Curious, isn't it? Then, presumably, everything unfolded like this. Among the putschists were at least two members of the Presidium - Khrushchev and Defense Minister Bulganin (Moskalenko and others always refer to them in their memoirs). They confronted the rest of the government with a fact: Beria had been killed, something had to be done about it. The whole team inevitably found themselves in the same boat and began to hide their ends. Another thing is much more interesting: why was Beria killed?
The day before, he returned from a ten-day trip to Germany, met with Malenkov, and discussed with him the agenda for the meeting on June 26. Everything was amazing. If something happened, it happened in the last 24 hours. And, most likely, it was somehow connected with the upcoming meeting. True, there is an agenda, preserved in Malenkov’s archive. But most likely it's a linden tree. No information has been preserved about what the meeting was actually supposed to be devoted to. It would seem... But there was one person who could know about this. Sergo Beria said in an interview that his father told him in the morning at the dacha that at the upcoming meeting he was going to demand from the Presidium a sanction for the arrest of the former Minister of State Security Ignatiev.
But now everything is clear! So it couldn't be clearer. The fact is that Ignatiev was in charge of Stalin’s security in the last year of his life. It was he who knew what happened at Stalin’s dacha on the night of March 1, 1953, when the leader had a stroke. And something happened there, about which many years later the surviving guards continued to lie mediocrely and too obviously. And Beria, who kissed the hand of the dying Stalin, would have torn all his secrets from Ignatiev. And then he organized a political trial for the whole world against him and his accomplices, no matter what positions they held. This is just in his style... No, these same accomplices under no circumstances should have allowed Beria to arrest Ignatiev. But how do you keep it? All that remained was to kill - which was done... Well, and then they hid the ends. By order of Defense Minister Bulganin, a grandiose “Tank Show” was organized (equally ineptly repeated in 1991). Khrushchev's lawyers, under the leadership of the new Prosecutor General Rudenko, also a native of Ukraine, staged the trial (dramatization is still a favorite pastime of the prosecutor's office). Then the memory of all the good things that Beria did was carefully erased, and vulgar tales about a bloody executioner and a sexual maniac were put into use. In terms of “black PR,” Khrushchev was talented. It seems that this was his only talent...
And he wasn’t a sex maniac either!
The idea of presenting Beria as a sexual maniac was first voiced at the Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953. Secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin, who, as he claimed, searched Beria’s office, found in the safe “a large number of objects of a libertine man.” Then Beria's security guard, Sarkisov, spoke and spoke about his numerous relationships with women. Naturally, no one checked all this, but the gossip was started and went for a walk around the country. “Being a morally corrupt person, Beria cohabited with numerous women...” - investigators wrote in the “sentence.”
There is also a list of these women on file. There’s just one problem: it almost completely coincides with the list of women with whom General Vlasik, Stalin’s security chief, who was arrested a year earlier, was accused of cohabiting with them. Wow, how unlucky Lavrenty Pavlovich was. There were such opportunities, but the women came exclusively from under Vlasik! And without laughing, it’s as simple as shelling pears: they took a list from Vlasik’s case and added it to the “Beria case.” Who will check? Nina Beria many years later, in one of her interviews, said a very simple phrase: “It’s an amazing thing: Lavrenty was busy day and night with work when he had to deal with a legion of these women!” Drive along the streets, take them to country villas, and even to your home, where there was a Georgian wife and a son and his family lived. However, when it comes to denigrating a dangerous enemy, who cares what really happened?
Elena Prudnikova
Birthday number 5 symbolizes an enthusiastic nature, loving adventure and risky activities, prone to everything unusual. You are active, love trips and travel, and feel at home everywhere.
You quickly and easily learn foreign languages and traditions of other peoples. Often your actions and behavior turn out to be completely sudden and unexpected, with unpredictable consequences.
With all the difficulties, you usually get away with it. In many ways, resourcefulness, wit, and cheerfulness help you in life. Love for frequent changes can prevent you from appreciating the present and seeing real prospects.
5 is the number of feelings. And people of this number are indeed extremely sensitive. By nature they are very lively, impulsive, frivolous, prone to risk, and value pleasure very much. As a rule, they are easily excitable and are often susceptible to nervous disorders. In business, people of number 5 tend to succeed and recover very quickly from failures. They have the best relationships with those with the same number.
The lucky day of the week for the number 5 is Thursday.
Your planet is Jupiter.
Advice: You are always focused only forward, although sometimes it is useful for you to see what is at hand.
Important:
The desire for freedom, liveliness, sociability.
Five makes a person sexy and nervous, adventurous and lively. Encourages you to always be on the side of the law, protect the weak, and expose any injustice.
Five patronizes rulers, missionaries, teachers, philosophers, lawyers, bosses and travelers.
Love and sex:
When looking for a sexual partner, these people usually show reckless courage and can have many affairs before deciding to take the final step.
They love to experiment in this area and take a wait-and-see attitude for a long time. Whether their marriage or intimate relationship will be successful or unsuccessful depends on the extent to which the partners understand each other and whether they are ready to fill their love affair with spiritual content. They are usually embarrassed by the external manifestation of feelings.
Words play a more important role for them than caresses, kisses, and sometimes sex itself. But over the years, they understand that words alone are not enough for harmony.
People born on the 26th are hospitable and love entertainment. Their house is constantly full of people. They are sensitive and capable of deep feelings. In some situations they act as idealists. They cannot get excited if the object is not surrounded by an aura of romance.
These people do good to others. Capable of great sacrifices. For friends and loved ones - soft; they are often exploited, but up to a certain limit: they are not as harmless as they seem.
The social balance is always in their favor.
Those around you need to learn to respect their individuality.
These people should pay attention to the liver and digestion.
The qualities listed in the cells of the square can be strong, average, weak or absent, it all depends on the number of numbers in the cell.
The higher the value, the more pronounced the quality.
Every 2 years the Element of the year changes (fire, earth, metal, water, wood). The Chinese astrological system divides years into active, stormy (Yang) and passive, calm (Yin).
You Snake elements Water of the year Yin
24 hours correspond to the twelve signs of the Chinese zodiac. The sign of the Chinese horoscope of birth corresponds to the time of birth, so it is very important to know the exact time of birth; it has a strong impact on a person’s character. It is argued that by looking at your birth horoscope you can accurately determine the characteristics of your character.
The most striking manifestation of the qualities of the hour of birth will occur if the symbol of the hour of birth coincides with the symbol of the year. For example, a person born in the year and hour of the Horse will display the maximum qualities prescribed for this sign.
Dates: 2013-06-22 -2013-07-22
The four Elements and their Signs are distributed as follows: Fire(Aries, Leo and Sagittarius), Earth(Taurus, Virgo and Capricorn), Air(Gemini, Libra and Aquarius) and Water(Cancer, Scorpio and Pisces). Since the elements help to describe the main character traits of a person, by including them in our horoscope, they help to form a more complete picture of a particular person.
Features of this element are cold and humidity, metaphysical sensitivity, feeling, perception. There are 3 signs of this quality in the Zodiac - a water trine (triangle): Cancer, Scorpio, Pisces. The Water trine is considered the trine of feelings and sensations. Principle: internal constancy despite external variability. Water is emotions, inner peace, preservation, memory. She is plastic, changeable, secretive. Gives such qualities as uncertainty, daydreaming, imaginative thinking, gentleness of manifestation. It slows down metabolism in the body, controls fluids and the work of endocrine glands.
People whose horoscopes express the element of Water have a phlegmatic temperament. These people have great sensitivity, are very receptive and impressionable, thinking, living more of an internal life than an external one. People of the Water trine are usually contemplative, thinking both about their own good and the good of their loved ones, however, at times they can be indifferent, lethargic, and lazy, with the exception of people of the Scorpio sign. Their external manifestation of feelings is not as pronounced as that of representatives of the Fire or Air trigons, but they experience internal feelings with great strength and depth.
For people of the Water trine, efficiency, practicality, sobriety of thought, and objectivity are not their strong points, but they are not short of imagination, they have a rich and vivid imagination, great internal and external strength, especially among Scorpios.
People of the water trigon, thanks to the richness of their inner world and sophistication of perception, achieve the greatest success in professions related to the world of arts, they especially shine as artists and performing musicians. Water signs can also be excellent workers in areas related to service and nutrition. And Scorpios are also excellent detectives due to their exquisite intuition.
The plans and moods of people of the Water trine can change both from external circumstances and from the internal state of the soul. A minor detail, sometimes not even tracked by consciousness, can radically change their state of mind, which can lead to a complete loss of interest either in the matter or in the partner.
People of the element of Water have great spiritual sophistication, are kind, polite, courteous, very attractive and attractive. They are usually not aggressive, with the exception of Scorpio.
Of the signs of the Water trine, Scorpio is the strongest in body and spirit, the most meaningful, the most aggressive, not susceptible to unwanted influence from the outside and showing strong resistance to everything with which his soul does not agree. His patience, endurance, tenacity and perseverance are simply amazing.
The weakest of the zodiac signs of the Water trine is Pisces. The middle ground between firmness and instability is occupied by the third sign of this trine - Cancer. Although his spiritual sphere is also very receptive and impressionable, he is distinguished by noticeable perseverance, endurance and purposefulness, therefore, of all the water signs, it is Cancer who more often than others achieves success in life.
The feelings of all three signs of the Water trine are approximately equally strong and, as a rule, prevail over the mind. These people are always ready to make self-sacrifice for the good of a loved one, as they always experience deep and pure feelings towards their loved ones. If they are not appreciated, they leave their partner forever, which is the real drama of life for them. They are looking for a partner who is worthy of them. Love and marriage are of paramount importance in life for them, especially for women.
An excessive tendency towards daydreaming and fantasies, too vivid an imagination can lead to internal contradiction - a collision of their illusions with reality. If a person does not see a way out of this state, depression, addiction to alcohol, drugs, other stimulants, and even mental illness may occur.
Aries, Cancer, Libra, Capricorn. The cardinal cross is the cross of will, the material basis of the universe, a new impulse of idea. His main quality is the desire for realization. It is always directed towards the future. It gives dynamism, activity, and the desire for a goal. A person in whose horoscope the Sun, Moon or most of the personal planets are in cardinal signs will be a man of action. Such people are energetic and live in the present; for them, the most important thing is the current moment in time and the feeling of “here and now.” Therefore, their emotions and sensations are bright and strong. Their joy is as strong and sincere as disappointment, but any emotions are short-lived, since soon these signs are immersed in a new life, in new sensations, and starting a new business. With age, their moods become more even and come to their usual businesslike mood. Obstacles do not frighten them, but only increase their pressure and desire for the goal. However, they do not have much strength to withstand the fight for their goal for too long. Therefore, if the struggle with an obstacle takes too long or the results of your efforts are not visible at all, then such an obstacle begins to seem insurmountable, which leads to disappointment, causes a loss of strength and can even lead to depression. Also detrimental to them is the lack of dynamics and the ability to take initiative. Such a person will always strive forward and upward, captivating him with his energy. He is always in sight, noticeably rises above his surroundings, achieves his life goal and reaches a high social level.
This is a sign of the primary manifestation of the element of Water. It is under the control of the second luminary - the Moon, which largely shapes the psychological and emotional internal structure of this sign. The Sun in the sign of Cancer creates the psychological structure of people of a juvenile nature. To some extent, this is youth psychology and perception of the world. Water carries the functions of a passive and reflective principle; it becomes the cause of internal transformation, transformation, mutation and transmutation.
People born under the sign of Cancer are characterized by a desire for internal perfection and introspection. Cancers have a subtle spiritual life, they are constantly changing internally, just as the Moon is constantly changing in the sky: it is born, grows, reaches its apogee, decreases, dies. Cancers are very easily vulnerable; they are the most vulnerable sign of the Zodiac. Therefore, in the form of protection from such increased vulnerability, Cancers need to organize a shell. They need it to protect themselves from the deep emotionality given to them by nature. And often, as a reaction to such emotionality, Cancers pretend to be a strong person, although internally they are very weak. Cancers are a very feminine sign, receptive, “yin”, and they take more than they give, i.e. they are dominated by lunar characteristics. Cancers love novelty in everything, change, travel; they are rather restless people, and they are very attached to loved ones.
Of all the zodiac signs, Cancer is the most homely, the most family sign. Family comes first in Cancer’s hierarchy of values; they are attached to home, to the past, and love retrospection. If your Sun is in this wonderful sign, then your consciousness is often drawn to the history of your family, culture, ethnic group, people. You most likely have very heightened psychic abilities. Mediumship abilities are also possible. Among Cancers there are many mediums and major occultists. It is known that Cancers love the company of their sign, which is not a general pattern: as a rule, people of the same sign communicate with each other quite intensely and quickly get bored with each other, but this does not apply to Cancers, they can communicate with each other for a long time and fruitfully.
You probably remember your past, childhood in detail, you like to plunge into childhood memories, you have excellent intuition that helps you preserve your individual essential core in all cases of life. You have a very subtle mental nature, as well as a wide range of talents, a subtle perception of the emotional world. Accordingly, this gives rise to your talent as artists, writers, poets, and psychologists. You reveal to us many secrets of the Soul, yours and others, the secrets of our subconscious.
You will always achieve what you want, but you will not do it actively, but passively, waiting in the wings. You can rest assured that Cancer will achieve his goal. It is useless to put pressure on you, because you do not tolerate it, you immediately go to the side, into the depths. Therefore, if someone is going to communicate with Cancer, they need to act indirectly, indirectly and not put pressure on him directly and openly. Cancers can be seduced, since water signs are susceptible to all sorts of influences and seductions.
Cancers, as a water sign, often work with liquids and it is noticed that a lot of Cancers work in dairies. Among Cancers there are bartenders, especially night ones, because it is at night that Cancers feel great. Low levels in Cancer are the worst traits of any person. Deceit and deceit, clinginess. At the lowest level, Cancers are swindlers, cynics, and very noisy.
What could be the dynamics of your development of this sign? Cancers, as a rule, are always based on traditions. For high Cancer, everything that happened in the distant past is authority. They go to the present and future through the past. Retrospectiveness is the natural background of their perception, and, as a rule, the new for them is the well-forgotten old, this is their credo. Thus, Cancers always rely on the past, on traditions, on family; they seem to be moving backwards. If we talk about the problems of Cancers, then this is to harmonize their manifestations, which often occur in a distorted and perverted form. Often their will, the impulsive energy of Cancer, is in conflict with the emotional world; subconsciously they strive to have public, social authority, without having sufficient grounds in their internal structure. Therefore, it is important for them to choose high guidelines and spiritual authorities for their development from childhood. For them, an absolutely important problem is the formation of their inner spiritual world, the construction of a spiritual core, which we always talk about, which is the basis of the personality of each of us, but this is especially important for Cancers with their variability and impressionability. The land of Cancer is India, a country intimately connected to its deep past, a land of deep spiritual traditions. Among the Hindus we find subtlety, intuitiveness, and a connection with the element of Water, symbolizing mystery.
Examples are the artists El Greco, Pizarro, Rembrant, Rubens, Corot, Degas, and writers - Hemingway, Rousseau, George Sand, Kafka, many teachers who have a great feeling for children and work with them, for example Ushinsky.
Famous Cancers: Alsou, Akhmatova, Agutin, Akhedzhakova, Armani, Arbatova, Aguzarova, George Bush, Budnitskaya, Bordovskikh, Borovoy, Gurtskaya, Darwin, Princess Diana, Cardin, Tom Cruise, Tutta Larsen, Lollobrigida, Mayakovsky, Myagkov, Pevtsov, Poplavskaya , Proust, Rockefeller, Carlos Santana, Ringo Star, Feuchtwanger, Stallone, Tyson, Chagall, Shantsev, Shirvindt, Schumacher, Khodorkovsky, Tom Hanks.
Watch a video:
Cancer | 13 zodiac signs | TV channel TV-3
The site provides condensed information about the zodiac signs. Detailed information can be found on the relevant websites.
TO THE SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE ABOUT BERIA a
The enemies wanted to place the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and government.
The task is to place the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the service of the party and the government, to take these bodies under the control of the party.
The enemies wanted to use the Ministry of Internal Affairs for criminal purposes.
The goal is to eliminate any possibility of such crimes happening again.
The bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs occupy a place in the system of the state apparatus where there is the greatest opportunity to abuse power.
The challenge is to prevent abuse of power.
(Great restructuring; correction of] methods; agency; introduce party spirit.)
Committee -
internal views on enemies to protect friends
outside - establish reconnaissance
Ministry of Internal Affairs - task - (camps must [check], ...)
1. facts - Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia 1
Are these measures necessary?
What happened, how did they begin to understand?
The Ministry of Internal Affairs corrected the party and the government]
Central Committee - to the background
2. The post of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Comrade B[eria] - from this post he controls the party and the government [.] This is fraught with great dangers, if in time, but now not fix it.
3. Incorrect, etc.
Court - preg. b
Special meeting
Data
Hungarian question[os] - We didn’t agree in advance (Still emphasized! aa) Germany - should we send a security officer? should I send a manager?
Is this correct - no!
We need to fix it in time. - Suppression of the collective. What kind of collectivism is this?
Peremptory - end it
4. Disunity, with caution.
Letter about Molotov Let's tune in to each other!
Nizhen - monolithic[ th] team [team] and it exists!
5. How to fix:
a) Ministry of Internal Affairs - give the post to another (Kr[uglov]) + Central Committee
Security management - Central Committee
From morning to evening you cannot take a step without control! b
Our protection is for each individual, for the one who is being guarded.
(no denunciations)
With Comrade Stalin, we are dissatisfied with the Organization of eavesdropping - Central Committee - control Comrades, you’re not sure who’s eavesdropping on whom? b) From deputy post[Council of Ministers of the USSR] - release the na[begin] minister] etc industrialism]
c) Special[ial] Committee - in Minister[ treachery] Saburov and Khrunichev 2
d) Presidium of the Central Committee - on major issues decisions] - signed by the secretary, the Chairman? 3
there was a decision
Who wants to discuss... with
a Note on the back of the sheet: “From the Malenkov archive according to inventory No. 179.” - Comp.
aa Possibly "Underline". - Comp.
b The words are written by G.M. Malenkov in the margins. - Comp.
c The word could not be understood. - Comp.
1 Apparently, this refers to decisions made by the constituent union republics. See documents No. 15 and No. 16, Section I.
2 We are talking about transforming the Special Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers, whose chairman was L. Beria, which led the work on the production of nuclear weapons, into a ministry and the possible appointment of M. Saburov or M. Khrunichev to the post of minister.
3 Perhaps G. Malenkov had in mind the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.
There is one version of events, which Sergei Kremlev, for example, calls “extreme.” Another author (I don’t remember who exactly) says even more harshly: “I don’t know why Sergo Beria needed to come up with all this.” Nevertheless, the evidence that Lavrenty Pavlovich’s son stubbornly insisted on cannot be dismissed. He writes about this in his book, but I give an earlier story - a fragment of an interview that Sergo Beria gave to the Georgian journalist Ruslan Chilachava, since this test was subject to the least amount of revision.
Quote 2.1.
“On June 26, 1953, my father was at the dacha. I left earlier, somewhere around eight, and an hour later I was in the Kremlin. (Father’s office was located in the opposite building.) At four o’clock in the afternoon we had to report to father about the preparations for a nuclear explosion... (The following is about the preparation for the report, together with other designers, from B. J1. Vannikov. - E. P.) At about twelve o’clock an employee from Vannikov’s secretariat comes up to me and invites me to the phone: Hero of the Soviet Union Amet-Khan, who tested aircraft with my equipment, called twice. “Sergo,” he shouted into the phone, “I’ll tell you some terrible news, but hold on! Your house is surrounded by troops, and your father, in all likelihood, was killed. I’ve already sent a car to the Kremlin gates, get in it and go to the airfield "I'm ready to transport you somewhere before it's too late!"
I started calling my father's secretariat. The phones were silent. They probably managed to turn them off. No one answered the phone either at the dacha or in the apartment. There was no communication everywhere... Then I turned to Vannikov. After listening to me, he also began to call, but through his own channels... Vannikov established that the meeting had been canceled and something incomprehensible was happening. He told me: “If something irreparable has already happened, we are all powerless, but we will stand up for you, we will not allow them to deal with you!”
A car with friends was indeed waiting for me at the Kremlin gates. They tried to persuade me not to go home, explaining that the road there was already blocked, and shooting was heard around...
Halfway there I returned to Vannikov. He approved of my decision not to hide and immediately called Malenkov. Malenkov’s phone did not answer. Then he called Khrushchev. The phone was picked up. “Nikita Sergeevich,” Vannikov began, “Beria’s son is next to me. My comrades and I... know what happened. Therefore, we ask you to take care of the safety of young Beria.” Khrushchev answered him something. (Then Vannikov told me the meaning of his answer: they say, nothing happened to anyone anywhere, what are you making up there?) Apparently, Khrushchev was not yet aware of how it all ended.
Boris Lvovich (Vannikov - E.P.), so that I would not be captured alone, went with me to a city apartment located on the Garden Ring. The area was indeed cordoned off by the military, and we were not allowed into the courtyard for a long time, until Vannikov called Khrushchev again. Finally, after his permission, we were allowed through, which confirmed his involvement in what was happening. The wall on the side of my father's room was gouged by heavy machine gun bullets, the windows were broken, and the doors were knocked out.
While I was desperately looking at all this, one of the guards ran up to me and said: “Sergo, they just carried someone out of the room on a stretcher covered with a tarpaulin.”
The security guard was urgently called, and I did not have time to ask him if my father was at home during the shelling.”
In the book, Sergo wrote that around this time his father went to his city apartment for dinner. This is very similar to the truth - Beria, when possible, dined at home. And it is quite natural that, when leaving the Kremlin, he could call his son and ask if he would go with him.
Until recently, Sergo’s story (and Beria’s son, unfortunately, is endowed with a rich imagination - or he had bad co-authors) was the only evidence of the storming of Beria’s mansion on June 26, 1953, which allowed most researchers to simply brush it aside - since it absolutely does not agree with official version. Although, if you think about it, why did Sergo Lavrentievich come up with this? What difference does it make whether his father was killed on the spot, tortured in prison, or shot on a fabricated case?
But more recently, more evidence has emerged. Former USSR sanitary doctor Pyotr Nikolaevich Burgasov published a book of memoirs, which also cites this episode. He talked about the same thing in his interview with Moscow television journalist Roman Gazenko, who kindly made this text available to me.
Quote 2.2.
“June 26th is coming. I rise from the buffet, from the first floor to my second floor, and Vannikov and Sergo Beria rush past me along the stairs, almost knocking me down. This was completely different from Vannikov - he was such a correct person. I go up to my office and say to Morozov: “Listen, I was almost knocked down by Vannikov and Beria... Sergo. They went down like a bullet. What happened?” He replies: “Something must have happened. It doesn’t happen like that.” It was about one-half past one in the afternoon. Our lunch break started at five and ended at seven. I go to Vannikov (apparently at the beginning of the break, that is, about five o’clock in the afternoon. - E.P.), he and I were sitting in the adjacent rooms, through the wall. He sits with his elbows on the table, his head lowered towards the table. I ask: “Boris Lvovich, what happened?” He raised his eyes, looked at me and said: “Doctor, a tragedy occurred. I just returned from the mansion where Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria lived. When Sergo and I arrived there, there in the yard there were two cars with machine gunners. At first they didn’t want to let us through, but then they found out who I was and let us through. In Lavrenty Pavlovich’s office, all the windows were broken. When we were in the yard, the captain came up to us and said: “Fifteen minutes ago on a stretcher.” , covered with a raincoat, they carried out the corpse and took it away. “Whose corpse it was is clear, because the office spoke for itself.” Boris Lvovich Vannikov, who witnessed these events, told me this.”
The significance of this story cannot be overestimated. The version that was called “extreme”, with its appearance, becomes the main one, because the official one does not stand up to any criticism, the others are based on vague guesses, and here there are two pieces of evidence. He explains much more - for example, the extremely strange behavior of Beria’s comrades in the Special Committee at the plenum of the Central Committee that defies logical comprehension. Since the entire top of the Special Committee knew what Vannikov knew, the actions of Malyshev and Zavenyagin receive a completely different light. Looking ahead, let's say: events could unfold the way they unfolded only in one case - if Beria was killed immediately, on June 26, and all the characters (or those who should have become such, but did not) knew about it very well .
I wonder how Sergo Amet-Khan, who reported everything, found out? One can only guess about this. He lived nearby, passed along the street, or someone called him asking him to warn Sergo. Most likely, the latter. The security officers should have been the first to know about what had happened - after all, in addition to the official security, Beria probably also had a secret one. Well, the pilots involved in testing military equipment have long-standing, strong ties with the security officers, because it’s all one get-together. Most likely, one of those guys who were sitting in the surrounding houses called Amet-Khan, asking him to find Sergo and inform him about what was happening.
So, let's restore the events. It was not for nothing that I cited a fragment of the interview - in conversations with Chilachava, Sergo cites many small details that were omitted from the book written later. In this case, it is the trace of a machine gun burst on the wall. In combination with broken windows, it allows us to reconstruct the picture of events.
Around noon (most likely between twelve and one o'clock in the afternoon) two armored personnel carriers (or two cars) with soldiers drove into the courtyard of Beria's mansion. Beria's house is not a fortress, an armored personnel carrier could simply ram the gate (oh, how right Stalin was when he offered Lavrenty Pavlovich to live in the Kremlin back in 1938!). The guards jumped out of the house and began to deal with the soldiers. What is Beria doing? It’s as simple as that: he goes to the window to see what happened. And then they hit the window with a machine gun.
Time factor
When this happened can be determined quite accurately. To begin with, a word from Yuri Mukhin. He analyzes the memories of the participants in the “arrest”, who, before arresting Beria, allegedly had to sit for some time in a small room near Malenkov’s office.
Quote 2.3.
“At what time was Beria arrested?
As you understand, according to legend, the military waited a long time for the signal and therefore could not help but glance at their watches.
Moskalenko: “About an hour later, that is, at 13.00, June 26, 1953...” Zhukov: “A little later (it was in the first hour of the day) the bell rang, the second one. I’m up first...” Sukhanov: “The meeting has begun at 14.00 on June 26, 1953. The military were waiting for the prearranged signal... They waited for more than an hour. And then two bells rang."
General Moskalenko was either a direct participant in the operation in the mansion or knew about it. Marshal Zhukov was unlikely to participate, but he learned about what had happened almost immediately. Both of them unconsciously operate with a period of time tied to 12 o'clock in the afternoon. Sergo remembers the same thing - “around noon.” Burgasov also names the same period of time - around one o'clock in the afternoon. (In the latter case, it must be taken into account that some time had to pass from the moment of the assault to the meeting on the stairs - until Amet-Khan found out about everything that happened, while he found Sergo, while he went out to the gate, returned back, while Vannikov called Malenkov and Khrushchev... I think just about an hour passed.)
But Malenkov’s assistant Sukhanov, who is not privy to the details of the operation in the mansion, gives a completely different time for the “arrest” - 14 hours. Why? The reason, again, is simple: apparently, it was at this time that the very meeting at which Beria was allegedly arrested was scheduled (if there was no arrest, this does not mean that there was no meeting). Here is Sukhanov, who knows nothing about the midday shooting, and correlates the time of the “arrest” with the date of its start.
And where, by the way, was Beria before twelve o’clock in the afternoon?
Historian Yuri Zhukov managed to get to the journals kept by the secretaries of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and where they recorded in detail all the actions of their bosses. And I found out that there was another meeting that day. At 10 o'clock in the morning, members of the Council of Ministers (in full force) gathered to listen to Beria's report on his trip to Germany, from where he had returned the day before.
Now everything connects. Beria spent the night at the dacha only on weekends, but when he arrived from Germany on June 25, he did not go home, but to the dacha, to his family. In the morning from there I went to a meeting of the Council of Ministers, which, since he was not a person prone to unnecessary chatter, should last one and a half to two hours, no more. The subsequent schedule was tight: at two o’clock there was a meeting of the unknown body where he was allegedly arrested, then, at four, a meeting at the Special Committee. So it was not surprising that, although it was still too early for lunch, he went home - then there was no time left. That's when everything happened.
"Tank Show"
So, nine out of ten for the fact that at about twelve o'clock in the afternoon on June 26, 1953, Beria was killed on the spot during the storming of his mansion. And at two o’clock in the afternoon, the Kantemirovskaya tank and Tamanskaya infantry divisions located in Naro-Fominsk received orders to enter the capital and take control over it. The division commanders, together with the district commander, were at that time in Kalinin (now Tver) for command and staff exercises, and one can only guess whether these exercises were “set up” for the planned coup or just coincidence. It could have been a coincidence...
Be that as it may, according to the official version, at 14:00 the deputy commander of the Kantemirovskaya division, Colonel Paramonov, received a phone call from Defense Minister Bulganin, who ordered to raise three tank regiments, load full ammunition and enter Moscow in 40 minutes.
Yuri Zhukov was a teenager then. He remembers this day and the tanks entering Moscow - indeed, for a boy such an impression is unforgettable. It was about five o'clock in the evening, which is quite consistent: it takes just two to three hours to alert a division, equip its vehicles and reach Moscow.
One tank regiment stood on the Lenin Hills, another blocked the Gorky Highway (which Dzerzhinsky’s division stationed in Reutovo was hypothetically supposed to approach the capital), the third regiment took control of the stations, post office, telegraph, Gorky Street and the Kremlin. There, in the center, the troops of the Taman division were located.
But the most incredible story happened with the air units. The commander of the 56th Air Division, Colonel Dolgushin, was urgently summoned to the commander of the Moscow Military District Air Force, Colonel General Krasovsky. What happened next, according to Andrei Sukhomlinov’s reconstruction, looked like this:
Quote 2.4.
“...He suddenly said:
- Beria was arrested. You need to be ready to bomb the Kremlin!
Sergey Fedorovich replied:
- I won’t bomb the Kremlin!
- If my 216 planes bomb the Kremlin, then in 30 minutes, not only the Kremlin, but Moscow will no longer exist. It's a pity".
It is difficult to say what this dialogue actually looked like. Somehow the division commander reacts very calmly to the news of the arrest of the second person in the state and the impending possible bombing of the Kremlin in connection with this. The situation is extremely ambiguous and requires additional clarification - who is the conspirator in this case and on whose side is Dolgushin proposed to act? Maybe, by agreeing to carry out this strange order, he himself will become an “enemy of the people”? However, what I bought for is what I sell for - the story is quite well known and, it seems, comes from the words of Dolgushin himself. By the way, the commanders of the other two air divisions raised on alert did not seem to refuse to carry out the order.
The military stood in Moscow for three days, and then turned up and quietly left. Nothing extreme ever happened.
Khrushchev later claimed that the Presidium of the Central Committee was afraid of Dzerzhinsky’s division - they say that Beria was going to rely on the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs when carrying out a coup. But since Beria did not intend to carry out any coup and was physically unable to do so, being already dead, the question arises: why was this show needed? Only for camouflage? Or did he have a real goal?
A dog that didn't behave
It’s unlikely that they were thinking about camouflage at that moment. If they had thought, they would have at least taken fingerprints from Beria’s corpse.
Are you saying that the plan to storm the mansion is a gamble? Extreme version, you say? It's extreme in the book. But in fact, arrest at a meeting for the conspirators (so we called them by their name) is infinitely more dangerous. It is enough for any of Beria’s guards or assistants to suspect something and go to the nearest security post - it’s all over. None of the putschists will ever leave the Kremlin.
Beria kept the government elite (which they complained about at the plenum) and his workers under constant and vigilant surveillance. The same Burgasov recalled: he constantly demanded, explained, persuaded: “I must know where you are all the time.” When Pyotr Nikolaevich once “got lost” (he went to a restaurant after defending his dissertation and never showed up for work), he was greeted in the morning with a message that Beria had been looking for him all evening and was so excited that he didn’t even go home. Naturally, while demanding this from others, he himself informed where necessary about each of his steps.
Therefore, the first to know about what had happened, after the actors, were the security officers. And the question is: what would they do if their boss was arrested or captured? There is only one answer: they set about freeing him. And since the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in addition to the internal troops, included two units for special operations, it would not have seemed too much to anyone. This is also why I don’t believe for a minute in the version of the arrest (however, for many other reasons too).
What if the minister is killed? In this case, no one could predict the behavior of the security officers. It may happen that they will use their entire arsenal of means and methods. Or maybe they won't do anything. It all depends on the level of recklessness of the person who will take the reins of the office.
Beria had three first deputies: Kruglov, Serov and Kobulov. The first is the “chief policeman” of the country; he was not involved in state security matters. The second, judging by his biography and subsequent career, is Khrushchev’s man. (Before the war, Serov worked in Ukraine, after 1953 he rose sharply, becoming chairman of the KGB.) He, in principle, could try to neutralize the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But to do this, it was necessary to somehow get rid of Kobulov, the most dangerous person for the conspirators after Beria.
According to the official version, Bogdan Kobulov was arrested on June 27 in the Central Committee building, where he was allegedly summoned on official business. How it turned out in reality is unknown.
Was he in Moscow on June 26? On the eve of the events, Kobulov probably met with his boss, since it was on the evening of June 25 that Beria informed Malenkov what question he was going to raise the next day at that very meeting of an unknown body. Beria had just arrived from Germany, where he had very little time for Moscow affairs - events were teetering on the brink of a new war. And if on the evening of June 25 he raised this question with Malenkov, it means that it was that evening that he was informed of the new results of the investigation, which at that time was the main one in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
For the same reason, Kobulov most likely should have been present in the capital on June 26 - too important a person was to be arrested. They couldn’t kill him on the spot like Beria - there are required full-face and profile photographs taken during registration in prison. Meanwhile, the security officers did not participate in the events at all. They were like that dog from Conan Doyle's story, which did not behave in any way, which was the main strangeness of the case.
There are two possible reasons for this behavior. Perhaps Kobulov was arrested not on June 27, but on the 26th, having been summoned to the Central Committee under some pretext. Any more or less intelligent conspirator would have done this - such a person cannot be left behind. In this case, they could count on Serov to keep the Ministry of Internal Affairs from interfering in events. True, other dangerous people remained in power - for example, General Maslennikov, commander of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a front-line soldier, a tough and decisive person, and therefore also unpredictable. To neutralize his possible actions, tanks were called to Moscow.
The second version of the reasons why the security officers did not behave at the moment of the putsch (so we called what was happening by its real name) is that they knew for sure that Beria was dead, and they turned out to be reasonable enough to refrain from speaking out. If he had actually been captured alive, the direct responsibility of the guys from the Ministry of Internal Affairs would have been to plow the ground, take the entire Politburo hostage (except Malenkov) - but rescue the boss. Moreover, in the state he was not at all the person who is generally considered to be (we will talk about this later), and the actions of the security officers would have become natural measures to suppress the putsch. The putschists were taken, justice was restored, the country is moving on the same course, everything is in order.
But if he is dead, the situation is completely different. In the course of suppressing the putsch, the security officers had to engage in battle with the army, which would end with no one knows how. More precisely, we know what - a bloody massacre between the military and Dzerzhinsky residents, and for starters, quite possibly, the bombing of Moscow. In the name of what to do all this? After all, you can’t bring Beria back, you can’t restore the previous order. The king died, now, no matter how you look at it, there is still a flood - is there any reason to make this flood bloody?
In addition, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is a hierarchical structure. The second person in the state is dead, but the first is alive, which means that before you act, you need to contact him and get an order from him - what to do. But no order came. Or maybe he followed - sit still and keep a low profile.
Perhaps Dzerzhinsky would have acted differently. But Bogdan Kobulov is not Dzerzhinsky, but simply a very good security officer. Be that as it may, he did not raise the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On his part, this can even be called a civic feat - he understood perfectly well that he was doomed, but he did not save himself at such a cost.
And again the time factor
On the one hand, the two-hour gap between the storming of the mansion and the “Tank Show” seems to indicate that there was no pre-planned plan. Otherwise these two events would have happened simultaneously. Apparently, it was like this: having finished the action, the main performers went to the Kremlin, arriving there approximately between half past twelve and one in the afternoon. Quite quickly, information about what happened reached or was communicated to other members of the Presidium and to Marshal Zhukov. After which they all got together and began to think about what to do now. Beria is dead, nothing can be brought back, and the surviving members of the government were all in the same boat - both the organizers of the murder and those who were neither in sleep nor in spirit. They thought in a terrible hurry, almost in a panic - hence the “Malenkovsky draft”, and much more. But one thing absolutely had to be done - to neutralize the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because it was impossible to predict how Beria’s department would react to what happened. It was then that the tank and motorized divisions were put on alert - because the minutes were ticking. In terms of time, everything, in general, comes together.
On the other hand, what haunts me is the exact coincidence of the time when the alarm was announced with the beginning of the meeting at which Beria was allegedly arrested (remember, Sukhanov said that it was scheduled for 2 p.m.?). Is this coincidence a trace of the original plan of the conspirators?
And that’s true - they could not plan the assault on the mansion in advance, because who can predict when Beria will go home and whether he will go there at all? When, after a meeting of the Council of Ministers, he said that he would go to lunch, then an idea could have been born in someone’s hot head: take a couple of armored personnel carriers, go to Kachalov Street and end everything at once. And if the arrest of Beria at the meeting was the original plan, which they decided to abandon due to the “brilliant impromptu” storming of the mansion, then it turns out that the alarm was announced on time, and the plans changed.
It is known who directly led the murder of Beria, and they themselves did not refuse this high honor, they even demanded an order for themselves. True, they assured that they shot him in the prison basement - but that’s not the point... Generals who are proud of the executioner’s feat - the execution of an unarmed, tied up man - this is normal for the Khrushchev team. (By the way, according to some reports, the military who were present at the execution of Beria’s associates - a real execution - did not destroy their weapons. Prosecutor Kitaev and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Lunev had to kill themselves. They managed. This is also in the spirit of the Khrushchev team.)
The perpetrators of the action itself, apparently, are generals Moskalenko and Batitsky. One is the chief of air defense of the Moscow Military District, the other is the chief of staff of the Air Force, both from Khrushchev’s personal, “Ukrainian” team. But what is the role of Marshal Zhukov in all this?
General Moskalenko left interesting memories. When he allegedly went to a meeting (like arresting Beria), Zhukov came to the Kremlin with him. True, according to Moskalenko, this happened at eleven o’clock. But at eleven, the marshal still had to sit at a meeting of the Council of Ministers - he simply could not help but go there, because he was not only the Deputy Minister of Defense, but also the former head of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
But if we assume that Moskalenko came to the Kremlin and met Zhukov there after the action, that’s a different matter. This was supposed to happen between half past twelve and one o'clock. It's too early to head to the meeting scheduled for 2 p.m. But if Zhukov was sitting in his office, preparing a “tank show,” he was informed about a new turn of events, after which he jumped on board and rushed to the Kremlin—that would be just right.
Why do I think that the marshal is involved in the coup? For many reasons. Firstly, he was once the head of the Kyiv Special Military District - just when Khrushchev was the first secretary in Ukraine. Secondly, immediately after Stalin’s death, he was returned from “exile” to the Ural Military District and appointed First Deputy Minister of Defense - who, one wonders, told him fortunes? Someone strong, but it was hardly Beria and Malenkov, who worked in the rear during the war and never crossed paths with Zhukov. He also did not have close ties with Molotov, Mikoyan, or Kaganovich. And with Khrushchev - he did. Thirdly, this is evidenced by Zhukov’s behavior in the summer of 1957, when the so-called “anti-party group” (Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Bulganin) tried to remove Khrushchev from the post of General Secretary. He survived precisely thanks to Zhukov, who, in record time, delivered members of the Central Committee loyal to Khrushchev to the Kremlin by military planes. Why did he save Khrushchev if he was not on his team?
There is also a fourth argument - perhaps the most weighty. Raising an army for such actions as capturing your own capital is very difficult. Moreover, Andrei Sukhomlinov and other authors write that the troops carried out the verbal order of the Minister of Defense. Do you understand what this is - a verbal order?
In this regard, we can recall one story. When in 1941, General Rokossovsky received an order from the front commander, General Konev, that surprised him (specifically: to transfer his troops to another commander, and to arrive with his headquarters in Vyazma), he demanded written confirmation from Konev, and only then began to carry it out. This is what they did during the war at the front, when the clock was sometimes counted. Something else also happened: having verbally given the “wrong” order, higher-ups often blamed it on their subordinates. The most recent example is that already in our time, the commander of a special forces group, Captain Ullman, was put on trial for carrying out an oral order, which his superiors later refused.
Ulman was only ordered to shoot several Chechens - this does not amount to treason in any way. Can you imagine what it means when a tank division receives an order to occupy the capital in peacetime?! Any normal commander will not take a step without receiving written confirmation, because this is his salvation from a possible tribunal. Or the order must come from a person endowed with truly colossal authority. There was only one such person in the Ministry of Defense at that time, and not Minister Bulganin, but his first deputy, Marshal Zhukov. Firstly, during the war he taught his subordinates to carry out his orders. And secondly, the marshal is accused of many sins, but the accusations that he refused to confirm his orders, blaming his subordinates, were never heard. Such a person could raise troops over the telephone. But Bulganin could not, because despite his high position, he was a nobody for the military, who still measured commander’s authority by war. So, a member of the Military Council of the front...
However, if the first version is correct and the murder of Beria was carried out without a well-thought-out plan at all, then the marshal may not have been involved in the putsch, but was only involved in a cover operation. But if the second is true and the conspirators initially really intended to arrest Beria at the meeting (and, naturally, kill him right there) - then he automatically falls into the number of conspirators. Which once again proves: an empire should not know nationalities. If the “commander of the Victory” had become the one who should have become it - Marshal Rokossovsky - perhaps the history of the USSR would have developed differently...
In the same boat
The rest of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were confronted with all these regrettable facts - either at 14:00 or a little earlier. Beria is dead, and we must somehow continue to live with this. And for credibility, the generals stood behind the conspirators. But even without the generals, everyone was in the same boat with the putschists.
What would have happened if the rest of the Presidium had not accepted the coup? The conspirators had nothing to lose; they had strength on their side. Most likely, Malenkov would have shared the fate of Beria; the rest might have been arrested. What's next? Information about what is happening comes to the surface. How do the party, the army, and finally the Ministry of Internal Affairs react, in what proportions are they divided into supporters and opponents of the putsch? One thing is certain: the conspirators would have had to use force. Next - a bloody battle in Moscow, disorganization of management. A country that was already in a difficult situation - Stalin had just died - would slide into chaos, to the great joy of our “friends” from England and the USA, who would not fail to drive wedges into all the cracks and try to bring events to a civil war, the collapse of the socialist system, the collapse of the USSR, etc. What the split in the top leadership leads to, we don’t even need to explain, we saw everything during “perestroika”.
All members of the Presidium, without exception, understood this. Therefore, their further actions have only one goal: to hide the fact of the murder. It is common to consider such behavior to be cowardice and meanness - but those who say so view the situation solely from the standpoint of personal honor. Meanwhile, the country was hostage to the putschists. Khrushchev calculated everything exactly - not a single member of the Presidium agreed to such a thing.
This, by the way, is another proof that Beria was dead by that time. If there had been a real alternative to Khrushchev, then the generals with pistols would not have forced the members of the Presidium to dance to the tune of the putschists. But from this follows another immutable condition - they had to see Beria dead. Otherwise, they simply would not have believed either Khrushchev or the generals. It could only be presented to them in the Kremlin, because a mass excursion of members of the Presidium somewhere, unknown to what consequences, could have led if any of them had managed to escape from under supervision.
And here we can recall the ridiculous legend about the carpet - after his arrest, Beria was allegedly taken out of the Kremlin, wrapped in a carpet. It is precisely absurd things that go against ordinary logic that often contain echoes of real events. It's stupid to roll a living person into a carpet when you can simply tie him up, gag him and put him on the floor of the car. But a corpse is another matter. It was probably not worth dragging the dead body of the second person in the state through the corridors of the Kremlin, and you would stain everything with blood. And in this case, the carpet was a good solution to the problem. Bring it, demonstrate it, then take it away and immediately burn it so that there is no evidence left. That is why Tsaregradsky was unable to take Beria’s fingerprints - by that time the body no longer existed.
In general, it was necessary to somehow get out of the situation that had been created, which was terrible for everyone - and, first of all, terrible for the country. And the most logical - and, perhaps, the only possible decision was the one that was made - to present Beria as an “enemy of the people.” After all, if Trotsky and Tukhachevsky could do it, then why couldn’t Beria?
By the way, the same motives can explain the behavior of Beria’s deputies on the Special Committee, Malyshev and Zavenyagin, at the plenum of the Central Committee, who diligently threw mud at their former boss. Don't consider them such scoundrels. These people had their own hostage - the Special Committee, the atomic project. It already had to be dragged on without Beria, and if they were also removed, who would come to manage the project and how would it all end? Or perhaps they directly threatened: if you don’t say what needs to be done, we will do this and that... Well, what could Malyshev and Zavenyagin, who probably knew their deadlines, be afraid of - both of them would soon die from radiation sickness, “professional” illnesses of nuclear project workers.
After the fact
What follows is not very interesting, and there is no point in writing much about it. The only interesting thing is that one document shows that the “legend of the arrest” did not immediately occur to the new authorities of the Soviet Union.
Doc. 2.1. Resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee “On organizing the investigation into the case of criminal anti-party anti-state actions of Beria.” June 29, 1953
"1. The investigation into the Beria case will be entrusted to the Prosecutor General of the USSR.
2. Oblige Comrade Rudenko to select the appropriate investigative apparatus within 24 hours, reporting on its personnel to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and immediately begin, taking into account the instructions given at the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to identify and investigate the facts of hostile anti-party and anti-state activities of Beria through his entourage (Kobulov B, Kobulov A., Meshik, Sarkisov, Goglidze, Shariya, etc.), as well as to investigate issues related to the removal of Comrade Strokach.”
What's interesting here? The fact that not a word is said about the beginning of the investigation of Beria himself, but only about the investigation of his affairs through his entourage. Therefore, the idea of declaring Beria arrested was finally established in the bright minds of the party after June 29. What did they think they would say to the plenum hastily assembled by the putschists - that Beria was killed during his arrest? Hanged himself in prison? Be that as it may, this resolution is another argument that after June 26, Beria was no longer alive.
(By the way, if you replace just one word in the dialogue between Krasovsky and Dolgushin, it immediately takes on meaning. If the Air Force commander said not “Beria is arrested”, but “Beria is killed,” then the situation becomes clear: there was an attempt at a coup d’etat, in the process of suppressing which, perhaps it will be necessary to involve aviation. Otherwise, it will be necessary to include, at a minimum, Krasovsky, and possibly Dolgushin, among the conspirators. In principle, there is nothing impossible here, given that the chief of staff of the Air Force Batitsky participated in the action, but there are no grounds for such a statement not available either.)
Arrest, of course, is politically much more advantageous than death “while trying to resist.” But by declaring Beria arrested and not dead, the conspirators again took a desperate risk - after all, the plenum could demand that he be given the floor, and what then to do? Therefore, it was necessary to pour out so much dirt, to stun people so much that no one would even have such a thought - neither then nor later. And the defamation of the “enemy of the people Beria” was carried out in full, in a hurry and out of fear, overdoing it and fashioning the image of a monster, a monster. They hardly wanted it, they would have been satisfied with the usual option - it just happened that way.
Is this why Molotov immediately began to confuse and mumble as soon as Chuev asked him about Beria - the old man was probably ashamed, but how can you tell the truth? Kaganovich simply avoided these conversations. Perhaps Khrushchev led them with pleasure - but he was the organizer of the murder, his position obliged. However, some rudiments of conscience, apparently, were stirring in him. As soon as the passions had subsided, they immediately released Beria’s wife and son from prison and even gave Sergo the opportunity to work in his specialty - is this when the children of “enemies of the people” were allowed to work behind closed doors? As soon as he asked for a transfer from Sverdlovsk, where he was initially sent, to a city with a different climate, he was immediately offered to choose a new place of residence. Kyiv? No problem! They gave him a good apartment, created a research group especially for him...
They, perhaps, were glad to at least morally rehabilitate Beria - they weren’t such bastards at the top - but this was no longer possible. And then they simply tried to erase him from history. Say neither good nor bad. Forget. It only got worse...
Does the picture seem clear? Nothing like that! Things only get more confusing as the motive remains unclear. For what?
Lavrenty Pavlovich BERIA
The personality of Lavrenty Beria and his role in the history of our country is still assessed ambiguously. Almost 60 years of anti-Stalinist brainwashing are taking their toll. But if we put aside the blatant lies of Khrushchev’s bandits and perestroika and current idiots, it turns out that Lavrenty Pavlovich is one of the most outstanding statesmen in the history of Russia. Apparently, this is also why the current gang of thieves in power, all sorts of Putin-Medvedev-Chubais, have such hatred for Stalin and Beria that with them, for what they are doing to Russia today, they would be put up against the wall along with their supporters...
Born in March 1899, killed by Khrushchev’s gang on June 26 (according to the official version - in December) 1953.
1921-1931 in leading positions of intelligence and counterintelligence in Transcaucasia, he fought against the Mensheviks, Dashnaks, Musavatists and other gangs, Trotskyists and foreign intelligence agents
Since 1932 - First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the CPSU (b), manages the construction of cities, the creation of the oil industry and other strategic industries in the Caucasus.
From 1938 to 1945 he was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. This is what the enemies of that time wrote (General von Buttlar):
“The special conditions that existed in Russia greatly hampered the collection of intelligence data regarding the military potential of the Soviet Union, and therefore this data was far from complete. The extremely skillful camouflage by the Russians of everything related to their army, as well as strict control over foreigners and the impossibility of organizing a wide espionage networks made it difficult to verify the little information that the intelligence officers were able to collect..." Specifically and personally in the USSR, L.P. was responsible for the “impossibility of organizing a wide network of espionage.” Beria".
November 9, 1939 Beria signs the order “On shortcomings in the investigative work of the NKVD bodies,” in which he demands the release from custody of those illegally arrested throughout the country and establishes strict control over compliance with all criminal procedural norms. A review of cases opened under Yezhov began. In 1939 alone, 330 thousand people were released, and the review of cases continued.
At the same time, the “fifth column” of traitors before and during the war is destroyed. Thanks to this, the cohesion of the Soviet people, an extremely low percentage of betrayal, the collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg and the mass partisan movement are ensured.
During the war, all power passes to the State Defense Committee. Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, over the formation of the Air Force, and was later entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three People's Commissariats: the oil, coal and railways messages. L.P. Beria, of course, led the NKVD (intelligence, counterintelligence, sabotage, protection of other borders). Engaged in the transfer of production to the east, strategic support for fronts and armies. He made a colossal contribution to ensuring Victory over the occupiers and already in 1943 he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.
It is the NKVD that the Soviet Army owes its guards (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Guards Divisions). Among the traitors there were representatives of all branches of the Red Army troops, except for the NKVD generals.
In 1944, Beria, within a few weeks, ensured the disarmament and eviction to Kazakhstan of the Chechens, Ingush and other peoples of the Caucasus, who en masse went over to the side of the occupiers. This is not the current rotten FSB, which is only capable of blowing up its own citizens in residential buildings and catching rights fighters under the guise of fighting extremism.
Since 1945, at the head of the Special Committee, Beria has been developing nuclear and hydrogen bombs, Kometa and Berkut air defense missiles. The first successful test of a nuclear bomb took place in 1949. In 1953, the USSR became the first in the world to test the hydrogen bomb, providing the necessary basis for nuclear parity with the United States.
In 1953, Beria made the following proposal to the Supreme Council for an amnesty for prisoners:
“The draft decree provides for the release from places of detention of about 1,000,000 people sentenced to a term of up to 5 years, convicted regardless of the term of punishment for official, economic, and some military crimes, as well as women with children under 10 years of age, and pregnant women, minors under 18 years of age, elderly men and women and patients suffering from a serious incurable illness.
It is proposed not to extend the amnesty to those sentenced to a term of more than 5 years and held accountable for counter-revolutionary crimes, banditry, large-scale theft of socialist property and premeditated murder."
In 1953, for attempting to remove the party from power and transferring full power to the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, that is, while trying to implement the decisions of the 19th Congress, the party was killed shortly after Stalin. nomenklatura headed by Khrushchev. Beria was killed on June 26 while being detained shortly after the murder of Stalin, which he was actively investigating. Allegedly, the subsequent trial and trial of Beria (the official court) was just a performance.
The murder of Stalin and Beria, as well as the elimination of the decisions of the 19th Party Congress, became the control point for the beginning of the decomposition of the party nomenklatura, as a result of which the USSR was destroyed.
ETERNAL MEMORY TO THE GREATEST STATEMAN OF RUSSIA!
GLORY TO COMRADE BERIA!
