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22. Khasan and Khalkhin Gol After the massacre committed by the Japanese in Nanjing, President Roosevelt started talking about the need to help China. But... no official steps were taken to curb the aggressors. However, no one qualified the Japanese as aggressors.

Fighting on the Mongolian-Manchurian border between Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese troops, during which Soviet troops under the command carried out a classic deep offensive operation with encirclement and complete defeat of the enemy. Tanks, aircraft, and artillery were actively involved in the battle.

Late 30s The 20th century was characterized by a great increase in international tension. At the same time, militarized Germany and Japan pursued an active policy to expand their territories at the expense of neighboring states. The Soviet Union was also quite active in this regard. His interests in the Far East collided with the interests of Japan.

The name of the great battle that took place in Mongolia between the two powers, “Khalkin Gol,” is replaced by many Western historians with the term “Incident at Nomon Khan” (named after the border mountain), allegedly provoked by the Soviet side in order to show its military strength.

This is probably not entirely true. Undoubtedly, during the battles in the Far East, the USSR worked out schemes for conducting deep offensive operations, which it intended to use in the coming big war in Europe. One should not have any illusions about the sincerity of the friendship of the Soviet government with countries oppressed and captured by all sorts of aggressors. Indeed, among the new “friends” of the Stalinist regime, in addition to the future “16th Soviet republic” of Mongolia (by the way, recognized by that time only by the Soviet Union), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Western Ukraine soon turned out to be. Finland also experienced the power of friendly Soviet disposition. However, Japan's goals were no more noble. A militarized and aggressive power sought to secure a military foothold for itself, invaded foreign territories, and created a fortified military area here. The actions of the Japanese in relation to Outer Mongolia can be assessed as aggressive.

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In the 30s The Japanese army invaded China, occupied the entire territory of Manchuria, creating here the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by Emperor Pu Yi. Manchuria was turned by Japan into a springboard of aggression against the USSR, Mongolia and China. The first step of aggression was the Japanese invasion in July 1938 on Soviet territory near Lake. Hassan. This unremarkable border strip of land, cut by hills and river valleys, became the site of heated battles. Soviet troops won an important victory here in stubborn battles.

The Japanese believed that conquering the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic would provide them with major strategic benefits. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, General Itagaki, said that Mongolia “is very important from the point of view of the Japanese-Manchu influence of today, because it is the defensive flank of the Trans-Siberian Railway, connecting Soviet territories in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mongolia were united with Japan and Manchukuo, then the Soviet territories in the Far East would be in a very difficult situation and it would be possible to destroy the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without much military effort. Therefore, the goal of the army should be to extend Japanese-Manchu rule to Outer Mongolia by any means necessary."

In Manchuria, on the borders with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Japanese created 11 fortified areas and placed strong military garrisons in settlements along the state borders; they built and improved highways. The main group of the Kwantung Army was concentrated in Northern and Northeastern Manchuria. By the summer of 1939, its number here had been increased to 350 thousand people; the group had more than a thousand artillery pieces, 385 tanks and 355 aircraft.

The Japanese command, in addition to the Harbin – Qiqihar – Hailar railway (formerly CER), began construction of a new strategic railway from Solun to Halun – Arshan and further to Ganchzhur. It was carried out bypassing the spurs of the Greater Khingan ridge and was supposed to run almost parallel to the Mongol-Manchu border, at a distance of only two or three kilometers from it in places.

The Japanese feared that the Khalun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway might come under targeted fire from the dominant sandy heights on the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol. In this regard, it was decided to seize part of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic east of the river. By owning this territory, it was possible to eliminate the threat to the strategic railway, as well as reduce the possibility of a strike in the rear by Japanese troops concentrated in the Hailar fortified area. It could also become a good springboard for military operations against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union.

Given the tension of the situation and the threat of a military attack, the USSR took diplomatic and military measures. Back on March 12, 1936, the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Assistance was signed. In accordance with this agreement, units of the Red Army were sent to Mongolia, from which the 57th Special Corps was formed. The Soviet government officially declared that "the border of the Mongolian People's Republic, by virtue of the mutual assistance agreement concluded between us, we will defend as resolutely as our own."

By the summer of 1939, the Soviet troops in the Far East included the 1st Separate Red Banner Army under the command of 2nd Rank Army Commander G. M. Stern, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army of Corps Commander I. S. Konev, the Transbaikal Military District (commander Corps commander F. N. Remizov). The operational subordination of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army was the Pacific Fleet, the 2nd Separate Red Banner Army was the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, and the Transbaikal Military District was the 57th Special Corps, stationed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The construction of many defensive areas in the most threatened areas was completed. A new operational formation was created from aviation units and formations - the 2nd Air Army. Rifle and cavalry formations included tank battalions and mechanized regiments.

The Japanese command chose the eastern protrusion of the republic in the area of ​​the river as the target of attack. Khalkhin Gol. Mastering this area would give the Japanese a number of advantages. The Khalkhin Gol River, 100–130 m wide and 2–3 m deep, has steep slopes, is swampy in many places, and in some places was difficult to access for military equipment. A few kilometers east of it stretches a ridge of heights. Along with this, there are many sand pits in the river valley. The river flows into Khalkhin Gol here. Khaylastyn-Gol, cutting the area of ​​upcoming hostilities into two parts.

On the Manchu side, two railways came close to this area, and the nearest railway station for supplying Soviet and Mongolian troops, Borzya, was 750 km away. Steppe and deserted area east of the river. Khalkhin Gol was guarded only by separate border patrols; the outposts were located 20–30 km from the state border.

In May 1939, the Japanese military command brought about 38 thousand soldiers, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft to the intended combat area. Soviet-Mongolian troops defending east of the river. Khalkhin-Gol, on a front 75 km away, consisted of 12.5 thousand soldiers, 186 tanks, 266 armored vehicles and 82 aircraft. In terms of the number of personnel and aviation, the enemy was three times larger than the forces of the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

To substantiate their claims to the territory located on the right bank of Khalkhin Gol, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps on which the state border ran along the river - more than 20 kilometers west of its true location.

On May 11, 1939, Japanese units attacked the outposts of the Mongolian People's Army east of the river. Khalkhin Gol in the lake area. Buir-Nur. The Mongol warriors were forced to retreat to the river. The fighting lasted here for ten days, but it did not bring any success to the Japanese.

The Soviet command took urgent measures to strengthen the leadership of troops in the area of ​​​​the outbreak of hostilities. In early June, the deputy commander of the Belarusian Military District for cavalry, divisional commander G.K. Zhukov, was sent there. He came to the conclusion that “with the forces that the 57th Special Corps in the Mongolia had, it would be impossible to stop the Japanese military adventure...” The Soviet High Command immediately decided to strengthen the corps. G.K. Zhukov was appointed its commander. Soon, fresh units and units began to arrive to help the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the Khalkhin Gol area. New fighters (Chaika and I-16) were received to strengthen the aviation group.

On June 20, the commander of the Kwantung Army ordered the offensive of the Japanese-Manchurian troops in the Khalkhin Gol area. On June 30, the commander of the Japanese 23rd Division, Lieutenant General Kamatsubara, in turn, ordered the troops to go on the offensive. The plan of the Japanese command boiled down to the following: going on the offensive throughout the entire area, pinning down the Soviet units from the front, and then using a strike group to bypass the left flank of the defense and cross the river. Khalkhin Gol, occupy the dominant heights of Bain-Tsagan in this area and strike in the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian units.

On the night of July 3, Japanese troops went on the offensive. Having crossed Khalkhin Gol, they developed a strike in the direction of Mount Bain-Tsagan. The battle lasted three days, about 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 300 guns and several hundred aircraft took part on both sides. Part of the Japanese group moved to the left bank of the river. Khalkhin Gol. Mount Bayin-Tsagan was occupied.

The Soviet command sent motorized units to this area: the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of Colonel I.I. Fedyuninsky. By 19:00 on July 3, the enemy was attacked from three sides. The battle continued at night and all day on July 4th. All attempts by the Japanese to launch a counterattack and transfer new units across the river were repulsed. By the morning of July 5, the Japanese retreated (or rather, they fled) to the crossing. Their strike force, pressed against the river, was completely defeated. The enemy lost almost all the tanks, a significant part of the artillery, 45 aircraft and about 10 thousand soldiers and. On July 8, the Japanese tried to take revenge for this defeat by going on the attack. After a bloody four-day battle, the Japanese troops, having lost another 5.5 thousand people killed and wounded, were forced to retreat.

Despite the Bain-Tsagan disaster, the Japanese still hoped to change the course of events in their favor. A “general offensive” was planned for August 1939. Over the course of a month, the Japanese command transferred new units and formations to the battle area. On August 10, the 6th Army was formed from them, led by General Ogisu Rippo. This army, located on an area of ​​70 km along the front and 20 km in depth, consisted of 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks, and more than 300 aircraft.

In turn, the USSR decided to provide large-scale military assistance to the MPR. By mid-August, the Soviet-Mongolian troops numbered about 57 thousand people, they were armed with 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, 2255 machine guns and 515 combat aircraft.

On July 15, 1939, the 1st Army Group was formed (the group commander was G.K. Zhukov, already a corps commander). The Mongolian troops operating in the battle area were led by Marshal X. Choibalsan.

Much work was done to organize the rear. Thousands of vehicles from the supply station, located, as already mentioned, on long distance, delivered in a short time 18 thousand tons of artillery ammunition, 6500 tons of ammunition for aviation, 15 thousand tons of fuels and lubricants, 7 thousand tons of fuel, 4 thousand tons of food.

The plan of the Soviet-Mongolian command was based on the following idea: having pinned down the forces of the Japanese troops from the front, launch a pre-emptive bilateral strike on the flanks in the general direction of Nomon-Khan - Burd-Obo, and then encircle and destroy the enemy between the river. Khalkhin Gol and the state border. To implement this plan, three groups of troops were created. The main blow was delivered by the southern group of Colonel M.I. Potapov, which consisted of two divisions, tank, motorized armored brigades and several tank battalions, and the auxiliary one was delivered by the northern group led by Colonel I.V. Shevnikov. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was tasked with pinning down the enemy from the front.

Preparations for the operation were carried out in the strictest secrecy with extensive use of operational disguise and disinformation. The unit commanders were brought up to date only 3-4 days before the operation, and the Red Army soldiers - on the night of August 20, on the eve of the offensive. During the preparation, measures were taken to create an impression on the enemy about the intended wintering of our units: stakes were driven in, wire barriers were built, and false demands were broadcast over the radio for the sending of stakes, wire, and winter uniforms. Moreover, orders were transmitted using a code known to the Japanese.

The Japanese command expected to launch a “general offensive” on August 24, 1939. Having anticipated the enemy by four days, the Soviet-Mongolian troops launched a decisive offensive on the morning of August 20. More than 150 bombers and powerful artillery attacked the enemy’s battle formations and artillery positions. About 100 Soviet fighters provided protection from enemy air strikes for part of the strike forces of the Soviet-Mongolian forces concentrated in the initial areas for the offensive.

After powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes, Soviet tanks moved into the attack. Following them, Soviet-Mongolian infantry and cavalry units rushed towards the enemy along the entire front.

The air and artillery strike of the Soviet-Mongolian troops turned out to be so powerful and sudden that the enemy did not fire a single artillery shot for an hour and a half, and the aviation did not make a single sortie.

While the troops of the central sector pinned down the main Japanese forces with frontal attacks, the southern and northern strike groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops broke through the enemy defenses on the flanks and quickly began to encircle the enemy in deep envelopment. The Japanese command sent a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft against the Soviet-Mongolian forces. Under their cover, infantry and cavalry increasingly began to launch counterattacks. A fierce battle broke out along the entire front.

Despite the desperate resistance of the enemy, by the end of the first day serious success had been achieved on the outer flanks of the southern and northern groups, where cavalry formations of the Soviet-Mongolian troops defeated units of the Japanese-Manchu cavalry and captured the designated lines along the state border.

Having assessed the current situation, the commander of the 1st Army Group, G.K. Zhukov, decided to commit all reserve forces to the battle in the northern direction. The mobile group under the command of Colonel I.P. Alekseenko, having gone on the offensive, reached Nomon-Khan - Burd-Obo by the end of August 23 and the next day entered into fire contact with units of the southern group. Japanese troops were completely surrounded. Attempts by the Japanese command to break through the encirclement from the outside with attacks from fresh reserves were unsuccessful.

The Soviet-Mongolian command began the systematic destruction of the encircled Japanese troops. Simultaneously with the external front of the encirclement, which consisted mainly of motorized armored, cavalry, aviation and partly rifle troops, which went over to the defense along the border, an internal front was formed of rifle units that delivered converging blows to the enemy.

Finding themselves in a cauldron, the Japanese troops desperately resisted, but on August 31, the last pockets of their defense were eliminated. After the complete defeat of its ground force, the Japanese command attempted to defeat Soviet aviation. However, this plan also failed. During the first half of September 1939, Soviet pilots conducted a series of air battles in which 71 Japanese aircraft were destroyed. A large group of the Kwantung Army ceased to exist. On September 16, the Japanese government was forced to admit the defeat of its troops and asked for a cessation of hostilities. In the battles at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese lost about 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 660 aircraft, and a significant amount of military equipment. The trophies of the Soviet-Mongolian troops included 12 thousand rifles, 200 guns, about 400 machine guns, and more than 100 vehicles. The entire Japanese command was forced to resign. The commander of the Kwantung Army, General Ueda, and the chief of staff of the army, General Mosigan, were removed.

In terms of scale and nature, the operation at Khalkhin Gol was the largest operation for that time by modern armies equipped with the latest military equipment. At Khalkhin Gol, modern tanks and aircraft were used on a mass scale for the first time. In some battles, the number of vehicles numbered in the hundreds, and at decisive moments of the battle up to 300 aircraft took to the air. The creation of an external and internal front to eliminate the encircled enemy was a new contribution to the further development of military art.

The defeat of Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol basically confirmed the correctness of the views existing in Soviet military theory on the conduct of offensive operations, and in particular deep operations. The August operation showed that its successful implementation is inextricably linked with skillful maneuvering of troops, the use of counterattacks, gaining air superiority, isolating the combat area from suitable enemy reserves and disrupting his communications. At the same time, the experience of Khalkhin Gol allowed us to draw conclusions about the need to increase the density of artillery.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol once again confirmed the growing role of reserves in the war and their timely and skillful use at decisive moments of hostilities. The introduction of mobile reserves, carried out by the commander of the army group G.K. Zhukov, made it possible to significantly speed up the complete encirclement of the enemy.

More than 17 thousand soldiers, commanders and political workers were awarded government awards, 70 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them the commander of the army group G. K. Zhukov; pilots Ya. V. Smushkevich, G. P. Kravchenko and S. I. Gritsevets became twice Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The battles at Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhin golyn bailaan or Mongol Khalkhin golyn dain, Japanese ノモンハン事件 Nomon-khan jiken) - an undeclared local armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near borders with Manchukuo between the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic on the one hand and the Japanese Empire and Manchukuo on the other. The final battle took place in late August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th Separate Army of Japan. An armistice between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 16, 1939.

In Soviet historiography, these events are usually called a “military conflict.” At the same time, many Japanese historians admit that it was a real local war, and some authors call it the “Second Russo-Japanese War” - by analogy with the war of 1904-1905.

In Japanese historiography, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the “Nomon Khan Incident”, after the name of one of the heights in this area of ​​​​the Manchurian-Mongolian border.

Background to the conflict

In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. A puppet state of Manchukuo was created on the occupied territory, which was planned to be used as a springboard for further aggression against China, Mongolia and the USSR.

According to the Soviet side, the conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway, which was being built by the Japanese in this area bypassing the Greater Khingan to the USSR border in the area of ​​Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to the Soviet historian M.V. Novikov, to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the Khalkhin-Gol border and “issued a special order to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, on the maps of which the correct border in the Khalkhin River area was given.” Gol,” but the Russian historian K. E. Cherevko points out that the administrative border along the Khalkhin Gol channel was marked on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on the physical map of Outer Mongolia by the General Staff of the Republic of China in 1918.

In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end.

On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia in the form of the 57th Special Corps, which was successively commanded by division commanders I. S. Konev and N. V. Feklenko. By May 1939, the strength of the corps was 5,544 people, including 523 commanders and 996 junior commanders.

In the summer of 1938, a two-week conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR.

In 1939, following the change of Japanese government in January, border tensions increased. The slogan of expanding the Japanese empire “all the way to Lake Baikal” began to be put forward. Attacks by Japanese troops on Mongolian border guards became more frequent. At the same time, Japan accused Mongolia of deliberately violating the borders of Manchuria.

Hostilities

Border provocations

On January 16, 1939, in the area of ​​the Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo height, a group of 5 Japanese soldiers fired at a detachment of four MPR border guards from a distance of about 500 meters.

On January 17, at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo, 13 Japanese soldiers attacked a detachment of three MPR border guards, capturing the head of the outpost and wounding another soldier. On January 29 and 30, Japanese and Bargut cavalrymen made new attempts to capture the guard detachments of the MPR border guards. And in February and March, the Japanese and Barguts carried out about 30 attacks on the MPR border guards.

On the night of May 8, a group of Japanese up to a platoon with a light machine gun tried to secretly occupy an island belonging to the MPR in the middle of the Khalkhin Gol River, but after a short firefight with the border guards of the MPR, they retreated, losing 3 soldiers killed and one captured (Takazaki Ichiro from the reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division) .

On May 11, a detachment of Japanese cavalry (up to 300 people with several machine guns) advanced 15 km deep into the territory of the MPR and attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. As reinforcements approached the border, the Japanese were pushed back to their original line.

On May 14, a reconnaissance detachment of the 23rd Japanese Infantry Division (300 horsemen supported by a flight of five light dive bombers) attacked the 7th border outpost of the MPR and occupied the heights of Dungur-Obo. On May 15, the Japanese transported up to 30 trucks with two infantry companies, 7 armored vehicles and 1 tank to the occupied heights.

On the morning of May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a sapper company and an artillery battery of the Red Army. At the same time, a division of MPR armored vehicles was sent there. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.

During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces under the command of Colonel Yamagata consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6-8 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, Japanese troops, having numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed largely due to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Yu. B. Vakhtin.

The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

Although there was not a single collision on the ground in June, an air war has developed in the skies since May 22. The first clashes showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Ya. V. Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience of the war in Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system.

To strengthen air defense, two divisions of the 191st anti-aircraft artillery regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.

At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff M.V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in June in the area of ​​military conflict, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new combat plan: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of ​​​​combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aviation managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft (the Japanese lost 2 bombers and 3 fighters).

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, which for the first time in the world used combat unguided air-to-air missiles, later used to create multiple launch rocket systems. Thus, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.

At the same time, on June 26, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol. The words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.

By the end of June, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the Red Army’s defenses on the operational sector of the front.

On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobayashi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them.

Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by Zhukov, which was promptly put into action. Zhukov, without waiting for the approach of the infantry cover, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve (up to 150 tanks T-37A, BT-5, BT-7 and OT-26) and 8 1st Mongolian armored division, equipped with BA-6 armored vehicles with 45 mm cannons. Soon they were supported by the 7th motorized armored brigade (154 armored vehicles BA-6, BA-10, FAI). It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander Stern. To be fair, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of troops, the USSR People's Commissar of Defense in a telegram dated July 15 reprimanded Kulik and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.

A group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8,632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

July August

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, aviation commander corps commander Y. V. Smushkevich, corps commander G.K. Zhukov, divisional commissar M.S. Nikishev.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the implementation of the plan planned by the chief of staff Bogdanov offensive operation against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place. From July 21 to July 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.

Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal Military District under the command of the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment, Major A. Bulyga. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.

During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter:

“You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.”

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree the Japanese 6th separate army under the command of General Ryuhei Ogisu (Japanese), consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments of the Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should be noted that most of the soldiers in the Japanese group had combat experience of the war in China.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, airplanes and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the overall superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive

the total number of Soviet and Mongolian troops was 35 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 216 field and 286 anti-tank guns, 40 mortars, 2255 heavy and light machine guns, 498 tanks, 346 armored vehicles, 581 aircraft;

The total number of Japanese troops was 25 infantry battalions, 17 cavalry squadrons, 135 field and 142 anti-tank guns, 60 mortars and bomb throwers, 1238 heavy and light machine guns, 120 tanks and armored vehicles, 450 aircraft.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. 153 bombers and about 100 fighters were launched into the air. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing the tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment as trophies.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

On the morning of September 4, two battalions of Japanese infantry tried to occupy the heights of Eris-Ulyn-Obo, but were thrown back beyond the state border, losing up to 350 soldiers and officers. On the night of September 8, in the same area, Japanese troops made a new attempt to penetrate into Mongolia with up to four infantry companies, but were again repulsed with heavy losses. In total, in these attacks the enemy lost up to 500 military personnel killed, 18 machine guns and more than 150 rifles were captured.

After September 8, the Japanese command did not take action with ground troops, but air battles continued. In the first half of September, 7 air battles took place in the skies over the territory of the MPR. The largest one - 120 Japanese planes against 207 Soviet ones - took place on September 15, the day the armistice was signed. On September 16, hostilities on the border ceased.

In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.

During the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 artillery pieces were destroyed by artillery fire (six 105-mm guns, 55 pieces of 75- mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine gun batteries were suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles were destroyed, 21 observation posts, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel warehouses and 2 warehouses with ammunition.

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

The conflict ended in May 1942 with the signing of a final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on the old map. For the Red Army, which was suffering defeats on the Soviet-German front, a rather difficult situation arose at that time. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Japanese. But it only lasted until 1945, before Japan's surrender in World War II.

The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol was one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan to attack the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was sure to win.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous (August 23) signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 it signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation Japanese army and the fleet was defeated by the “maritime party”, which defended the idea of ​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend Hitler to bind himself to an alliance with it.

The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and the British Ambassador in Tokyo Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, denounced on January 26, for six months, and then fully restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.

The events at Khalkhin Gol also became important element propaganda in the USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of ​​​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of a major war.

The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

On August 1, 1939, at the height of hostilities, an additional insignia was established to the highest degree of distinction of the USSR, the title “Hero of the Soviet Union” - the “Hero of the Soviet Union” medal, renamed in October of the same year into the “Gold Star” medal. The title was established in 1934, but no special insignia were provided.

The fate of the winners

70 servicemen were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 83 were awarded the Order of Lenin, 595 - the Order of the Red Banner, 134 - the Order of the Red Star, 33 - the medal "For Courage", 58 - the medal "For Military Merit". The commissar of the 8th motorized brigade, Alexander Nikolaevich Moskovsky, was forever included in the lists of personnel of the military unit; on August 28, 1939, he led a night counterattack of a rifle company against a Japanese battalion and died in battle (as a result of a successful counterattack, the Japanese battalion was thrown back, losing over 170 soldiers killed and failed to break through the encirclement).

The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established the badge “Participant in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol”, which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.

Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown corps commander, after the victory over the Japanese, headed the country's largest Kiev Military District, and then became the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

The aviation commander of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and Army Commander G. M. Stern were awarded Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force; Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission to resolve controversial issues regarding the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made a “gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years of labor camp. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. He ended the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and with the rank of major general.

Combat losses of the parties

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the battles from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured (of which about 20 thousand were Japanese losses). The Soviet-Mongolian troops lost 9831 Soviet (together with the wounded - more than 17 thousand) and 895 Mongolian soldiers.

Reflection in literature and art

The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, and articles were published in newspapers.

K. M. Simonov - novel “Comrades in Arms”, poem “Far in the East”, poem “Tank”.

F. Bokarev - poem “Memory of Khalkhin Gol”

H. Murakami - novel “The Chronicles of the Wind-Up Bird” (a long story by Lieutenant Mamiya).

In cinema

"Khalkin-Gol" (1940) - documentary, CSDF.

“Listen, on the other side” (1971) - Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

“I, Shapovalov T. P.” (1973, directed by E. E. Karelov) - the first part of the “High Rank” duology, an episode in the film.

“On the Roads of the Fathers” (2004) - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.

"Khalkin-Gol. The Unknown War" (2008) - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.

“Historical Chronicles with Nikolai Svanidze” 1939

Volunteers

My Way (film, 2011) (Korean: 마이웨이) is a Korean film directed by Kang Jaegyu, released in 2011. The film is based on the story of Korean Yang Kyungjong and Japanese Tatsuo Hasegawa, captured by the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol.

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol

In foreign historiography, particularly in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the “Nomon Khan Incident.” "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of ​​the Manchu-Mongol border.

Background to the conflict

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the railway being built by the Japanese in this area, bypassing the Greater Khingan Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the USSR border in the area of ​​Irkutsk and Lake Baikal, since in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. To substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, the maps of which showed the correct border in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River» .

May 1939. First battles

The Soviet command took radical measures. On May 29, a group of ace pilots led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. 17 of them were heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. They began training pilots and reorganized and strengthened the air surveillance, warning and communications system. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

Downed Soviet fighter

At the beginning of June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G. K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M. V. Zakharov. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Soon after arriving in the area of ​​military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new combat plan: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to gather in the area of ​​​​combat operations: the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army, commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Downed Japanese plane

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor on June 20. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here, which for the first time in the world used combat unguided air-to-air missiles, later used to create multiple launch rocket systems. Thus, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan (in this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize dominance in the air . In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.

July. Japanese attack

Komkor G.K. Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete its task.

The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8,632 people. killed. However, it should be noted that some sources indicate total losses on both sides at 120 thousand people, which significantly contradicts official, both Soviet (7632 people killed) and Japanese data (8632 people killed). The Japanese side lost almost all their tanks and most of their artillery. These events became known as the “Bayan-Tsagan Massacre.”

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of Army Commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of: commander commander of the 2nd rank Stern G. M., chief of staff corps commander Bogdanov M. A., aviation commander corps commander Ya. V. Smushkevich, corps commander Zhukov G.K., divisional commissar Nikishev M.S.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th tank brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, Zhukov, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups performing an encirclement maneuver.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, an auxiliary blow by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne, 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Also participating in the operation were Mongolian troops - the 6th and 8th Cavalry Divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army at Khalkhin Gol, 1939.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 6:15 a.m., powerful artillery preparation and air raids on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Forcing Soviet tanks R. Khalkhin Gol

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese planes in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

Captured Japanese soldiers

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, he took a considerable risk, since the commander’s closest reserve - the Mongolian armored brigade - was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo . After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to release its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured as trophies 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 heavy and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million rounds of ammunition, and much other military equipment.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for Japan's non-aggression against the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the Japanese General Staff, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram dated June 30 to immediately fulfill his allied obligations and strike the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 2, the final decision was made to wait until Germany was sure to win.

In Japan, the defeat and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro. The new Japanese government announced on September 4 that it did not intend to intervene in any form in the conflict in Europe, and on September 15 signed an armistice agreement, which led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 13, 1941. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “maritime party” won, defending the idea of ​​cautious expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. The German military leadership, having studied the experience of the Japanese wars in China and Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan’s military capabilities very low and did not recommend that Hitler commit himself to an alliance with it.

The fighting on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic coincided with negotiations between Japanese Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita (English) Russian with the British ambassador in Tokyo, Robert Craigie. In July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, denounced on January 26, for six months, and then fully restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and petroleum products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow into Japan until the outbreak of war with the United States.

The impact of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

The aviation commander of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and Army Commander G. M. Stern were awarded Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War. In June 1941, both military leaders were arrested and executed a few months later. Rehabilitated in 1954.

The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 17, 1939. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the USSR NKO, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission to resolve controversial issues regarding the state border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of provocation on the Japanese side, Bogdanov made a “gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR,” for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, he was convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 paragraph “a” for 4 years ITL. By a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with his criminal record expunged and placed at the disposal of NGOs of the USSR. He ended the Great Patriotic War with the position of division commander and the rank of major general.

Propaganda in the USSR

The events at Khalkhin Gol became an important element of propaganda in the USSR. Novels, poems and songs were written, articles were published in newspapers. The essence of the propaganda boiled down to the idea of ​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Participants in the tragic events of the summer of 1941 many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of the great war.

In literature

• Simonov K. M. - novel “Comrades in Arms.”
• Simonov K.M. - poem “Far in the East”.
• Simonov K.M. - poem “Tank”.

In cinema

• « Khalkhin Gol"() - documentary film, TsSDF.
• “Listen, on the other side” () - Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• “Officers” (, dir. V. Rogovoy) - in one of the episodes of the film, the heroes of G. Yumatov and V. Lanovoy meet in the context of a military conflict on Khalkhin Gol.
• “I, Shapovalov T. P.” (, dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the “High Rank” dilogy, an episode in the film.
• “On the Roads of the Fathers” () - a television film by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• "Khalkin-Gol. Unknown War"() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large amount of chronicles, as well as comments from veteran participants in those events and historians.

Literature

• Bakaev D. A. Khasan and Khalkhin Gol are on fire. Saratov, Volga region publishing house, 1984. - 151 pages.
• Vorozheikin A.V. Stronger than death. - M.: Children's literature, 1978.
• Vorotnikov M. F. G.K. Zhukov on Khalkhin Gol. Omsk: book publishing house, 1989-224 pp. (circulation 10,000 copies)
• Gorbunov E. A. August 20, 1939. M., “Young Guard”, 1986.
• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. (Chapter 7. The undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol). - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M.: Techniki - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M.: Aviation Promotion Foundation “Russian Knights”, 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the 20th Century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7
• Koshkin A. A."Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese. Why Japan didn't attack the USSR.
• Koshkin A. A. The collapse of the “Ripe Persimmon” strategy: Japan’s military policy towards the USSR 1931-1945. - M.: Mysl, 1989. - 272 p.
• Kuznetsov I. I. Heroes of Khalkhin Gol. 3rd ed., add. Ulaanbaatar, Gosizdat, 1984-144 pp.
• Simonov K. M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol Notes. - M.: Fiction, 1985.
• At Khalkhin Gol. Memoirs of Leningraders who took part in battles with Japanese militarists in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River in 1939. Comp. N. M. Rumyantsev. - L.: Lenizdat, 1989.
• Novikov M.V. Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M.: Politizdat, 1971. - 110 p. - 150,000 copies.
• Panasovsky V. E. Lessons from Hassan and Khalkhin Gol. M., “Knowledge”, 1989.
• Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.
• Shishov A.V. Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M.: Veche, 2001.

see also

• List of associations, formations, units and subunits that were part of the Active Army in the area of ​​the river. Khalkhin Gol in 1939

Notes

1. Team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses of the Armed Forces / G. F. Krivosheev. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - P. 177. - 608 p. - (Archive). - 5,000 copies. - ISBN 5-224-01515-4
2. History of the Second World War. 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes). volume 2, M., Voenizdat, 1974. p.217
3. (English) . Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981. Retrieved June 20, 2010.
4. Team of authors. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: A statistical study. M., 2001. P. 179
5. Kolomiets M. Fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, May-September 1939. M., 2002. P. 65.