Belarusian operation 1944 |
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Belarus, Lithuania, eastern regions of Poland. |
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Red Army victory. Liberation of Belarus and Lithuania. The entry of Soviet troops into Poland. |
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Opponents |
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PKNO, 1st Army of the Polish Army |
BCR, Belarusian Regional Defense |
Poland, Home Army |
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Commanders |
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Ivan Bagramyan (1st Baltic Front) |
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Ivan Chernyakhovsky (3rd Belorussian Front) |
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Georgy Zakharov (2nd Belorussian Front) |
Georg Reinhardt (3rd Panzer Army) |
Konstantin Rokossovsky (1st Belorussian Front) |
Kurt von Tippelskirch (4th Field Army) |
Georgy Zhukov (coordinator of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts) |
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Alexander Vasilevsky (coordinator of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts) |
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Alexey Antonov (development of the operation plan) |
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Walter Weiss (2nd Field Army) |
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Side forces |
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(at the time of the start of the operation) 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, St. 5 thousand tanks, St. 5 thousand aircraft |
(according to Soviet data) 1.2 million people, 9500 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft |
178,507 killed/missing 587,308 wounded, 2,957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft |
Exact losses are unknown. Soviet data: 381 thousand dead and missing, 150 thousand wounded 158,480 prisoners David Glantz: estimate from below - 450 thousand total losses. Alexey Isaev: more than 500 thousand people Steven Zaloga: 300-350 thousand people, including 150 thousand prisoners (until the 10th of July) |
Belarusian offensive operation, "Bagration"- a large-scale offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War, carried out on June 23 - August 29, 1944. Named so in honor Russian commander Patriotic War of 1812 P. I. Bagration. One of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.
During this extensive offensive, the territory of Belarus, eastern Poland and part of the Baltic states was liberated and the German Army Group Center was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, partly due to the fact that A. Hitler forbade any retreat. Subsequently, Germany was no longer able to make up for these losses.
By June 1944, the front line in the east approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge ledge - a wedge facing deep into the USSR, the so-called "Belarusian Balcony". If in Ukraine the Red Army managed to achieve a series of impressive successes (almost the entire territory of the republic was liberated, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses in the chain of “boilers”), then when trying to break through in the direction of the Minsk Winter of 1943-1944, the successes, on the contrary, were quite modest.
At the same time, towards the end of the spring of 1944, the offensive in the south slowed down, and the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of efforts. As K.K. Rokossovsky noted,
Data on the forces of the parties differ in various sources. According to the publication “Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War”, 1 million 200 thousand people participated in the operation from the Soviet side (excluding rear units). On the German side - as part of the Army Group "Center" - 850-900 thousand people (including approximately 400 thousand in the rear). In addition, at the second stage, the right wing of the North Army Group and the left wing of the Northern Ukraine Army Group took part in the battle.
Four fronts of the Red Army were opposed by four armies of the Wehrmacht:
The section shows the alignment of forces of the German and Soviet troops as of June 22, 1944 (the corps of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army army are listed in the order of their alignment from north to south, reserves are indicated separately first).
Army Group Center (Field Marshal Ernst Busch, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Krebs)
* 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel-General Reinhardt) composed of:
* 9th Army Corps (General of Artillery Wutmann);
* 53rd Army Corps (General of the Infantry Gollwitzer);
* 6th Army Corps (General of Artillery Pfeiffer);
* 4th Army (General of Infantry Tippelskirch) composed of:
* 27th Army Corps (General of the Infantry Voelkers);
* 39th Panzer Corps (Artillery General Martinek);
* 12th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Muller);
* 9th Army (General of the Infantry Jordan) composed of:
* 35th Army Corps (Lieutenant General von Lutzow);
* 41st Army Corps (Lieutenant General Hoffmeister);
* 55th Army Corps (Infantry General Herrlein);
* 2nd Army (Colonel General Weiss) composed of:
* 8th Army Corps (Infantry General Khon);
* 23rd Army Corps (General of Engineering Troops Thimann);
* 20th Army Corps (General of Artillery von Roman);
In addition, the Hungarian units were subordinate to the 2nd Army: 5th, 12th and 23rd reserve and 1st cavalry division. The 2nd Army took part only in the second phase of the Belarusian operation.
* 1st Baltic Front (Army General Bagramyan) composed of:
* 4th Shock Army (Lieutenant General Malyshev);
* 6th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Chistyakov);
* 43rd Army (Lieutenant General Beloborodov);
* 3rd Air Army (Lieutenant General Papivin);
* 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel-General Chernyakhovsky) composed of:
* 11th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Galitsky);
* 5th Army (Lieutenant General Krylov);
* 31st Army (Lieutenant General Glagolev);
* 39th Army (Lieutenant General Lyudnikov);
* 5th Guards Tank Army (Marshal Rotmistrov);
* Horse-mechanized group (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);
* 1st Air Army (Lieutenant General Gromov);
* 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel-General Zakharov) composed of:
* 33rd Army (Lieutenant General Kryuchenko);
* 49th Army (Lieutenant General Grishin);
* 50th Army (Lieutenant General Boldin);
* 4th Air Army (Colonel General Vershinin);
* 1st Belorussian Front (Army General Rokossovsky) composed of:
* 3rd Army (Lieutenant General Gorbatov);
* 28th Army (Lieutenant General Luchinsky);
* 48th Army (Lieutenant General Romanenko);
* 61st Army (Lieutenant General Belov);
* 65th Army (Lieutenant General Batov);
* 6th Air Army (Lieutenant General Polynin);
* 16th Air Army (Colonel-General Rudenko);
In addition, the 1st Belorussian Front included the 8th Guards, 47th, 70th, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank armies, which took part only in the second phase of the Belorussian operation.
Initially, the Soviet command imagined the Bagration operation as a repetition of the Battle of Kursk, something like the new Kutuzov or Rumyantsev, with a huge consumption of ammunition with a subsequent relatively modest advance of 150-200 km. Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into the operational depth, with long, stubborn battles in the tactical defense zone for attrition - required a large amount of ammunition and a relatively small amount of fuel for mechanized units and modest capacities for the restoration of railways, the actual development of the operation turned out to be for the Soviet command of the unexpected.
The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed by the General Staff in April 1944. The general plan was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of Minsk, and completely liberate Belarus. It was an extremely ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire army group was planned very rarely during the course of the war.
Significant personnel changes were made. General V. D. Sokolovsky failed to prove himself in the battles of the winter of 1943-1944 (the Orsha offensive operation, the Vitebsk offensive operation) and was removed from command of the Western Front. The front itself was divided in two: the 2nd Belorussian Front (to the south) was headed by G.F. Zakharov, who showed himself well in battles in the Crimea, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, who had previously commanded the army in Ukraine, was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front (to the north).
The direct preparation of the operation was carried out from the end of May. Specific plans were received by the fronts on May 31 in private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
According to one version, according to the original plan, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one powerful blow from the south, in the Bobruisk direction, but K.K. and two main blows. He motivated his statement by the fact that in the heavily swamped Polissya, with one breakthrough, the armies would bump into each other's heads, clog the roads in the near rear, and as a result, the troops of the front could only be used in parts. According to K.K. Rokossovsky, one blow should have been delivered from Rogachev to Osipovichi, the other from Ozarichi to Slutsk, while surrounding Bobruisk, which remained between these two groups. The proposal of K.K. Rokossovsky caused a heated debate in the Stavka, the members of the Stavka insisted on delivering one blow from the Rogachev area, in order to avoid dispersal of forces. The dispute was interrupted by I. V. Stalin, who declared that the persistence of the front commander spoke of the thoughtfulness of the operation. Thus, K.K. Rokossovsky was allowed to act in accordance with his own idea.
However, G.K. Zhukov argued that this version is not true:
A thorough reconnaissance of enemy forces and positions was organized. The extraction of information was carried out in many directions. In particular, the reconnaissance teams of the 1st Belorussian Front captured about 80 "languages". Aerial reconnaissance of the 1st Baltic Front detected 1100 different firing points, 300 artillery batteries, 6000 dugouts, etc. Active acoustic, undercover reconnaissance was also carried out, the study of enemy positions by artillery observers, etc. Due to the combination various ways reconnaissance and its intensity, the enemy grouping was revealed quite completely.
The headquarters tried to achieve maximum surprise. All orders to the commanders of the units were given personally by the commanders of the armies; telephone conversations relating to preparations for the offensive, even in coded form, were forbidden. The fronts preparing for the operation went into radio silence. At the forefront, active earthworks were carried out to simulate preparations for defense. Minefields were not removed completely, so as not to alarm the enemy, sappers limited themselves to screwing fuses from mines. The concentration of troops and regroupings were carried out mainly at night. Specially assigned officers of the General Staff on planes patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures.
The troops conducted intensive training to work out the interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks, assault operations, forcing water barriers, etc. Units were withdrawn one by one from the front line to the rear for these exercises. Tactical techniques were tested in conditions as close as possible to combat and with live fire.
Before the operation, commanders of all levels up to companies carried out reconnaissance, setting tasks for subordinates on the spot. Artillery spotters and air force officers were introduced into the composition of the tank units for better interaction.
Thus, the preparation of the operation "Bagration" was carried out extremely carefully, while the enemy was left in the dark about the upcoming offensive.
If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of the future offensive, then the command of the Army Group Center and the General Staff of the Ground Forces of the Third Reich had a completely wrong idea about the forces and plans of the Soviet troops. Hitler and the High Command believed that a major offensive should still be expected in Ukraine. It was assumed that from the area south of Kovel, the Red Army would strike in the direction of the Baltic Sea, cutting off the Army Groups "Center" and "North". Significant forces were allocated to parry the phantom threat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of heavy tanks "Tiger". In the Army Group "Center" there were one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and only one battalion "Tigers". In April, the command of Army Group Center presented its leadership with a plan to reduce the front line and withdraw the army group to better positions beyond the Berezina. This plan was rejected. Army Group "Center" defended in the same positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense. For construction work, forced labor of the local population was widely used. In particular, in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Army, 15-20 thousand inhabitants were sent to such work.
Kurt Tippelskirch (then commander of the 4th Field Army) describes the mood in the German leadership as follows:
There was as yet no data that would have made it possible to predict the direction or directions of the undoubted Russian summer offensive that was being prepared. Since aviation and radio intelligence usually unmistakably noted large transfers of Russian forces, one could think that an offensive from their side was not yet directly threatened. So far, only in one case have intensive railroad movements lasting for several weeks behind enemy lines in the direction of the Lutsk, Kovel, Sarny region have been recorded, which, however, were not followed by the concentration of newly arrived forces near the front. At times it was necessary to be guided only by guesswork. The general staff of the ground forces considered the possibility of repeating the offensive on Kovel, believing that the enemy would concentrate the main efforts north of the Carpathians on the front of the Northern Ukraine Army Group, in order to push the latter back to the Carpathians. Army Groups "Center" and "North" predicted " calm summer". In addition, the Ploiesti oil region was of particular concern to Hitler. Regarding the fact that the first blow of the enemy will follow north or south of the Carpathians - most likely north - the opinion was unanimous. |
The positions of the troops defending in Army Group Center were seriously reinforced with field fortifications, equipped with numerous interchangeable positions for machine guns and mortars, bunkers and dugouts. Since the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, the Germans managed to create a developed defense system.
From the point of view of the General Staff of the Third Reich, the preparations against Army Group Center were intended only to "mislead the German command regarding the direction of the main attack and pull back reserves from the area between the Carpathians and Kovel." The situation in Belarus inspired so little concern in the Reich command that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the operation.
The preliminary stage of the operation symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944. As in the Patriotic War of 1812, one of the most significant battlefields was the Berezina River. Soviet troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanders - Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Army General G. F. Zakharov, Army General K. K. Rokossovsky), with the support of partisans, broke through the defenses of the German Army Group Center in many areas (commander - Field Marshal E. Bush, later - V. Model), surrounded and liquidated large enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius , Brest and east of Minsk, liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and its capital Vilnius (July 13), the eastern regions of Poland and reached the boundaries of the Narew and Vistula rivers and to the borders of East Prussia.
The operation was carried out in two stages. The first stage took place from June 23 to July 4 and included the following front-line offensive operations:
The offensive was preceded by an action of partisans unprecedented in scale. Numerous partisan formations operated in Belarus. According to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, during the summer of 1944, 194,708 partisans joined the troops of the Red Army. The Soviet command successfully linked the actions of partisan detachments with military operations. The goal of the partisans in the operation "Bagration" was, at first, to disable enemy communications, and later - to prevent the retreat of the defeated units of the Wehrmacht. Massive actions to defeat the German rear were launched on the night of June 19-20. Eike Middeldorf said:
The plans of the partisans included the commission of 40 thousand various explosions, that is, in fact, only a quarter of what was planned was carried out, however, it was enough to accomplish it to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. The head of the rear communications of the army group, Colonel G. Teske stated:
Railways and bridges became the main object of application of partisan forces. In addition to them, communication lines were disabled. All these actions greatly facilitated the advance of troops at the front.
If the “Belarusian Balcony” as a whole protruded to the east, then the area of the city of Vitebsk was a “ledge on a ledge”, protruding even further from the northern part of the “balcony”. The city was declared a "fortress", a similar status had Orsha located south. The 3rd Panzer Army under the command of General G. H. Reinhardt was defending in this sector (the name should not be deceived, there were no tank units in the 3rd Panzer Army). The Vitebsk region itself was defended by its 53rd Army Corps under the command of General F. Gollwitzer ( English). Orsha was defended by the 17th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army.
The operation was carried out on two fronts. The 1st Baltic Front, under the command of General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan, operated on the northern flank of the future operation. His task was to surround Vitebsk from the west and develop the offensive further southwest towards Lepel. The 3rd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel-General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, operated further south. The task of this front was, firstly, to create a southern "claw" of encirclement around Vitebsk, and secondly, to independently cover and take Orsha. As a result, the front was supposed to reach the area of the city of Borisov (south of Lepel, southwest of Vitebsk). For operations in depth, the 3rd Belorussian Front had a cavalry-mechanized group (mechanized corps, cavalry corps) of General N. S. Oslikovsky and the 5th Guards Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov.
To coordinate the efforts of the two fronts, a special task force of the General Staff was created, headed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky.
The offensive began with reconnaissance in force early in the morning of June 22, 1944. In the course of this reconnaissance, it was possible in many places to break into the German defenses and capture the first trenches. The next day was the main blow. The main role was played by the 43rd Army, which covered Vitebsk from the west, and the 39th Army under the command of I. I. Lyudnikov, which surrounded the city from the south. The 39th Army had practically no overall superiority in men in its zone, but the concentration of troops in the breakthrough sector made it possible to create a significant local superiority. The front was quickly broken both to the west and south of Vitebsk. The 6th Army Corps, which was defending south of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Within a few days the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remaining parts of the corps, having lost control and communication with each other, made their way to the west in small groups. The railway Vitebsk - Orsha was cut. On June 24, the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina. The counterattack of Army Group North units from the western flank failed. In Beshenkovichi, "corps group D" was surrounded. A cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky was introduced into the gap south of Vitebsk, and began to quickly move to the south-west.
Since the desire of the Soviet troops to encircle the 53rd Army Corps was undeniable, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army G.Kh. On the morning of June 24, Chief of the General Staff K. Zeitzler arrived in Minsk. He got acquainted with the situation, but did not give permission to withdraw, having no authority to do so. A. Hitler initially forbade the withdrawal of the corps. However, after Vitebsk was completely surrounded, on June 25 he approved the breakthrough, ordering, however, to leave one - the 206th Infantry Division in the city. Even before that, F. Gollwitzer had withdrawn the 4th airfield division somewhat to the west to prepare a breakthrough. This measure, however, came too late.
On June 25, in the Gnezdilovichi area (southwest of Vitebsk), the 43rd and 39th armies linked up. In the Vitebsk region (the western part of the city and the southwestern environs), the 53rd Army Corps of F. Gollwitzer and some other units were surrounded. The 197th, 206th and 246th infantry, as well as the 6th airfield division and part of the 4th airfield division, got into the "cauldron". Another part of the 4th aviation field was surrounded to the west, near Ostrovno.
In the Orsha direction, the offensive developed rather slowly. One of the reasons for the lack of spectacular success was the fact that the strongest of the German infantry divisions, the 78th assault, was located near Orsha. She was much better equipped than the others and, in addition, had the support of almost fifty self-propelled guns. Also in this area were parts of the 14th motorized division. However, on June 25, the 3rd Belorussian Front introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. She cut the railway leading from Orsha to the west at Tolochin, forcing the Germans to withdraw from the city or die in the "boiler". As a result, by the morning of June 27, Orsha was released. The 5th Guards Tank Army was advancing southwest towards Borisov.
On the morning of June 27, Vitebsk was completely cleared of the encircled German group, which had been continuously subjected to air and artillery strikes the day before. The Germans made active efforts to break out of the encirclement. During the day of June 26, 22 attempts were recorded to break through the ring from the inside. One of these attempts was successful, but the narrow corridor was sealed after a few hours. A group of about 5,000 people that broke through was again surrounded around Moshno Lake. On the morning of June 27, General of the Infantry F. Gollwitzer capitulated with the remnants of his corps. F. Gollwitzer himself, the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Schmidt, the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Hitter (Buchner erroneously listed as killed), the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, Major General Muller-Bülow and others were captured.
At the same time, small boilers near Ostrovno and Beshenkovichi were destroyed. The last large group of encirclement was led by the commander of the 4th airfield division, General R. Pistorius ( English). This group, trying to leave through the forests to the west or southwest, on June 27 stumbled upon the 33rd anti-aircraft division marching in marching columns and was dispersed. R. Pistorius died in battle.
The forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts began to develop success in the southwestern and western direction. By the end of June 28, they liberated Lepel and reached the Borisov area. The retreating German units were subjected to continuous and most severe air strikes. There was little opposition from the Luftwaffe. Highway Vitebsk - Lepel, according to I. Kh. Bagramyan, was literally littered with dead and broken equipment.
As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 53rd Army Corps was almost completely destroyed. According to V. Haupt, two hundred people broke through from the corps to the German units, almost all of them were wounded. Parts of the 6th Army Corps and Corps Group D were also defeated. Vitebsk and Orsha were liberated. The losses of the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet applications, exceeded 40 thousand dead and 17 thousand prisoners (the 39th Army, which destroyed the main "cauldron", showed the best results). The northern flank of Army Group Center was swept away, and thus the first step was taken towards the complete encirclement of the entire group.
As part of the battle in Belarus, the Mogilev direction was auxiliary. According to G.K. Zhukov, who coordinated the operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the rapid pushing of the German 4th Army out of the “cauldron”, which was created by strikes through Vitebsk and Bobruisk to Minsk, was meaningless. Nevertheless, in order to accelerate the collapse of the German forces and the fastest advance, the offensive was organized.
On June 23, after effective artillery preparation, the 2nd Belorussian Front began forcing the Pronya River, along which the German defensive line passed. Since the enemy was almost completely suppressed by artillery, sappers built 78 light bridges for infantry and four 60-ton bridges for heavy equipment in a short time. After a few hours of battle, according to the testimony of prisoners, the number of many German companies fell from 80-100 to 15-20 people. However, units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the Basya River in an organized manner. By June 25, the 2nd Belorussian Front captured very few prisoners and vehicles, that is, it had not yet reached the rear communications of the enemy. However, the Wehrmacht army gradually retreated to the west. Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper north and south of Mogilev, on June 27 the city was surrounded and taken by attack the next day. About two thousand prisoners were captured in the city, including the commander of the 12th Infantry Division R. Bamler and the commandant of Mogilev G. G. von Ermansdorf, who was later found guilty of committing numerous serious crimes and hanged.
Gradually, the withdrawal of the 4th Army lost organization. The connection of the units with the command and with each other was broken, the units were mixed up. The retreating troops were subjected to frequent air raids, which caused heavy losses. On June 27, the commander of the 4th Army, K. von Tippelskirch, gave an order by radio for a general withdrawal to Borisov and Berezina. However, many retreating groups did not even receive this order, and not all of those who received it were able to comply.
Until June 29, the 2nd Belorussian Front announced the destruction or capture of 33 thousand enemy soldiers. The trophies included, among other things, 20 tanks, presumably from the Feldhernhalle motorized division operating in the area.
The Bobruisk operation was supposed to create a southern "claw" of a huge encirclement, conceived by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. This action was entirely carried out by the most powerful and numerous of the fronts participating in the Bagration operation - the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. Initially, only the right flank of the front took part in the offensive. He was opposed by the 9th field army of General H. Jordan. As well as near Vitebsk, the task of crushing the flank of Army Group Center was solved by creating a local "cauldron" around Bobruisk. The plan of K.K. Rokossovsky as a whole represented the classic "Cannes": from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th Army advanced (reinforced by the 1st Don Tank Corps), from the east to the west the 3rd I am an army that includes the 9th Panzer Corps. For a quick breakthrough to Slutsk, the 28th Army was used with the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev. The front line in the area of operation made a bend to the west near Zhlobin, and Bobruisk, among other cities, was declared a “fortress” by A. Hitler, so that the enemy himself in some way contributed to the implementation of Soviet plans.
The offensive near Bobruisk began in the south on June 24, that is, somewhat later than in the north and center. Bad weather at first severely limited aviation operations. In addition, the terrain conditions in the offensive zone were very difficult: it was necessary to overcome an extremely large, half a kilometer wide, swampy swamp. However Soviet troops this did not stop, moreover, the corresponding direction was chosen intentionally. Since the German defense was quite dense in the well-passable area of Parichi, the commander of the 65th Army, P. I. Batov, decided to advance somewhat to the south-west, through a swamp that was relatively poorly guarded. The quagmire was overcome along the gats. P. I. Batov noted:
On the first day, the 65th Army broke through the defenses of the enemy, completely stunned by such a maneuver, to a depth of 10 km, and a tank corps was introduced into the breakthrough. A similar success was achieved by its left-flank neighbor - the 28th Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinsky.
The 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, on the contrary, met stubborn resistance. H. Jordan used his main mobile reserve, the 20th Panzer Division, against her. This seriously slowed down progress. The 48th Army under the command of P. L. Romanenko, advancing to the left of the 28th Army, was also stuck due to the extremely difficult terrain. In the afternoon, the weather improved, which made it possible to actively use aviation: 2465 sorties were carried out by aircraft, but progress remained insignificant.
The next day, on the southern flank, the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev was introduced into the breakthrough. The contrast between P. I. Batov’s rapid offensive and the slow gnaw through of the defense by A. V. Gorbatov and P. L. Romanenko was noticeable not only to the Soviet, but also to the German command. H. Jordan redirected the 20th Panzer Division to the southern sector, which, however, having entered the battle "from the wheels", was unable to eliminate the breakthrough, lost half of its armored vehicles and was forced to retreat to the south.
As a result of the retreat of the 20th Panzer Division and the introduction of the 9th Panzer Corps into battle, the northern "claw" was able to advance deeply. On June 27, the roads leading from Bobruisk to the north and west were intercepted. The main forces of the German 9th Army were surrounded by a diameter of about 25 km.
H. Jordan was removed from the command of the 9th Army, instead of him General of the Tank Forces N. von Forman was appointed. However, personnel changes could no longer affect the position of the encircled German units. There were no forces capable of organizing a full-fledged deblocking strike from the outside. An attempt by the reserve 12th Panzer Division to cut through the “corridor” failed. Therefore, the encircled German units began to independently make energetic efforts to break through. The 35th Army Corps, located east of Bobruisk, under the command of von Lutzow, began to prepare for a breakthrough to the north to join the 4th Army. On the evening of June 27, the corps, having destroyed all weapons and property that could not be carried away, made an attempt to break through. This attempt generally failed, although some groups managed to pass between the Soviet units. On June 27, communication with the 35th Corps was interrupted. The last organized force in the encirclement was General Hoffmeister's 41st Panzer Corps. The groups and individual soldiers who lost control gathered in Bobruisk, for which they crossed the Berezina to the western coast - they were continuously bombed by aircraft. Chaos reigned in the city. The commander of the 134th Infantry Division, General Philip, shot himself in despair.
On June 27, the assault on Bobruisk began. On the evening of the 28th, the remnants of the garrison made the last attempt to break through, while 3,500 wounded were left in the city. The attack was led by the surviving tanks of the 20th Panzer Division. They managed to break through the thin barrier of Soviet infantry to the north of the city, but the retreat continued under air strikes, causing heavy losses. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was cleared. About 14 thousand soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were able to get to the positions of the German troops - for the most part they were met by the 12th Panzer Division. 74 thousand soldiers and officers died or were captured. Among the prisoners was the commandant of Bobruisk, Major General Haman.
The Bobruisk operation ended successfully. The destruction of two corps, the 35th Army Corps and the 41st Tank Corps, the capture of both their commanders and the liberation of Bobruisk took less than a week. As part of Operation Bagration, the defeat of the German 9th Army meant that both flanks of Army Group Center were left bare, and the road to Minsk was open from the northeast and southeast.
After the crushing of the front of the 3rd Panzer Army near Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front began to develop success in two directions: to the northwest, against the German grouping near Polotsk, and to the west, in the direction of Glubokoe.
Polotsk caused concern among the Soviet command, since this next "fortress" now hung over the flank of the 1st Baltic Front. I. Kh. Bagramyan immediately set about eliminating this problem: there was no pause between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. Unlike most of the battles of Operation Bagration, near Polotsk, the main enemy of the Red Army was, in addition to the remnants of the 3rd Panzer Army, Army Group North represented by the 16th Field Army under the command of General H. Hansen. On the enemy side, only two infantry divisions were used as reserves.
June 29 was followed by a blow to Polotsk. The 6th Guards and 43rd Armies bypassed the city from the south (the 6th Guards Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th Shock Army - from the north. The 1st Panzer Corps captured the city of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. The corps seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina with a surprise attack. The counterattack planned by the 16th Army simply did not take place.
The partisans provided considerable assistance to the attackers, intercepting small groups of the retreating, and sometimes even attacking large military columns.
However, the defeat of the Polotsk garrison in the cauldron did not take place. Karl Hilpert, who commanded the defense of the city, arbitrarily left the "fortress" without waiting until the escape routes were cut. Polotsk was liberated on 4 July. Failure in this battle cost Georg Lindemann, commander of Army Group North, the post. It should be noted that despite the absence of "cauldrons", the number of prisoners was significant for an operation that lasted only six days. The 1st Baltic Front announced the capture of 7,000 enemy soldiers and officers.
Although the Polotsk operation was not crowned with a defeat similar to what happened near Vitebsk, it brought significant results. The enemy lost a stronghold and a railway junction, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of Army Group North were outflanked from the south and were in danger of being hit on the flank.
After the capture of Polotsk, there were organizational rearrangements for new tasks. The 4th shock army was transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front, on the other hand, the 1st Baltic Front received the 39th Army from Chernyakhovsky, as well as two armies from the reserve. The front line moved 60 km to the south. All these measures were associated with the need to improve the controllability of the troops and strengthen them before the upcoming operations in the Baltic.
On June 28, Field Marshal E. Bush was removed from command of Army Group Center, his place was taken by Field Marshal V. Model, who was a recognized specialist in defensive operations. Several fresh formations were sent to Belarus, in particular, the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.
After the collapse of the northern and southern flanks near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the German 4th Army was squeezed into a kind of rectangle. The eastern "wall" of this rectangle was formed by the Drut River, the western - by the Berezina, the northern and southern - by Soviet troops. To the west was Minsk, which was targeted by the main Soviet attacks. The flanks of the 4th Army were not actually covered. The environment looked imminent. Therefore, the army commander, General K. von Tippelskirch, ordered a general retreat across the Berezina to Minsk. The only way to do this was a dirt road from Mogilev through Berezino. The troops and rear institutions that had accumulated on the road tried to cross the only bridge to the western bank of the Berezina under constant destructive attacks from attack aircraft and bombers. military police withdrew from the regulation of the crossing. In addition, the retreating were attacked by partisans. Additionally, the situation was complicated by the fact that numerous groups of soldiers from units defeated in other sectors, even from near Vitebsk, joined the retreating troops. For these reasons, the passage through the Berezina was slow and was accompanied by great sacrifices. It should be noted that the pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, located directly in front of the 4th Army, was insignificant, since the plans of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not include the expulsion of the enemy from the trap.
After the crushing of two corps of the 9th Army, K.K. Rokossovsky received new tasks. The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two directions, to the southwest, towards Minsk, and west, to Vileyka. The 1st Belorussian Front received a symmetrical task. Having achieved impressive results in the Bobruisk operation, the 65th and 28th armies and the mechanized cavalry group of I. A. Pliev turned strictly to the west, to Slutsk and Nesvizh. The 3rd Army of A. V. Gorbatova advanced to the north-west, towards Minsk. The 48th army of P. L. Romanenko became a bridge between these shock groups.
In the offensive of the front, mobile formations were in the lead - tank, mechanized units and cavalry-mechanized groups. The cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev, moving quickly towards Slutsk, reached the city on the evening of June 29. Since the enemy in front of the 1st Belorussian Front was for the most part defeated, resistance was weak. The city of Slutsk itself was an exception: it was defended by units of the 35th and 102nd divisions, which suffered serious losses. The Soviet troops estimated the Slutsk garrison to be about two regiments.
Faced with organized resistance in Slutsk, General I. A. Pliev organized an assault with three parties simultaneously. The flank coverage brought success: on June 30, by 11 o'clock in the morning, Slutsk was cleared by a cavalry-mechanized group with the assistance of infantry that had bypassed the city.
By July 2, the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev captured Nesvizh, cutting off the escape route to the southeast for the Minsk group. The offensive developed quickly, with only small scattered groups of soldiers resisting. On July 2, the remnants of the German 12th Panzer Division were thrown back from Pukhovichi. By July 2, the tank corps of the front of K.K. Rokossovsky approached Minsk.
At this stage, German mobile reserves began to arrive at the front, withdrawn mainly from the troops operating in Ukraine. On June 26-28, the 5th Panzer Division under the command of General K. Dekker arrived northeast of Minsk, in the Borisov region. It posed a serious threat, given that over the previous few months it had hardly taken part in hostilities and was staffed almost to its full strength (including in the spring the anti-tank battalion was re-equipped with 21 Jagdpanzer IV / 48 tank destroyers, and in June a fully staffed battalion of 76 "panthers"), and upon arrival in the Borisov region was reinforced by the 505th heavy battalion (45 "tiger" tanks). The weak point of the Germans in this area was the infantry: these were either security or infantry divisions that suffered significant losses.
On June 28, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the horse-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps set off to force the Berezina and advance on Minsk. 5th Panzer Army, marching in the middle order of battle, on the Berezina, she collided with a group of General D. von Saucken (the main forces of the 5th Panzer Division and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion). The group of D. von Saucken had the task of holding the Berezina line in order to cover the retreat of the 4th Army. On June 29 and 30, extremely tough battles were fought between this group and two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced with great difficulty and heavy losses, but during this time the cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the arrows of the 11th Guards Army crossed the Berezina, breaking the weak resistance of the police units, and began to cover the German division from the north and south. The 5th Panzer Division, under pressure from all sides, was forced to retreat with heavy losses after brief but fierce street fighting in Borisov itself. After the collapse of the defense at Borisov, N. S. Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was aimed at Molodechno (north-west of Minsk), and the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were aimed at Minsk. The right-flank 5th combined-arms army at that time was moving north strictly west, to Vileyka, and the left-flank 31st army followed the 2nd guards tank corps. Thus, there was a parallel pursuit: Soviet mobile formations overtook the retreating columns of the encircled group. The last frontier on the way to Minsk was broken. The Wehrmacht suffered serious losses, and the proportion of prisoners was significant. The claims of the 3rd Belorussian Front included over 22,000 German soldiers killed and over 13,000 captured. Together with a large number of destroyed and captured vehicles (almost 5 thousand vehicles, according to the same report), it can be concluded that the rear services of Army Group Center were subjected to heavy blows.
To the northwest of Minsk, the 5th Panzer Division gave another serious battle to the 5th Guards. tank army. On July 1-2, a heavy mobile battle took place. German tankers announced the destruction of 295 Soviet combat vehicles. Although such claims should be treated with caution, there is no doubt that the losses of the 5th Guards. tank army were heavy. However, in these battles, the 5th TD was reduced to 18 tanks, and all the “tigers” of the 505th heavy battalion were also lost. In fact, the division lost the opportunity to influence operational environment, while the strike potential of the Soviet armored units was by no means exhausted.
July 3 2nd Guards. the tank corps approached the outskirts of Minsk and, having made a roundabout maneuver, broke into the city from the north-west. At that moment, the advance detachment of the Rokossovsky front approached the city from the south, and the 5th Guards advanced from the north. tank army, and from the east - the advanced detachments of the 31st combined arms army. Against such numerous and powerful formations in Minsk, there were only about 1,800 regular troops. It should be noted that the Germans managed to evacuate more than 20 thousand wounded and rear soldiers on July 1-2. However, quite numerous stragglers (mostly unarmed) still remained in the city. The defense of Minsk was very short: by 13:00 the capital of Belarus was liberated. This meant that the remnants of the 4th Army and the units that joined it, more than 100 thousand people, were doomed to captivity or extermination. Minsk fell into the hands of the Soviet troops heavily destroyed during the fighting in the summer of 1941, in addition, retreating, Wehrmacht units caused additional destruction to the city. Marshal Vasilevsky stated: “On July 5 I visited Minsk. The impression I have left is extremely heavy. The city was heavily destroyed by the Nazis. Of the large buildings, the enemy did not have time to blow up only the house of the Belarusian government, the new building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, the radio factory and the House of the Red Army. Power plant, railway station, most industrial enterprises and institutions were blown up ""
The encircled German group made desperate attempts to break out to the west. The Germans even attempted attacks with bladed weapons. Since the command of the army fled to the west, the actual command of the remnants of the 4th field army was carried out instead of K. von Tippelskirch by the commander of the 12th army corps, W. Müller.
The Minsk "cauldron" was shot through with artillery fire and aircraft, ammunition was running out, supplies were completely absent, so an attempt to break through was made without delay. To do this, the encircled were divided into two groups, one led by W. Muller himself, the other was led by the commander of the 78th Assault Division, Lieutenant General G. Traut. On July 6, a detachment under the command of G. Traut, numbering 3 thousand people, made an attempt to break through at Smilovichi, but collided with units of the 49th Army and was killed after a four-hour battle. On the same day, G. Trout made a second attempt to get out of the trap, but not reaching the crossings over the Svisloch near Sinelo, his detachment was defeated, and G. Trout himself was captured.
On July 5, the last radiogram was sent from the "cauldron" to the command of the army group. She said:
There was no answer to this desperate appeal. The outer front of the encirclement quickly shifted to the west, and if at the moment of closing the ring it was enough to pass 50 km to break through, soon the front passed already 150 km from the boiler. From the outside, no one made their way to the surrounded. The ring was shrinking, resistance was suppressed by massive shelling and bombing. On July 8, when the impossibility of a breakthrough became obvious, W. Muller decided to capitulate. Early in the morning, he left, focusing on the sounds of artillery fire, towards the Soviet troops, and surrendered to units of the 121st Rifle Corps of the 50th Army. They immediately wrote the following order:
"July 8, 1944. To all soldiers of the 4th Army, located in the area east of the Ptich River! Our position, after many days of heavy fighting, became hopeless. We have fulfilled our duty. Our combat readiness has practically been reduced to nothing, and there is no reason to count on the resumption of supplies. According to the Wehrmacht High Command, Russian troops are already near Baranovichi. The path along the river is blocked, and we cannot break through the ring on our own. We have a huge number of wounded and soldiers who have strayed from their units. The Russian command promises: a) medical assistance to all the wounded; b) officers to leave orders and edged weapons, soldiers - orders. We are required to: collect and hand over in good condition all available weapons and equipment. Let's put an end to senseless bloodshed! I order: Stop resistance immediately; gather in groups of 100 or more under the command of officers or senior non-commissioned officers; concentrate the wounded at collection points; act clearly, energetically, showing comradely mutual assistance. The more discipline we show when surrendering, the sooner we will be put on allowance. This order must be distributed orally and in writing by all available means. lieutenant general and commander XII Army Corps. |
The commanders of the Red Army were quite self-critical about the actions to defeat the Minsk "cauldron". The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, General G.F. Zakharov, expressed extreme dissatisfaction:
However, during July 8 - 9, the organized resistance of the German troops was broken. Until July 12, the cleansing continued: partisans and regular units combed the forests, neutralizing small groups of encircled. After that, the fighting east of Minsk finally stopped. More than 72 thousand German soldiers died, more than 35 thousand were captured.
On the eve of the second stage of Operation Bagration, the Soviet side tried to exploit the success achieved as much as possible, while the German side tried to restore the front. At this stage, the attackers had to deal with the arriving enemy reserves. Also at this time, there were new personnel changes in the leadership of the armed forces of the Third Reich. The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, K. Zeitzler, proposed withdrawing Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with its help. This proposal was rejected by A. Hitler for political reasons (relations with Finland), and also because of the objections of the naval command: leaving the Gulf of Finland worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden. As a result, K. Zeitzler was forced to leave the post of chief of the general staff, and was replaced by G. V. Guderian.
Field Marshal V. Model, for his part, tried to erect a defensive line running from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi and seal a hole in the front 400 km wide. To do this, he had at his disposal the only army of the Center group that had not yet been hit - the 2nd, as well as reinforcements and the remnants of the defeated units. In sum, these were obviously insufficient forces. V. Model received significant assistance from other sectors of the front: until July 16, 46 divisions were transferred to Belarus. However, these formations were introduced into battle gradually, often "from the wheels", and could not quickly change the course of the battle.
After the liberation of Polotsk, the 1st Baltic Front of I. Kh. Bagramyan received the task of attacking in the north-west direction, towards Dvinsk and west, towards Kaunas and Sventsyan. Overall plan consisted of a breakthrough to the Baltic and cutting off Army Group North from other Wehrmacht forces. To prevent the troops of the front from being stretched along different lines of operations, the 4th shock army was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front. Instead, the 39th Army was transferred from the 3rd Belorussian Front. Reserves were also transferred to the front: it included the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer and the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze. These rearrangements caused a slight pause, since on July 4 only two of the front's armies had an enemy in front of them. The reserve armies marched to the front, the 39th was also on the march after the defeat of the Vitebsk "cauldron". Therefore, until July 15, the battle went on without the participation of the armies of Ya. G. Kreizer and P. G. Chanchibadze.
Expecting an attack on Dvinsk, the enemy transferred part of the forces of Army Group North to this area. The Soviet side estimated the enemy forces near Dvinsk at five fresh divisions, as well as a brigade of assault guns, security, sapper and penal units. Thus, the Soviet troops did not have superiority in forces over the enemy. In addition, interruptions in the supply of fuel forced the Soviet aviation to greatly reduce activity. Because of this, the offensive that began on July 5 stalled by the 7th. Shifting the direction of the blow helped only move forward a little, but did not create a breakthrough. On July 18, the operation in the Dvina direction was suspended. According to I. Kh. Baghramyan, he was ready for such a development of events:
The advance to Sventsiany was much easier, since the enemy did not throw in such significant reserves in this direction, and the Soviet grouping, on the contrary, was more powerful than against Dvinsk. Advancing, the 1st Panzer Corps cut the Vilnius-Dvinsk railway. By July 14, the left flank had advanced 140 km, leaving Vilnius south and moving towards Kaunas.
Local failure did not affect the overall course of the operation. The 6th Guards Army again went on the offensive on July 23, and although its advance was slow and difficult, on July 27 Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right. After July 20, the introduction of fresh forces began to affect: the 51st Army reached the front line and immediately liberated Panevezys, after which it continued to move towards Siauliai. On July 26, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps was brought into battle in its lane, which went to Siauliai on the same day. The resistance of the enemy was weak, mainly separate operational groups acted from the German side, so Siauliai was taken already on July 27.
The enemy quite clearly understood the intention of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to cut off the North group. J. Frisner, the commander of the army group, drew A. Hitler's attention to this fact on July 15, arguing that if the army group does not reduce the front and is not withdrawn, isolation and, possibly, defeat await it. However, there was no time to withdraw the group from the emerging "bag", and on July 23, G. Frisner was removed from his post and sent south, to Romania.
The general goal of the 1st Baltic Front was to access the sea, so the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, as a mobile front group, was turned almost at a right angle: from west to north. I. Kh. Bagramyan formalized this turn with the following order:
By July 30, it was possible to separate the two army groups from each other: the vanguards of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic states in the Tukums region. On July 31, after a rather tense assault, Jelgava fell. Thus, the front went to the Baltic Sea. Arose, in the words of A. Hitler, "a gap in the Wehrmacht." At this stage, the main task of the front of I. Kh. Baghramyan was to retain what had been achieved, since an operation at great depth would lead to a stretching of communications, and the enemy was actively trying to restore land communications between army groups.
The first of the German counterattacks was an attack near the city of Birzhai. This town was located at the junction between the 51st Army, which had broken through to the sea, and the ledge of the 43rd Army, following it on the right. The idea of the German command was to go through the positions of the 43rd Army covering the flank to the rear of the 51st Army running to the sea. The enemy used a fairly large grouping from the Army Group North. According to Soviet data, five infantry divisions (58th, 61st, 81st, 215th and 290th), the Nordland motorized division, the 393rd assault gun brigade and other units participated in the battle. On August 1, going on the offensive, this group managed to encircle the 357th Rifle Division of the 43rd Army. The division was rather small (4 thousand people) and was in a difficult situation. However, the local "cauldron" was not subjected to serious pressure, apparently due to a lack of strength from the enemy. The first attempts to unblock the encircled unit failed, but communication was maintained with the division, it had an air supply. The situation was reversed by the reserves thrown in by I. Kh. Bagramyan. On the night of August 7, the 19th Panzer Corps and the encircled division, which was beating from the inside of the "cauldron", united. Birzhai was also kept. Of the 3908 people who were surrounded, 3230 people left in the ranks and about 400 were wounded. That is, the losses in people were moderate.
However, the counterattacks of the German troops continued. On August 16, attacks began in the Raseiniai area and west of Siauliai. The German 3rd Panzer Army tried to push the Red Army back from the Baltic Sea and reestablish contact with Army Group North. Units of the 2nd Guards Army were pushed back, as were units of the neighboring 51st Army. By August 18, the 7th, 5th, 14th tank divisions and a tank division were installed in front of the 2nd Guards Army " Greater Germany"(in the document it is erroneous -" SS division "). The situation near Siauliai was stabilized by the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. However, on August 20, an offensive began from the west and east towards Tukums. Tukums was lost, and for a short time the Germans restored land communication between Army Groups Center and North. The attacks of the German 3rd Panzer Army in the Siauliai region failed. At the end of August there was a break in the battles. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of Operation Bagration.
The destruction of the 4th Wehrmacht Army east of Minsk opened up attractive prospects. On July 4, I. D. Chernyakhovsky received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with the task of advancing in general direction to Vilnius, Kaunas and by July 12 to liberate Vilnius and Lida, in the future to seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Neman.
Without taking an operational pause, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the operation on July 5. The offensive was supported by the 5th Guards Tank Army. The enemy did not have sufficient forces for direct confrontation, however, Vilnius was declared by A. Hitler to be another “fortress”, and a rather large garrison was concentrated in it, which was additionally reinforced during the operation and numbered about 15 thousand people. There are also alternative points of view on the size of the garrison: 4 thousand people. The 5th Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps broke through the enemy defenses and advanced 20 km in the first day. For infantry, this is a very high pace. The matter was facilitated by the friability of the German defense: the army was opposed on a wide front by battered infantry formations and construction and security units thrown to the front. The army captured Vilnius from the north.
Meanwhile, the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were advancing further south, in the area of Molodechno. At the same time, the tank army gradually shifted to the north, surrounding Vilnius from the south. Molodechno itself was taken by cavalrymen of the 3rd Guards Corps on July 5th. A warehouse with 500 tons of fuel was captured in the city. On July 6, the Germans tried to conduct a private counterattack against the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 212th Infantry and 391st Security Divisions, as well as the improvised Hoppe armored group of 22 self-propelled artillery mounts, took part in it. The counterattack had, according to German claims, limited success, but it is not confirmed by the Soviet side; only the fact of a counterattack is noted. It had no effect on the advance to Vilnius, but the 11th Guards Army had to somewhat slow down the pace of movement towards Alytus, repelling this and subsequent attacks (later, the 11th Guards Army was hit by counterattacks from the 7th and the remnants of the 5th Panzer Divisions, security and infantry units). On July 7 - 8, the city was surrounded by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army from the south and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps from the north. The garrison under the command of Major General R. Shtagel took up all-round defense. The city was defended by a consolidated group of various units, which was common for the battles of 1944, including the 761st Grenadier Brigade, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions, and others.
On July 7, an uprising broke out in Vilnius by the Polish nationalist organization the Home Army (Operation Sharp Gates as part of the Storm Action). Her detachments, led by the local commander A. Krzhizhanovsky, according to various sources, numbered from 4 to 10 thousand people, and they managed to take control of part of the city. The Polish rebels were not able to liberate Vilnius on their own, but they provided assistance to the Red Army units.
By July 9, most of the key facilities in the city, including the railway station and the airfield, were captured by units of the 5th Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army. However, the garrison stubbornly resisted.
I. L. Degen, a tanker who participated in the assault on Vilnius, left the following description of these battles:
The lieutenant colonel said that only a hundred people of infantry, a couple of German tanks and several guns - one or two, were holding the enemy's defenses, and miscalculated. (…) And we, three tanks, crawled along the city streets, not seeing each other. The two German guns promised by the lieutenant colonel, apparently, multiplied by asexual division, they began to hit us with guns from all sides. They barely had time to destroy them. (…) The battle with the Germans in the city, in addition to the Soviet units, was actively fought by the Poles with red and white bandages on their hands (subordinate to the Polish government in London) and a large Jewish partisan detachment. They had red bands on their sleeves. A group of Poles approached the tank. I jumped down to them and asked: "Do you need help?" The commander, it seems, a colonel, almost with tears in his eyes shook my hand and showed me where the Germans were firing at them most intensively. It turns out that the day before they were left face to face with the Germans without support. That is why the lieutenant general turned out to be so kind to us ... Immediately the lieutenant, who I had already seen at the headquarters of the regiment, ran in and conveyed a request from the commander - to support the battalion in the same direction that the Poles had just indicated to me. Found in the basement of the NP battalion commander. The battalion commander briefed me on the situation and set the task. He had seventeen people left in the battalion ... I chuckled: well, if three tanks are considered a tank brigade, then why can't 17 fighters be a battalion ... One 76-mm gun was attached to the battalion. The calculation had two armor-piercing shells left. It was the entire ammunition load. The gun was commanded by a young junior lieutenant. Naturally, the artillerymen could not support the battalion with fire. Their heads were filled with one thought: what will they do if they walk down the street? german tanks?! Starting from July 9, my tank did not leave the battlefield for three days. We completely lost our orientation in space and time. Nobody brought me shells, and I was forced to think a thousand times before allowing myself one more shot from a tank gun. He mainly supported the infantry with the fire of two machine guns and caterpillars. There was no connection with the brigade and even with Varivoda. Street fighting is a real nightmare, it is a horror that human brain unable to fully cover. (…) On July 13, the fighting in the city stopped. The Germans surrendered in groups. Remember how many Germans the lieutenant colonel warned me about? One hundred people. So, only five thousand German prisoners turned out to be. But there were no two tanks either. |
On the night of July 12-13, the German 6th Panzer Division, supported by part of the "Grossdeutschland" division, broke through the corridor to Vilnius. The operation was personally led by Colonel General G. Kh. Reinhardt, commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. Three thousand German soldiers came out of the "fortress". Others, no matter how many, died or were captured on July 13. The Soviet side announced the death in Vilnius and the surrounding area of eight thousand German soldiers and the capture of five thousand. By July 15, the 3rd Belorussian Front had captured a bridgehead over the Neman. Parts of the Home Army were interned by the Soviet authorities.
While the assault on Vilnius was underway, the southern wing of the front was quietly moving west. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured Lida, and by July 16 reached Grodno. The front crossed the Neman. A large water barrier was passed at a fast pace with moderate losses.
Parts of the Wehrmacht tried to neutralize the bridgeheads beyond the Neman. To this end, the command of the German 3rd Panzer Army created an impromptu battle group from parts of the 6th Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland division. It consisted of two tank battalions, a motorized infantry regiment and self-propelled artillery. The counterattack on July 16 was aimed at the flank of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. However, this counterattack was carried out in a hurry, they did not manage to organize reconnaissance. In the depths of the Soviet defense near the town of Vroblevizh, the battle group stumbled upon the 16th Guards, which had risen to the defense. anti-tank brigade, and lost 63 tanks during the heavy battle. The counterattack bogged down, the bridgeheads beyond the Neman were held by the Russians.
After the battle for Vilnius, the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki, the last major cities on the way to East Prussia. On July 28, the troops of the front went on the offensive and in the first two days advanced 5-17 km. On July 30, the enemy defenses along the Neman were broken through; in the zone of the 33rd Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was introduced into the gap. The exit of the mobile unit to the operational space put the Kaunas garrison at risk of encirclement, so by August 1, Wehrmacht units left the city.
However, the gradual increase in German resistance led to a relatively slow advance with serious losses. The stretching of communications, the exhaustion of ammunition, the growing losses forced the Soviet troops to suspend the offensive. In addition, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks on the front of I. D. Chernyakhovsky. So, on August 9, the 1st Infantry, 5th Panzer Divisions and the "Grossdeutschland" Division counterattacked the 33rd Army of the Front, which was marching in the center, and somewhat pressed it. In mid-August, a counterattack by infantry divisions in the Raseiniai area even led to tactical (regiment-level) encirclements, which, however, were soon broken through. These chaotic counterattacks led to the drying up of the operation by the 20th of August. On August 29, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the defensive, reaching Suwalki and not reaching several kilometers to the borders of East Prussia.
The exit to the old borders of Germany caused panic in East Prussia. Despite the assurances of Gauleiter E. Koch that the situation on the outskirts of East Prussia had stabilized, the population began to leave the region.
For the 3rd Belorussian Front, the battles within the framework of Operation Bagration ended with the Kaunas operation.
After the creation of the Minsk "cauldron", General G.F. Zakharov, like other front commanders, received the task of moving deep to the west. As part of the Bialystok operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front played an auxiliary role - it pursued the remnants of Army Group Center. Leaving behind Minsk, the front moved strictly to the west - to Novogrudok, and then - to Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th and 50th armies at first could not take part in this movement, as they continued to fight with the German units that were surrounded in the Minsk "cauldron". Thus, only one remained for the offensive - the 3rd Army. She started moving on 5 July. At first, enemy resistance was very weak: in the first five days, the 3rd Army advanced 120-125 km. This pace is very high for infantry and is more characteristic of a march than an offensive. On July 8 Novogrudok fell, on July 9 the army reached the Neman.
However, gradually the enemy built a defense in front of the troops of the front. On July 10, in front of the positions of the front, reconnaissance established the remnants of the 12th and 20th tank and part of four infantry divisions, as well as six separate regiments. These forces could not stop the offensive, but they influenced the operational situation and slowed down the pace of the operation.
On July 10, the 50th Army entered the battle. The Neman was forced. On July 15, the troops of the front approached Grodno. On the same day, the troops repelled a series of counterattacks, causing serious damage to the enemy. On July 16, Grodno was liberated in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front.
The enemy reinforced units in the Grodno direction, but these reserves were not sufficient, and in addition, they themselves suffered heavy losses in battles. Although the pace of the front's offensive fell seriously, from July 17 to July 27, the troops broke through to the Augustow Canal, on July 27 they recaptured Bialystok, and reached the pre-war border of the USSR. The operation took place without noticeable encirclement of the enemy, which is due to the weakness of mobile formations in the front: the 2nd Belorussian Front did not have a single tank, mechanized or cavalry corps, having only tank infantry support brigades. In general, the front fulfilled all the tasks assigned to it.
In the future, the front developed an offensive against Osovets, and on August 14 occupied the city. The bridgehead behind the Narew was also occupied by the front. However, the advance of the troops was rather slow: on the one hand, stretched communications played their role, on the other hand, frequent counterattacks of the strengthened enemy. On August 14, the Bialystok operation was terminated, and for the 2nd Belorussian Front, Operation Bagration also ended.
After the liberation of Minsk, the front of K.K. Rokossovsky, like others, received a directive to pursue the remnants of Army Group Center. The first destination was Baranovichi, in the future it was supposed to develop an offensive on Brest. A mobile grouping of the front was aimed directly at Baranovichi - the 4th Guards Cavalry, 1st Mechanized and 9th Tank Corps.
Already on July 5, the forces of the Red Army encountered the incoming operational reserves of the enemy. The 1st mechanized corps entered into battle with the 4th tank division, which had just arrived in Belarus, and was stopped. In addition, Hungarian units (1st Cavalry Division) and German infantry reserves (28th Light Division) appeared at the front. On July 5 and 6 there were intense battles, the advance was insignificant, only the 65th army of P.I. Batov was successful.
Gradually, the resistance near Baranovichi was broken. The attackers were supported by large aviation forces (about 500 bombers). The 1st Belorussian Front significantly outnumbered the enemy, so the resistance gradually weakened. On July 8, after a heavy street battle, Baranovichi was liberated.
Thanks to the success near Baranovichi, the actions of the 61st Army were facilitated. This army, under the command of General P. A. Belov, advanced in the direction of Pinsk through Luninets. The army operated in extremely difficult wetlands between the flanks of the 1st Belorussian Front. The fall of Baranovichi threatened to envelop the German troops in the Pinsk region and forced them to a hasty retreat. During the pursuit, the Dnieper River Flotilla provided significant assistance to the 61st Army. In particular, on the night of July 12, the ships of the flotilla secretly climbed up the Pripyat and landed a rifle regiment on the outskirts of Pinsk. The Germans failed to destroy the landing force, on July 14 Pinsk was liberated.
On July 19, Kobrin, a city east of Brest, was semi-encircled and the next day taken. The right wing of the front reached Brest from the east.
Fighting was also carried out on the left wing of the front, separated from the right wing by the impenetrable swamps of Polesie. As early as July 2, the enemy began to withdraw troops from Kovel, an important transport hub. On July 5, the 47th Army went on the offensive and on July 6 liberated the city. Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky arrived here for direct command of the troops. On July 8, in order to capture the bridgehead on the Western Bug (the subsequent task was to reach Lublin), the 11th Panzer Corps was brought into battle. Due to disorganization, the corps was ambushed and irretrievably lost 75 tanks, the corps commander Rudkin was removed from his post. Unsuccessful attacks continued here for several more days. As a result, near Kovel, the enemy retreated 12-20 kilometers in an organized manner and disrupted the Soviet offensive.
On July 18, the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive in full force. The left wing of the front, which had hitherto remained largely passive, entered the operation. Since the Lvov-Sandomierz operation was already underway to the south, it was extremely difficult for the German side to maneuver with reserves. The opponents of the 1st Belorussian Front were not only parts of the Army Group "Center", but also the Army Group "Northern Ukraine", commanded by V. Model. This field marshal thus combined the posts of commander of Army Groups "Center" and "Northern Ukraine". In order to maintain contact between the army groups, he ordered the 4th Panzer Army to be withdrawn behind the Bug. The 8th Guards Army under the command of V.I. Chuikov and the 47th Army under the command of N. I. Guseva went to the river and immediately crossed it, entering the territory of Poland. K.K. Rokossovsky attributes the crossing of the Bug to July 20, D. Glantz - to the 21st. Be that as it may, the Wehrmacht failed to create a line along the Bug. Moreover, the defense of the German 8th Army Corps collapsed so quickly that the help of the 2nd Panzer Army was not needed, the tankers were forced to catch up with the infantrymen. The tank army of S. I. Bogdanov consisted of three corps, and posed a serious threat. She quickly advanced towards Lublin, that is, strictly to the west. The 11th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, supported by infantry, turned towards Brest, to the north.
At this time, Kobrin was released on the right wing of the front. Thus, a local “cauldron” began to form near Brest. On July 25, the encirclement around the units of the 86th, 137th and 261st Infantry Divisions was closed. Three days later, on July 28, the remnants of the encircled group broke out of the "boiler". During the defeat of the Brest group, the Germans suffered serious losses in the dead, which is noted by both warring parties (according to Soviet applications, 7 thousand corpses of German soldiers remained on the battlefield). Very few prisoners were taken - only 110 people.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Army was advancing on Lublin. The need for an early capture was due to political reasons. JV Stalin emphasized that the liberation of Lublin "... is urgently required by the political situation and the interests of independent democratic Poland." The army received the order on July 21, and on the night of the 22nd began to carry it out. Tank units advanced from the battle formations of the 8th Guards Army. The 3rd Panzer Corps struck at the junction between the two German corps, and after a fleeting battle broke through their defenses. In the afternoon, the coverage of Lublin began. The highway Lublin - Pulawy was blocked, on the road the rear establishments of the enemy were intercepted, which were evacuated along with the city administration. Part of the forces of the tank army that day had no contact with the enemy due to interruptions in the supply of fuel.
The success of the first day of the breakthrough to Lublin led to a reassessment by the Red Army of its capabilities. On the morning of July 23, the city was stormed by the forces of tank corps. On the outskirts, the Soviet forces were successful, but the blow towards Loketka Square was parried. The problem of the attackers was an acute shortage of motorized infantry. This problem was alleviated: an uprising of the Home Army broke out in the city. On this day, S. I. Bogdanov, who was watching the assault, was wounded. General A. who replaced him. I. Radzievsky (before that - the chief of staff of the army) energetically continued the assault. Early in the morning of July 24, part of the garrison left Lublin, but not everyone managed to successfully retreat. Before noon, units attacking it from different sides united in the center of the city, and by the morning of July 25, Lublin was cleared.
According to Soviet data, 2228 German soldiers were taken prisoner, led by SS Gruppenführer H. Moser. The exact losses of the Red Army during the assault are unknown, but according to the certificate of Colonel I.N. Bazanov (chief of staff of the army after the wounding of S.I. Bogdanov), from July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1433 people dead and missing. Considering the losses in the battle near Radzimin, the irretrievable losses of the army during the attack on Lublin and the assault can reach six hundred people. The capture of the city took place ahead of plans: the directive for the assault on Lublin, signed by A. I. Antonov and I. V. Stalin, provided for the occupation of Lublin on July 27. After the capture of Lublin, the 2nd Panzer Army made a deep push north along the Vistula, with the ultimate goal of capturing Prague, the eastern suburbs of Warsaw. Majdanek death camp was liberated near Lublin.
On July 27, the 69th Army entered the Vistula near Pulawy. On the 29th, she captured the bridgehead at Pulawy south of Warsaw. The forcing went fairly smoothly. However, not all divisions had the same success.
On July 30, the 69th, 8th Guards, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank armies received an order from K.K. Rokossovsky to seize bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. The front commander, as well as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, intended in this way to create a base for future operations.
1. To the head of the engineering troops of the front, pull up the main crossing facilities to the river. Vistula and ensure the crossing: 60th Army, 1st Polish Army, 8th Guards Army. 2. Army commanders: a) draw up army plans for crossing the river. Vistula, linking them with the operational tasks performed by the army and neighbors. These plans should clearly reflect the issues of infantry interaction with artillery and other means of reinforcement, focusing on the reliable supply of landing groups and units with the task of preventing their destruction on the western bank of the river; b) organize strict control over the implementation of the forcing plan, while avoiding gravity and disorganization; c) bring to the attention of commanders of all degrees that the soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves in forcing the river. Vistula, will be presented to special awards with orders up to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 168. L. 105–106 |
On July 31, the Polish 1st Army unsuccessfully tried to cross the Vistula. Pointing out the reasons for the failure, the head of the political department of the Polish army, Lieutenant Colonel Zambrovsky, noted the inexperience of the soldiers, the lack of ammunition and organizational failures.
On August 1, the 8th Guards Army began to cross the Vistula at Magnuszew. Its bridgehead was to emerge between the Puławy bridgehead of the 69th Army and Warsaw. The original plan called for crossing the Vistula on August 3-4, after the reinforcement of the 8th Guards Army with artillery and crossing facilities. However, V. I. Chuikov, who commanded the army, convinced K. K. Rokossovsky to start on August 1, counting on the surprise of the strike.
During August 1 - 4, the army managed to conquer a vast area on the western bank of the river, 15 km along the front and 10 in depth. The supply of the army on the bridgehead was provided by several built bridges, including one with a carrying capacity of 60 tons. Taking into account the possibility of enemy attacks on a sufficiently long perimeter of the bridgehead, K.K. Rokossovsky on August 6 ordered the transfer of the “outsider” of the battles for the bridgehead, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, under Magnuszew. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front provided itself with two large bridgeheads for future operations.
In the literature there is no single name for the battle that took place on the eastern bank of the Vistula in late July and early August. In addition to Radzimin, he is also tied to Warsaw, Okunev and Volomin.
The Lublin-Brest operation called into question the reality of Model's plans to hold the front along the Vistula. The field marshal could fend off the threat with the help of reserves. On July 24, the 9th Army was recreated, the forces arriving on the Vistula were subordinated to it. True, at first the composition of the army was extremely meager. At the end of July, the 2nd Panzer Army began to test its strength. The ultimate goal of Radzievsky's army was to capture a bridgehead behind the Narew (a tributary of the Vistula) north of Warsaw, in the Serock region. On the way, the army was supposed to capture Prague, a suburb of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula.
On the evening of July 26, the army's motorcycle vanguard collided with the German 73rd Infantry Division at Garwolin, a town on the east bank of the Vistula northeast of Magnuszew. This was the prelude to a difficult mobile battle. The 3rd and 8th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army were aiming at Prague. The 16th Panzer Corps remained near Demblin (between the Magnushevsky and Pulawsky bridgeheads), waiting for the infantry to relieve it.
The 73rd Infantry Division was supported by separate units of the "airborne tank" division "Hermann Goering" (reconnaissance battalion and part of the division's artillery) and other scattered infantry units. All these troops were combined under the leadership of the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division Fritz Franek into the Franek group. On July 27, the 3rd TC crushed the reconnaissance battalion of the Hermann Goering, the 8th Guards. TK also achieved a breakthrough. Under the threat of coverage, the Franek group rolled back to the north. At this time, tank units began to arrive to help the battered infantry division - the main forces of the Hermann Goering division, 4th and 19th tanks. divisions, SS divisions "Viking" and "Dead Head" (in two corps: the 39th Panzer Dietrich von Saucken and the 4th SS Panzer Corps under Gille). In total, this grouping consisted of 51 thousand people with 600 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 2nd Tank Army of the Red Army had only 32 thousand soldiers and 425 tanks and self-propelled guns. (the Soviet tank corps approximately corresponded in size to the German division). In addition, the rapid advance of the 2nd TA led to a backlog of rears: fuel and ammunition were delivered intermittently.
However, until the main forces of the German tank formation arrived, the Wehrmacht infantry had to endure a heavy blow from the 2nd TA. On July 28 and 29, heavy fighting continued, Radzievsky's corps (including the approaching 16th tank) tried to intercept the Warsaw-Sedlec highway, but could not break through the defenses of the Hermann Goering. The attacks on the infantry of the Franek group were much more successful: a weak spot in its defense was found in the Otwock area, the group began to be enveloped from the west, as a result of which the 73rd division began to retreat unorganized under the blows. General Franek was captured no later than July 30 (it is on the 30th that Radzievsky's report on his capture is dated). The Franek group was divided into separate parts, suffered heavy losses and quickly rolled back to the north.
The 3rd Panzer Corps was aimed deep to the northwest with the aim of enveloping Prague, through Volomin. It was a risky maneuver, and in the following days it almost led to disaster. The corps broke through the narrow gap between the German forces, in the face of the accumulation of enemy battle groups on the flanks. The 3rd TC suddenly underwent a flank attack at Radzimin. On August 1, Radzievsky orders the army to go on the defensive, but the 3rd TC does not withdraw from the breakthrough.
On August 1, units of the Wehrmacht cut off the 3rd TC, repulsing Radzimin and Volomin. The escape routes of the 3rd TC were intercepted in two places.
However, the collapse of the encircled corps did not take place. August 2 8th Guards. the tank corps, with a blow from the outside, broke through a narrow corridor towards the encircled. It was too early to rejoice in the salvation of those surrounded. Radzimin and Volomin were left, and the 8th Guards. the tank and 3rd tank corps were to defend themselves against enemy tank divisions attacking from several sides. On the night of August 4, in the location of the 8th Guards. maybe the last large groups of encircled people came out. In the 3rd TC, two brigade commanders were killed in a cauldron. By August 4, Soviet infantry represented by the 125th Rifle Corps and cavalry (2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) arrived at the battlefield. Two fresh formations were enough to completely stop the enemy on August 4. It should be noted that the forces of the 47th and 2nd tank armies carried out a search for the soldiers of the encircled 3rd TC who remained behind the front line, the result of these activities was the rescue of several hundred encircled. On the same day, the 19th Panzer Division and Hermann Goering, after unsuccessful attacks on Okunev, were withdrawn from Warsaw and began to be transferred to the Magnushevsky bridgehead, with the goal of destroying it. The unsuccessful attacks of the Germans on Okunev continued (with the forces of the 4th division) on August 5, after which the forces of the attackers dried up.
German (and, more broadly, Western) historiography evaluates the Battle of Radzimin as a serious success for the Wehrmacht by the standards of 1944. It is alleged that the 3rd Panzer Corps was destroyed or at least defeated. However, information about the actual losses of the 2nd Panzer Army casts doubt on the validity of the latter statement. From July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1,433 people killed, missing and captured. Of this number, 799 people accounted for the counterattack near Volomin. With the actual strength of the corps of 8-10 thousand soldiers, such losses do not allow us to talk about the death or defeat of the 3rd TC in the boiler, even if he alone suffered all of them. It must be admitted that the directive to seize the bridgehead beyond the Narew was not carried out. However, the directive was issued at a time when there was no information about the presence of a large group of Germans in the Warsaw area. The presence of a mass of tank divisions in the Warsaw region in itself made it unrealistic to break through to Prague, and even more so, across the river, by the relatively small 2nd Panzer Army. On the other hand, a counterattack by a strong grouping of the Germans, with their numerical superiority, brought modest results. The losses of the German side cannot be precisely ascertained, since during the ten-day period of July 21-31, 9, the Wehrmacht army did not provide reports on the losses incurred. Over the next ten days, the army reported the loss of 2155 people dead and missing.
After a counterattack near Radzimin, the 3rd TC was assigned to Minsk-Mazovetsky for rest and replenishment, and the 16th and 8th Guards. tank corps were transferred to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Their opponents there were the same divisions, "Hermann Goering" and the 19th tank division, as near Radzimin.
With the approach of the 2nd Panzer Army to Prague, the eastern district of Warsaw, the leaders of the underground "Home Army" decided on a large-scale uprising in the western part of the city. The Polish side proceeded from the doctrine of "two enemies" (Germany and the USSR). Accordingly, the purpose of the uprising was twofold: to prevent the destruction of Warsaw by the Germans during the evacuation and at the same time to prevent the establishment of a regime loyal to the USSR in Poland, as well as to demonstrate the sovereignty of Poland and the ability of the Home Army to act independently without the support of the Red Army. The weak point of the plan was the need to very accurately calculate the moment when the retreating German troops would no longer be able to resist, and the Red Army units would not yet enter the city. On July 31, when units of the 2nd Panzer Army were a few kilometers from Warsaw, T. Bor-Komorowski convened a meeting of the commanders of the Home Army. It was decided to implement the "Storm" plan in Warsaw, and on August 1, a few hours after the army of A. I. Radzievsky went on the defensive, the uprising began.
At the end of the battle at Radzimin, the 2nd Panzer Army was divided. The 3rd tank corps was withdrawn from the front line to the front rear for rest, the other two were sent to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Only the 47th Army remained in the Warsaw area, operating on a broad front. Later, the 1st Army of the Polish Army joined it. Initially, these forces did not provide assistance to the uprising. After that, an unsuccessful attempt was made by the army of the Polish Army to force the Vistula.
After the initial successes of the uprising, the Wehrmacht and the SS began the gradual destruction of parts of the Home Army. The uprising was finally crushed in early October.
The question of whether the Red Army could provide assistance to the uprising, and whether the Soviet leaders were willing to provide such assistance, is debatable. A number of historians argue that the stop near Warsaw is connected mainly with the desire of I.V. Stalin to give the Germans the opportunity to put an end to the uprising. The Soviet position boiled down to the fact that helping the uprising was extremely difficult due to the stretching of communications and, as a result, interruptions in supply, and the increased resistance of the enemy. The point of view, according to which the offensive near Warsaw stopped due to purely military reasons, is shared by some Western historians. Thus, there is no consensus on this issue, but it can be stated that, in fact, the Home Army fought the Germans in the insurgent Warsaw one on one.
The 8th Guards Army occupied the defenses on the Magnushevsky bridgehead with the main forces, and two more divisions were concentrated on the east coast in the Garvolin area due to K.K. Rokossovsky's fears about possible German counterattacks. However, the blows of the German 19th Panzer Division and the Hermann Goering division, withdrawn from Radzimin, fell not on the rear of the bridgehead, but on its front, on its southern part. In addition to them, the Soviet troops noted the attacks of the 17th Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division reorganized after the death in the Minsk and Bobruisk "cauldrons". To combat these forces, V. I. Chuikov had, in addition to infantry, a tank brigade and three regiments of self-propelled artillery. In addition, reinforcements gradually arrived at the bridgehead: on August 6, a Polish tank brigade and a regiment of IS-2 heavy tanks were thrown into battle. On the morning of August 8, it was possible to build bridges across the river, thanks to the anti-aircraft "umbrella", which was hung by the newly arrived three anti-aircraft divisions. Using the bridges, the 8th Guards Tank Corps, withdrawn from the 2nd Tank Army, crossed to the bridgehead. This moment became a turning point in the struggle for the Magnushevsky bridgehead, in the following days the activity of the enemy fell. The introduction of the "fresh" 25th Panzer Division did not help either. Then the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army arrived. By August 16, the enemy had stopped attacking.
This battle was given to the 8th Guards Army very hard. From August 1 to August 26, her total losses amounted to more than 35 thousand people. However, the bridgehead was held.
At the Pulawy bridgehead on August 2, the 69th Army, with the support of the Polish Army, united two small bridgeheads near Pulawy into a single one, 24 km along the front and 8 in depth. From August 5 to 14, the Germans tried to destroy the bridgehead, but failed. After that, the army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi finally consolidated the bridgeheads, by August 28 creating a bridgehead 30 by 10 km.
On August 29, the front went on the defensive, although the right wing of the front still continued private operations. From this date, the operation "Bagration" is considered completed.
On July 21, 1944, after the Red Army had crossed the Curzon Line and entered Polish territory, a provisional government of Poland, also known as the Polish Committee of National Liberation, was established. It was created with the active participation of the USSR and with complete disregard for the Polish government in exile in London, which is why many historians consider it a puppet. The Polish Committee of National Liberation included representatives of the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the parties "Strongist of the People" and "Strongist of the Democrats". On July 27, members of the Polish Committee of National Liberation arrived in Lublin (hence another name for this body - "Lublin Committee"). Initially, by no one except the USSR, not recognized as the government of Poland, he actually controlled the liberated part of the country. The members of the government in exile were forced to either remain in exile or join the Lublin Committee.
The success of the operation "Bagration" significantly exceeded the expectations of the Soviet command. As a result of a two-month offensive, Belarus was completely cleared, a part of the Baltic states was recaptured, and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, advancement to a depth of up to 600 km was achieved on a front of 1,100 km. In addition, the operation endangered Army Group North in the Baltic; carefully built line, the line "Panther", managed to get around. Subsequently, this fact greatly facilitated the Baltic operation. Also, as a result of the capture of two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of Warsaw - Magnushevsky and Pulawski (as well as the bridgehead near Sandomierz, captured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation), a reserve was created for the future Vistula-Oder operation. In January 1945, the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began from the Magnushevsky and Pulavsky bridgeheads, stopping only on the Oder.
From a military point of view, the battle in Belarus led to a large-scale defeat of the German armed forces. There is a widespread point of view that the battle in Belarus is the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Operation Bagration is a triumph of the Soviet theory of military art due to the well-coordinated offensive movement of all fronts and the operation to misinform the enemy about the location of the general offensive that began in the summer of 1944. On the scale of the Soviet-German front, Operation Bagration was the largest in a long series of offensives. She swallowed up German reserves, seriously limiting the enemy's ability to fend off both other offensives on the Eastern Front and the Allied advance in Western Europe. So, for example, the division "Grossdeutschland" was transferred to Siauliai from the Dniester and, thus, was deprived of the opportunity to participate in repelling the Yasso-Chisinau operation. The division "Hermann Goering" was forced to leave its position near Florence in Italy in mid-July, and was thrown into battle on the Vistula, Florence was liberated in mid-August, when units of the "Goering" unsuccessfully stormed the Magnushevsky bridgehead.
The human losses of the Red Army are quite accurately known. They amounted to 178,507 dead, missing and captured, as well as 587,308 wounded and sick. These are high losses even by the standards of the Second World War, in absolute numbers significantly exceeding the victims not only in successful, but even in many unsuccessfully completed operations. So, for comparison, the Berlin operation cost the Red Army 81 thousand irretrievable losses, the defeat near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943 - a little more than 45 thousand irretrievable. Such losses are associated with the duration and scope of the operation, carried out on difficult terrain against a skillful and energetic enemy, who occupied well-prepared defensive lines.
The issue of human losses of the Wehrmacht is debatable. The most common among Western scientists are the following data: 26,397 dead, 109,776 wounded, 262,929 missing and captured, and a total of 399,102 people. These figures are taken from ten-day casualty reports provided by the German armies. The extremely small number of those killed is due to the fact that many of the dead were recorded as missing, sometimes the entire division was declared missing.
However, these figures are subject to criticism. In particular, the American historian of the Eastern Front, D. Glantz, drew attention to the fact that the difference between the strength of Army Group Center before and after the operation was much larger. D. Glantz emphasized that the data of ten-day reports are minimum minimorum, that is, they represent a minimum estimate. The Russian researcher A. V. Isaev, in a speech on the Echo of Moscow radio station, estimated German losses at about 500 thousand people. S. Zaloga estimated German losses at 300-350 thousand people up to and including the surrender of the 4th Army.
It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that in all cases the losses of the Army Group "Center" are calculated, without taking into account the casualties of the Army Groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".
According to official Soviet data published by the Soviet Information Bureau, the losses of German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 were estimated at 381,000 killed, 158,480 prisoners, 2,735 tanks and self-propelled guns, 631 aircraft and 57,152 vehicles. It is likely that these data, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses, are significantly overestimated. In any case, the issue of Wehrmacht casualties in Bagration has not yet been put to rest.
In order to demonstrate to other countries the significance of success, 57,600 German prisoners of war captured near Minsk were marched through Moscow - for about three hours a column of prisoners of war walked along the streets of Moscow, and after the march the streets were washed and cleaned.
They clearly demonstrate the scale of the catastrophe that befell Army Group Center, the loss of command personnel:
Demonstrate the scale of the disaster |
||||
3 tank army |
||||
53 Army Corps |
General of the Infantry Gollwitzer |
captured |
||
206 Infantry Division |
Lieutenant General Hitter ( English) |
captured |
||
4 airfield division |
Lieutenant General Pistorius |
|||
6 airfield division |
Lieutenant General Peschel ( English) |
|||
246 Infantry Division |
Major General Müller-Bülow |
captured |
||
6th Army Corps |
General of the Artillery Pfeiffer ( English) |
|||
197 Infantry Division |
Major General Hane ( English) |
missing |
||
256 Infantry Division |
Major General Wüstenhagen |
|||
39 tank corps |
General of Artillery Martinek |
|||
110 infantry division |
Lieutenant General von Kurowski English) |
captured |
||
337 Infantry Division |
Lieutenant General Schönemann ( English) |
|||
12th infantry division |
Lieutenant General Bamler |
captured |
||
31st Infantry Division |
Lieutenant General Ochsner ( English) |
captured |
||
12th Army Corps |
Lieutenant General Müller |
captured |
||
18 motorized division |
Lieutenant General Zutavern |
committed suicide |
||
267 infantry division |
Lieutenant General Drescher ( English) |
|||
57th Infantry Division |
Major General Trowitz ( English) |
captured |
||
27th Army Corps |
General of the Infantry Völkers |
captured |
||
78 assault division |
Lieutenant General Trout English) |
captured |
||
260 infantry division |
Major General Klamt German) |
captured |
||
army engineering service |
Major General Schmidt |
captured |
||
35th Army Corps |
Lieutenant General von Lützow English) |
captured |
||
134th infantry division |
Lieutenant General Philip |
committed suicide |
||
6th infantry division |
Major General Heine English) |
captured |
||
45th infantry division |
Major General Engel |
captured |
||
41 tank corps |
Lieutenant General Hoffmeister ( English) |
captured |
||
36th Infantry Division |
Major General Conradi ( English) |
captured |
||
commandant of Bobruisk |
Major General Haman English) |
captured |
||
Spare parts |
||||
95th Infantry Division |
Major General Michaelis |
captured |
||
707 Infantry Division |
Major General Gere ( English) |
captured |
||
motorized division "Feldherrnhalle" |
Major General von Steinkeller |
captured |
||
This list is based on Carell, is incomplete and does not cover losses incurred during the second phase of the operation. So, it lacks a lieutenant-general. Franek, commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, who was captured in the last days of July near Warsaw, the commandant of Mogilev, Major General Ermansdorf, and others. However, it shows the scale of the shock experienced by the Wehrmacht and the loss of senior officers of Army Group Center.
The General Staff of the Red Army developed a plan for delivering powerful strikes by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts in the direction of the cities of Vitebsk and Orsha. The operation was named "Bagration", in honor of the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, General P.I.Bagration. The offensive plan was approved by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 30, 1944.
The general plan of the operation provided for the defeat of German formations in Belarus, the liberation of Minsk and access to the state border of the USSR.
In 1944, the initiative on the Soviet-German front was owned by the Red Army, whose command developed only offensive strategic operations. The German leadership set defensive tasks for its troops, with the possibility of secondary counterattacks.
The zone of the big summer offensive of the Red Army covered more than 500 kilometers from east to west and about 450 kilometers from north to south. In military-strategic terms, this area was the shortest to the most important industrial and administrative centers of Germany, the capture of which could have a serious impact on the outcome of the war.
Since the spring of 1944, intensified combat training was launched in the Soviet troops in connection with the upcoming offensive.
At these exercises, offensive combat techniques, issues of interaction between various branches of the armed forces, and the capture of enemy strongholds were practiced. Much attention was paid to ways to overcome water barriers, to move through swampy terrain, and the peculiarities of the natural landscape of the area of upcoming hostilities were taken into account.
The regrouping of the Red Army formations took place under conditions of the strictest camouflage, the movement of troops was carried out, as a rule, at night. During the day, false maneuvers were performed with dummies of military equipment, imaginary crossings were prepared, and the concentration of large formations in secondary directions was simulated.
By the beginning of the offensive, the troops of the four Soviet fronts numbered about 2.4 million soldiers and officers, more than 5 thousand tanks, 36 thousand guns and about 5 thousand aircraft.
On the territory of occupied Belarus, the German military command, back in 1942-1943, began to create fortified positions and strongholds of defense. Army Group "Center" under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush was inferior to the Soviet troops in numbers two times, in tanks almost six times, in guns and aircraft four times.
Naturally, it was impossible to completely hide such a large-scale preparation for an offensive operation. However, the German command believed that the main blow of the Red Army would follow to the south, in Ukraine, in the direction of the Romanian oil fields, a secondary blow was expected in the Belarusian direction.
On June 23, 1944, Operation Bagration began. Unprecedented in terms of firepower, artillery fire from more than thirty thousand guns and mortars shook the German defensive positions for two hours.
On the first day of the offensive, Soviet troops managed to penetrate the German defenses in places up to thirteen kilometers. Overcoming fierce resistance, the Red Army steadily advanced to the West.
On June 25, in the area of the city of Vitebsk, five German divisions were surrounded, numbering up to 35 thousand people, the capture of which was completed in a few days.
On June 26, 1944, the city of Orsha, the strategic center of German defense, was liberated. The successful actions of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front led to the encirclement of six German divisions in the area of the city of Bobruisk.
The airspace was behind Soviet aviation and the actions of the pilots caused serious damage to the enemy.
The Red Army actively used the tactics of concentrated strikes by tank formations and subsequent exits to the rear of the German troops. The raids of the tank guards corps destroyed the rear communications of the enemy, disorganized the defense system, blocked the retreat routes and completed his encirclement.
On July 2, as a result of a swift strike by the troops of the 1st and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, the capital of Belarus, the city of Minsk, was liberated. To the east of the city, a 150,000-strong German group was surrounded. By the thirteenth of July, the liquidation of the encircled troops was completed and about thirty-five thousand German soldiers and officers were in Soviet captivity.
By the end of August 1944, the troops of the Red Army, having carried out an offensive with a front of up to 1,100 kilometers, advanced 500-600 kilometers to the west. Soviet Belarus was almost completely liberated from the invaders. The Army Group Center was defeated, the German troops lost more than 600 thousand soldiers and officers.
Soviet losses amounted to about 700 thousand people killed, wounded and missing.
The liberation of Belarus, a significant part of the Baltic states, the Red Army's advance to the border with East Prussia opened up strategic prospects for the further defeat of the enemy and the successful end of the war.
In the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of May 1, 1944, the tasks of the Red Army for the summer and autumn were formulated. It was supposed to complete the expulsion of the invaders from Soviet territory, restore the state border of the USSR along its entire length, withdraw the European allies from the war on the side of Germany and free the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and other peoples of Western Europe from fascist captivity. In order to solve these tasks during the summer-autumn campaign, it was planned to prepare and consistently conduct a whole series of strategic offensive operations in a vast area - from the Arctic to the Black Sea. Paramount importance in the plans of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the summer of 1944 was assigned to the Belarusian operation.
By the summer of 1944, the front line in the Belarusian direction was bent in such a way that a huge ledge arose, which deeply wedged into the location of the Soviet troops. This ledge was an important strategic foothold for the Germans. Thanks to him, the German troops covered the approaches to Poland and East Prussia, maintained a stable position in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. The Wehrmacht command also took into account the fact that the Belarusian network of railways and highways made it possible to maneuver forces and means in order to maintain interaction between the North, Center and Northern Ukraine army groups.
In addition, the ledge hung over the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the north and created the threat of flank attacks. In addition, German aviation had the opportunity to raid Soviet communications and industrial centers, based on airfields in Belarus.
Therefore, the German command sought to keep the Belarusian ledge at any cost. It prepared him for a stubborn defense, the main role in which was assigned to the Army Group Center, led by Field Marshal E. Bush.
At the northern junction of the Army Group Center, the defense was held by the formations of the German 16th Army, which was part of the Army Group North, and at the southern junction by the formations of the 4th Panzer Army from the Northern Ukraine Army Group. The main enemy forces were concentrated in the areas of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Kovel, where they covered the most convenient directions for the offensive.
The troops of four fronts were supposed to take part in the Belarusian operation. The 1st Baltic Front under the command of General I. Kh. Chernyakhovsky - south of Vitebsk to Borisov. The 2nd Belorussian Front under General G.F. operated in the Mogilev direction. Zakharov. Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky aimed at Bobruisk, Minsk.
The developed Belarusian strategic offensive operation received the code name "Bagration" - in honor of the outstanding Russian commander, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, Infantry General Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration.
According to the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, the Belarusian operation is divided into two stages. At the 1st stage, the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Polotsk front-line operations were carried out and the encirclement of the Minsk group of the enemy was completed. In terms of duration, this stage took the period from June 23 to July 4.
The course of hostilities was as follows. On June 23, the troops of the 1st Baltic, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts went on the offensive. The next day, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front entered the battle. The offensive of the main forces was preceded by reconnaissance in force, carried out on the morning of June 22 on the 1st Baltic, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts and on June 23 - on the 1st Belorussian front.
The troops of the 1st Baltic Front, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, already on June 25 surrounded 5 German divisions in the Vitebsk region and west of it and liquidated them by June 27. On this day, Orsha was liberated, on June 28 - Lepel, and on July 1 - Borisov. As a result, the German 3rd Panzer Army was cut off from the 4th Army.
Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front after breaking through the enemy defenses along the river. Pronya, Basya and Dnepr liberated Mogilev on June 28. The troops of the right edge of the 1st Belorussian Front on June 27 surrounded over 6 German divisions in the Bobruisk region and liquidated them by June 29. At the same time, the troops of the front reached the line Svisloch - Osipovichi - Starye Dorogi. On July 3, eastern Minsk was liberated, which was surrounded by formations of the German 4th and 9th armies (over 100 thousand people). Somewhat earlier, on June 28, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal E. Bush, was removed from his post. Instead, Field Marshal V. Model was appointed. This circumstance had no effect on the state of affairs at the front. Soviet troops continued to advance rapidly.
On July 4, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and continued their attack on Siauliai. In 12 days, Soviet troops advanced 225-280 km at an average daily pace of up to 20-25 km, liberating most of Belarus.
The fascist German army group "Center" was defeated - its main forces were surrounded and defeated. With the release of our troops to the line Polotsk - Lake. Naroch - Molodechno - west of the city of Nesvizh, a gap of 400 km was formed in the strategic front of the enemy. An attempt by the German command to close it was unsuccessful.
At the 2nd stage of the Belarusian operation, which lasted from July 5 to August 29, the fronts, closely interacting with each other, successfully carried out 5 offensive operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Belostok and Lublin-Brest.
The German divisions, which were surrounded in the area east of Minsk, tried to break through to the west and southwest. But during the fighting, most of the enemy soldiers and officers were either captured or destroyed.
The troops of the fronts continued to smash the remnants of the formations of Army Group Center and inflict heavy damage on enemy manpower and equipment.
The German command intensively transferred fresh units to this sector of the front from Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, as well as from the army groups North, South Ukraine and North Ukraine.
As a result of the offensive of the Soviet troops, all of Belarus, as well as part of Lithuania and Latvia, were liberated. Our troops entered the territory of Poland. We came close to the borders of East Prussia. The German Army Group North was isolated in the Baltic.
The success achieved during the Belarusian operation was used by the Headquarters for decisive actions in other directions. On July 10-24, the troops of the Leningrad, 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts, as well as the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, went on the offensive. The front of the strategic offensive stretched from the Baltic to the Carpathians. The Soviet troops, which included the 1st Army of the Polish Army, crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland on July 17-18.
By August 29, the advancing troops reached the line of Jelgava - Dobele - Augustov - pp. Narew and Vistula. The further advance of the Soviet army was stopped by the enemy. The reasons for this are the general fatigue of the troops and the lack of ammunition. The Red Army in this sector of the front was forced to go on the defensive.
For 68 days of continuous offensive, Soviet troops in the 1100 km zone advanced westward by 550-600 km.
1. "Operation" Bagration "liberation of Belarus" Moscow, OLMA-PRESS, 2004
A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is forcing the Luchesa River.
June 1944
This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. In the course of it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also significantly undermined the forces of the enemy, brought the collapse of fascism closer - our Victory.
Unparalleled in terms of spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the greatest achievement of the national military art. As a result, the most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a heroic death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.
Map of the Belarusian operation
After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed in Belarus a huge ledge with an area of \u200b\u200babout 250 thousand square meters. km, facing east. It penetrated deeply into the location of the Soviet troops and was of great operational and strategic importance for both sides. The elimination of this ledge and the liberation of Belarus opened the Red Army the shortest route to Poland and Germany, endangered flank attacks by the enemy army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".
In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center (3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partly of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy grouping included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, in which there were 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1300 combat aircraft. The reserve of the Army Group "Center" had 11 divisions, most of which were involved in the fight against the partisans.
During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which the troops of 4 fronts were to act in concert. The troops of the 1st Baltic (commander general of the army), 3rd (commander colonel general), 2nd (commander colonel general G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian fronts (commander general of the army) were involved in the operation. , long-range aviation, the Dnieper military flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.
Commander of the 1st Baltic Front General of the Army
THEM. Baghramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation
The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the grouping consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. 5 air armies provided air support and cover for the troops of the fronts.
The idea of the operation was to break through the enemy defenses in 6 directions with deep strikes from 4 fronts, encircle and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian ledge - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, advancing in converging directions on Minsk, surround and liquidate east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the force of the strike, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.
When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy's forces, making it difficult for him to use reserves in repelling the offensive of our troops.
To strengthen the grouping, in the spring and summer of 1944, the Stavka replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineering and engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the numerical strength of the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.
The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, expected to repel a private offensive of the Soviet troops with the forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive lanes with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-lane, defense in depth, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.
By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops included 1.2 million people, 34,000 guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and about 5,000 combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of manpower by 1.5 times, guns and mortars by 4.4 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts by 4.5 times, and aircraft by 3.6 times.
In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belorussian one.
By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the tasks for the fronts were determined as follows:
Troops of the 1st Baltic Front to break through the enemy defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi area, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area. Subsequently, develop an offensive on Lepel;
Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway on Borisov, and part of the forces on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;
Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts, to defeat the Mogilev grouping, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;
Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to defeat the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy. To this end, the front was to deliver two blows: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second - from the area of the lower reaches of the Berezina to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Mogilev grouping;
The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions to Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.
The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy's rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on the rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first undermining of the rails should be carried out on the night of June 20.
Much attention was paid to the concentration of aviation efforts on directing the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Only on the eve of the offensive, aviation made 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas of front breakthrough.
The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours and 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned by methods of barrage, sequential concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2 armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the double barrage method.
At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The chief of staff, Colonel General M.S., is on the phone. Malinin, far left - Front Commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944
The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters - the Chief of the General Staff of the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, the head of the operational department of the General Staff, General, was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Marshal of Artillery N.D. arrived from Moscow to help the artillery commanders and headquarters. Yakovlev and Colonel-General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.
The operation required 400,000 tons of ammunition, about 300,000 tons of fuel, over 500,000 tons of food and fodder, which were delivered on time.
According to the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, the operation "Bagration" is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.
The 1st stage of the Bagration operation included breaking through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth, expanding the breakthrough towards the flanks and defeating the nearest operational reserves and capturing a number of cities, incl. the liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - development of success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the main operational reserves of the enemy, capturing important lines and bridgeheads on the river. Wisla. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined to a depth of up to 160 km.
The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.
The actions of the troops during the operation "Bagration", as in no other operation of the Soviet troops before that, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.
German captured soldiers of the Army Group "Center" are being escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944
The troops, advancing 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for a subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.
Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944
The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The success of the Belorussian operation was timely used by the Headquarters for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Soviet troops on July 17-18 crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narew and Vistula rivers.
Vistula river. Crossing tanks. 1944
Further development of the offensive with an acute shortage of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and by order of the Stavka they went on the defensive.
2nd Belorussian Front: Front Commander General of the Army
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin are discussing a plan to strike the enemy from the air. August 1944
As a result of the Belorussian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for inflicting new powerful strikes against enemy groupings operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic States, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for deploying offensive operations of the Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.
The Belarusian offensive operation of the group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. Its distinguishing feature is its huge spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.
Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, a member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944
The troops of the Red Army, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550-600 km to the west, expanding the front of hostilities to 1,100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of the German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, on the outskirts of Warsaw and the border with East Prussia.
Battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia
During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht, then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat capability. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.
Operation "Bagration" showed vivid examples of the high skill of Soviet generals and military leaders. She made a significant contribution to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in a short time and in the most various conditions environment. The task of breaking through the powerful defense of the enemy, as well as the rapid development of success in the operational depth through the skillful use of large tank formations and formations, was successfully solved.
In the struggle for the liberation of Belorussia, Soviet soldiers displayed mass heroism and high combat skills. 1500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.
Partisan formations played an exceptionally important role in the liberation of Belarus.
Parade of partisan brigades after liberation
the capital of Belarus - Minsk
Solving tasks in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of hostilities, the early transition of the enemy to the defensive, the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to heavy losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the beginning of the operation. And irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also had heavy losses in armament.
The world community appreciated the events on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Political and military figures of the West, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of the Second World War. “The swiftness of the offensive of your armies is amazing,” wrote President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944 to I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government dated July 24, British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the events in Belarus "victories of great importance." One of the Turkish newspapers on July 9 stated: "If the advance of the Russians continues to develop at the same pace, the Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the allied troops will finish operations in Normandy."
Professor of the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English specialist in military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin” emphasized: “The defeat of the Army Group Center by the Soviet troops was their biggest success achieved ... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, bigger than Stalingrad."
Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out at a time when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began hostilities in Western Europe. However, 70% of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The catastrophe in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive operations of the allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the conduct of a coalition war in Europe.
The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, led to a sharp weakening of the combat potential of the Wehrmacht. By liquidating the Belarusian ledge, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were advancing in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads by the Soviet troops on the Vistula in the areas of Pulawy and Magnuszew opened up prospects for conducting new operations to defeat the enemy in order to completely liberate Poland and advance on the German capital.
Memorial complex "Mound of Glory".
Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mitskevich, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. An earthen hill 35 m high is crowned by a sculptural composition of four bayonets lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside ring, made in the mosaic technique, the text is beaten off: “Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!”
Sergey Lipatov,
Research Fellow at the Research
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation
.
The lightning-fast conduct of the Belarusian operation, code-named "Bagration", came as a surprise even to the Soviet leadership. In 2 months, the whole of Belarus was liberated, the Army Group Center was completely defeated. The skill of the military leaders and the heroism of the Soviet soldiers were the basis for the success of the brilliant operation. The miscalculations of the German command also played their role.
The military operations of 1944 to liberate the occupied territories went down in history as "Stalin's Ten Strikes". During the winter and spring campaigns, the Red Army managed to lift the blockade of Leningrad, clear Karelia, Crimea and Ukraine of the Germans. The fifth blow was the Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration" against the German army group "Center".
In 1941, from the first months of the Great Patriotic War, a powerful fascist group firmly established itself in Belarus and hoped to maintain its position in 1944. The blows of the Soviet troops in Belarus turned out to be so stunning for the Germans that their armies did not have time to retreat to new lines of defense, they were surrounded and destroyed - the Army Group Center practically ceased to exist.
On the front line, by the beginning of 1944, a "Belarusian balcony" was formed - a ledge to the east along the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev. The troops of the GA "Center" were here only 500 km from Moscow, while in the north and south of the country the enemy was driven far to the west.
From the occupied territory of Belarus, the Germans had the opportunity to conduct a positional war and carry out an attack by strategic aviation on the Soviet capital. Three years of the occupation regime became a real genocide of the Belarusian people. The liberation of Belarus was considered by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to be the primary task of the Red Army after the victory at the Kursk salient. In the autumn of 1943, attempts were made to break the Belorussian balcony on the move, using the offensive impulse of our soldiers - they turned into heavy losses, the Germans were sitting firmly here and were not going to surrender. The strategic task of defeating the GA "Center" and the liberation of Belarus had to be solved in 1944.
Map of the "Belarusian operation of 1944"
In April, Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov outlined in the Headquarters of the Civil Code the contours of a new offensive in Belarus: the operation was code-named "Bagration" and under this name went down in history. The high command of the spacecraft was able to learn from the unsuccessful offensive in this direction in the autumn-winter of 1943.
1. The fronts were reorganized: on the site of the Central and Western fronts, 4 new fronts were formed: the 1st Baltic (1 PF) and the Belorussian fronts (BF): 1st, 2nd, 3rd. They had a shorter length, which facilitated the operational communication of the commanders with the forward units. Commanders with experience in successful offensive operations were placed at the head of the fronts.
Coordinated the actions of the fronts A.M. Vasilevsky (to the north) and G.K. Zhukov (in the south, in the location of 1 and 2 BF). In the summer of 1944, the German command faced an enemy far superior to him in experience and level of military thinking.
2. The idea of the operation was not to attack the main enemy fortifications along the main Warsaw-Minsk-Orsha-Moscow highway (as was the case in the autumn of 1943). To break through the front line, the Headquarters planned a series of encirclements: near Vitebsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk. It was planned to introduce tanks into the gaps formed and with a lightning throw to capture the main enemy forces near Minsk in pincers. Then it was necessary to clear Belarus from the invaders and go to the Baltic states and to the border with Poland.
Operation "Bagration"
3. Some controversy was caused in the Headquarters by the question of the possibility of tank maneuvers in the swampy terrain of Belarus. K.K. Rokossovsky mentions this in his memoirs: several times Stalin asked him to go out and think about whether to throw tanks into the swamps. Seeing the inflexibility of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Supreme Civil Code approved Rokossovsky's proposal to attack Bobruisk from the south (this area was marked on German maps as impassable swamps). During the war years, the Soviet leader learned to value the opinion of his military leaders, even if it did not coincide with his point of view.
A column of T-34-85 tanks of the 195th moves along a forest road during Operation Bagration
The German command did not expect that Belarus would become the main object of the Soviet offensive. Hitler was sure that the Soviet troops would develop success in Ukraine: from Kovel to the north, towards East Prussia, where Army Group North was located. In this area, the Northern Ukraine grouping had 7 tank divisions, 4 heavy Tiger battalions, while the Center GA had 1 tank division and the Tiger battalion. In addition, Hitler assumed that Soviet troops would continue to move south: to Romania, to the Balkans, to the zone of traditional interests of Russia and the USSR. The Soviet command was in no hurry to remove 4 tank armies from the Ukrainian front: in the swamps of Belarus, they would be superfluous. Only 5 TA Rotmistrov was redeployed from Western Ukraine, but the Germans did not notice this or did not attach any importance to it.
Against the GA "Center", the Germans expected a series of small attacks in the style of 1943. They were going to parry them, relying on defense in depth (270-280 km deep) and a system of fortresses - "festungs". Transport hubs: Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk - Hitler ordered that they be declared fortresses, strengthened for all-round defense and not surrender under any circumstances. The Fuhrer's order played a fatal role in the death of the armies of the Center group: they could not retreat in a timely manner, they were surrounded and died under Soviet air strikes. But at the beginning of June 1944, the Nazis could not dream of such an outcome of events even in a nightmare: on this sector of the front, the Nazi General Staff promised a "calm summer." And the commander of the GA "Center" Ernst Busch calmly went on vacation - two weeks before the Soviet offensive.
The basis for the success of the Belarusian operation in 1944 is its thorough preparation.
The Stavka planned to start the operation on June 19-20, this date was postponed due to a delay in the delivery of ammunition. The Headquarters did not focus on the symbolic meaning of the date (June 22 - the anniversary of the outbreak of World War II).
Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the forces of the advancing parties in 1941 and in 1944. The 1st part of the table contains data as of 06/22/1941. Army Group Center is the attacking side, the troops of the Western Military District of the USSR are defending. In the 2nd part of the table - the balance of power on 23.06. 1944, when the opponents switched places.
| military forces | Plan "Barbarossa" 1941 | Plan "Bagration" 1944 | ||
| GA "Center" | ZapOVO | 1st PF; 1-3 BF | GA "Center" | |
| Personnel (million people) | 1,45 | 0,8 | 2,4 | 1,2 |
| Artillery (thousand) | 15 | 16 | 36 | 9,5 |
| Tanks (thousand) | 2,3 | 4,4 | over 5 | 0,9 |
| Aircraft (Thousand) | 1,7 | 2,1 | over 5 | 1,35 |
The comparison shows that in 1941 the Germans did not have an overwhelming superiority in military force and equipment - they were counting on surprise and new blitzkrieg tactics. By 1944, the Soviet commanders had mastered the use of tank pincers, appreciated the importance of the surprise factor, and used overwhelming superiority in military equipment. During the Belarusian operation, German teachers received a worthy lesson from their students.
The offensive operation, codenamed "Bagration", lasted 68 days - from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It can be conditionally divided into several stages.
“Minsk is ours, forward to the west!”
At the first stage, on June 23-19, there was a breakthrough of the front line in the north and south of the “Belarusian Balcony”. Events developed as planned.
During the fighting on June 23 - June 29, gaps appeared along the enemy defense line from the north and south, into which the tank corps of the 1st and 2nd BF, as well as Rotmistrov's 5th TA, rushed. Their goal is to close the encirclement of German troops east of Minsk and liberate the capital of Belarus. In a hurry, almost at a run, the 4th Army of Tippelskirch retreated to Minsk, hopelessly trying to overtake Soviet tanks and not get surrounded, groups of soldiers flocked here, escaping from boilers near Vitebsk, Orsha, Bobruisk. The retreating Germans could not hide in the forests of Belarus - there they were destroyed by partisan detachments. Moving along highways, they became an easy target for aviation, which ruthlessly destroyed enemy manpower, the crossing of German units across the Berezina was especially catastrophic.
The new commander of the GA "Center" V. Model tried to hold back the offensive Soviet tanks. Dekker’s 5th TD, which arrived from the Ukrainian Front, equipped with Tigers, stood in the way of Rotmistrov’s 5th TD, imposed a series of bloody battles. But one division of heavy tanks could not stop the advance of other formations: on July 3, the 2nd guards tank corps of Chernyakhovsky broke into Minsk from the north, troops of K.K. Rokossovsky, and at noon on July 4, the capital of Belarus was liberated from the Nazis. Around 100,000 German soldiers, mostly from the 4th Army, were surrounded near Minsk. The last radiogram of those surrounded by the "Center" was something like this: "Give us at least maps of the area, did you write us off?" Model left the encircled army to its fate - it capitulated on July 8, 1944.
The number of prisoners in the reports of the Soviet Information Bureau caused distrust of the allies of the USSR in World War II. The actions of England and the United States on the Western Front (opened on June 6, 1944) were far from being as successful as in Belarus. The Soviet leadership organized a parade of captured Germans so that the world community would be convinced of the size of the catastrophe of the German army. On the morning of July 17, 57 thousand captured soldiers marched through the streets of Moscow. At the head of the columns were the highest ranks - shaved, in uniform and with orders. The parade was attended by 19 army generals and 6 colonels. The bulk of the columns were unshaven, poorly dressed lower ranks and privates. The parade was completed by watering trucks that washed away fascist dirt from the pavements of the Soviet capital.
Having solved the main task of defeating the GA "Center", the Soviet troops entered the operational space. Each of the 4 fronts developed the offensive in its own direction, the offensive impulse lasted from July 5 to August 29.
IL-2 attacking a German convoy
The main result of the operation is the destruction of a large enemy grouping, the liberation of Belarus, parts of Lithuania and Latvia. On a 1,100 km long front line, Soviet troops advanced 500-600 km forward. Bridgeheads were created for new offensive operations: Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Baltic.
The losses of the Red Army in the operation are the largest of all the battles of 1944:
Attack during Operation Bagration
The statistical study of German military casualties is based on ten days of field reports. They give this picture:
The loss of command staff is the best evidence of the catastrophe that occurred with by the German army during the Belarusian operation: out of 47 senior officers, 66% died or were captured.
German soldiers at the end of Operation Bagration
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