In this brochure, the author details the issues of organization and technology military intelligence in the German fascist army.
The methods of conducting reconnaissance by the Germans in various types of combat are also covered in detail.
The trophy documents cited by the author make it possible to follow the views of the fascist German command on military intelligence.
The brochure is intended for officers, sergeants and privates of the Red Army.
INTRODUCTION
In the German army, all intelligence, counterintelligence, and agitation and propaganda work is concentrated in the intelligence departments of military formations.
The activities of the intelligence departments are based on timely mutual information from top to bottom and from bottom to top, neighbors, as well as within the headquarters (between intelligence, operational departments and military branches).
The intelligence departments are closely connected with the field gendarmerie and the secret field police.
Scheme 1.
Organization of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the division of the German army
(1s - intelligence and counterintelligence).
Responsibilities of officers of the intelligence section and interpreter.
Third General Staff Officer(head of the intelligence department). His duties:
Organization of surveillance and reconnaissance by reconnaissance units, means of communication, combat.
Processing of intelligence data coming from military units and air reconnaissance; interrogation of prisoners of war, defectors, the local population.
Studying the operational-tactical situation.
Preparation of an operational order for a point on the enemy and setting reconnaissance tasks for military units.
Participation in reconnaissance flights of the division commander and the head of the operational department.
Overseeing the maintenance of military secrecy and compliance with covert control requirements; organizing counterintelligence, fighting sabotage, riots, taking hostages.
Reconnaissance, equipment and protection of the command post of the division commander.
Organization of propaganda among the troops, writing reports for the press, military censorship.
Communication with civil administration, protection and pacification of occupied areas.
Communication with officers of foreign armies, negotiations with the enemy.
Third officer for assignments(0Z) is the Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Branch and Liaison Officer with Neighbors and Troops. His duties include:
Office management of the department.
Selection of the NP commander of the division and organization of observation.
Organization of communications with aviation and management of the laying out of identification panels.
Keeping a log of orders and reports of the department; organization of distribution of orders and reports of the operational and intelligence departments.
Regulation of traffic on the ways to the command post of the division commander.
Giving information to those who strayed from their units and directing them to units.
Responsibilities of an interpreter: "Interrogation of prisoners of war, escort of lodgers, translation of announcements written in foreign languages, reading and evaluating foreign maps, diagrams, reports, orders and charters. Performing special tasks of the head of the intelligence department for counterintelligence and propaganda among the local population" (according to documents 45 -th pd).
The intelligence department of the army corps headquarters performs the following functions:
"Getting information and evaluating it.
Intelligence, interrogation of prisoners of war and defectors.
Studying the position of the enemy.
The study of combat strength, organization, weapons
and supplies to the enemy.
Communications service (own lines of communication, concealment of plans from the enemy with the help of communications).
Counterintelligence, the fight against espionage.
Fight against sabotage.
Fight against enemy propaganda.
Correspondence monitoring (censorship).
Communication with foreign officers and correspondents.
Maintaining a journal of secret correspondence of the intelligence department "(according to the documents of 6 AK).
In the German army, each infantry division for conducting military reconnaissance has a reconnaissance detachment according to the state, consisting of the following units: a company of heavy weapons, a scooter company, and a cavalry squadron. The combat composition of such a detachment: 310 people, 216 combat horses, 13 light machine guns, 4 machine guns, 6 50-mm mortars, 3 37-mm guns, 2 75-mm infantry guns, 9 vehicles and 4 armored vehicles. In each infantry regiment, the functions of military intelligence in mobile forms of combat are usually performed by a scooter platoon (45 people, 4 machine guns, 45 bicycles).
There are no special reconnaissance units in an infantry battalion, just as there are no special reconnaissance personnel. Reconnaissance is organized by the battalion commander; subdivisions are technical executors.
At the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, not all German infantry divisions had the reconnaissance detachments provided by the state.
The German tank divisions have a full-time reconnaissance body - a reconnaissance detachment, which consists of a company of heavy weapons, one or two motorcycle rifle companies and a company of armored vehicles or armored personnel carriers (up to 406 people in total, 60 machine guns, 29 light machine guns, 2 heavy machine guns, 11 anti-tank guns, 2-4 88mm mortars, 3 50mm guns, 2 75mm infantry guns, 24 armored vehicles, 100-120 motorcycles and 70-80 vehicles). In addition, a tank regiment includes a platoon of light tanks (5 vehicles), and a tank battalion also includes a platoon of light tanks (5 vehicles) and a platoon of motorcycles.
The practice of the war of 1939-1940, when the German army almost freely occupied Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, Greece and Yugoslavia, at that time confirmed to the German command the correctness of the organizational forms of intelligence units.
With the successful offensive of the German troops, operating in the face of negligible resistance from the armies of the occupied countries, the presence of strong mobile reconnaissance detachments in the infantry and tank divisions fully ensured the performance of reconnaissance tasks by the German command and did not cause the need to train all infantry in military reconnaissance in difficult battle conditions.
The German army saw and felt something different in the war with the Soviet Union. Hitler's plans for a "blitzkrieg" in the east failed. The forms of battle that hitherto "inherent" in the German army were replaced for it on the Soviet-German front by new ones, for which the division's military intelligence agencies were not prepared: positional defense, retreat, encirclement battles.
The troops also turned out to be unprepared for military reconnaissance. It is clear that, faced with these "new" forms of combat, the German army was forced to look for new methods of military reconnaissance. That is why, since the beginning of 1942, we have witnessed the issuance by many German commanders of formations and army commanders of instructions, orders, memos and training pamphlets on military intelligence.
In view of the heavy losses in people, equipment and weapons suffered by the German army, the German command was forced to reduce the reconnaissance detachments of some divisions. On the basis of a secret instruction from the 1st Branch of the Organizational Department of the German General Staff of the Land Army dated August 9, 1942, reconnaissance detachments and anti-tank defense divisions of some divisions were united and renamed "mobile divisions".
Such a union was carried out in the 376th, 82nd and other divisions.
The combat composition of the mobile division is as follows: two bicycle companies, two anti-tank companies. Armament: 12 light machine guns, 24 guns, 4 heavy machine guns.
The tasks of the mobile division, according to the testimony of prisoners, are as follows:
In practice, it turned out that the anti-tank companies of the mobile division were always cut off from the division itself and were distributed to the infantry regiments of the divisions. Thus, in defense, the combination of RO and PTD actually did not matter.
The anti-tank companies of the battalion should receive larger caliber guns, since at present the 37-mm and 45-mm anti-tank guns have proved to be ineffective in combat.
The mobile division in relation to tactical reconnaissance is directly subordinate to the division commander and receives the task from the division chief of staff.
Parts of the German army replenished and improved the methods of action of their intelligence, drawing much from the examples of the military operations of the valiant intelligence officers of the Red Army; therefore, in organizing intelligence, we must, observing its basic principles, never act according to a template, but tirelessly seek new methods. On the other hand, our advanced units must always be exceptionally vigilant, so that any reconnaissance venture of the enemy is discovered in a timely manner and, by their restraint and impudent countermeasures unexpected for the enemy, nip it in the bud, destroying enemy reconnaissance groups, capturing prisoners and documents of the dead.
The issues of organizing German aviation intelligence, intelligence by means of communications, artillery and intelligence, we touch only in general terms.
1. KEY INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
According to documents, testimonies of prisoners and, finally, the experience of the war, in the German army the main sources of obtaining information about the enemy are:
Aviation reconnaissance;
- military intelligence;
- reconnaissance by means of communications;
- artillery reconnaissance;
- undercover intelligence.
The data obtained with the help of these sources is supplemented by the study of captured trophy documents, the interrogation of prisoners of war and local residents. The German Field Marshal Küchler, in his directive of January 2, 1943, characterizes the importance of intelligence as follows:
"The offensive intentions of the enemy can only be revealed in time when all commanders, from the company commander to the commander of the army group, will daily critically assess the position of the enemy by comparing the data of all types of intelligence received during the day ..."
2. AVIATION INTELLIGENCE
Aviation reconnaissance occupies a leading place in the general reconnaissance system of the German army and is carried out continuously in almost all sectors of the front.
Usually aviation reconnaissance is organized by the command of the army and army groups (fronts). Air intelligence data is quickly transmitted to active troops.
If individual enemy reconnaissance aircraft operate over the battlefield, then the reconnaissance data is transmitted to the commanders of the first line formations by radio, often in clear text.
Aviation reconnaissance is carried out to a depth of more than 500 km.
The degree of saturation of certain areas with air reconnaissance means is determined by the command of the German troops in accordance with the importance of these areas.
A careful and daily study by our observers of the flight paths of enemy reconnaissance aircraft will ensure the identification of these "important directions", which in turn will contribute to the correct prediction of enemy actions.
Much attention is paid by the German command to aerial photography of objects. The pictures are quickly deciphered, and the data in the form of photographic schemes is transmitted to the troops. Aviation reconnaissance is carried out not only by special reconnaissance aircraft, but also by combat aircraft (bombers, and fighters over the battlefield).
Aviation reconnaissance in the German army usually performs the following tasks:
Battlefield reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance are carried out from a height of 1,500-3,000 m; long-range air reconnaissance is carried out at an altitude of 5,000-7,000 m. The FV-189 and XSh-126 continue to be the main tactical depth reconnaissance aircraft. Long-range reconnaissance is carried out by aircraft "Ju-88", "Xe-111" and at night - "Do-217".
The commander of the German northern army group, Field Marshal Küchler, in his directive of January 2, 1943, indicates:
"Air reconnaissance should give a complete picture of the enemy's movement along the tracks and railways leading to the front line ..."
In the same directive, in order to ascertain the intentions of our troops, he demands from air reconnaissance that
"... currently passive sectors of the front did not go unnoticed. It is important to keep under constant surveillance the movement of the enemy along the main supply routes to the very front line. Data such as the concentration of cars and carts, the movement and location of soldiers in settlements, the appearance of camp lights, freshly trodden paths and ruts from cars on icy rivers, give reason to conclude that the enemy is preparing offensive operations.
3. INTELLIGENCE BY COMMUNICATIONS
Radio intelligence in the German army is an army intelligence tool. It is conducted by special radio intelligence units and has the following tasks:
In order to intercept transmissions from the radio stations of our units and find their direction, the Germans practice the location of some radio intelligence units as close as possible to the front and placing them at the command posts of regiments and battalions.
When information is received by radio interception about an advance or withdrawal, about a change or regrouping of enemy units, about target designation of artillery observation posts, about the discovery of headquarters sites, as well as about the results of the actions of their troops, the Germans immediately transfer them to the highest headquarters. In turn, the headquarters, having quickly processed this data, send them with their comments to the troops and neighbors.
The German command believes that radio reconnaissance is an important type of reconnaissance, especially during periods of non-flying weather, when the effect of air reconnaissance is reduced.
4. ARTILLERY SCOUT
Artillery reconnaissance is carried out by the Germans by artillery observation, instrumental reconnaissance methods, as well as by determining targets from aircraft and from observation balloons.
In mobile forms of combat, artillery observation is carried out by dropping special artillery patrols with forward units to correct fire. These patrols also make sure that their troops do not fall under their own artillery fire.
When the front is stabilized, artillery batteries organize a network: the main OPs, on which the battery commander and a group of observers are stationed, and forward OPs, which are thrown as close as possible to the enemy's position (on his flanks). All NPs, as a rule, have radio stations and correct their firing by radio. The main NPs are usually located at the command posts of those subunits and units to which they are attached or supported by the batteries that sent them.
In tank artillery units, observation is carried out from observation tanks.
Optical observation is supplemented in the German army by the wiring of photometric and sound measuring batteries, artillery aircraft and observation balloons.
Field Marshal Küchler, in his directive of January 2, 1943, speaking of artillery reconnaissance, points out:
“The more the enemy builds his offensive operations on the basis of strong artillery preparation and artillery support, the more important becomes artillery reconnaissance by observation and all other artillery means, including a tethered balloon. The information obtained in this way is supplemented by data obtained with the help of spotter aircraft.
On all sectors of the front, even passive ones, there should be a clear picture of the enemy artillery grouping: how many batteries are available (their number has increased or decreased in recent days), the location of firing points, their reserve positions, etc. Only in this case can we hope that our artillery, in cooperation with aviation, will be able to deliver a decisive blow to enemy artillery.
Artillery reconnaissance should not be regarded as an area exclusively concerned with artillery. The results of artillery reconnaissance must be reported as soon as possible to the leading and lower staffs, since this information is important additional data for a correct assessment of the enemy's position. The corresponding headquarters of the aviation formation must be immediately informed about these reconnaissance results so that it has complete data for air attacks on enemy artillery in all sectors of the front.
5. INTELLIGENT INTELLIGENCE
The German command, using the methods of blackmail, deceit, physical violence, widely practices the recruitment of agents. When retreating, the Germans often leave their agents in populated areas, which, when German aircraft appear, give signals with colored rockets indicating the presence or absence of our troops in these points and their belonging (by type of troops).
For the training of saboteurs and spies, the Germans organized a number of special schools with a training period of several months. Persons graduating from these schools are sent to our rear in groups of 3-5 people in order to organize sabotage and espionage. Groups infiltrate our battle formations under the guise of refugees or local residents, and sometimes airlifted; while in the depths of the front, German agents are trying to establish the number and numbering of our troops, as well as their actions. These groups transmit the collected information either by signals from the front-line villages or by personal appearance at the German headquarters.
The German command planted part of the agents in our rear, supplying them with radio equipment. Sometimes the Germans have traitors to our Motherland in their reconnaissance groups, who, using the knowledge of the Russian language, contribute to the actions of German intelligence officers.
The traitors to our Motherland, captured on May 9, 1943, showed that they were part of a special-purpose reconnaissance company, which, deployed 100-150 km behind the front line, was used to drop small parachute groups for the purpose of sabotage and espionage in our rear, to fight partisans, as well as to conduct military intelligence in order to capture prisoners.
This reconnaissance company consists of several groups (in a group of 8-10 people). All preparations for action are carried out in the rear; to conduct military reconnaissance, the group is transferred at night by motor vehicle to the front line and, after completing the task, is immediately withdrawn back to the area of \u200b\u200bthe company's permanent deployment.
The Germans send sabotage groups to our rear also with the task of capturing officers. Such groups usually consist of 10-14 people.
The testimony of one saboteur established that in one of the cities the Germans created a sabotage-intelligence school with a two-month training period. The school has 150 students of various nationalities. The saboteurs are divided into three groups: two of them are riflemen and one is a sapper. Upon completion of training, all saboteurs are transferred to the front line, where they study the situation in our tactical rear, as well as the front line of defense, for a month, after which they are thrown into our rear for action.
Traitors to our Motherland, used by the enemy for reconnaissance, are dressed in the uniform of soldiers and officers of the Red Army or act in civilian clothes.
On the night of July 27, 1943, a group of scouts from the N unit, returning from reconnaissance from the rear of the enemy, met in the village. Pickle of an old man. After a short conversation, in which the old man, who introduced himself as a local resident, showed excessive curiosity, he disappeared. The behavior of this "resident" seemed suspicious to the scouts, and they decided to check it. A group of scouts, having bypassed the bushes from the side opposite to the one in which the old man had disappeared, advanced, carrying on a conversation in broken Russian. Soon the old man came out to meet them and, when he was asked the question: “Is there a Russ soldier in the village?”, He mistook them for Germans in disguise and spoke in detail about the units and equipment that he had seen in recent days in Marinovka. The traitor to the Motherland was arrested.
6. SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Troop intelligence in the German armies is one of the main types of intelligence. It is carried out by all commanders, regardless of whether they have been assigned a task of reconnaissance or not.
The reconnaissance task is assigned to the commander of a Lipetsk company by a battalion commander or a regiment commander. The reconnaissance object is chosen personally by the company commander. An order for reconnaissance is given a few days before it is carried out, for each operation separately.
The commanders of German units and formations pay great attention to the organization and conduct of military intelligence. So, for example, the command of the 47th German tank corps in the directive of January 3, 1943 indicates:
“In view of the difficulty of conducting air reconnaissance in the winter, military reconnaissance is almost the only way for you and for the high command to learn anything about the enemy.
We will be able to conserve strength and at the same time be guaranteed against surprises only if we have first-class ground reconnaissance."
The military intelligence of the Germans performs the following tasks:
"The information received from prisoners is extremely important not only for revealing the intentions of the enemy; they often also provide important targets for artillery and heavy infantry weapons - for harassing and destroying fire during the day and night. Therefore, all active divisions must at all times seek to capture prisoners."
"Constant observation of the habits of the enemy soldiers in position, the exact location of their posts, the study of the terrain, the use of various tricks, the misleading of the enemy, the setting of traps, and, more importantly, well-prepared and energetically conducted strike reconnaissance operations should facilitate the success of our troops in capturing prisoners.
In the conditions of a stable front, the Germans set the task for their intelligence agencies: to reconnoiter the enemy’s front to the smallest detail - his grouping of forces, the deployment of heavy weapons, the deployment of headquarters, reserves, etc. Only in this way, the Germans believe,
"... it will be possible to detect any changes in the enemy and draw the necessary conclusions from this for the combat leadership."
When the front is stabilized, the main means of military intelligence in the German army are line infantry units. In clause 9 of the order for the 15th motorized regiment of October 19, 1942, No. 454/42, it is indicated:
"Before an offensive, always clarify the following questions through observation and active reconnaissance:
a) the outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, the location and condition of the nests of resistance;
b) the difference in enemy grouping day and night;
c) obstacles, minefields;
d) the possibility of a convenient approach to the enemy.
The order for the 22nd German Panzer Division (dated December 5, 1942, No. 968/42. Secret) reads:
"It is necessary to strengthen reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy on the following issues:
- What engineering fortifications does the enemy have?
- Is the enemy bringing up new forces for the offensive?
- The intensity of the movement of enemy columns and the supply of ammunition.
- Audibility of the noise of tanks and engines at night.
- Is the activity of enemy artillery intensifying?
- Is the enemy pulling forces from our front?
The capture of prisoners contributes to the creation of a clear picture of the enemy.
The strengthening of the enemy's reconnaissance activity testifies to his offensive intentions.
The weakening of military intelligence is considered by the German command as a serious crime.
The German command strives to ensure that the soldiers consider service in intelligence a profitable business. To this end, a number of benefits have been established in the German army for the composition of intelligence units.
The captured platoon commander of the 24th Airborne Infantry Regiment testified:
"For delivering new data about the enemy to the command, the commander of the RG is awarded an iron cross of the 2nd class. The battalion commander has the right to award this order, but usually in these cases the division commander himself, to whom the battalion commander immediately reports on the successful actions of the RG, after 1-2 rewards scouts. From March to July, 5 people were awarded in the second battalion. "
The commander of the 82nd German Infantry Division, Bensch, in an effort to interest the soldiers in the benefits of service in intelligence, writes in his order:
“I ordered for good success in the service of eavesdropping, surveillance and intelligence to immediately issue orders, to announce gratitude in the order for the division, to give special leaves out of turn or to issue especially good goods from the military store. In the same way, reward for excellent success in guard service. .."
7. METHODS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
The main methods of military intelligence in the German army are:
According to the testimonies of prisoners, a reconnaissance operation is carried out when changes in the enemy grouping and in his fire system are established by observation. The choice of method of action depends on the task and the location of the enemy,
Analyzing the reconnaissance operation of the 216th Infantry Regiment of the 86th Infantry Division, carried out at dawn on November 6, 1942 and yielding no results (except for the loss of 8 people killed and 23 wounded by the Germans), the command of the 86th Infantry Division notes:
“If, among other things, there is a need for reconnaissance actions, then two possibilities present themselves:
a) action by small reconnaissance groups (one or two squads) at night in order to remove the sentry;
b) conducting large-scale reconnaissance operations (up to a battalion) during the day after careful preparation with appropriate support from all types of weapons.
The German command demands that reconnaissance be organized thoughtfully, taking into account all the features of our defense, its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the combat skills of our troops.
Preparations for the operation are conducted covertly; The Germans are striving to disguise their actions so that not the slightest sign could betray the preparatory measures for leading a night search or reconnaissance in force.
The Germans, like us, believe that camouflage increases the chances of success of actions, helps to reduce their own losses and thereby increases the fighting strength of the group; that neglect of camouflage entails unjustified losses in personnel and disruption of surprise actions; that reconnaissance actions must be decisive, using the element of surprise, and this is how its success is achieved.
During reconnaissance, the Germans pay special attention to securing the flanks. For this purpose, flank guard groups are appointed, which take up their positions immediately before the start of the reconnaissance groups.
During reconnaissance operations, the actions of reconnaissance groups and detachments are covered by strong artillery and mortar fire.
RG and German detachments attack the object after the artillery and mortars, having made a short and strong fire raid on the object, transfer fire to the border of the latter and sufficiently paralyze the organized opposition from the enemy with fire.
The reconnaissance actions of the Germans, arising suddenly, proceed quickly and decisively; sometimes the whole operation ends within 15-20 minutes.
The training of scouts is carried out by the Germans mainly on the ground with the task of "training in the ability to crawl like a cat to any target, suddenly open fire from cover, quickly disappear when meeting with a strong enemy" (instructions of the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army).
If the group consists of old soldiers who know combat service well, then there is no advance training in actions.
8. OBSERVATION
The Germans believe that well-organized surveillance is the most important method of military intelligence.
Observation is carried out by them continuously in all types of combat. The network of observation posts is located by the Germans on the dominant heights, trees, bell towers, towers and special towers with a large observation sector. Observation posts are well equipped, have optical instruments(stereo tubes, binoculars) and provided with telephone communication; artillery NPs are provided with radio communications. All NPs have rockets for nighttime illumination of the area.
The enemy also uses tanks as a command post. So, for example, on April 12, 1943, in the area of the Kordelevsky stream (southwest of Krasny Bor), the Germans used a tank as an advanced observation post to reconnoiter our front line by observation and adjust fire. When the tank was set on fire by us, and its crew was destroyed during the withdrawal, a radio station and a map were found in the tank with areas of suppression by artillery fire marked on it.
The Germans supplemented intelligence data obtained from other sources by observing a widely developed system of OP.
Field Marshal Küchler, in his directive of March 2, 1943, writes:
“Each type of reconnaissance can provide only a part of the required information. From the numerous reconnaissance data put together like a mosaic, the command creates a complete picture of the enemy’s position. At the same time, observation reconnaissance with binoculars, a stereo tube and without them is also obligatory.
Infantry and artillery observers, through numerous observations, must create a complete and clear picture for their command of the enemy forces and changes in his grouping in front of their front. In addition, observational reconnaissance, by identifying important targets, provides data for the direct use of weapons and the conduct of combat of local significance.
For example, the identification of a new machine gun or anti-tank weapon, the establishment of increased traffic along the paths on the enemy’s side, the location of enemy observation on a tree, the detection of an enemy officer, etc., are of great importance for the success of the defense in a particular sector. Do not allow the slightest dullness of attention and conduct continuous surveillance even on passive sectors of the front.
Directive of the commander of the German 384th Infantry Division No. 978/42 dated September 15, 1942, noting the careless performance of the surveillance service, reads:
"Whoever sleeps close to the enemy on duty is punished with the death penalty. There should be no doubt about this."
The testimonies of the prisoners established that there were no special observation posts in platoons and companies. It is the responsibility of all sentries and patrols to conduct surveillance.
The company commander also does not have a specially equipped NP. Entering individual bunkers, he monitors those objects that interest him.
All data on the behavior of the enemy are recorded by the Germans in the observation log. The record indicates the time and result of the observation. The sentries report the results of the observation to the platoon commander in writing at the appointed time. The latter makes selections from these reports and includes them in the combat reports sent to the company. The company commander reports the most important data to the battalion, where the battalion commander and the battalion adjutant deal with intelligence issues.
In addition, the observation is carried out by an officer or non-commissioned officer on duty in the trench (order of the 126th Infantry Division of April 11, 1942).
The commanders of battalions, regiments and divisions have special NPs or use the NPs of attached artillery.
On the NP of the regiment and division are usually: the commander of the NP (lieutenant or sergeant major), draftsman and radio operator (they are also messengers).
The OP commander must have good eyesight and be well versed in tactics; he watches through a stereo tube.
At night, the Germans continue reconnaissance by eavesdropping, which is carried out by deportation to our front line, as well as in the directions of the possible passage of our secrets of night eavesdroppers. The task of the eavesdropping groups is to timely warn their command about changes in the location of our units, as well as inform them about the passage of our scouts.
So, for example, on the night of November 25-26, 1942, before the offensive of the troops of the N Army, the enemy, through his hearers, timely established the approach and concentration of our troops on the starting position.
At night, enemy sentries, for the purpose of better observation, systematically illuminate the area with rockets.
When withdrawing, the Germans organize surveillance just as carefully.
According to the testimony of a captured chief lieutenant, in July 1943, in the Oryol direction, the German command demanded from company commanders a clear organization of observation, moreover, NPs were organized on the flanks and in front. The results of the observation were reported to the company commander, and the latter - to the battalion commander; further this information was transmitted to the division commander.
9. ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE GROUPS
(DOZOROV)
The combat strength of a reconnaissance group is usually in force from a squad to a platoon, rarely to a company. The quantitative composition varies depending on the situation and the nature of the reconnaissance object.
The group is headed by an officer, sergeant major or non-commissioned officer, holding a position not lower than the platoon commander.
According to the testimony of the prisoner, the commander of the 268th German Infantry Division forbade reconnaissance by large reconnaissance groups, as they suffer significant losses.
In one of the operational documents, the commander of the 86th Infantry Division reported to the command of the 23rd German Army Corps:
"Since 11/1/42, 11 reconnaissances have been undertaken by the division. Losses: 2 killed, 7 wounded. No prisoners taken. Carried out at dawn on 11/6/42, according to the order, reconnaissance of one of the companies of the 216th regiment cost 8 killed, 23 wounded No prisoners taken Causes of losses:
Oh good organized system enemy defenses, both at the forefront and in depth;
b) high vigilance of the enemy as a result of the activities of their own intelligence;
c) well-targeted barrage of enemy artillery;
d) very limited time for preparation. The experience of these and previous reconnaissance shows that such reconnaissance undertakings, with a solid, heavily fortified line of defense, are doomed to failure in advance.Even with a successful local breakthrough, the enemy can concentrate the fire of all types of weapons on the reconnaissance group, and heavy losses are inevitable. In order to suppress enemy artillery fire with our own artillery and heavy weapons, the expenditure of such an amount of ammunition is required, which is beyond the scope of such operations.
SS Division Command" Greater Germany" characterizes the actions of his intelligence as follows:
"In view of the heavily fortified front of the defense and the continuous massive aimed fire of the Russians, reconnaissance in large groups does not work. It is necessary to switch to reconnaissance by one or two squads, with the support of strong artillery fire. Actions of reconnaissance groups should be preceded by thorough preparation. Each infantry regiment should be represented by 18 hours to the division headquarters for information on the results of the work of reconnaissance groups.
This document testifies that, under conditions of a stable front, the enemy is compelled, along with carrying out reconnaissance in force, to widely practice conducting reconnaissance in small groups consisting of one or two squads. To ensure the fulfillment of tasks, reconnaissance groups are issued a large number of artillery shells and mines.
In the German army, all line units conduct reconnaissance. For reconnaissance, the Germans select the most notorious thugs. The selection principle is voluntary. If the number of those wishing to go into reconnaissance is not enough, the company commander himself selects and appoints the best soldiers to the WG. Usually soldiers without families are selected. When announcing a record of those wishing to go into reconnaissance, officers and non-commissioned officers are the first to sign in order to raise their combat authority.
By order of the commander of the 511th Infantry Regiment of the 293rd German Infantry Division, each company was to conduct at least one reconnaissance in its area within a month in order to capture a prisoner or study the front line and the fire system of our defense.
Reconnaissance in combat is often preceded by the actions of small reconnaissance groups in order to clarify the defense regime on our front line.
When a reconnaissance group consisting of more than a platoon is sent out, sappers are attached to it and its actions are supported by fire weapons. If reconnaissance is sent in small groups, sappers are not attached to it. The group makes passages in wire obstacles and minefields on its own, and its actions are usually supported only by the fire of the company that sent it out.
The time for conducting reconnaissance is chosen differently: groups operate during the day, but in most cases - at night, in the range from 2 to 4 hours (this takes into account the time of the least, according to the Germans, vigilance of our troops).
Armament
German soldiers going on reconnaissance are armed mainly with machine guns, pistols, hand grenades, daggers (bayonets), are supplied with explosives and anti-tank grenades (to undermine the bunker and residential dugouts), mines, and scissors. Sometimes groups have backpack flamethrowers.
Outfit
The uniform of soldiers going on reconnaissance is light, not binding actions. In winter - a combined suit with a hood (one side of the suit is white, the other is steel-colored); scouts put on cloaks or felt boots on their feet, put a cap on their heads.
Equipment
The soldier's equipment is as light as possible. Before being sent out for reconnaissance, a soldier, as a rule, receives wine.
Connection
Communication to control the reconnaissance group is carried out by means of a light-type radio station, with the help of rockets, flashlights, etc. The Germans rarely resort to wired communication, as they are afraid that our units may use communication lines to organize an ambush.
Procedure
The order of operations of a small reconnaissance group is usually as follows: sentinels and sappers move in front. At a distance of 100-150 m from the main patrol, a direct guard of the core is moving in the amount of 4-5 people (support group). Further, at 150-200 m, a core (strike group) follows, reinforced by 1-2 light machine guns, having side patrols at a distance of 100-150 m. Orderlies are moving behind. The company commander in charge of reconnaissance usually does not move beyond the front line of his troops. Such a reconnaissance group, when meeting with our reconnaissance bodies or guarding units, does not enter into battle, but, hiding behind the fire of light machine guns, hastily retreats to its location; however, there were cases when the reconnaissance group, upon detecting it, called in artillery and mortar fire and, under its cover, made a short raid on the object in order to capture a prisoner.
An enemy reconnaissance group in a large combat strength (30-40 people), when approaching an object, adopts the battle formation shown in diagram 2.
Scheme 2
When blocking our firing point, the enemy RG tries to adopt (in principle) the order shown in diagram 3.
Scheme 3
So, for example, in the area of one of our units, the enemy chose the trench of our military outposts to capture a prisoner, having previously fired artillery at neighboring firing points and in depth. After zeroing in this area, the artillery fired no more. Our observation noted only the movement of individual soldiers and small groups. On the third day after shooting, in the second half of the night, a group of German scouts began to crawl towards our trench. She was spotted by our combat guards, who met her with machine-gun fire. Then the enemy reconnaissance group called in artillery and mortar fire, which surrounded the trench in our outpost. Under cover of fire, the enemy reconnaissance group broke into our trench in a short raid. When conducting reconnaissance with crossing the river, the Germans used the following method: two groups were sent in parallel to the intended object under the cover of conventional sighting, artillery and mortar fire: one of 2-3 people (distracting) and the other of 9-10 people (exciting). The distracting group, acting openly, attracted attention, while the capturing group at that time secretly attacked the object in order to capture the prisoner.
In swampy areas and in floodplains, the Germans conduct reconnaissance by the actions of separate groups (of 10-15 people) on rafts or boats, organizing ambushes in the main directions.
In order to preserve the element of surprise, the German command used the following method during reconnaissance: under the cover of darkness, the group approached the object at the closest distance, and then during the day, after waiting for the moment when the vigilance of our units weakened, suddenly attacked our OT and, under the cover of barrage fire, retreated to your defensive line.
The Germans prepare reconnaissance searches with the aim of capturing the "language" for a long time, sometimes up to 14 days. Searches are carried out mainly by reconnaissance groups from companies and battalions, led by non-commissioned officers.
During the preparatory period, the non-commissioned officer assigned to conduct the search, together with a group of observers of 2-3 people, carefully monitors the object. On the eve of the day scheduled for the search, the non-commissioned officer acquaints the entire composition of the reconnaissance group with the data of his observation in detail.
On the ground, under the leadership of one of the intelligence officers, all issues of interaction are coordinated. All personnel get acquainted in detail with the terrain on which they are to act; azimuths of movement along the compass to the intended object and back are assigned. The entire composition of the reconnaissance groups is charged with the duty to memorize pronounced landmarks in the process of movement. Movement is made by jumps from one frontier to another.
With the advance of the attack group, the guards moving on the flanks change their firing positions and move to a new line in such a way that fire and visual communication with the group is not disturbed.
According to the testimony of the prisoner, the platoon commander is obliged to establish the number of OTs and their weapons. If our artillery fires from the same direction for a long time, then the Germans determine this direction with the help of a compass, after which the OPs are detected. Among the Germans, when changing units, the platoon commander receives from his predecessor the following information about the enemy: the distance to the enemy’s front line, the presence of combat guards and their location, the approximate strength of the opposing enemy units.
From March 1943 to mid-May 1943, the 8th company of the 24th German airborne infantry regiment conducted reconnaissance 6 times. The reconnaissance groups were given the task of determining the configuration of the enemy's forward edge, the armament of the OT and the number of sentries.
The numerical composition of the WG did not exceed one department (10-11 people). The Germans conducted reconnaissance, as a rule, at night, in the darkest hours. A group in this composition should in no case seek rapprochement with the enemy.
The captured chief corporal of the 6th company of the 204th mountain rifle regiment of the 9th mountain rifle division testified the following about the organization and operation of German security intelligence:
"Each company conducts reconnaissance of the enemy's front line in front of its sector every 2-3 days, sending out reconnaissance groups of 6-8 people. Reconnaissance is carried out to an insignificant depth and is sent out at night before full dawn or in the evening until complete darkness. Usually the reconnaissance group returns through 2-3 hours, having completed or not completed the task.The reconnaissance group, as a rule, avoids a combat encounter with the enemy.The main tasks that are assigned to the reconnaissance groups are reconnaissance of the enemy’s front line, its firing points and fire systems and, mainly, capture ( suddenly, without fire) control prisoners. Armament of the reconnaissance group: 1-3 machine guns, 4-5 rifles, and 2 hand grenades for each soldier. "
Examples of the actions of German intelligence groups
Where our officers and soldiers are vigilant and always ready for initiative, resourceful and decisive action, German intelligence is not successful.
So, a reconnaissance group of Germans numbering 19 soldiers (of which 4 were sappers) under the command of a non-commissioned officer had the task of breaking into our trenches, capturing a prisoner and blowing up several dugouts and a bunker.
For several days, this reconnaissance group carefully and continuously studied, by method, observations of the approach route to our forward edge.
The armament of the group consisted of machine guns and grenades; in addition, the group had scissors for cutting wire and 10 anti-tank mines to undermine our dugouts and bunkers. When approaching our front line, the group was divided into two flank subgroups, 6 people each, with the task of penetrating into our trenches and using their actions to ensure the actions of the third, central subgroup of 6-7 people (of which 4 were sappers to undermine the bunker and dugouts ). The central subgroup of the enemy had no guards from the rear. Our reconnaissance, having discovered enemy reconnaissance, missed it, and then suddenly attacked from the rear. As a result, the enemy lost up to 10 people wounded and killed and, having abandoned weapons and equipment, retreated to their original position. At the same time, our fighters captured two soldiers and took 13 machine guns, scissors, 10 anti-tank mines and documents.
January 3, 1943, at about 9 o'clock, an enemy group of 10 people tried to conduct reconnaissance of our defense. German scouts were discovered by our sentry, who reported this to the commander without opening fire. The latter warned the neighboring OT about the approach of the enemy. Having let the enemy group up to 70-100 m, our OT opened heavy fire on it. The enemy, having suffered losses, began to retreat in disorder; at the same time, bypassing the retreating enemy, the platoon commander sent a group with the task of capturing a prisoner. Pursuing the enemy and fighting with him, the group captured two prisoners, senior corporals, and returned to their original position without loss.
On the morning of December 18, 1942, a platoon of the 5th company of the 6th German airborne infantry division, which had just arrived in the Velikiye Luki direction, received the task of determining whether the village of Litvinovka was occupied by our units. At 9 o'clock in the morning, the platoon set out from Savin and began to advance towards Litvinovka. In front of the platoon, at a distance of one kilometer, a patrol of 7 people was moving, led by a senior corporal. The platoon commander, a non-commissioned officer, moved with the platoon and did not send guards to the sides, limiting himself to the appointment of observers who advanced in the general formation of the platoon. The patrol had two 50-mm mortars, 5 machine guns, 2 pistols and 2 grenades for each soldier. Communication of the watch with the core was carried out by messengers. Our scouts timely detected the movement of the enemy, set up an ambush and captured the entire composition of the head patrol, and forced the core to withdraw with rifle and machine-gun fire.
The following examples show that the enemy, despite the demands of the command, is not always well prepared for action in reconnaissance.
On February 1, 1943, in the area south of Stary Beloostrov, an enemy reconnaissance group (consisting of 18-20 people) took up a starting position 150-200 meters from our wire fence and sent a patrol of 3 people to the wire, apparently to make a passage.
The rest adopted the following battle order: the central group (8 people) advanced directly behind the patrol and, apparently, represented the capture group. Enemy soldiers moved with an interval of 40-50 m. To the right and left of the central group, one support group (4-5 people each) was located in place, which began to dig in. A telephone wire was stretched behind the watch.
When approaching our wire fence, the enemy patrol ran into a minefield, and our combat guards opened fire on the enemy reconnaissance group, which, having thrown four coils of cable, hastily retreated to its location.
In the Star area. The market, before conducting reconnaissance, the enemy destroyed two of our bunkers with artillery and mortar fire in the evening; at 6 o'clock he began to conduct reconnaissance in this area with a group of 10 people, using the method of blocking the bunker from the rear with two support groups (3 people each) and one capture group (4 people). There was no one in the bunker, which the enemy blocked. When meeting with our sentry, enemy reconnaissance did not take any action to capture the "tongue" and lay down in a trench near the bunker; only when the sentry began to throw grenades at the enemy, the Germans, having taken the wounded, retreated to the starting line, leaving two land mines in place, weighing 5 kg each.
If the enemy has made thorough preparations before going on reconnaissance, and if our subunits are insufficiently vigilant in their combat service, then the enemy succeeds in successfully accomplishing his mission.
So, for example: on February 17, 1943, in the Zalozye region, the enemy completely stopped firing before the actions of his reconnaissance group. At 7 o'clock in the morning, an enemy group (15 people) secretly approached a camouflage fence in our defense sector. Using ladders, the enemy overcame the fence and, splitting into three groups, penetrated into the depths of our defense, where he blocked the bunker and the dugout.
On June 9, 1943, in the Annina area, an enemy reconnaissance group (18 people), under cover of darkness, approached our wire fence and disguised itself. At 9 o'clock. 30 minutes. in the morning, when our fighters, with the exception of 3-4 observers in the company, lay down to rest, the enemy reconnaissance group, quickly breaking through the wire fence with the help of straw mats and raincoats, broke into our trenches. The junior commander and two of our soldiers were killed at the same time; the Germans, having captured their personal documents, retreated to the location of their units without loss in 15 minutes.
When the enemy sets active tasks for his reconnaissance, he increases the combat strength of the subunit assigned to reconnaissance to an infantry company.
First example. On the night of May 1, 1943, a company of Germans, partially dressed in Red Army uniforms, with Russian weapons, had the task of outflanking our battalion, which was defending on the right bank of the river, in two groups. Northern Donets (northern Yashikovo), and capture prisoners, in a favorable situation, throw the battalion back to the left bank of the river. One enemy group of 70 people had the task of bypassing the battalion from the north and striking from the rear, the second - of 50 people - was supposed to bypass the battalion from the Yashikovo side and hit the flank.
At that time, our reconnaissance party (17 people) under the command of Guards Sergeant Puchkov, also operated in the same sector, which infiltrated the enemy’s front line and organized an ambush on the Slavyanoserbsk-Svh road. (beam Sukhodol).
500 m northeast of Slavyanoserbsk at 1 hour 40 minutes. the head patrol of Sergeant Puchkov's group of guards called out in Russian: "Stop! Pass!" The senior patrol boldly went to the callers, being sure that these were our sappers mining the site. The second sentinel, following the first, was fired at point-blank range. The reconnaissance party, rushing to the rescue to the patrol, opened fire from machine guns and threw grenades at the enemy. The enemy lost 3 people killed, 10 wounded and, leaving one 50-mm mortar with 45 mines, retreated to its original position.
As a result of the bold actions of Comrade Puchkov's group, the German intelligence plan was thwarted.
Second example. Our defense area was clearly visible from the enemy. Directly in front of the front line of our defense, a river flowed, the eastern bank of which was occupied by the enemy. The night of February 12, 1943 was dark. The enemy reconnaissance group was dressed in clean white coats, all its property and weapons were painted white or wrapped in bandages.
For 15 days before the reconnaissance, the enemy daily conducted methodical artillery and mortar fire in order to destroy our wire fence. As a result, it was torn in many places, and it did not require much effort to overcome it.
On February 12, 1943, at about 6 o'clock, an enemy group (30-40 people) crossed the river and overcame a wire fence. Our sentry at the machine gun noticed 4 Germans creeping up behind him at 15 m; he signaled with his voice and threw two grenades at them; the enemy did not respond with fire and continued to lie in place. At this time, the main forces of the enemy RG, having divided into two parts, deepened 70-100 m into our defenses, and one group (4-5 people) was allocated to cover in case our reinforcements approached from the depths of the defense; this group advanced 150 m from the eastern bank of the river. Lower Verman and located 10 m from our trench. The main two groups entered from the rear: the first - to the dugout of the submachine gunners' squad, the second - to the submachine gunners' trench.
About 6 o'clock. 03 min. The enemy gave a signal with a whistle, at which all enemy groups shouted: "Russ, surrender!" They started throwing grenades and firing machine guns at the trench.
After 15 minutes of battle, the enemy managed to occupy the dugouts of the machine-gun crew and the submachine gunners. Our trenches and SOT were not prepared to fire in the rear, so they were at a disadvantage.
After a thirty-minute skirmish, the enemy gave a signal with red and green rockets, on which heavy artillery fire was opened from two artillery and three mortar batteries in order to fringe the actions of their reconnaissance group. Under cover of artillery and mortar fire, the enemy withdrew. To cover the retreat of the reconnaissance group, the enemy used up to 1,200 shells and mines.
Conclusion. The successful action of the enemy group is explained by:
In some sectors of the front, the Germans are trying to quietly penetrate the depths of the defense of our units in order to disrupt communications, obtain documents and capture a prisoner.
For example, on January 14, 1943, up to 20 German machine gunners secretly passed firing points on our front line of defense in the area northeast of Sorokino and went 2-3 km deep in our direction, where they established the location of the command post of the 3rd company of one of our regiments . Coming from the rear and flanks, the enemy attacked the residential dugouts of the 3rd company and threw grenades at them. As a result of the battle, the garrison of the command post of the company suffered losses.
On June 24, 1943, in the Zadushnoye area, the platoon commander, Lieutenant Ivanov, moved 50 meters away from the dugout without weapons. At this time, the Germans attacked him in the amount of three people. Lieutenant Ivanov knocked down one German with a blow of his fist and raised a cry. The Germans, seeing that their idea had failed, hid in the forest.
The commanders of some German units are even developing special reconnaissance instructions. In this regard, the instruction of the commander of the 336th Infantry Division Lukht on the organization and actions of the search is characteristic.
336th infantry division command post, 11/18/1942
Operational Department No. 1025/42.
SECRET
INSTRUCTION #1
on the action of reconnaissance groups
The short winter days and the consequent limitation of our air reconnaissance activities oblige us to observe the enemy's actions with the help of the RG more intensively than before.
In addition, it is necessary to keep the initiative in your hands and be the master of the foreground.
Since the enemy also knows the area in front of our front line of defense, and in turn sends out the RG, cunning and misleading the enemy play a significant role in conducting searches.
The size and composition of the reconnaissance groups depend on the assigned task and the depth of reconnaissance. The group must be no less than a squad, and only in exceptional cases - more than a platoon.
During reconnaissance in combat, observation of the actions of the RG by the forces of the means supporting the RG should be organized.
In this case, it is recommended to attach the RG, forward observation posts for artillery and heavy infantry gun units, equipped with radio stations.
It is advisable to attach a sapper to the WG both to remove obstacles and minefields of the enemy, and to destroy his strongholds.
But careful preparation and planned fire support alone do not ensure the search for the WG. Only courage, determination and the use of all new tricks can lead to success.
When meeting with the enemy, the RG should capture prisoners and destroy, if possible, the remnants of his intelligence.
It is impossible to allow the possibility of setting up ambushes by the opponents on the way back of the reconnaissance group; therefore, as a general rule, round trip traffic should not follow the same path. The opportunity to intercept the returning Russian RG and destroy it should not be missed.
Retreating in front of a stronger enemy, the RG must lure him into the fire zone of the front line of defense; therefore, as a rule, it is necessary to retreat at an angle to the front line in order to ensure the possibility of firing.
The fact that during the search for the RG no contact was made with the enemy, does not mean that the enemy was absent.
The WG should never let its guard down because of this, especially on the way back.
It is especially important to warn friendly and neighboring units about the tasks, time and order of the search in order to provide timely support, if necessary, from the forward edge of the defensive zone.
When repulsing the enemy's RG, the military unit should more than usual strive not to miss a single person; at the same time, special detachments should cut off the enemy's withdrawal routes and destroy his soldiers.
The later fire is opened from the forward edge of the defense on the enemy's RG, the more likely it is to be destroyed. Open fire too early leads to the unmasking of its location, but not to the destruction of the enemy. Cunning, the ability to mislead the enemy, as well as the ability to find a way out of any situation, provide superiority in intelligence.
10. AMBUSH
Ambushes are set up by the Germans mainly at night on the routes of probable movement of our reconnaissance groups with the task of preventing their actions and capturing prisoners.
Cases have been noted when small groups of the enemy, in order to organize ambushes to capture prisoners, seek to penetrate deep into the defenses of our units. Often the enemy, in order to ensure the passage of reconnaissance groups to our rear, opens strong artillery and mortar fire on the forward edge of the disposition of our troops in the direction where the group's passage is planned.
At night, when the opportunity arises, the enemy, being in ambush, often attaches himself to the flank of our active reconnaissance groups and, choosing a convenient moment, captures the gaping one.
On one of the sectors of the front, our reconnaissance party, after a thorough study of the object, decided to capture a German sentry in a trench.
On July 12, 1943, at 10 p.m., a reconnaissance party of 18 people left their starting position and by 11 p.m. reached the enemy’s barriers. The blocking group, having made a passage in a minefield and a barbed wire, missed the capture group. When the latter reached the third row of the barbed wire, it turned out to be a semi-encircled enemy ambush up to a platoon. Having a numerical superiority, the enemy cut off our retreat route, intending to capture her; shouting "Russ, give up!" the Germans rushed to their full height at our scouts, but they, in turn, fell upon the enemy with hand grenades and machine gun fire and, after a short fight, withdrew, capturing two wounded German soldiers, taking two machine guns and losing one person killed (scheme four).
Scheme 4
Ambushes are especially widely used by the Germans during the retreat. During this period of the battle, ambushes are organized by motorized infantry and groups of tanks, which, well camouflaged, suddenly and at point-blank range open fire on our forward trenches or groups of infantry with the task of capturing a prisoner or inflicting defeat, and then quickly break away towards the flanks.
11. RECONSTRUCTION IN BATTLE
In the German army, the most common method of conducting military intelligence is reconnaissance in combat. Reconnaissance in combat is carried out by the Germans to perform the following tasks:
Reconnaissance in force facilitates the introduction of spies and sabotage groups into our rear.
Training Brochure No. 5 of the German 16th Army defines the purpose of reconnaissance in force as follows:
"1. Maintaining an offensive spirit on the defensive.
2. Strengthening the feeling of superiority over the enemy in each individual soldier. Education of the qualities of a single fighter. Training and education of growing commanding cadres.
3. Weakening and fettering the enemy. Destruction of its military installations; staging the offensive of their units.
4. Establishment by the capture of prisoners, documents, weapons and other property:
a) the intentions of the enemy in combat activities;
b) strengthening or changing its parts;
c) rearrangements;
d) the use of new types of weapons;
e) the composition, combat readiness, morale and nutrition of enemy units.
5. Concealment of one's offensive plans in other sectors of the front (disorientation of the enemy in the matter of the number of his troops).
6. Preparation for the upcoming offensive: the occupation of important landmarks immediately before the start of the offensive, the removal of mines, etc. "
Reconnaissance in combat (or, as the Germans call it, force reconnaissance) is carried out by shock detachments with strength from a platoon to a battalion, with fire support from artillery and mortars, and sometimes with the support of small groups of tanks with self-propelled artillery guns. The final determination of the strength of the detachment depends on the mission, the nature of the terrain, and the strength of the enemy in the area of operations. Depending on the task and the conditions under which the detachment will have to operate, the composition of the detachment is divided into a number of teams: assault, support, demolition, demining, communications, and sanitary support.
There may be several assault teams and support teams; their number in each individual case is determined by the commander in charge of reconnaissance in battle.
Armament
The armament of the reconnaissance detachment is the usual: up to 40% of machine guns, rifles, 6-8 hand grenades per soldier. The number of light and heavy machine guns is determined by the terrain; so, in open areas, there is up to one light machine gun per squad and up to a platoon of heavy machine guns per company.
In addition, each squad carries 3-4 hand-held smoke grenades, a few grenades with a combustible bottle attached to them, and sometimes backpack flamethrowers. When operating at night, most of the ammunition is tracer cartridges.
Sapper teams have, in addition to hand weapons, bundles of hand grenades, wire cutters, anti-personnel mines, and portable obstacles.
Equipment and uniforms
The equipment and uniforms of soldiers going on reconnaissance are as light as possible; shoulder straps and documents remain in the offices of the companies.
Exploration time
The time of reconnaissance is determined by the requirement to preserve the surprise of actions; reconnaissance is usually carried out at night and at dawn.
Preparing for action
The Germans pay great attention to preparing for action, trying to ensure the success of the operation, since unsuccessful actions and losses reduce the morale of German soldiers and undermine their confidence in officers. Preparatory work is carried out in secret, in compliance with all camouflage measures. The preparation of a detachment consists of additional reconnaissance of the object of operations, preparation of fire cover, organization of communications, provision of surprise operations and combat training for operations.
The commander of the detachment is required to fully study all the data about the enemy: the combat disposition of manpower, the locations of all firing points, the locations and nature of engineering obstacles and structures, and the behavior of the enemy in the area of forthcoming operations.
This information is obtained through observation posts and by sending out small reconnaissance groups. The actions of such groups are usually covert and passive (without a fight).
The Germans also pay great attention to the issue of fire impact during reconnaissance in combat, believing that the success of the detachment's action depends on its effectiveness. When linking the interaction of artillery and mortars, the detachment commander, together with the commanders of the subunits supporting him, resolves the following issues on the ground:
When distributing artillery, the artillery commander allocates one gun for every one or two targets. Guns and mortars of heavier calibers are allocated to carry out tasks to repel counterattacks. To prevent accidents, as well as to defeat unexpected targets, the artillery commander allocates a reserve of artillery assets consisting of several infantry guns. Artillery fire is controlled through the detachment commander using telephone, radio and light signals.
Preparation of all data for firing artillery and mortars is carried out in advance (sometimes with the involvement of a topographic battery); sighting is masked by carrying out fire raids on some enemy targets.
When the detachment develops management issues, much attention is paid to the organization of communications. As a rule, the commander of an active detachment always has a wired connection with the commanders of subunits and supporting assets. In addition, control is duplicated by radio (via the artillery communications network), signals and messengers.
In a number of German instructions and training brochures, it is recommended that the entire squadron undergo appropriate training before going out for combat operations. To this end, a terrain is selected in the rear, similar to the area of the forthcoming actions, on which the actions of commands are practiced to automaticity. If such training cannot be carried out, then the Germans limit themselves to training on a box of sand. In preparation, the leader of the classes widely practices the introduction of additional, complicating the situation, conditions. This method of conducting classes is aimed at educating soldiers and non-commissioned officers ingenuity and initiative.
Each reconnaissance in force is preceded by an order from the commander organizing the reconnaissance. The German command requires that the order be "clear, strict and beyond all doubt" and that the following issues be covered in it:
"enemy, task, forces, organization, armament, equipment, support of heavy weapons, means of communication, attached medical staff, equipment of the main dressing station, transport for the wounded, protection and transportation of prisoners and trophies, reflection of counterattacks, detachment after completing the task, planned course of action ".
In the event of a commander's failure, it is preliminarily established who will take over the leadership of the group. The planned course of action is discussed in detail with the deputy.
The order of the operation
A detachment prepared for action advances to its initial position covertly. Speech to the location of the enemy (at the line of attack) is also carried out covertly and silently. The German command requires the entire detachment to comply during this period with all camouflage measures, proper use of the terrain, competent and quick occupation of the firing line, entry (if necessary) into battle, avoiding unnecessary running of specialists (sappers, liaisons, artillerymen) in battle formations.
The area or line of starting positions for the attack is chosen as close as possible to the location of the object, but not to the detriment of maintaining secrecy, in order to avoid premature detection of the detachment. Germans say:
"It is better to be 50 meters from the object and then suddenly break through with a single throw than to give out your approach by crawling close to the object."
All fire support means are brought into readiness for action until the detachment returns to its original position. Following this, on the flanks of the forthcoming action of the detachment, the lines of the cover teams are occupied; then sappers move forward to clear mines and make passages in the barriers, and assault teams move forward behind them.
Fire from infantry weapons and heavy weapons opens only from the moment the enemy detects the actions of the detachment, or if necessary. With the detachment wedged into the enemy’s position, the Germans pay attention to covering the detachment’s flanks from possible counterattacks and securing a breakthrough point behind them; to this end, during this period, the provision of flanks by covering teams is being strengthened, and artillery and heavy mortars suppress enemy artillery and mortar batteries and firing points firing at the captured area. It should be noted that the Germans, when organizing reconnaissance in force, always provide it with strong artillery and mortar fire.
During the period of active operations, the detachment commander is located where he considers it necessary (usually on the main line of action). During his absence, the detachment commander leaves a developed non-commissioned officer at the command post by the phone, through whom he passes all orders to the fire support means.
Captured prisoners and all trophies are evacuated by the Germans from the battlefield immediately; orderlies, prisoners of war and soldiers of those squads who, according to the plan, are the first to leave the battlefield, carry out their wounded and dead.
The German Regulations Commanding Troops §102 distinguishes between the following methods of attack:
a) a sudden attack by strike teams and a sapper without fire training;
b) attack by strike teams with the support of artillery and mortar fire, but without preliminary fire preparation (attack with the first shot);
c) attack by strike teams when attacking larger units after artillery preparation.
Exit from battle
The detachment makes a withdrawal from the battle only by order of its commander. Separation is usually carried out by infantry under the cover of fire fringing, in order to prevent the enemy from organizing a pursuit. Covering teams during this period provide flanks until all squads leave the battle. Squads make their way out of the battle by rolling, supporting each other with their fire. If the weather and conditions are favourable, the Germans cover the withdrawal with a smoke screen.
Simultaneously with the main operation of reconnaissance in force, the Germans practiced false operations in the neighborhood in order to divert the attention of our units and fire weapons from their main line of action. Typically, such operations are carried out by firing artillery and mortars at neighboring areas of our location, but only after the detachment has invaded the battle formations of our units.
The testimony of the captured commander of the reconnaissance detachment, who conducted reconnaissance in force on June 16, 1943, established the following procedure for preparing for this reconnaissance operation: a group of volunteers of up to 30 people from one company was selected with the task of capturing prisoners in our two bunkers of military outposts and, if it allows situation, blow up these bunkers. Of the 30 people, two assault groups were created:
main- consisting of 11 people, led by the commander of the 2nd platoon, sergeant major Galpaap and spare- consisting of 10 people, led by sergeant major Klingner. The support group consisted of 9 people and was armed with an easel machine gun and 3 light machine guns.
The reconnaissance task was set two days before the reconnaissance. To prepare for reconnaissance, a reconnaissance observation group was sent under the command of sergeant major Klingner. During the day of observation, it was established: the number of our OTs and their location, weapons, the approximate composition of the garrisons and the nature of the work to strengthen the defensive structures.
These observations were reported to the command of the battalion and regiment. Based on the study of these data, an order was issued for the regiment to conduct reconnaissance in force on June 16, 1943. The commanders of both capture groups together drew up a plan of action. Previously, the company commander personally gave both sergeant majors instructions on providing the reconnaissance group with fire; for this purpose, light machine guns, 8 81-mm mortars, 2 50-mm mortars and 2 20-mm caliber guns were allocated. The battalion commander attended the classes, who showed a perspective aerial photograph of the corresponding defense sector and explained it to the company commander, commanders of the RG and mortar crews.
Neither the battalion commander nor the company commander conducted classes or conversations with the rest of the reconnaissance group. Practical exercises on the ground were also not carried out.
The supporting artillery was given the task of conducting heavy fire at the appointed time.
The reconnaissance group's offensive time was scheduled for 10.30. Artillery and mortars, according to the order, were to open fire at 10.28. Calling fire was not required. The signal for shifting fire was two white rockets (the signal was set by the battalion commander).
The task of carrying out the wounded was entrusted to the support group. Directly behind the camouflage fence at the front line of the defense were: a doctor, a medical non-commissioned officer and 4 porters; a peasant cart served as a means of further transportation of the wounded to the rear.
As a result of this preparation, by the time artillery and mortar fire was opened, the reconnaissance group concentrated on the starting position, at a distance of 100-120 m from the middle edge of our units.
12. EXAMPLES OF THE ENEMY'S BATTLE RECONFORMATION
When it is impossible to take up a starting position covertly, the enemy usually practices a fire raid of artillery and mortars on the area of the intended object of action. This enables our units on the front line of defense to timely reveal the intentions of the enemy and take countermeasures.
1. March 13, 1943 in the area of the southern slopes of high. Sugar Loaf, an enemy reconnaissance group of 20-25 people at 5 o'clock in the morning raided a separate dugout at the front line of our defense. The action of the reconnaissance group was preceded by an intense fire raid on the dugout, undertaken in the expectation that, due to the strong impact of artillery and mortar fire, observation from our side would be weakened and the firing points would be suppressed. However, the enemy, approaching the dugout, was met with fierce fire and, having suffered heavy losses, retreated to his original position. In the afternoon, after an hour-long artillery preparation, the enemy with a reinforced battalion (one rifle, two machine-gun and one engineer companies) led reconnaissance in force, having the task of opening our defense system on the Uritsky sector of the front, and, breaking into our advanced trenches, for some time held captured frontier. However, as a result of counterattacks by our units and strong artillery and mortar fire, the enemy was defeated and the remnants of his reconnaissance detachment were driven back to their original position. Up to 100 corpses were found in the trenches, and several fresh pits with buried corpses were found in front of the trenches.
2. On the night of May 9, 1943, in section N of the rifle division, the enemy, with a force of up to 60 people, conducted reconnaissance in the direction of high. 253.0. Approaching the front edge of our defense, the enemy dug in, and the sappers, to the sound of an artillery raid along the front edge of our defense, made passages in minefields and barbed wire with elongated charges. With the transfer of artillery fire to the depth of our defense, the enemy made a throw to our front line, but met with strong rifle and machine-gun fire, was thrown back to its original position with losses.
3. On June 14, 1943, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy launched a heavy fire raid on our outposts with two 75-mm artillery batteries and batteries of 155-mm, 120-mm and 81-mm mortars. After that, by transferring fire into the depths of the defense, he surrounded the outposts in order to prevent our units from helping him. At this time, enemy reconnaissance in two groups (10-12 people each) attacked our outposts from two directions. Throwing grenades at the trench and firing automatic fire, the Germans managed to snatch our seriously wounded sergeant and retreated to their location. The enemy fired artillery during the entire reconnaissance action, simultaneously ensuring the withdrawal of his reconnaissance.
4. January 19, 1943, at 5 p.m. 30 min., the enemy after artillery preparation in the area of the river. Slavyanka tried to conduct reconnaissance by force up to a platoon, but our strong machine-gun fire confused the Germans; not daring to attack our outposts and suffering losses, they began to hastily retreat to their front line. A captured German testified that his platoon had lost up to 20 men killed and wounded. The captain in charge of reconnaissance was killed. The platoon acted in the order of the usual offensive. The personnel were armed with machine guns, rifles, four light machine guns. In its composition, the platoon had a sapper with heavy pieces to undermine our defensive structures.
5. On the night of May 10, 1943, in the area of temporary warehouses. For a long time, three groups of Germans (one group of 50 people and two groups of 20 people) imperceptibly approached our wire fence and, having made passages, concentrated behind it. At this time, the artillery and mortars of the enemy suddenly opened fire on the front line of our defense and after a while they transferred the fire to the depths. With the transfer of fire, a group of 50 people shouted "Hurrah" attacked our trench, and a group of 20 people imitated an attack on a neighboring trench. Both groups were met by organized fire from our infantry and, having not achieved success, retreated under the cover of a smoke screen. In this operation, the Germans lost 15 people killed and wounded. The prisoner captured on the battlefield belonged to the 3rd company of the 335th engineer battalion of the 335th infantry division.
Scheme 5. Actions of Finnish intelligence at 8.00 14.7.43 in the Svir-3 area
6. May 7, 1943, at 3 o'clock in the morning, the enemy launched a heavy fire raid on the Samokhin Lug area. In total, up to 900 artillery shells and mines were fired. At 3 hours 30 min. the enemy with a group of infantry numbering up to 90-100 people went on the attack. At the same time, the enemy infantry, in addition to machine guns, rifles and grenades, was armed with knapsack flamethrowers (3-4 of them were used by it in our trenches). However, the actions of enemy intelligence were not successful. Having suffered losses from our artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire (up to 20-30 people were killed), the enemy group withdrew.
7. The enemy organized reconnaissance in force in the area of temporary storage warehouses. Lactic. Our outposts were chosen as the object of the attack. April 6, 1943, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy, in order to divert the attention of our forward units, made a thirty-minute fire attack on a site located away from the object at a distance of 500 m. After that, he moved the fire, directing it into our minefields and land mines in front of the outposts (invisibly, with the aim of making passages in them), and sharply increased its intensity.
At 8 o'clock. 45 minutes, fringing the area of \u200b\u200byour military outposts with artillery and mortar fire and opening fire on the command post of the company and the approach routes to our forward trenches, the enemy went on the attack in three groups, 15-17 people each (two on the flanks and one from the front). .
Despite the fire resistance of our units, middle group the enemy broke into the trenches of the outposts (flank groups were stopped before approaching the trenches), then, with the strong support of their artillery fire and under the influence of the fire of our units, the enemy withdrew to their original position. Ensuring the operation of his reconnaissance detachment, the enemy fired up to 2,000 mines and shells.
If it is necessary to capture a prisoner in a certain area, the German command spares neither effort nor means for this.
8. In front of the front of the N Rifle Division, our observation spotted a group of German officers conducting reconnaissance on the front line. On the same day, the enemy carried out a short artillery raid on the front line of our defense. Over the next two days, the enemy did not show any activity. Two days later, in the second half of the night, the enemy again opened heavy artillery and mortar fire on the same area. Under cover of fire, a German reconnaissance detachment with a strength of up to 50-60 people in three groups began to crawl towards our military outposts. At the signal of the rocket, enemy fire was transferred to our neighboring firing points. Two groups made a throw to the trenches, and the third group fired. With powerful artillery fire and machine gun fire, the enemy was thrown back to its original position, while suffering losses.
Three days later, the enemy resumed the reconnaissance operation in this area, this time with a stronger reconnaissance detachment - consisting of 80 people, supported by up to 2 artillery battalions. The method of conducting reconnaissance was the same. This time the operation was successful for the Germans, after which they did not conduct reconnaissance in this area for a long time.
9. On the night of February 15, 1943, the enemy opened heavy fire on our defense area from 3 artillery and 4 mortar batteries, firing 350 shells and mines. Under the cover of this fire, three enemy groups (up to 20 people each) approached the location of one of our platoons. At the same time, two groups of demonstrations in front of the front attracted the attention of two of our NPs (see Diagram 6).
Scheme 6
The third enemy group, taking advantage of this, penetrated into the gap between the OT and attacked the platoon from the rear. Before the start of the attack, the enemy placed the NZO between the positions of the platoon and the dugouts, simultaneously firing at the slopes of a separate height. After completing the first part of the task and regrouping, the enemy launched an attack on the dugouts. Artillery fire was moved into the depths. Having thrown grenades at the dugouts, the enemy, under the cover of artillery fire, withdrew to their location, carrying away the wounded and the dead.
Conclusions.
1. The calculation of the enemy's actions was built on the prepared massive fire of artillery and mortars.
2. Accurate sighting of enemy artillery and mortars made it possible for groups to snuggle up close to the firing shaft and clear our obstacles.
3. Dense fringing of the object of attack with fire excluded active opposition by counterattacks.
The following order of the 404th Grenadier Regiment No. 121/43 dated February 23, 1943 regarding the actions of "shock detachments" is of considerable interest to us in terms of containing instructions for conducting reconnaissance in force.
404 grn. regiment. CP regiment 23.2.43
Oper. Department. No. 121/43
SECRET
ORDER ON THE SHELF
on the operations of shock detachments in positional defense
Operations of strike detachments in positional defense are carried out to carry out the following tasks:
a) intrusion into the enemy's disposition with the aim of capturing prisoners (in order to obtain information about the enemy), trophies, destroying as much enemy manpower as possible, destroying his defensive structures, especially dugouts, bunkers;
b) clearing their trenches from the enemy who broke into them, whether it be an enemy offensive with large forces or a small operation carried out by him.
I. Operations of strike detachments with the aim of invading enemy positions
1. The operation is carried out after careful preparation, according to a previously developed plan, and mainly at night.
The most important condition for achieving easy and quick success is the observance of surprise actions.
2. Preparatory measures include conducting thorough reconnaissance and reconnaissance, both visual and by the actions of reconnaissance detachments, which should, if possible, consist of future members of shock detachments.
The task of intelligence and reconnaissance is to:
a) establish the exact location of the enemy trenches, especially the branches from them;
b) determine the number of enemy garrisons, the number of machine guns and posts; identify also those posts that could interfere with operations from the flank or from the rear; set the exact time of changing posts;
c) reveal the location of enemy reserves;
d) establish the type and strength of enemy barriers, as well as ways to overcome them (wire barriers must be cut, since undermining violates the surprise of actions; it is recommended to resort to the latter method only if necessary, having weighed in advance whether an explosion should be simulated with artillery shots);
e) establish the most convenient ways to approach the enemy;
f) survey the terrain ahead to identify mined areas; timely, before the start of the operation, remove the mines; cover the sapper while clearing mines;
g) establish convenient positions for the cover detachments;
h) in accordance with paragraphs. 1-7 set the area for the invasion and the way to approach it;
i) compose detailed diagram based on the results of reconnaissance carried out in accordance with paragraphs 1-8, also using, to the extent possible, aerial photographs.
Such reconnaissance and reconnaissance should be carried out in several sectors of the battalion's defense area.
After that, establish the most convenient areas for the successful conduct of the operation with the least possible forces, with minimal losses and an insignificant consumption of ammunition.
Opportunities for the operation strike force appear everywhere. The consumption of people, ammunition and other means to achieve success is different, depending on the situation, terrain and one's own intentions.
3. In the plan for carrying out such an operation, it is necessary to indicate the composition and weapons of the shock detachment, as well as set out in detail the method of its conduct; an explanatory diagram must be attached. It is also important to bear in mind the following:
a) it is necessary to change the methods and methods of carrying out these operations as often as possible, for example, with regard to time: the enemy is especially vigilant in the morning, therefore it is recommended to choose the time immediately after dark, before or after midnight; break into the front line of the enemy should be without artillery preparation, replacing it with a short fire raid (1-2 shots from each gun and mortar);
b) after an invasion of an enemy location, it is often necessary to open carefully organized barrage fire along the lines of communication identified by the bunker, along the flanks and rear of the invasion area and at the nearest enemy reserves;
c) it is necessary to spatially limit the target attacked by the detachment and indicate the period for the return of the detachment;
d) light signals should be installed to correct the fire of artillery and heavy weapons; set signals "operation completed" or "operation failed" in order to avoid wasting ammunition.
4. Preparation of the operation. We must strive to conduct practical exercises in trenches as similar (in location) as possible to those of the enemy. To acquaint each member of the shock detachment practically and on the diagram, from aerial photographs and by means of explanations on the ground with the location of the enemy trenches and the plan of the operation. Each participant in the operation must know his task firmly, and also be able to pronounce in Russian: "hands up", "stop", "come out".
5. The operation of shock detachments consists of the following elements:
a) the invasion of a shock detachment (or several detachments) into an enemy location and taking possession of the trenches; when the strike detachment is broken down into axes, two (or more) strike squads are formed, of which one remains under the command of the strike detachment commander.
b) the actions of several cover groups (provided with machine guns), which from our positions cover the advance of the shock detachment, support it with fire during the operation, and also cover its withdrawal after the operations; often there is a need to take with them small groups of cover (2 people, without machine guns) in order, for example, to prevent the movement of the enemy along the lines of communication;
c) measures that divert the attention of the enemy (opening fire in other areas with rifles, machine guns and artillery and throwing hand grenades, especially at the moment of invading an enemy location).
6. The strength, organization, composition and armament of the strike detachment are very diverse and depend on the scale of the operation, the situation, the position of the enemy and one's own intentions, i.e., the assigned task. Most of the shock troops were still too large. Only selected soldiers can make a throw into the enemy's trenches and fight there. Leaders are coandiers, shooters with hand grenades and grenade carriers. Be sure to appoint and instruct at least one deputy commander of the strike force.
7. Approximate order of battle, distribution of duties and armament of the shock detachment for mastering the enemy's trench.
8. The number of sappers in the strike squad depends on the number of dugouts that are planned to be blown up. Each sapper can take 2 bundles of grenades with him, which are just enough to blow up a dugout in frozen ground.
9. Exceptionally good results were achieved by small shock detachments, acting suddenly and decisively against an insufficiently strong enemy.
The approximate composition of a small group: 1 commander, 3-4 soldiers (one of them is the deputy commander of the detachment), 2 sappers.
The order of battle and weapons are the same as in paragraph 7.
With decisive actions of a small detachment, it is necessary to strive to capture the enemy's trench, even if the enemy offers strong resistance.
10. The equipment must be adjusted so that, while maintaining the striking power of the detachment, it does not hamper the movement of people:
a) warm winter equipment adversely affects the mobility of people; a white camouflage canvas robe has proven itself well; boots should be worn leather (not felt boots);
b) mask the helmet with a white cloth without a balaclava or hood;
c) a waist belt (without a cartridge bag), on the right side of it is a bread bag with 12 round grenades; grenade carriers take with them grenades with a handle; take cartridges in pockets;
d) a pistol on a belt or on a cord plugged into a belt; if the machine fails, it is often necessary to use a pistol, so take with you a supply of 4-6 magazines for each pistol;
e) before the operation, clean the machine, lower the spring, fill the magazine with only 20-25 cartridges. First make a few trial shots; the machine will work flawlessly if there are two springs in each store; despite the second spring, the machine can be loaded with 25 rounds;
f) missiles blind the enemy and cause confusion in his ranks; in addition, illumination of the area can be useful to us; for rocket launchers, take a ramrod with you to push out empty shells;
g) round grenades and grenades with a handle are the main weapons in trench combat; in a trench, the morale and explosive effect of a grenade with a handle is especially great; in case of need, they can be used as a means of striking in hand-to-hand combat; take grenades with you on your waist belt and in grenade bags; each carrier takes one bag (total 2 bags of grenades with a handle in each bag); loosen protective caps before the strike squad sets out; wear round grenades in a bread bag (according to paragraph 10).
If stubborn resistance is expected from the enemy, then divide the shooters with hand grenades into throwers from close range and from a long distance. In such cases, the consumption of grenades is very high, so you need to take more of them with you in bags;
h) hand grenades severely destroy dugouts; smoke-blinding mines (for smoking out of dugouts) did not justify themselves, as they blind both the enemy and their own at the same time, and, moreover, they act too slowly;
i) bundles of grenades and anti-tank mines; to blow up one dugout in winter, 2 bundles of grenades or 2 anti-tank mines are needed; for bunker, one is enough;
j) a sharp shovel can be very useful;
k) take dressings with you, for the removal of the wounded - one raincoat;
l) do not take letters, diaries, soldier's books, personal signs, etc. with you.
11. Completing a task. Silently approach the enemy's barbed wire, using all means of camouflage for this; cut the wire if possible in two places; there are two soldiers at each location. Choose places that are relatively less guarded by enemy posts, and break into the trenches with a swift throw. The surprise will be even greater if you break into the trench without using hand grenades. Destroy enemy posts with a blow from the rear, using cold weapons without a shot. The strike force attacks the trench and breaks through it to the target specified in advance. Gradually, he takes possession of the trench. After throwing hand grenades into a dugout shelter or an identified enemy, advance in jumps from one trench bend to another, continuing to throw hand grenades in front of you. Use firearms in trenches on straight sections. Try to stun, capture or destroy the resisting soldiers. Along with the destruction of the enemy garrisons located in the trenches, the enemy located in dugouts and bunkers is also destroyed with the help of hand grenades and other weapons.
It is advisable to leave two soldiers at the edge of the trench, to the right and left of the detachment commander, so that, moving along the trench along with the shock detachment, they provide support from above, destroying the enemy appearing in the trench with hand grenades, machine gun fire or a bayonet. In case of strong enemy fire, they temporarily hide in a trench, reinforcing the composition of the shock detachment there.
Sappers, using anti-tank mines and grenades, blow up dugouts and bunkers; loopholes are thrown with hand grenades. If there is a withdrawal along the same path along which the detachment moved forward, then all these explosions should be made during the withdrawal. The shock detachment must not go beyond the boundaries of the task assigned to it, otherwise it may fail the entire operation and, moreover, fall into a trap itself. This, however, does not mean that the detachment commander should not show initiative in taking advantage of favorable circumstances, if any are presented to him during the course of the operation.
Never leave your comrade on the battlefield. Take the wounded or dead with you.
The success of operations is regarded depending on the number of captured prisoners, trophies and documents, trenches cleared of the enemy, blown up dugouts and bunkers, as well as on the magnitude of the losses inflicted on the enemy.
II. Clearing your own trench from the enemy who burst into it
1. The capture of a trench takes place in accordance with the instructions set out in paragraph 1, immediately after its capture by the enemy.
2. For counterattacks, a shock detachment is organized from neighboring squads. A brave soldier is able to clear a whole trench from the enemy alone with the help of grenades, if only he has enough of these grenades. In the absence of a commander, the most energetic of the soldiers takes command.
3. In the event of a systematically organized counteroffensive to capture the trench, no significant changes should be made to the instructions in paragraph 1. During the day, the shock detachment, after penetrating into the enemy trench, advances dispersed in depth.
4. In the rear of the shock detachment, people must be prepared in advance to occupy and hold the trench captured from the enemy. These men follow the strike force in a scattered fashion. The number of people depends on the width of the breakthrough section.
5. If the advance is hindered by enemy tanks, then they must be destroyed earlier (by the actions of tank destroyers, anti-tank guns, etc.). If this fails, then the capture of the trench should be postponed until dark.
The same applies to a normal counterattack on level ground. In this case, the enemy tanks located in the breakthrough area must first be destroyed (using self-propelled guns, assault guns and artillery).
13. ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE DURING WITHDRAWAL
During the offensive of our troops, the Germans conduct enhanced reconnaissance with a wide network of NPs, in small groups (mainly at night, without artillery support) and in combat (with the support of strong artillery and mortar fire). The composition of the German reconnaissance group in the latter case is often up to a company of infantry.
Armament: rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.
Method of action: at the moment of artillery and mortar shelling of the forward edge of our units, the reconnaissance group concentrates to launch an attack on the intended object. At the moment the fire is transferred into the depths of the combat formations of our units, the reconnaissance group attacks individual firing points. In all cases, the withdrawal of the reconnaissance group is covered by strong artillery and mortar fire.
Military reconnaissance of the enemy in conditions of open flanks is carried out by strong mobile groups with a simultaneous strike on the flank and rear of our subunits and units in order to capture prisoners.
The enemy conducts flank security reconnaissance with individual tanks and armored vehicles, setting them the task of getting into contact with our advancing troops.
In the battle formations of the battalions, the enemy has groups of 8-15 people who, in the process of counterattacks, seek to capture prisoners.
When retreating, enemy tank units conduct reconnaissance of our troops by observation from mobile OPs and strong reconnaissance detachments consisting of 6-10 tanks and up to an infantry company. Such a reconnaissance detachment, by demonstrating an offensive on a wide front, seeks to provoke the fire of our fire weapons.
To capture prisoners, the enemy uses fast-moving reconnaissance groups consisting of 2-3 light tanks or 3-4 armored vehicles, which, having outlined a separate group of our troops or a recklessly operating reconnaissance group, quickly surround it and fire at it; then 1-2 tanks approach the trenches, and the tank crews, under cover of fire, seek to capture our fighters.
After the retreat, the enemy conducts reconnaissance with stronger detachments - from 12 to 20 tanks (light and medium), from 8 to 12 armored vehicles, up to 20 motorcyclists and from 20 to 50 vehicles with motorized infantry, reinforced by one 75-mm battery or 2nd self-propelled guns . Such a cutting detachment goes to the flanks of our units and to the rear.
Using their high maneuverability and mobility, German reconnaissance groups suddenly attack our small units or transports moving along the road in order to capture prisoners and clarify the grouping of our units, after which they quickly retreat to the line of their troops or to the side in order to repeat the sortie in another place.
Aircraft are usually assigned to such reconnaissance groups.
Based on the order for the 404th Infantry Regiment of the 256th Infantry Division, captured along with other documents from the headquarters of the regiment, as well as the testimony of prisoners, we can imagine the following scheme for organizing reconnaissance and guarding the retreating enemy units: in the tail of the retreating units, the Germans leave officer patrols in the composition an officer or a sergeant-major and up to the detachment of soldiers with the tasks of ensuring the withdrawal of their rearguards, establishing the combat composition of our pursuing troops by observation and misleading them about the true outline of an intermediate field position. Sappers carry out mining of approaches, roads, villages, and at the end of mining they retreat through intermediate field positions to a new object of work.
At an intermediate field position, the Germans leave rear outposts with radio stations, with the task of holding back the advance of our units and ensuring the withdrawal of rearguard detachments to intermediate defense lines. German rearguard units are provided with sufficient ammunition and are usually supported by 3-5 tanks and artillery up to a division strength.
14. Cunning of the enemy
The Germans are taking all possible measures to counteract our scouts.
Thus, on April 7, 1943, on one of the sectors of the front, the enemy used the following method of military cunning. In the direction of one settlement, located 1.5 km from the front line, our intelligence operated. Before reaching this settlement, 150-200 meters, the patrol noticed several enemy soldiers who were lying on the ground and groaning. Not far from these "wounded" soldiers, an ambush organized by the enemy was noticed, which was preparing to attack at the moment when our intelligence approaches the "wounded" for their inspection.
Our scouts, having figured out the enemy's cunning, lay down in cover and destroyed the simulators with machine gun fire; the rest of the German soldiers from the ambush fled in panic to their area of location.
Sometimes the Germans, for the purpose of reconnaissance of minefields, drive horses in our direction in directions of interest to them.
Enemy reconnaissance groups operating at night, when infiltrating deep into our defenses, often use dogs to help them detect our ambushes and secrets.
The enemy also practices guard dogs to guard his front line. In addition, the Germans use the mining of parapets of trenches, communications (which they themselves do not use); on trees (at the level of a person's chest) they hang mines, mine corpses, weapons, equipment.
German WGs sometimes include people who know Russian, who, during reconnaissance at night, go ahead and conduct a conversation in Russian. Our fighters sometimes mistake such groups for their returning scouts.
For example, on July 16, 1943, at 3 am, an enemy reconnaissance group of up to 20 people crossed the river. Mius and approached one of our firing points. The sentry asked: "Pass!" From the group, they answered in Russian: "My own! I'll come up and tell you the pass." The German, having separated from the group, came close to the sentry and stunned him with several blows to the head. The platoon commander, who happened to be nearby, killed a German with machine gun shots; a group of Germans immediately opened heavy fire and, taking the corpse of their soldier, retreated.
When overcoming our anti-tank ramparts, the enemy uses assault wooden ladders up to 2 m high (there are up to 3 pieces in the WG).
In order to mislead our units into diverting their attention, the Germans often use demonstrative actions in secondary sectors before reconnaissance. It should be said that the enemy makes extensive use of other various tricks adapting them to the situation.
15. COUNTERACTION OF THE ENEMY TO OUR INTELLIGENCE
During reconnaissance in combat during our artillery raid along the front line and when our subunits are wedged into the enemy defenses, the latter pulls the manpower located on the front line to the flanks of the sector attacked or occupied by us. Then the enemy opens artillery and mortar fire on previously prepared data in order to prevent the approach of our reserves from the depth and destroy our units that have wedged into his forward edge.
With previously withdrawn units and reserves brought up from the depths, the Germans launch counterattacks on the flanks.
When the enemy detects our reconnaissance, he leaves his firing points and retreats along the trenches into the depths of defense, when our reconnaissance approaches the firing points without detecting the enemy, at that time he suddenly opens strong flank fire from machine guns and machine guns.
When the movement of our reconnaissance is detected, the enemy sets up ambushes in its path, mainly from submachine gunners, numbering up to 10-15 people, and flanking light machine guns, and also stops lighting the area with rockets. Allowing our reconnaissance behind a wire fence, at close range to the trenches, he suddenly opens machine-gun fire, at the same time trying to cut off our reconnaissance escape routes with manpower. The enemy also makes extensive use of all kinds of obstacles and obstacles, which he mines, sometimes placing microphones and various surprises in them.
Characteristic is the enemy's assessment of the activities of our military intelligence, given in the order of the 82nd German Infantry Division:
“Over the past month, four of our people were captured, and we did not take a single Russian. How is this explained?
The Russian looks out like a lynx, creeps up like a marten, smells like a wolf, and eavesdrops like a fox. He does not advance, as we do, - boldly going ahead with thunder and lightning, but imperceptibly sneaks up and crawls hundreds of meters along the ground, waiting for hours.
If our sentries stand indifferently and motionless for hours in the same place, if our patrols in the trenches, like running cars, wander for hours along the trenches, along the same path, if our patrols constantly walk along the beaten paths, then there is nothing surprising is that our people are captured from time to time. And captivity means death.
Is there a remedy for this? Yes! We must overcome this sensitive and cautious enemy with composure, intelligence, cunning, endurance and exceptional accuracy. So:
1. Sentinels constantly change places, look in all directions (especially backwards) and listen!
2. More alarm devices, more slingshots; constantly change calls, even if it is difficult!
3. Always have weapons at the ready, whether at the post, on the way to the dugout, to the restroom, when changing. No man should be at night without a hand grenade ready to be thrown!
4. Whether in the trenches, in the forefield or in the rear, at night - everything should be strained to the limit. At every step you can stumble upon the enemy. Whoever wanders back and forth like a running machine will be seized. The one who is awake and listens will destroy the enemy!
Therefore, first of all, you need:
- constant hunting, patrolling, looking out and eavesdropping in the foreground, all this is sneaking and crawling
CONCLUSION
It is easy to discern the enemy's intentions if we carefully and continuously observe his actions. His intentions can be deciphered by observing the sighting of artillery, determined by the movements of his units, by the action of his reconnaissance agencies, aviation, etc.
It is necessary to increase combat vigilance in our subunits, to educate soldiers and officers on the basis of the combat experience of our operations and the study of the actions of the enemy, to demand from the entire composition of units and subunits the observance of revolutionary military discipline.
The Russian soldier has always been distinguished by love for the Motherland, courage, courage and innate cunning.
All these qualities received the most complete and vivid expression in the Red Army soldier. The history of wars shows that the Russian army has always beaten its opponents. The Red Army has also always beaten, beats and will beat to the point of complete extermination all those who encroach on our socialist homeland, on the brotherhood of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The guarantee for this is the historical glory of our Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin, pronounced by him on November 6, 1941: "Our cause is just, victory will be ours!" And we will win the sooner, the better we know the enemy.
90 Chapter 3. Special services of the leading countries of the world and the former USSR
to take a single complex of buildings specially built for him in Cheltenham, called the "donut" for the corresponding architecture.
GCHQ, like SIS, is directly related to the formation of the US intelligence agencies, in particular the NSA, which was created with the direct participation of GCHQ specialists. It is not surprising that GCHQ and NSA work closely together, forming a single system of electronic and electronic intelligence (the so-called "Echelon").
The German special services engaged in intelligence activities include the following institutions, bodies and subdivisions of the executive branch.
Intelligence agencies subordinate to the administration of the Federal Chancellor.
Federal Intelligence Service (BND - Bundesnachrichtendienstes). The main intelligence service of Germany, engaged in foreign intelligence. In Russian-language literature, the transliteration of the German abbreviation is used to designate it
Special services subordinate to the Minister of the Interior.
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV - Bundesamt for Verfassungsschutz). The main secret service of Germany, engaged in counterintelligence. In Russian-language literature, the transliteration of the German abbreviation - BFF is used to designate it.
Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (LfV - Landesamt for Verfassungsschutz). The Federal Law on the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany determines the creation of both a federal body for the protection of the Constitution and bodies operating within the subjects of the federation - the lands. The Land Offices for the Protection of the Constitution perform the same functions as the BFF, provided that the cases they deal with do not go beyond the regional level. The BFF has exclusive jurisdiction over federal affairs, as well as all cases related to espionage against the FRG.
Federal Office for Information Technology Security (BSI - Bundesamt for Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik). Designed to provide security
secure government communications, develop standards and regulations in the field of information security, conduct certification of information systems and components, provide support to the Federal Office and the Land Offices for the protection of the Constitution in the investigation of illegal and other activities that use information technology.
Intelligence agencies subordinate to the Minister of Defense.
Intelligence Directorate of the Bundeswehr (ANBw - Amt for Nachrichten-wesen der Bundeswehr). The main military intelligence body responsible for collecting and evaluating information on the state of foreign armed forces.
Special services of Germany 91
Bundeswehr Radio Monitoring Office (AFMBw - Amt for Fernmeldwesen Bundeswehr). The main body of military radio intelligence.
Military Security Service (MAD - Militärischer Abschirmdienst). Military counterintelligence. It is, along with the BND and the BFF, the third main special service of Germany. In Russian-language literature, the transliteration of the German abbreviation - MAD is used to designate it.
Unlike most other special services of the leading countries of the world, the German special services, for obvious reasons, were actually created anew after the Second World War and for a long time worked under the control of the CIA.
The BND is entrusted with the task of conducting foreign intelligence. By creating this service, the German government deliberately combined military and political intelligence abroad in one department in order to exclude any kind of rivalry.
The BND is headed by the president, who is assisted in the operational management of the service by the vice president and the quality management apparatus. The structure of the BND includes eight departments.
Branch 1 - operational intelligence (Operative Aufklärung). Engaged in undercover intelligence (HUMINT).
Branch 2 - technical intelligence (Technische Beschaffung). Engaged in obtaining information from communication channels using technical means (SIGINT), as well as the disclosure of ciphers.
Department 3 - evaluation (Auswertung). An analytical unit that forms tasks for obtaining information for departments 1, 2 and 5 and processes the received data with the provision of reports, certificates and summaries to political, military and law enforcement structures.
Branch 4 - administration and general services (Steuerung und zentrale Dienstleistung).
Supports key business units by providing human resources, development, finance and legal services.
Branch 5 - Operational Intelligence and Evaluation for Organized Crime and International Terrorism Mining and analytical unit, designed to quickly obtain information about organized criminal communities involved in international terrorism, international drug trafficking, money laundering and illegal migration. Represents the BND in international organizations involved in combating related threats.
Department 6 - technical support (Technische Unterstützung). Provision of all departments of BND with the necessary equipment and technologies. All BND data processing systems are managed by this department. In addition, engineers and technicians
92 Chapter 3. Special services of the leading countries of the world and the former USSR
departments develop all the special equipment necessary for operational units to solve their problems.
Department 7 - BND school (Schule des BND). Closed educational institution for advanced training and retraining of BND employees.
Branch 8 - internal security and counterintelligence (Sicherheit, Geheimschutz und Spionageabwehr). This department is entrusted with control over ensuring the safety of state and official secrets by BND employees, as well as responsibility for conducting counterintelligence activities.
BND is one of the best intelligence agencies in the world. To some extent, this is due to the experience accumulated before 1945. It is no secret that after the announcement of the Cold War course, many professional intelligence officers who had previously been in the service of the Third Reich were recruited to work in the intelligence agencies of the FRG, for example, General Reinhard Gehlen, who headed the analytical department of the German General Staff during the war. By the way, today it is already known that to a large extent this experience was Soviet - before the aggravation of relations with Germany, the NKVD, as well as other "power" departments of the USSR, provided Hitler's special services with a tangible methodical (and, apparently, not only methodical) help. After the war, the BND worked for a long time under the vigilant tutelage of the CIA, and its main opponent was the intelligence of the Ministry of State Security (“Stasi”), which did not miss a single chance to obtain information on the territory of the FRG. And, of course, the BND had to face, as they say, “face to face” with such Soviet special services as the KGB and the GRU. Thus, both the BND and East German intelligence were "at the forefront" of the confrontation between East and West, which could not but affect their professionalism.
The unification of Germany, when the German secret services gained access to the Stasi archives, also contributed to the strengthening of the BND, since counterintelligence was able to identify many embedded intelligence officers of the GDR and the USSR (although perhaps not the most important ones - much could remain in the hands of the CIA), and also thanks to access to materials revealing the methods of conducting operational work of the best intelligence services in the world.
Thus, the BND and other special services of the FRG absorbed all the best that had been accumulated by the German, Soviet, American, British and East German special services. This is even evident from the BND structure - it is simple and at the same time close to optimal. We can say that such a structure is a model of the structure of the intelligence service of a democratic European state, comparable in size to Germany, for example, Ukraine.
The British MI5 had the greatest influence on the development and formation of the BFF, so these two special services are quite similar (for example, BFF officers cannot carry out arrests and detentions, they do not have the right to carry and use weapons, etc.). In addition, the BFF, for obvious reasons, could not use specific
German intelligence
The main intelligence center responsible for collecting information about the Soviet Union was the department of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH), called "Foreign Armies - East" (FHO). Established in 1938, the FHO was responsible for military information on Poland, the Scandinavian countries, some Balkan countries, the USSR, China, and Japan. But, beginning on July 31, 1940, when Hitler gave the OKH the order to prepare to move to the East, the FHO focused on the Soviet Union.
The head of the Foreign Armies - East department, Colonel Kinzel, gave a generalized assessment of the Red Army at the end of 1939: “In numerical terms, a powerful military tool. - The main emphasis falls on the "mass of troops." - Organization, equipment and controls are insufficient. - The principles of leadership are unsatisfactory, the leadership itself is too young and inexperienced ... - The quality of the troops in a difficult combat situation is doubtful. The Russian "mass" does not reach the level of an army equipped with modern weapons and higher-class leadership.
In the process of creating the Barbarossa plan, the participants were largely influenced by the strategic assessments of the USSR (Rusland-bild) periodically produced by the General Staff. According to them, the Soviet Union, like the former tsarist Russia, was a "colossus with feet of clay." An unexpected quick blow should knock him off his feet. According to the leading German generals, the Red Army in 1940-1941 was a clumsy accumulation of military units, incapable of operational initiative at all command levels, adapted only to the mechanical form of planning and operational behavior, and most importantly, not ready to wage a modern war. This assessment was particularly influenced by the actions of the Red Army in Poland and against Finland. These two campaigns were recognized as the most obvious evidence that the Red Army, firstly, had not recovered from the almost complete destruction of the officer corps during the "great purges", and secondly, had not mastered the new military equipment, had not joined the process mastering modern technology.
It is quite obvious that the quick victory of the Wehrmacht over the French army, which in the 1920s and 1930s seemed to many the most powerful military force in Europe, played a perverse role. Faith in the military-technical superiority of Germany was no longer questioned at any level. The German leadership, even in the event of a war with the USSR, expected quick decisive results. Henceforth, the problem of "Barbarossa" was considered as a problem of smoothly coordinated plans, correct operational preparation.
The above organization "Foreign Armies - East" (FHO), as mentioned, was instructed to analyze the capabilities of the Red Army after the end of the Polish campaign. Starting in the autumn of 1939, the FHO identified five channels of information: 1) radio intelligence; 2) reports of Abwehr agents and emigrants from the Baltics; 3) reports of the German military attaches; 4) allied intelligence reports; 5) testimonies of deserters from the Red Army. The Germans showed great skill in radio interception, in radio intelligence, but this source, limited in terms of space and function, did not give grounds for strategic assessments, did not allow judging the deployment of Red Army units, especially those located beyond the Urals. The Germans knew absolutely nothing about the military recruitment system.
The work of the FHO ended with the creation of an extensive memorandum “The military power of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Regulations on 01/01/1941. Two thousand copies of this document were printed by January 15, 1941. It spoke about the presence in the USSR of sixteen military districts and two military commissariats, led by the People's Commissariat of Defense. Radio reconnaissance and aerial photography enabled the FHO to identify eleven Soviet armies in the European part of the USSR. According to the memorandum, the USSR could mobilize from eleven to twelve million people. But the authors of the memorandum doubted the possibility of mobilizing such a mass of troops, since the country did not have enough officers, uniforms and equipment, and the factories needed labor.
The memorandum defined the volume of human masses that make up the Red Army: 20 armies, 20 infantry corps (150 infantry divisions), 9 cavalry corps (32-36 cavalry divisions), 6 mechanized corps, 36 motorized-mechanized brigades. The number of infantry divisions at the end of 1940 was determined at 121. From the memorandum, in essence, it followed that the FHO did not know the exact number of divisions of the Red Army and their location. The FHO made a big mistake by deciding that all Soviet tanks were obsolete models. German experts did not know about the existence of the T-34 tanks, although they showed themselves most conspicuously at Khalkhin Gol.
As for the balance of power between Germany and Russia, Hitler personally said that the armored forces of the USSR were "numerically the largest in the world." The number of Soviet tanks was determined at ten thousand units. Germany had three and a half thousand tanks. And this did not cause Hitler any fears. The Germans considered most of the Soviet tanks hopelessly outdated. Curiosity was caused only by the heaviest tank in the world - the KV-1 (43.5 tons), which first appeared (according to German information) in service in 1940.
German intelligence made a mistake two and a half times. The Red Army had 24,000 tanks. And among them is a tank, the creators of which we all owe. This is an ingenious model "T-34". A major miscalculation of German intelligence was that she did not pay attention to this tank, although hundreds of "thirty-fours" participated in battles with the Japanese in the late 30s. The frontal armor of the T-34 in 1941 reflected the fire of German guns of almost any caliber.
The assessment of the German Luftwaffe of the Soviet Air Force is in line with the same trend. On February 1, 1941, Berlin counted 10,500 Soviet aircraft, 7,500 of which were stationed in the European part of the USSR. The OKH headquarters thought it was better: 5655 aircraft in the European part of the Union. Of these, only 60 percent are ready for combat, and only 100-200 aircraft have a modern design. In fact, at the time of the German attack, the Red Army had 18 thousand aircraft of all types, and Halder later bitterly had to write in his diary: "The Luftwaffe significantly underestimated the number of enemy aircraft."
The key issue was the balance of ground forces. In January 1941, the FHO determined the size of the Red Army in peacetime at 2 million soldiers, the military - at 4 million. In fact, on January 1, 1941, there were 4 million soldiers in the ranks of the Red Army, and by June - 5 million.
In August 1940, General Marx counted 171 divisions in the Red Army (117 infantry, 24 cavalry, 30 mechanized brigades); On March 29, 1941, General Halder noted that the Russians "have 15 divisions more than we previously believed." Already in recent days, the Germans have established that there are 226 divisions in the European part of the USSR - this is a rather sharp increase that caused discomfort among the Germans. But they, these new realities, no longer influenced the fatal march of Nazi Germany. The Germans discovered the terrible truth for themselves in the second month of what they saw as a blitzkrieg.
The FHO memorandum made two important conclusions that directly related to the planning of Barbarossa.
First. The bulk Soviet troops will be located to the south and north of the Pripyat swamps in order to close the places of the breakthrough of the German troops and for counterattacks on the flanks of the German armies. Doubts were immediately expressed about the ability of the Red Army to carry out such operations, given general level military leadership and training of troops, the general level of organization, as well as the state of Soviet railways and highways.
Second. The strength of the Red Army lies in its numbers, as well as the stoicism, firmness and courage of a single soldier. These qualities should especially manifest themselves in defense. If in the Finnish campaign the Soviet soldier fought without enthusiasm, then in the event of a German invasion, he will be more steadfast. In general, German analysts did not see much difference between the Russian soldier of the First and Second World Wars. “The Soviet Union today retains only the external form, and not the true essence of the Marxist doctrine ... The state is controlled by the bureaucratic methods of persons blindly loyal to Stalin, the economy is controlled by engineers and managers who owe everything to the new regime and are truly devoted to it.” It was emphasized that "the Russian character - heavy, mechanical, withdrawing from decisions and responsibility - has not changed."
The general assessment of the Red Army is as follows: “Clumsiness, schematism, the desire to avoid decision-making and responsibility ... The weakness of the Red Army lies in the clumsiness of officers of all ranks, their attachment to formulas, insufficient training, as required by modern standards, the desire to avoid responsibility and the obvious inefficiency of the organization in all aspects." There was a lack of a competent, highly professional military leadership capable of replacing the generals who died in the purges, the backwardness of the troop training system, and insufficient military supplies to equip them.
The last assessment of the Red Army, carried out by the organization "Foreign Armies - East", dates back to May 20, 1941. Number in the European part: 130 infantry divisions, 21 cavalry, 5 armored, 36 motorized-mechanized brigades. The arrival of reinforcements from Asia is unlikely for political reasons. In essence, the FHO called for neglecting the divisions located in the Far East.
The following is very important: the FHO believed that in the event of an attack from the West, the withdrawal of the bulk of Soviet troops into the depths of Russia - following the example of 1812 - was impossible. It was predicted that defensive battles would be fought in a strip about thirty kilometers deep using fortifications created in advance. The same fortifications will serve as starting bases for counterattacks. The Red Army will try to stop the German offensive near the border and transfer combat operations to enemy territory. Consequently, the fate of the war will be decided at the border. Large-scale troop movements should not be expected. Hitler fully shared this illusion, and it cost Germany dearly. (In just a few weeks, the OKH would receive information similar to the report of the 41st Panzer Corps: "The materials presented give only a very superficial picture of the alleged resistance of the enemy.")
One of the reasons for the inefficiency of the German intelligence service was, as already mentioned, the fact that the German codebreakers never managed to read the ciphers of the Red Army command and Soviet intelligence. In this regard, she had no achievements, like the British and Americans. The Germans were able to infiltrate a few agents into the Red Army headquarters at the divisional and army levels, as well as in the rear, but they never succeeded in infiltrating the Soviet General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, or any institution above the army level. Attempts to get into the upper echelon of the GRU, NKVD, and then SMERSH were unsuccessful. Moreover, as it turned out after the war, the German lost unconditionally in the competition between the two intelligence services: the most valuable agents of the Abwehr transmitted information containing disinformation. This, above all, concerns the three leading agents of the Abwehr, whose reports and assessments of the USSR directly influenced military planning in Germany. This refers to "Max", located in Sofia, "Stex" in Stockholm and Ivar Lissner in Harbin. They have been working with Moscow's knowledge from the very beginning and have been spreading strategic disinformation. As the American researcher D. Thomas writes, “The FHO was vulnerable to Soviet disinformation, especially at the strategic level, not only because of the lack of reliable basic information about Soviet plans, but also because of a specifically German way of thinking. Namely: there was a sense of superiority that led to an underestimation of Soviet military capabilities; the emphasis on Soviet military shortcomings, which does not allow for a correct assessment of Soviet operational capabilities; a tendency to "mirror-image" Soviet intentions; over-centralization of the evaluation process in the hands of a small group of analysts. (However, even observing the outcome of the aggression, not all German authorities stigmatized the FHO. For example, General Jodl during interrogations in 1945 stated: “On the whole, I was satisfied with the work of our intelligence services. the best result was an accurate identification of the location of Russian troops at the beginning of 1941 in Western Belarus and Ukraine.")
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Collection by Germany of reconnaissance against the USSR
To implement the strategic plans for an armed attack on neighboring countries, Hitler told his entourage about them as early as November 5, 1937 - fascist Germany, naturally, needed extensive and reliable information that would reveal all aspects of the life of future victims of aggression, and especially information on the basis of which it would be to draw a conclusion about their defense potential. By supplying government bodies and the high command of the Wehrmacht with such information, the "total espionage" services actively contributed to the preparation of the country for war. Intelligence information was obtained in different ways, using a variety of methods and means.
The Second World War, unleashed by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, began with the invasion of German troops into Poland. But Hitler considered the defeat of the Soviet Union, the conquest of a new "living space" in the East up to the Urals, to the achievement of which all state bodies of the country, and primarily the Wehrmacht and intelligence, were oriented. The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty signed on August 23, 1939, as well as the Friendship and Border Treaty concluded on September 28 of the same year, were supposed to serve as camouflage. Moreover, the opportunities opened up as a result of this were used to increase activity in the intelligence work against the USSR that was carried out throughout the entire pre-war period. Hitler constantly demanded from Canaris and Heydrich new information about the measures taken by the Soviet authorities to organize a rebuff to armed aggression.
As already noted, in the first years after the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany, the Soviet Union was viewed primarily as a political enemy. Therefore, everything related to him was within the competence of the security service. But this arrangement did not last long. Soon, in accordance with the criminal plans of the Nazi elite and the German military command, all the services of "total espionage" were involved in a secret war against the world's first country of socialism. Speaking about the direction of the espionage and sabotage activities of Nazi Germany at that time, Schellenberg wrote in his memoirs: “The decisive and decisive action of all secret services against Russia was considered the first and most important task.”
The intensity of these actions increased markedly from the autumn of 1939, especially after the victory over France, when the Abwehr and SD were able to release their significant forces occupied in this region and use them in the eastern direction. The secret services, as is clear from archival documents, were then given a specific task: to clarify and supplement the available information about the economic and political situation of the Soviet Union, to ensure the regular flow of information about its defense capability and future theaters of military operations. They were also instructed to develop a detailed plan for organizing sabotage and terrorist actions on the territory of the USSR, timed to coincide with the time of the first offensive operations of the Nazi troops. In addition, they were called upon, as has already been said in detail, to guarantee the secrecy of the invasion and to launch a wide campaign of misinformation of world public opinion. This was how the program of actions of Hitler's intelligence against the USSR was determined, in which the leading place, for obvious reasons, was assigned to espionage.
Archival materials and other quite reliable sources contain a lot of evidence that an intense secret war against the Soviet Union began long before June 1941.
Zally Headquarters
By the time of the attack on the USSR, the activity of the Abwehr - this leader among the Nazi secret services in the field of espionage and sabotage - had reached its climax. In June 1941, the "Zalli Headquarters" was created, designed to provide leadership in all types of espionage and sabotage directed against the Soviet Union. The Valley Headquarters directly coordinated the actions of teams and groups assigned to army groups to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations. It was then located near Warsaw, in the town of Sulejuwek, and was led by an experienced scout Schmalschleger.
Here is some evidence of how events unfolded.
One of the prominent employees of German military intelligence, Stolze, during interrogation on December 25, 1945, testified that the head of the Abwehr II, Colonel Lahousen, having informed him in April 1941 of the date of the German attack on the USSR, demanded to urgently study all the materials at the disposal of the Abwehr regarding Soviet Union. It was necessary to find out the possibility of inflicting a powerful blow on the most important Soviet military-industrial facilities in order to completely or partially disable them. At the same time, a top-secret division was created within the framework of the Abwehr II, headed by Stolze. For reasons of secrecy, it had the running name "Group A". His duties included the planning and preparation of large-scale sabotage operations. They were undertaken, as Lahousen emphasized, in the hope that it would be possible to disorganize the rear of the Red Army, sow panic among the local population, and thereby facilitate the advance of the Nazi troops.
Lahousen acquainted Stolze with the order of the headquarters of the operational leadership, signed by Field Marshal Keitel, which outlined in general terms the directive of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command to deploy sabotage activities on Soviet territory after the start of the Barbarossa plan. The Abwehr was supposed to start carrying out actions aimed at inciting national hatred between the peoples of the USSR, to which the Nazi elite attached particular importance. Guided by the directive of the supreme command, Stolze conspired with the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists Melnik and Bendera that they would immediately begin organizing in Ukraine the actions of nationalist elements hostile to Soviet power, timing them to coincide with the moment of the invasion of the Nazi troops. At the same time, the Abwehr II began to send its agents from among the Ukrainian nationalists to the territory of Ukraine, some of whom had the task of compiling or clarifying lists of local party and Soviet assets to be destroyed. Subversive actions involving nationalists of all stripes were also carried out in other regions of the USSR.
Actions of ABWER against the USSR
Abwehr II, according to Stolze's testimony, formed and armed "special detachments" for operations (in violation of international rules of warfare) in the Soviet Baltic states, tested back in the initial period of World War II. One of these detachments, whose soldiers and officers were dressed in Soviet military uniforms, had the task of seizing the railway tunnel and bridges near Vilnius. Until May 1941, 75 Abwehr and SD intelligence groups were neutralized on the territory of Lithuania, which, as documented, launched active espionage and sabotage activities here on the eve of Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR.
How great was the attention of the high command of the Wehrmacht to the deployment of sabotage operations in the rear of the Soviet troops, shows the fact that the "special detachments" and "special teams" of the Abwehr were in all army groups and armies concentrated on the eastern borders of Germany.
According to Stolze's testimony, the Abwehr branches in Koenigsberg, Warsaw and Krakow had a directive from Canaris in connection with the preparation of an attack on the USSR to intensify espionage and sabotage activities to the maximum. The task was to provide the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht with detailed and most accurate data on the system of targets on the territory of the USSR, primarily on roads and railways, bridges, power plants and other objects, the destruction of which could lead to a serious disorganization of the Soviet rear and in in the end would have paralyzed his forces and broken the resistance of the Red Army. The Abwehr was supposed to extend its tentacles to the most important communications, military-industrial facilities, as well as large administrative and political centers of the USSR - in any case, it was planned.
Summing up some of the work carried out by the Abwehr by the time the German invasion of the USSR began, Canaris wrote in a memorandum that numerous groups of agents from the indigenous population, that is, from Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Balts, Finns, etc., were sent to the headquarters of the German armies. n. Each group consisted of 25 (or more) people. These groups were led by German officers. They were supposed to penetrate the Soviet rear to a depth of 50,300 kilometers behind the front line in order to report by radio the results of their observations, paying special attention to collecting information about Soviet reserves, the state of railways and other roads, as well as about all activities carried out by the enemy. .
In the prewar years, the German embassy in Moscow and the German consulates in Leningrad, Kharkov, Tbilisi, Kyiv, Odessa, Novosibirsk and Vladivostok served as the center for organizing espionage, the main base for the strongholds of Hitler's intelligence. In those years, a large group of career German intelligence officers, the most experienced professionals, representing all parts of the Nazi “total espionage” system, and especially the Abwehr and the SD, worked in the diplomatic field in the USSR in those years. Despite the obstacles put up by the Chekist authorities, they, shamelessly using their diplomatic immunity, developed a high activity here, striving, first of all, as archival materials of those years indicate, to test the defense power of our country.
Erich Köstring
The Abwehr residency in Moscow at that time was headed by General Erich Köstring, who until 1941 was known in German intelligence circles as "the most knowledgeable specialist on the Soviet Union." He was born and lived for some time in Moscow, so he was fluent in Russian and was familiar with the way of life in Russia. During the First World War, he fought against the tsarist army, then in the 1920s he worked in a special center that studied the Red Army. From 1931 to 1933, in the final period of Soviet-German military cooperation, he acted as an observer from the Reichswehr in the USSR. He ended up in Moscow again in October 1935 as a military and aviation attache in Germany and stayed until 1941. He had a wide circle of acquaintances in the Soviet Union, whom he sought to use to obtain information of interest to him.
However, of the numerous questions that Köstring received from Germany six months after his arrival in Moscow, he was able to answer only a few. In his letter to the head of the intelligence department for the armies of the East, he explained this as follows: “The experience of several months of work here has shown that there can be no question of the possibility of obtaining military intelligence information, even remotely related to the military industry, even on the most harmless issues. . Visits to military units have been suspended. One gets the impression that the Russians are supplying all attachés with a set of false information.” The letter ended with an assurance that he nevertheless hoped that he would be able to draw up "a mosaic picture reflecting the further development and organizational structure of the Red Army."
After the German consulates were closed in 1938, the military attaches of other countries were deprived of the opportunity to attend military parades for two years, and, in addition, restrictions were placed on foreigners establishing contacts with Soviet citizens. Köstring, in his words, was forced to return to using three "meager sources of information": traveling around the territory of the USSR and traveling by car to various regions of the Moscow region, using the open Soviet press, and, finally, exchanging information with military attaches of other countries.
In one of his reports, he draws the following conclusion about the state of affairs in the Red Army: “As a result of the liquidation of the main part of the senior officers, who mastered the military art quite well in the process of ten years of practical training and theoretical training, the operational capabilities of the Red Army have decreased. The lack of military order and the lack of experienced commanders will have a negative effect for some time on the training and education of troops. The irresponsibility that is already manifesting itself in military affairs will lead to even more serious negative consequences in the future. The army is deprived of commanders of the highest qualification. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for concluding that the offensive capabilities of the mass of soldiers have declined to such an extent as not to recognize the Red Army as a very important factor in the event of a military conflict.
In a message to Berlin by Lieutenant Colonel Hans Krebs, who replaced the ill Köstring, dated April 22, 1941, it was said: “The Soviet ground forces, of course, have not yet reached the maximum number according to the combat schedule for wartime, determined by us at 200 infantry rifle divisions. This information was recently confirmed by the military attachés of Finland and Japan in a conversation with me.
A few weeks later, Köstring and Krebs made a special trip to Berlin to personally inform Hitler that there were no significant changes for the better in the Red Army.
The employees of the Abwehr and SD, who used diplomatic and other official cover in the USSR, were tasked, along with strictly oriented information, to collect information on a wide range of military-economic problems. This information had a very specific purpose - it was supposed to enable the strategic planning bodies of the Wehrmacht to get an idea of the conditions in which the Nazi troops would have to operate on the territory of the USSR, and in particular when capturing Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and other large cities. The coordinates of the objects of future bombardments were clarified. Even then, a network of underground radio stations was being created to transmit the collected information, caches were set up in public and other suitable places where instructions from Nazi intelligence centers and items of sabotage equipment could be stored so that agents sent and located on the territory of the USSR could use them at the right time.
Using trade relations between Germany and the USSR for intelligence
For the purpose of espionage, cadres, secret agents and proxies of the Abwehr and the SD were systematically sent to the Soviet Union, for the penetration of which into our country the intensively developing economic, trade, economic and cultural ties between the USSR and Germany in those years were used. With their help, such important tasks were solved as collecting information about the military and economic potential of the USSR, in particular about the defense industry (capacity, zoning, bottlenecks), about the industry as a whole, its individual large centers, energy systems, communication routes, sources of industrial raw materials, etc. Representatives of business circles were especially active, who often, along with the collection of intelligence information, carried out instructions to establish communications on Soviet territory with agents whom German intelligence managed to recruit during the period of active functioning of German concerns and firms in our country.
Attaching great importance to the use of legal possibilities in intelligence work against the USSR and in every possible way seeking to expand them, both the Abwehr and the SD, at the same time, proceeded from the fact that the information obtained in this way, in its predominant part, is not capable of serving as a sufficient basis for developing specific plans, adopting correct decisions in the military-political field. And besides, based only on such information, they believed, it is difficult to form a reliable and somewhat complete picture of tomorrow's military enemy, his forces and reserves. To fill the gap, the Abwehr and the SD, as confirmed by many documents, are making attempts to intensify work against our country by illegal means, seeking to acquire secret sources within the country or send secret agents from beyond the cordon, counting on their settling in the USSR. This, in particular, is evidenced by the following fact: the head of the Abwehr intelligence group in the United States, officer G. Rumrich, at the beginning of 1938, had instructions from his center to obtain blank forms of American passports for agents thrown into Russia.
“Can you get at least fifty of them?” Rumrich was asked in a cipher telegram from Berlin. Abwehr was ready to pay a thousand dollars for each blank American passport - they were so necessary.
Long before the start of the war against the USSR, documentary specialists from the secret services of Nazi Germany scrupulously followed all the changes in the procedure for issuing and issuing personal documents of Soviet citizens. They showed an increased interest in clarifying the system for protecting military documents from forgery, trying to establish the procedure for the use of conventional secret signs.
In addition to agents illegally sent to the Soviet Union, the Abwehr and the SD used their official employees, embedded in the commission to determine the line of the German-Soviet border and the resettlement of Germans living in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, as well as the Baltic states, to obtain information of interest to them. territory of Germany.
Already at the end of 1939, Hitler's intelligence began to systematically send agents to the USSR from the territory of occupied Poland to conduct military espionage. They were usually professionals. It is known, for example, that one of these agents, who underwent 15 months of training in the Berlin Abwehr school in 1938-1939, managed to illegally enter the USSR three times in 1940. Having made several long one-and-a-half to two-month trips to the regions of the Central Urals, Moscow and the North Caucasus, the agent returned safely to Germany.
Beginning around April 1941, the Abwehr shifted mainly to dropping agents in groups led by experienced officers. All of them had the necessary espionage and sabotage equipment, including radio stations for receiving direct radio broadcasts from Berlin. They had to send response messages to a fictitious address in cryptography.
In the Minsk, Leningrad and Kiev directions, the depth of undercover intelligence reached 300-400 kilometers or more. Part of the agents, having reached certain points, had to settle there for some time and immediately begin to carry out the task received. Most of the agents (usually they did not have radio stations) had to return to the intelligence center no later than June 15-18, 1941, so that the information they obtained could be quickly used by the command.
What primarily interested the Abwehr and SD? The tasks for either group of agents, as a rule, differed little and boiled down to finding out the concentration of Soviet troops in the border areas, the deployment of headquarters, formations and units of the Red Army, points and areas where radio stations were located, the presence of ground and underground airfields, the number and types of aircraft based on them, the location of ammunition depots, explosives, fuel.
Some agents sent to the USSR were instructed by the intelligence center to refrain from specific practical actions until the start of the war. The goal is clear - the leaders of the Abwehr hoped in this way to keep their agent cells until the moment when the need for them would be especially great.
Sending German agents to the USSR in 1941
The activity of preparing agents for being sent to the Soviet Union is evidenced by such data gleaned from the archives of the Abwehr. In mid-May 1941, about 100 people destined for deportation to the USSR were trained in the intelligence school of the department of Admiral Kanarys near Koenigsberg (in the town of Grossmichel).
Who was betting on? They come from the families of Russian emigrants who settled in Berlin after the October Revolution, the sons of former officers of the tsarist army who fought against Soviet Russia, and after the defeat they fled abroad, members of the nationalist organizations of Western Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, the Balkan countries, as a rule, who spoke Russian language.
Among the means used by Hitler's intelligence in violation of the generally accepted norms of international law was also aerial espionage, which was put at the service of the latest technical achievements. In the system of the Ministry of the Air Force of fascist Germany, there was even a special unit - a special-purpose squadron, which, together with the secret service of this department, carried out reconnaissance work against the countries that were of interest to the Abwehr. During the flights, all structures important for the conduct of the war were photographed: ports, bridges, airfields, military facilities, industrial enterprises, etc. Thus, the Wehrmacht military cartographic service received in advance from the Abwehr the information necessary to compile good maps. Everything related to these flights was kept in the strictest confidence, and only the direct executors and those from a very limited circle of employees of the Abwehr I air group, whose duties included processing and analyzing data obtained through aerial reconnaissance, knew about them. Aerial photography materials were presented in the form of photographs, as a rule, to Canaris himself, in rare cases - to one of his deputies, and then transferred to the destination. It is known that the command of the special squadron of the Rovel Air Force, stationed in Staaken, already in 1937 began reconnaissance of the territory of the USSR using Hein-Kel-111 disguised as transport aircraft.
Air reconnaissance of Germany before the start of the war
An idea of the intensity of aerial reconnaissance is given by the following generalized data: from October 1939 to June 22, 1941, German aircraft invaded the airspace of the Soviet Union more than 500 times. Many cases are known when civil aviation aircraft flying along the Berlin-Moscow route on the basis of agreements between Aeroflot and Lufthansa often deliberately strayed off course and ended up over military installations. Two weeks before the start of the war, the Germans also flew around the areas where the Soviet troops were located. Every day they photographed the location of our divisions, corps, armies, pinpointed the location of military radio transmitters that were not camouflaged.
A few months before the attack of fascist Germany on the USSR, aerial photographs of the Soviet territory were carried out at full speed. According to information received by our intelligence through agents from the referent of the German aviation headquarters, German aircraft flew to the Soviet side from airfields in Bucharest, Koenigsberg and Kirkenes (Northern Norway) and photographed from a height of 6 thousand meters. In the period from April 1 to April 19, 1941 alone, German planes violated the state border 43 times, making reconnaissance flights over our territory to a depth of 200 kilometers.
As established by the Nuremberg trials of the main war criminals, the materials obtained with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance, carried out in 1939, even before the start of the invasion of Nazi troops into Poland, were used as a guide in the subsequent planning of military and sabotage operations against the USSR. Reconnaissance flights, which were carried out first over the territory of Poland, then the Soviet Union (to Chernigov) and the countries of South-Eastern Europe, some time later were transferred to Leningrad, to which, as an object of air espionage, the main attention was riveted. It is known from archival documents that on February 13, 1940, Canaris' report “On new results of aerial reconnaissance against the SSSL received by the Rovel special squadron” was heard from General Jodl at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command. Since that time, the scale of air espionage has increased dramatically. His main task was to obtain information necessary for compiling geographical maps of the USSR. At the same time, special attention was paid to naval military bases and other strategically important objects (for example, the Shostka gunpowder plant) and, especially, oil production centers, oil refineries, and oil pipelines. Future objects for bombing were also determined.
An important channel for obtaining espionage information about the USSR and its armed forces was the regular exchange of information with the intelligence agencies of the allied countries of Nazi Germany - Japan, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, the Abwehr maintained working contacts with the military intelligence services of the countries neighboring the Soviet Union - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Schellenberg even set himself the task of developing the secret services of countries friendly to Germany and rallying them into a kind of “intelligence community” that would work for one common center and supply the countries included in it with the necessary information (a goal that was generally achieved after war in NATO in the form of informal cooperation between various secret services under the auspices of the CIA).
Denmark, for example, in whose secret service Schellenberg, with the support of the leadership of the local National Socialist Party, managed to take a leading position and where there was already a good “operational reserve”, was “used as a“ base ”in intelligence work against England and Russia. According to Schellenberg, he managed to infiltrate the Soviet intelligence network. As a result, he writes, after some time a well-established connection with Russia was established, and we began to receive important information of a political nature.
The wider the preparations for the invasion of the USSR, the more vigorously Canaris tried to include his allies and satellites of Nazi Germany in intelligence activities, to put their agents into action. Through the Abwehr, the centers of Nazi military intelligence in the countries of South-Eastern Europe were ordered to intensify their work against the Soviet Union. The Abwehr has long maintained the closest contacts with the intelligence service of Horthy Hungary. According to P. Leverkün, the results of the actions of the Hungarian intelligence service in the Balkans were a valuable addition to the work of the Abwehr. An Abwehr liaison officer was constantly in Budapest, who exchanged information obtained. There was also a representative office of the SD, consisting of six people, headed by Hoettl. Their duty was to maintain contact with the Hungarian secret service and the German national minority, which served as a source of recruiting agents. The representative office had practically unlimited funds in stamps to pay for the services of agents. At first it was focused on solving political problems, but with the outbreak of war, its activities increasingly acquired a military orientation. In January 1940, Canaris set about organizing a powerful Abwehr center in Sofia in order to turn Bulgaria into one of the strongholds of his agent network. Contacts with Romanian intelligence were just as close. With the consent of the chief of Romanian intelligence, Morutsov, and with the assistance of oil firms that were dependent on German capital, Abwehr people were sent to the territory of Romania in the oil regions. The scouts acted under the guise of employees of firms - "mountain masters", and the soldiers of the sabotage regiment "Brandenburg" - local guards. Thus, the Abwehr managed to establish itself in the oil heart of Romania, and from here it began to spread its spy networks further to the east.
The Nazi services of "total espionage" in the struggle against the USSR even in the years preceding the war, had an ally in the face of the intelligence of militaristic Japan, whose ruling circles also made far-reaching plans for our country, the practical implementation of which they associated with the capture of Moscow by the Germans. And although there were never joint military plans between Germany and Japan, each of them pursued its own policy of aggression, sometimes trying to benefit at the expense of the other, nevertheless, both countries were interested in partnership and cooperation between themselves and therefore acted as a united front in the intelligence field . This, in particular, is eloquently evidenced by the activities in those years of the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, General Oshima. It is known that he coordinated the actions of Japanese intelligence residencies in European countries, where he established fairly close ties in political and business circles and maintained contacts with the leaders of the SD and the Abwehr. Through it, a regular exchange of intelligence data about the USSR was carried out. Oshima kept his ally informed about the concrete measures of Japanese intelligence in relation to our country and, in turn, was aware of the covert operations launched against it by fascist Germany. If necessary, he provided the undercover and other operational capabilities at his disposal and, on a mutual basis, willingly supplied intelligence information. Another key figure in Japanese intelligence in Europe was the Japanese envoy in Stockholm, Onodera.
In the plans of the Abwehr and the SD directed against the Soviet Union, an important place, for obvious reasons, was assigned to its neighboring states - the Baltic States, Finland, Poland.
The Nazis showed particular interest in Estonia, considering it as a purely “neutral” country, the territory of which could serve as a convenient springboard for deploying intelligence operations against the USSR. This was decisively facilitated by the fact that already in the second half of 1935, after a group of pro-fascist officers led by Colonel Maazing, head of the intelligence department of the General Staff, gained the upper hand at the headquarters of the Estonian army, there was a complete reorientation of the country's military command to Nazi Germany . In the spring of 1936, Maasing, and after him the chief of staff of the army, General Reek, willingly accepted the invitation of the leaders of the Wehrmacht to visit Berlin. During their time there, they struck up a business relationship with Canaris and his closest aides. An agreement was reached on mutual information on the intelligence line. The Germans undertook to equip Estonian intelligence with operational and technical means. As it turned out later, it was then that the Abwehr secured the official consent of Reek and Maazing to use the territory of Estonia to work against the USSR. At the disposal of Estonian intelligence were provided photographic equipment for the production of photographs of warships from the lighthouses of the Gulf of Finland, as well as radio interception devices, which were then installed along the entire Soviet-Estonian border. To provide technical assistance, specialists from the decryption department of the Wehrmacht high command were sent to Tallinn.
General Laidoner, commander-in-chief of the Estonian bourgeois army, assessed the results of these negotiations as follows: “We were mainly interested in information about the deployment of Soviet military forces in the region of our border and about the movements taking place there. All this information, insofar as they had it, the Germans willingly communicated to us. As for our intelligence department, it supplied the Germans with all the data we had on the Soviet rear and the internal situation in the SSSL.
General Pickenbrock, one of Canaris's closest aides, during interrogation on February 25, 1946, in particular, testified: “Estonian intelligence maintained very close ties with us. We constantly provided her with financial and technical support. Its activities were directed exclusively against the Soviet Union. The head of intelligence, Colonel Maazing, visited Berlin every year, and our representatives, as necessary, traveled to Estonia themselves. Captain Cellarius often visited there, who was entrusted with the task of monitoring the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, its position and maneuvers. An employee of Estonian intelligence, Captain Pigert, constantly cooperated with him. Before the Soviet troops entered Estonia, we left numerous agents there in advance, with whom we maintained regular contact and through which we received information of interest to us. When Soviet power arose there, our agents intensified their activities and, until the very moment of the occupation of the country, supplied us with the necessary information, thereby contributing to a significant extent to the success of the German troops. For some time, Estonia and Finland were the main sources of intelligence information about the Soviet armed forces.
In April 1939, General Reek was again invited to Germany, which was widely celebrating Hitler's birthday, whose visit, as expected in Berlin, was supposed to deepen interaction between the German and Estonian military intelligence services. With the assistance of the latter, the Abwehr managed to carry out in 1939 and 1940 the transfer of several groups of spies and saboteurs to the USSR. All this time, four radio stations were functioning along the Soviet-Estonian border, intercepting radio messages, and at the same time, from different points, the work of radio stations on the territory of the USSR was monitored. The information obtained in this way was passed on to the Abwehr, from which the Estonian intelligence had no secrets, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.
The Baltic countries in intelligence against the USSR
Abwehr leaders regularly traveled to Estonia once a year to exchange information. The heads of the intelligence services of these countries, in turn, visited Berlin every year. Thus, the exchange of accumulated secret information took place every six months. In addition, special couriers were periodically sent from both sides when it was necessary to urgently deliver the necessary information to the center; sometimes military attachés at the Estonian and German embassies were authorized for this purpose. The information transmitted by Estonian intelligence mainly contained data on the state of the armed forces and the military-industrial potential of the Soviet Union.
The Abwehr archives contain materials about the stay of Canaris and Pikenbrock in Estonia in 1937, 1938 and June 1939. In all cases, these trips were caused by the need to improve the coordination of actions against the USSR and the exchange of intelligence information. Here is what General Laidoner, already mentioned above, writes: “The head of German intelligence, Kanaris, visited Estonia for the first time in 1936. After that, he visited here twice or thrice. I took it personally. Negotiations on issues of intelligence work were conducted with him by the head of the army headquarters and the head of the 2nd department. Then it was established more specifically what information was required for both countries and what we could give each other. The last time Canaris visited Estonia was in June 1939. It was mainly about intelligence activities. I spoke with Canaris at some length about our position in the event of a clash between Germany and England and between Germany and the USSR. He was interested in the question of how long it would take the Soviet Union to fully mobilize its armed forces and what was the condition of its means of transport (railway, road and road). On this visit, along with Canaris and Pikenbrock, was the head of the Abwehr III department, Frans Bentivegni, whose trip was connected with checking the work of a group subordinate to him, which carried out extra-cordon counterintelligence activities in Tallinn. In order to avoid the "inept interference" of the Gestapo in the affairs of the counterintelligence of the Abwehr, at the insistence of Canaris, an agreement was reached between him and Heydrich that in all cases when the security police would carry out any activities on Estonian territory, the Abwehr must first be informed . For his part, Heydrich put forward a demand - the SD should have an independent residency in Estonia. Realizing that in the event of an open quarrel with the influential chief of the imperial security service, it would be difficult for the Abwehr to count on Hitler's support, Canaris agreed to "make room" and accepted Heydrich's demand. At the same time, they agreed that all the activities of the SD in the field of recruiting agents in Estonia and transferring them to the Soviet Union would be coordinated with the Abwehr. The Abwehr retained the right to concentrate in their hands and evaluate all intelligence information regarding the Red Army and Navy, which the Nazis received through Estonia, as well as through other Baltic countries and Finland. Canaris strongly objected to the attempts of the SD employees to act together with the Estonian fascists, bypassing the Abwehr and sending unverified information to Berlin, which often came to Hitler through Himmler.
According to Laidoner's report to Estonian President Päts, the last time Canaris was in Tallinn was in the autumn of 1939 under a false name. In this regard, his meeting with Laidoner and Päts was arranged according to all the rules of conspiracy.
In the report of the Schellenberg department, preserved in the archives of the RSHA, it was reported that the operational situation for intelligence work through the SD in the pre-war period in both Estonia and Latvia was similar. At the head of the residency in each of these countries was an official employee of the SD, who was in an illegal position. All the information collected by the residency flowed to him, which he forwarded to the center by mail using cryptography, through couriers on German ships or through embassy channels. The practical activities of the SD intelligence residencies in the Baltic states were assessed positively by Berlin, especially in terms of acquiring sources of information in political circles. The SD was greatly assisted by immigrants from Germany who lived here. But, as noted in the above-mentioned report of the VI Department of the RSHA, “after the entry of the Russians, the operational capabilities of the SD underwent serious changes. The leading figures of the country left the political arena, and maintaining contact with them became more difficult. There was an urgent need to find new channels for transmitting intelligence information to the center. It became impossible to send it on ships, since the ships were carefully searched by the authorities, and the members of the crews who went ashore were constantly monitored. I also had to refuse to send information through the free port of Memel (now Klaipeda, Lithuanian SSR. - Ed.) via overland communication. It was also risky to use sympathetic ink. I had to resolutely take up the laying of new communication channels, as well as the search for fresh sources of information. The SD resident in Estonia, who spoke in official correspondence under the code number 6513, nevertheless managed to make contact with newly recruited agents and use old sources of information. Maintaining regular contact with his agents was a very dangerous business, requiring exceptional caution and dexterity. Resident 6513, however, was able to very quickly understand the situation and, despite all the difficulties, obtain the necessary information. In January 1940, he received a diplomatic passport and began working under the guise of an assistant at the German embassy in Tallinn.
As for Finland, according to the archival materials of the Wehrmacht, a “Military Organization” was actively operating on its territory, conditionally called the “Cellarius Bureau” (after its leader, the German military intelligence officer Cellarius). It was created by the Abwehr with the consent of the Finnish military authorities in mid-1939. Since 1936, Canaris and his closest assistants Pikenbrock and Bentivegni have repeatedly met in Finland and Germany with the head of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Swenson, and then with Colonel Melander, who replaced him. At these meetings, they exchanged intelligence information and worked out plans for joint action against the Soviet Union. The Cellarius Bureau constantly kept in view the Baltic Fleet, the troops of the Leningrad Military District, as well as units stationed in Estonia. His active assistants in Helsinki were Dobrovolsky, a former general of the tsarist army, and former tsarist officers Pushkarev, Alekseev, Sokolov, Batuev, Baltic Germans Meisner, Mansdorf, Estonian bourgeois nationalists Weller, Kurg, Horn, Kristyan and others. On the territory of Finland, Cellarius had a fairly wide network of agents among various segments of the country's population, recruited spies and saboteurs among the Russian White émigrés who had settled there, the nationalists who fled from Estonia, and the Baltic Germans.
Pickenbrock, during interrogation on February 25, 1946, gave detailed testimony about the activities of the Cellarius Bureau, saying that Captain First Rank Cellarius carried out intelligence work against the Soviet Union under the cover of the German embassy in Finland. “We have had close cooperation with Finnish intelligence for a long time, even before I joined the Abwehr in 1936. In order to exchange intelligence data, we systematically received information from the Finns about the deployment and strength of the Red Army.
As follows from Pickenbrock's testimony, he first visited Helsinki with Canaris and Major Stolz, head of the Abwehr department I of the Ost ground forces headquarters, in June 1937. Together with representatives of Finnish intelligence, they compared and exchanged intelligence information about the Soviet Union. At the same time, a questionnaire was handed over to the Finns, which they were to be guided in the future when collecting intelligence information. The Abwehr was primarily interested in the deployment of Red Army units, military industry facilities, especially in the Leningrad region. During this visit, they had business meetings and conversations with the German ambassador to Finland, von Blucher, and the military attaché, Major General Rossing. In June 1938, Canaris and Pickenbrock again visited Finland. On this visit, they were received by the Finnish Minister of War, who expressed satisfaction with the way Canaris's cooperation with the head of Finnish intelligence, Colonel Swenson, was developing. The third time they were in Finland was in June 1939. The head of Finnish intelligence at that time was Melander. The negotiations proceeded within the same framework as the previous ones. Informed in advance by the leaders of the Abwehr about the upcoming attack on the Soviet Union, Finnish military intelligence in early June 1941 put at their disposal the information it had in relation to the Soviet Union. At the same time, with the knowledge of the local authorities, the Abwehr began to carry out Operation Erna, which involved the transfer of Estonian counter-revolutionaries from Finland to the Baltic region as spies, radio agents and saboteurs.
The last time Canaris and Pickenbrock visited Finland was in the winter of 1941/42. Together with them was the chief of counterintelligence (Abwehr III) Bentivegni, who traveled to inspect and provide practical assistance to the "military organization", as well as to resolve issues of cooperation between this organization and Finnish intelligence. Together with Melander, they determined the boundaries of Cellarius' activities: he received the right to independently recruit agents on Finnish territory and transfer them across the front line. After the negotiations, Canaris and Pikenbrock, accompanied by Melander, went to the city of Mikkeli, to the headquarters of Marshal Mannerheim, who expressed a desire to personally meet with the chief of the German Abwehr. They were joined by the head of the German military mission in Finland, General Erfurt.
Cooperation with the intelligence services of the allied and occupied countries in the fight against the USSR undoubtedly brought certain results, but the Nazis expected more from him.
The results of the activities of German intelligence on the eve of the Great Patriotic War
“On the eve of the war, the Abwehr,” writes O. Reile, “was unable to cover the Soviet Union with a well-functioning intelligence network from well-located secret strongholds in other countries - Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan or Finland.” Created in peacetime strongholds in neutral countries - "military organizations" were either disguised as economic firms or included in German missions abroad. When the war began, Germany was cut off from many sources of information, and the importance of "military organizations" greatly increased. Until the middle of 1941, the Abwehr carried out systematic work on the border with the USSR in order to create its own strongholds and plant agents. Along the German-Soviet border, a wide network of technical reconnaissance equipment was deployed, with the help of which interception of radio communications was carried out.
In connection with Hitler's installation on the all-out deployment of the activities of all German secret services against the Soviet Union, the question of coordination became acute, especially after an agreement was concluded between the RSHA and the General Staff of the German Ground Forces to give each army special detachments of the SD, called "Einsatzgruppen" and "Einsatzkommando".
In the first half of June 1941, Heydrich and Canaris convened a meeting of Abwehr officers and commanders of police and SD units (Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando). In addition to separate special reports, reports were made at it that covered in general terms the operational plans for the upcoming invasion of the USSR. The ground forces were represented at this meeting by the quartermaster general, who, regarding the technical side of cooperation between the secret services, relied on a draft order worked out in agreement with the chief of the SD. Canaris and Heydrich, in their speeches, touched upon the issues of interaction, "feeling of the elbow" between parts of the security police, the SD and the Abwehr. A few days after this meeting, both of them were received by the Reichsführer SS Himmler to discuss their proposed plan of action to counter Soviet intelligence.
Evidence of the scope that the activities of the "total espionage" services against the USSR on the eve of the war can serve as such generalizing data: only in 1940 and the first quarter of 1941 in the western regions of our country were discovered 66 residencies of Nazi intelligence and neutralized more than 1300 of its agents .
As a result of the activation of the “total espionage” services, the volume of information they collected about the Soviet Union, which required analysis and appropriate processing, constantly increased, and intelligence, as the Nazis wanted, became more and more comprehensive. There was a need to involve relevant research organizations in the process of studying and evaluating intelligence materials. One of these institutes, widely used by intelligence, located in Wanjie, was the largest collection of various Soviet literature, including reference books. The special value of this unique collection was that it contained an extensive selection of specialized literature on all branches of science and economics, published in the original language. The staff, which included well-known scientists from various universities, including immigrants from Russia, was headed by one professor-Sovietologist, Georgian by origin. The impersonal secret information obtained by intelligence was transferred to the institute, which he had to subject to careful study and generalization using the available reference literature, and return to Schellenberg's apparatus with his own expert assessment and comments.
Another research organization that also worked closely with intelligence was the Institute of Geopolitics. He carefully analyzed the collected information and, together with the Abwehr and the Department of Economics and Armaments of the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command, compiled various reviews and reference materials on their basis. The nature of his interests can be judged at least from such documents prepared by him before the attack on the Soviet Union: “Military-geographical data on the European part of Russia”, “Geographical and ethnographic information about Belarus”, “Industry of Soviet Russia”, “Railway transport of the SSSL, "Baltic countries (with city plans)".
In the Reich, in total, there were about 400 research organizations dealing with socio-political, economic, scientific, technical, geographical and other problems of foreign states; all of them, as a rule, were staffed by highly qualified specialists who knew all aspects of the relevant problems, and were subsidized by the state according to a free budget. There was a procedure according to which all requests from Hitler - when he, for example, demanded information on any particular issue - were sent to several different organizations for execution. However, the reports and certificates prepared by them often did not satisfy the Fuhrer due to their academic nature. In response to the task received, the institutions issued "a set of general provisions, perhaps correct, but untimely and not clear enough."
In order to eliminate fragmentation and inconsistency in the work of research organizations, to increase their competence, and most importantly, their return, and also to ensure proper control over the quality of their conclusions and expert assessments based on intelligence materials, Schellenberg would later come to the conclusion that it was necessary to create an autonomous groups of specialists with higher education. Based on the materials placed at their disposal, in particular on the Soviet Union, and with the involvement of relevant research organizations, this group will organize the study of complex problems and, on this basis, develop in-depth recommendations and forecasts for the political and military leadership of the country.
The "Department of Foreign Armies of the East" of the General Staff of the Ground Forces was engaged in similar work. He concentrated materials coming from all intelligence and other sources and periodically compiled “reviews” for the highest military authorities, in which special attention was paid to the strength of the Red Army, the morale of the troops, the level of command personnel, the nature of combat training, etc.
Such is the place of the Nazi secret services as a whole in the military machine of Nazi Germany and the scope of their participation in the preparation of aggression against the USSR, in intelligence support for future offensive operations.
