The Hungarian troops were defeated, its territory was occupied by Soviet troops. After the war, free elections were held in the country, provided for by the Yalta agreements, in which the Party of Small Farmers received a majority. However, the coalition government imposed by the Allied Control Commission, which was headed by Soviet Marshal Voroshilov, gave half the cabinet seats to the winning majority, with key posts remaining with the Hungarian Communist Party.
Matthias Rakosi
The communists, with the support of Soviet troops, arrested most of the leaders of the opposition parties, and in 1947 they held new elections. By 1949, power in the country was mainly represented by communists. The Matthias Rakosi regime was established in Hungary. Collectivization was carried out, mass repressions began against the opposition, the church, officers and politicians of the former regime and many other opponents of the new government.
Hungary (as a former ally of Nazi Germany) had to pay significant indemnities to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, amounting to up to a quarter of GDP.
An important role was also played by the fact that in May 1955, neighboring Austria became a single neutral independent state, from which, after the signing of a peace treaty, the allied occupation forces were withdrawn (in Hungary Soviet troops have been there since 1944).
A certain role was played by the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, in particular the British MI6, which trained numerous cadres of “people's rebels” at its secret bases in Austria and then transferred them to Hungary
More than 50 thousand Hungarians took part in the uprising. It was suppressed by Soviet troops (31 thousand) with the support of Hungarian workers' squads (25 thousand) and Hungarian state security agencies (1.5 thousand).
In total, the following took part in the operation:
The internal party struggle in the Hungarian Labor Party between Stalinists and supporters of reforms began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956 led to the resignation of Secretary General Hungarian Labor Party Mátyás Rákosi, who was replaced by Erno Görö (former Minister of State Security).
The removal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznań uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the “Petőfi Circle” began to actively operate, in which the most pressing problems facing Hungary were discussed.
The inscription on the wall: “Death of state security!”
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon a demonstration began, in which tens of thousands of people took part - students and representatives of the intelligentsia. The demonstrators carried red flags, banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc. On the squares of Jasai Mari, on the Fifteenth of March, on the streets of Kossuth and Rakoczi, radical groups joined the demonstrators, shouting slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons. In addition, demands were put forward for free elections, the creation of a government led by Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT, Erne Gere, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.
In response to this, a large group of demonstrators tried to enter the broadcasting studio of the Radio House with a demand to broadcast the program demands of the demonstrators. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units defending the Radio House, during which the first dead and wounded appeared after 21:00. The rebels received weapons or took them from reinforcements sent to help guard the radio, as well as from civil defense warehouses and captured police stations. A group of rebels entered the Kilian Barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalion members joined the rebels.
Fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels and not to interfere with their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the headquarters for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.
At 11 p.m., based on the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin moving to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops “in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative labor.” Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest at 6 a.m. and began fighting with the rebels.
In the morning, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division approached the city, in the evening - the 128th Guards Rifle Division, joining the Special Corps. At this time, during a rally near the parliament building, an incident occurred: fire was opened from the upper floors, as a result of which a Soviet officer was killed and a tank was burned. In response, Soviet troops opened fire on the demonstrators, as a result, 61 people were killed on both sides and 284 were wounded.
Imre Nagy spoke on the radio and stated that “the government condemns the views that view the current grandiose popular movement as a counter-revolution.” The government announced a ceasefire and the start of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
In the morning, all Soviet troops were withdrawn to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left virtually without power.
Some prisons associated with the repressive GB were captured by the rebels. The security offered virtually no resistance and partially fled.
Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons. Locally, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils that were not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.
Having achieved success for some time, the participants in the uprising quickly radicalized, killing communists, employees of the State Security Service and the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and shelling Soviet military camps.
By order of October 30, Soviet military personnel were prohibited from returning fire, “succumbing to provocations,” and leaving the unit’s location.
There were recorded cases of murders of Soviet military personnel on leave and sentries in various cities of Hungary.
The Budapest town committee of the VPT was captured by the rebels, and over 20 communists were hanged by the crowd. Photos of hanged communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the whole world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary.
Soviet troops carried out artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent mopping-up operations with infantry forces supported by tanks. The main centers of resistance were the working-class suburbs of Budapest, where local councils managed to lead more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.
Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian special services and their Soviet colleagues managed to arrest about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which “a significant number were members of the VPT, military personnel and students.”
Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy, where they had taken refuge, on November 22, 1956, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. They were then returned to Hungary and put on trial. Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of whom 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but by 1963 all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of János Kádár.
After the fall of the socialist regime, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were ceremonially reburied in July 1989. Since 1989, Imre Nagy has been considered a national hero of Hungary.
According to statistics, during the period from October 23 to December 31, 2,652 Hungarian citizens died and 19,226 were injured on both sides in connection with the uprising and hostilities.
The losses of the Soviet army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing, 1540 wounded.
The entry of Soviet troops made it clear to the West that attempts to overthrow socialist regimes in Eastern Europe would provoke an adequate response from the USSR. Subsequently, during the Polish crisis, NATO directly stated that an invasion of Poland would lead to “very serious consequences,” which in this situation meant “the beginning of the Third World War.”
HUNGARY. 1956
Brief historical and geographical information
Hungary - a country in the middle reaches of the Danube. In ancient times, its territory was part of the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dacia. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Avar Khaganate formed there, which was defeated in the 8th century. Charlemagne, and in the 9th century. The Great Moravian Empire of the Western Slavs arose. In 896, tribes of Hungarians (Magyars) migrated to these lands from the southern Russian steppes under the leadership of Prince Arpad, who founded the dynasty. This year is considered the date of the “finding of a homeland” by the Hungarians and the beginning of their statehood, recognized by the King of Germany and Italy, Arnulf. In 1241 the country was devastated by the Mongols, then a threat arose from Ottoman Empire. The death of the Hungarian king Louis (Lajos) II in the battle with the Turks at Mohács in 1526 led to the division of the kingdom between the Holy Roman Empire of the Habsburgs and the Ottoman Sultanate. By 1711, the entire country came under the rule of the Habsburgs, which remained part of their empire until the beginning of the 20th century. Defeat in the First World War led to the establishment of an independent democratic republic in November 1918, which was briefly replaced by the communist rule of Bela Kun in 1919. From 1920 to 1944, Hungary (nominally a monarchy) was ruled by regent Miklós Horthy, who received dictatorial powers. During World War II, Hungary sided with Germany and its allies, after whose defeat it was occupied by the USSR. In 1946 it was proclaimed a republic, and in 1949 it became a one-party communist state.
The dramatic events of the autumn of 1956 in Hungary left a deep mark on the history of post-war Europe. They were a reflection the most difficult problems and the contradictions that arose during the Cold War era, and caused a wide resonance throughout the world.
As you know, at the final stage of World War II, not without the help of I.V. Stalin at the head of the Hungarian Working People's Party (HWP) and the country was a group of former Comintern leaders led by the “true Stalinist” Matthias Rakosi, who returned to their homeland from Moscow emigration. According to Henry A. Kissinger, a foreign policy adviser to American presidents in the 1950s and 1960s, back in the 1930s, Rakosi was literally ransomed by Stalin from a Budapest prison in exchange for Hungarian banners taken as trophies by the Tsarist troops in 1849.
After several years of their leadership of the country, serious signs of a socio-political crisis appeared in Hungary, expressed in dissatisfaction with the authorities, methods of government, and copying the experience of the USSR without taking into account national characteristics.
The political situation in the country was also aggravated by economic problems - wage cuts, rising prices and, against this background, a falling standard of living of the population. The forced industrialization and campaign to create agricultural cooperatives launched by the country's leadership sparked popular protest against socialist forms of management. The Soviet leadership, which closely followed the developments in Hungary, assessed the catastrophic consequences of M. Rakosi's rule, and took emergency measures to normalize the situation in the country. The Hungarian leaders, summoned to Moscow, were subjected to severe criticism at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee held on June 13, 1953 - for mistakes made, usurpation of power, repression and a difficult socio-economic situation.
The result of the meeting was the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), who was tasked with proclaiming changes, which included a number of transformations to mitigate totalitarian pressure on society, reforms in the economy and democratization of the existing political system.
Here, in our opinion, it is important to briefly characterize Imre Nagy, who became the main figure in the events that soon followed.
Imre Nagy was born on June 7, 1896 in the city of Kaposvár in the family of storekeeper József Nagy and housekeeper Rosalia Scharinger. He studied at a higher commercial school, from where he joined the Austro-Hungarian army in 1915. In July 1916, during the Brusilov breakthrough, he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Russians. He was in camps near Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude), in auxiliary work in Baikal villages, and in Irkutsk. In March 1918 he joined the international Red Guard detachment, in which he served until September of the same year. Here he was accepted into the Hungarian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(b). According to some information, he took part in the suppression of the rebellion by the White Cossacks in Verkhneudinsk, battles with the Whites near Irkutsk. The scale of this participation and Nagy’s personal contribution are unknown. In September 1918, the detachment , in which he was located, laid down his arms, and Nagy, along with other former prisoners of war, was returned to his former places of residence, where he worked until the defeat of Kolchak. With the arrival of the Reds in Irkutsk, Nagy became active and joined the Hungarian Red Guard squad, and from the summer of 1920 years to March 1921, he served in a special department of the Irkutsk Cheka. In those years, with a shortage of competent personnel, “internationalist fighters” were considered “reliable comrades”, ready to carry out any order. They were not connected by national ties with the local population, did not differ in relation to with excessive sentimentality and therefore willingly enlisted in ordinary work in the security forces. Thus ends the “internationalist” period in the life of Imre Nagy.
In 1921, after a short stay in Moscow, Nagy was sent by the Hungarian section of the Comintern to work underground in Hungary. There is little information about this period of his life in Russian archives. Nevertheless, several interesting facts are known. In particular, about the patronage of his closest associates in the underground struggle in Hungary, N. Tiriner and A. Molnar, to the Comintern, after his return to Moscow in 1929. In fact, they turned out to be provocateurs and agents of the Hungarian police, “surrendering” their comrades in the revolutionary movement. Nagy survived, which gave rise to unkind rumors in the circles of the Hungarian emigration. Perhaps these rumors were the reason for Nadia’s refusal to join the GPU staff. In addition, in the archival materials there are documents indicating that the security officers were unpleasantly impressed by Nagy’s “persistent attempts to get a job as a staff member of the GPU.” Instead of enlisting in the cadre, Nadya was offered to become a secret agent (secret informant), to which he agreed on January 17, 1933. Quite a lot of material has been preserved about his work on organs. There is, for example, a document indicating that in 1939 Nagy proposed that the NKVD “develop” 38 Hungarian political emigrants, including F. Münnich. In another list, he names 150 Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Germans, and Italians he knows, with whom, if necessary, he could “work.”
According to reports from Nadya (pseudonym - “Volodya”), several groups of political emigrants, consisting of members of the Hungarian, German and other communist parties, were convicted. All of them were accused of “anti-Soviet”, “terrorist” and “counter-revolutionary” activities (cases “Agrarians”, “Incorrigible”, “Agony of the Doomed” and others). Another document (June 1940) indicates that Nagy “gave materials” on 15 arrested “enemies of the people” who worked at the International Agrarian Institute, the Comintern, and the All-Union Radio Committee. The activities of "Volodya" led to the arrest of the famous scientist E. Varga, a number of leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party (B. Varga-Vago, G. Farkas, E. Neumann, F. Gabor and others). Some of them were shot, some were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and exile. In a letter from the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov to the CPSU Central Committee “On archival materials about the activities of Imre Nagy in the USSR”, prepared in June 1989, it was noted: “From the available archival materials it does not follow that Nagy collaborated with the NKVD under duress. Moreover , the documents directly indicate that “Volodya” shows great interest and initiative in his work, and is a qualified agent.”
But let's return to the events of the 1950s.
As a result of the decisions of the June (1953) plenum of the CR HPT, the first signs of a “thaw” appeared in the public life of Hungary. Rehabilitation campaigns for those illegally convicted have begun and activities have intensified public organizations. However, the democratization process could not develop to its full potential. Taking advantage of the economic difficulties on the just-begun path of transition to market forms of economic management, Rakosi, who remained the first secretary of the CR VPT, and his entourage undertook a counter-maneuver. The Prime Minister was accused of "seriously violating the principle of collegiality." The government crisis provoked a split in society, which resulted in a confrontation between reformers and conservatives, a confrontation between supporters of the “modernization” of the socialist system and dictatorship, and a rivalry between Nagy and Rakosi. As a result, Nagy was removed from the post of prime minister in April 1955, and expelled from the party in December. A new cold snap has arrived. However, attempts to restore the previous methods of governing the country gave rise to new resistance. The intelligentsia actively supported the reforms. The first publications of Hungarian writers appeared in the press criticizing the principles of party membership in literature and the interference of party functionaries in the creative activities of writers and artists. Various public associations began to form, acquiring an increasingly pronounced political character. The Hungarian Writers' Union became the center of discontent and resistance to the regime. In the Petofi circle, created in the summer of 1956, under the guise of literary discussions, criticism was carried out of the socio-political system that existed in the country. This happened against the backdrop of intensified ideological campaigns by the West: Radio Free Europe and Voice of America engaged in active propaganda, calling on Hungarians to openly oppose the ruling regime.
All this contributed to the formation of a government opposition around Nagy, who had been expelled from the party but was seeking his political rehabilitation.
External factors also added fuel to the fire.
In May - June 1955, a significant event took place: Soviet leaders arrived in Belgrade on an official visit, including to meet with I. Tito. The reconciliation with Tito had far-reaching political consequences. Moscow's rehabilitation of the Yugoslav "apostate" automatically absolved many people who were repressed during the campaign against "Titoism" from guilt. This had a strong impact even on those who sincerely believed in the ideals of socialism in Eastern Europe. In these states, including Hungary, a campaign has begun to rehabilitate those who suffered for “Titoism.”
And finally, an important reason for the development of the movement for “liberal reforms” was the speech of N.S., which exposed the Stalinist regime. Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU (February 14-25, 1956). Despite its “secrecy,” it became widely known in Eastern European countries in a matter of weeks, thanks to the operational work of American intelligence agencies. Criticism of the recent past, condemnation of the cult of personality, mistakes and crimes aroused quite strong, overt or hidden, anti-Soviet sentiments in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.
The consequence of this was a large-scale demonstration on June 28-29, 1956 in Poland in Poznan with calls for “Freedom!”, “Bread!”, “God!”, “Down with Communism!” The demonstration escalated into street clashes, troops from the voivodeship security department intervened, opening fire on the demonstrators, and then the army. As a result, more than 70 people died and about 500 were injured.
In Hungary, anti-Soviet sentiments began to manifest themselves at first in seemingly insignificant episodes - refusals in stores to sell goods to Soviet military personnel and members of their families, insults on city streets. Then they began to become more and more aggressive. In the dormitory of Soviet officers in Szombathely, the windows were broken with stones at night. At one of the railway crossings, a group of Soviet soldiers were thrown pieces of coal from a passing train. Commandant of Budapest Colonel M.Ya. Kuzminov reported that unknown persons called the commandant’s office by phone, threatened and warned that the Russians would face bloody retribution for everything they had done. Such incidents were increasingly gaining momentum.
The events in Poland met with warm support in Hungary. The situation was not softened by the forced reshuffle in the leadership of the Hungarian People's Republic: on July 18, 1956, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Hungarian People's Party, the resignation of Rakosi was accepted, who immediately, together with his wife, Soviet citizen F.F. Kornilova, went to the USSR for “treatment”. His faithful ally Erne Gere was elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT. Four new members were nominated to the central leadership, including János Kádár and two candidates, while 14 members and candidates were co-opted to the Central Committee. However, these changes, as it turned out later, resulted only in a tactical combination that changed little in essence.
In mid-October, student unrest began in Hungary. In Budapest, Debrecen, Miskolc, Szeged, Szombathely and Pecs, they demanded to abandon Stalinist methods of governing the country and to stop studying Marxism-Leninism in universities and institutes.
On October 22, at the Budapest Polytechnic University, 16-point demands were formulated - the convening of a party congress, the removal of Stalinists from the leadership, the expansion of socialist democracy, the return of I. Nagy to the post of prime minister, and the reduction of taxes on peasants. These were supplemented by calls for a multi-party system, holding free elections, restoring old state symbols, canceling military training and Russian language lessons, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
On October 23 at 15.00 a large student demonstration began in Budapest, which was gradually joined by representatives of all segments of the population. The number of demonstrators reached 200 thousand. The authorities were at a loss. The Minister of Internal Affairs L. Pirosha first banned it, then, when the demonstration took on an unprecedented mass character, he allowed it. However, already during the first clashes with law enforcement forces, the nature of the demonstration changed, and anti-government slogans appeared. According to eyewitnesses, well-organized groups of people began to stand out in the crowd. At 19:00, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the VPT, Erne Gere, spoke on the radio. But instead of trying to find some kind of compromise, he branded the speech as “counter-revolutionary” and “nationalist” and threatened reprisals. According to opinion. V. Musatov, who worked for a long time at the Soviet embassy in Budapest, and then in the apparatus of the Central Committee, where he dealt with issues of relations with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, he did this on purpose, “wanting to suppress the uprising in one fell swoop.” One way or another, Gere’s statement only further aggravated the situation. I. Nagy, who spoke at the request of the demonstrators at a rally in front of parliament, could not calm the passions. The unrest continued to gain momentum. Shouts began to be heard in the crowd: “We don’t need tunics!”, “Down with the red star!”, “Down with the communists!” Demonstrators tore off images of the state emblem from the national flags of the Hungarian People's Republic and burned red flags. The apotheosis of the unrest was the dismantling of the giant statue of Stalin, which was then broken into small pieces and disassembled for souvenirs. Anti-Semitic slogans also occupied not the least place. The significant number of Jews in the country's leadership, which, according to demonstrators, was primarily to blame for Hungary's problems, caused popular discontent throughout the country.
By evening, the situation in the capital became tense. The uprising began. The rebels were opposed by parts of the state security and army. Even with the beginning of armed uprisings, units of the Budapest garrison were ordered to occupy the most important objects in the city. But there were few troops in the city. Thus, in a report addressed to the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, it was reported that the total number of troops involved was only about 2,500 people. At the same time, the Hungarian People's Republic government did not give permission to open fire, so units and subunits set out without ammunition. As a result, they were unable to resist. Some units were disarmed by the rebels, who by the evening seized the editorial office and printing house of the central party newspaper, the weapons depot and cartridge factory, the Western Station and threatened to seize the buildings of the Party Central Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Railways.
Serious events unfolded near the building of the Hungarian Radio Center, where a crowd of demonstrators arrived, demanding access to the radio airwaves and, for the time being, restrained by the police and state security forces (ABH). A delegation of students was allowed into the building to negotiate with the director. However, soon a false rumor spread among the demonstrators remaining on the street that one of the delegates had allegedly been killed. The crowd became agitated and there were calls to storm the building. Regarding how subsequent events developed, the opinions of contemporaries were divided.
According to one version, shortly after 21:00, some of the security guards threw fans with tear gas out of the window of the radio center, and one or two minutes later, state security officers opened fire on the crowd. Then white ambulances appeared. But instead of doctors, state security officers dressed in white coats jumped out of the cars. An angry crowd attacked them and took away their weapons. Units of the Hungarian army were sent to help the ABH, but the soldiers, after some hesitation, went over to the side of the crowd.
According to another version, from 21.00 the rebels began to fire at the Radio Center building, and only when several of its guards were killed and wounded did state security officers receive permission to open fire.
This is how one of the radio security commanders describes the siege of the Center:
“About 6-6.30, groups of demonstrators appeared on Sándora Brody Street. The crowd grew continuously and behaved more and more aggressively. They did not follow the call to disperse, so in order to disperse them, we drove a wedge into the crowd and used grenades with tear gas.
Figure 141
Rioters on the streets of Budapest
Later we started firing warning shots, as a result of which we managed to clear Sándor Brody Street twice. But, since the crowd saw that we were only shooting in the air, they returned and never dispersed.
The first single shots with live ammunition were fired by demonstrators from Sandor Brody Street and almost simultaneously from the National Museum - through the Palace Garden - at 19:30. They shot at the windows, near which many people were standing at the time.
The first shots killed several people immediately. By the time we received the order to open fire, there were over twenty dead among the guards.
When we opened fire, the street was empty again for some time, but by this time the rebels had occupied the houses and roofs located opposite and were firing from there. Shooting was carried out from machine guns not only from Sándora Brody Street, but also from the roofs of houses located on Szentkyrái Street...”
One way or another, shortly after midnight the Radio Center was captured by attackers.
At noon on October 24, Hungarian radio announced the introduction of a state of emergency in Budapest and the establishment of a curfew. City residents were prohibited from going out onto the streets at night until 7 a.m. and holding rallies and meetings. The rebels were asked to stop the armed struggle and lay down their arms. And the day before, on the afternoon of October 23, Gere telephoned to Moscow with a request to send Soviet troops, who were in Hungary under the Warsaw Pact, to Budapest. At night, the plenum of the CC of the VPT formed a new government headed by Imre Nagy, who, being present at the meeting of the Central Committee, did not object to the invitation of Soviet troops. Moreover, speaking on the radio on October 25, he acknowledged their inevitability of intervention in the current situation. However, when the troops had already entered the capital, he rejected the request of the USSR Ambassador to sign the corresponding letter. Former head of government Hegedüs did it instead. The text of the appeal read: “On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People’s Republic, I ask the government of the Soviet Union to send Soviet troops to Budapest to help eliminate the unrest that has arisen in Budapest, to quickly restore order and create conditions for peaceful creative work.” The letter was backdated to October 24; it arrived in Moscow on October 28.
At this time, quite strange events were happening in Budapest. Some researchers explain them by the confusion of the authorities and the confusion that reigned in various government departments, including law enforcement agencies. Others are convinced that these were planned provocations, betrayal and direct intervention of Western intelligence services. We are talking primarily about weapons that ended up in large quantities in the hands of the rebels. Western media claimed that all of it was captured in battles with regular units of the Hungarian and Soviet armies or taken from the police. At the same time, according to many eyewitnesses of the events, already on the first day of the rebellion, trucks appeared on the streets and squares of the city, from which machine guns and rifles were distributed to everyone. Looking ahead, we note that during the period of the fighting and after its end in November 1956, more than 44 thousand small arms were confiscated from the rebels and the population, including 11 thousand 500 machine guns and about 2 thousand machine guns, 62 guns, of which 47 anti-aircraft. Moreover, about 2 thousand small arms were foreign-made in the post-war period.
How did the rebels get these weapons? Indeed, some of the small arms were taken from Hungarian military personnel, and some were seized from weapons depots captured by the rebels. But there were other “sources”. For example, it is known that I. Nagy, immediately after heading the government, demanded that the party activists be armed. Weapons were delivered to district committees, the police and large enterprises. However, from there it somehow fell into the hands of the rebels. The same thing happened when the Hungarian government decided to arm the workers.
At first, the Ministry of Defense searched for weapons for a long time, but when they were found, they again fell into the hands of the rebels in considerable quantities.
And “miracles” happened to the rebels. Thus, during the fighting, about 300 people were captured and disarmed. They were handed over to the Hungarian police. But a few days later the detainees were again captured with weapons in their hands.
Figure 142
A tank captured by the rebels. 1956
It later became known that all the detainees were released by order of the Budapest police chief Sandor Kopachi, and the weapons were returned to them.
On October 23 at 23.00, having received an order from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, units of the Special Corps were alerted and moved to Budapest. They had to make a 75-120 kilometer march. The calculation was for a demonstration of force. The operational group of the headquarters of the Special Corps, led by Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko also went to the capital, where with great difficulty she reached the Ministry of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic.
It should be said that the plan of action for the troops of the Special Corps to maintain and restore order in Budapest and on the territory of Hungary was developed by the corps headquarters and worked out on the map back in July 1956. It received the code name "Compass".
According to the plan, the restoration of order in Budapest was entrusted to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Major General S.V. Lebedeva. It was supposed to move out from Kecskemét and take under protection the main objects of the Hungarian capital. It determined the priority targets, as well as the forces and means to hold them.
17th Guards Mechanized Division Major General A.V. Krivosheeva was supposed to cover the border with Austria and ensure public order in the points of permanent deployment - in the cities of Gyor, Keszeg, Kermend, Szombathely. Units of the division stationed in Haimashkar formed a reserve and were intended for use in Budapest.
The remaining formations and units of the corps were instructed to ensure public order in their permanent deployment points, as well as to hold and defend military camps, airfields, warehouses and other important facilities.
The special instructions indicated: the procedure for the operation of units and subunits in the city, tasks for the protection and defense of objects, the procedure for interaction with units of the VNA and some other issues. The procedure for using weapons was specifically stipulated.
After revision on July 20, 1956, corps commander Lieutenant General P.N. Leshchenko approved a new version of the action plan of the Special Corps, according to which corps units were given 3 to 6 hours to establish control over the most important objects of the country and Budapest. After agreement with Moscow, the new plan received the code name “Volna”.
At the time when units of the Special Corps advanced to the capital, confusion and confusion reigned in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense. Information about the actions of the rebels, Hungarian units and the police was received very contradictory. Minister of Defense I. Bata and Chief of the General Staff L. Toth were in panic. By that time, there were about 7 thousand Hungarian soldiers and 50 tanks in Budapest, dispersed across many objects. At the same time, no one knew the location and number of forces located in a particular area, how reliable they were and how many military personnel went over to the side of the rebels. In such a situation, the Soviet command could not count on the interaction and assistance of the Hungarian army.
The first to enter Budapest at 4 a.m. on October 24 were the 37th Tank Regiment, led by the deputy commander of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Colonel Bichan, and the motorcycle battalion of Lieutenant Colonel G. Dobrunov. The regiment was given the task of taking under guard the buildings of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Trade Union, the parliament, the Soviet embassy, bridges over the Danube and liberating the Radio House captured by the rebels. However, even upon entering the city, Soviet units came under unexpected fire from the rebels. As a result of the attack, several people died, including the company commander of the motorcycle battalion, Captain Petrochenkov. Despite the losses, our soldiers, obeying the order, did not open fire.
The main forces of the division (5th mechanized regiment of Colonel Pilipenko, 6th mechanized regiment of Colonel Mayakov, 87th heavy tank-self-propelled regiment of Colonel Nikovsky) approached Budapest only at 5 o’clock. The regiments immediately entered the battle and in a short time cleared a number of important objects from armed groups, including train stations, bridges, and began, together with the previously arrived regiments, to protect the buildings of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Trade Union, the parliament, the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, the Soviet embassy, and banks , warehouses and airfield. By this time, the group of Soviet troops in Budapest numbered about 6 thousand people, 290 tanks, 1236 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns.
In the second half of the same day, the 83rd tank and 56th mechanized regiments of the 17th Guards Mechanized Division of Major General A. Krivosheev approached the city, which were tasked with maintaining order in the western part of the city - Buda and guarding the bridge over the Danube .
Figure 143
The crew of the BTR-152 armored personnel carrier from the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, which participated in the suppression of the rebellion. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)
Four VNA divisions began operating in the city together with Soviet units (7th mechanized division, 8th, 27th rifle and 5th mechanized division of the 3rd rifle corps). On October 24-26, by order of General Durko, a rebel detachment of 340 people was destroyed by Hungarian units in Kucskemet. During the operation in Sabadsalas, 7 rebels were killed and 40 wounded. At the same time, a number of units of the 8th mechanized regiment of the Hungarian army, construction and anti-aircraft units of the capital's garrison, individual officers and cadets of the military academy and schools went over to the side of the rebels.
By the end of October 24, the troops of the Special Corps had largely managed to complete their assigned tasks. However, as subsequent events showed, the forceful action taken led to a toughening of the rebels' resistance. The situation became more complicated the very next day - October 25. According to Mikoyan and Suslov, who arrived in Budapest on October 24 to clarify the situation in the country, the Hungarian capital was rocked by two events. The first is an incident near parliament, when, during a rally, unarmed demonstrators and Soviet soldiers targeted fire was opened and one tank was burned. Among the dead is the regiment commander, Major V.P. Bachurin. He was killed by a burst from a heavy machine gun during a peaceful conversation with demonstrators. In response to the provocation, Soviet units and Hungarian state security officers also responded with fire. To this day there is no exact answer as to who carried out this provocation. According to one version, Hungarian security officers started shooting from the rooftops. According to others, it is a group of armed rebels. One way or another, as a result of the shootout, more than 60 Hungarians were killed (according to later data - over 200 people).
Lieutenant General E.I. Malashenko recalls this incident as follows:
“Many approached the tanks standing here, climbed onto them and stuck banners into the barrels of the guns.
Figure 144
Participant in Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956
From the attics of buildings located on the square opposite the parliament, fire was opened on demonstrators and Soviet military personnel. Two Hungarian tanks accompanying the demonstrators fired several shots and disappeared. The commander of one of our units was killed.
Soviet soldiers and state security officers guarding parliament returned fire on the roofs of the buildings from which the shots were fired. There was panic on Lajos Kossuth Square. With the first shots, people began to scatter in search of cover. When the shooting died down, many hurried to leave the square. Twenty-two demonstrators were killed and many were wounded. Several of our military personnel and Hungarian police were killed..."
It is not known, as noted above, who was the instigator of this provocation, but what is certain is that it was a consequence of I. Nagy’s decision to lift the curfew. It was adopted several hours before the incident at Parliament, without the consent of the Soviet command.
The second event was a shootout near the Central Committee building - Soviet tank crews covering the building mistakenly opened fire on a suitable Hungarian security company, mistaking it for a rebel detachment; 10 Hungarians were killed.
Perhaps it was this incident that served as the reason for publications claiming that many Soviet military personnel sympathized with the rebels and even provided them with armed assistance. For example, the Austrian newspaper Bild Telegraph on October 31, 1956 wrote:
“Members of the AVO (Hungarian security officers) began to shoot at unarmed demonstrators... Suddenly the turrets of three Soviet tanks turned from 12 to 3 - as they say in the language of tank crews, and three tank commanders commanded in Russian: “Fire!” - but not at the demonstrators, but in the security officers of Hungary. Communist security officials fell under the shells of tanks of the Soviet army. This was the greatest heroism in the history of this Soviet military unit and the complete collapse of the official communist ideology...”
Reacting to the aggravation of the situation, the Soviet command took measures to increase the number of troops in the Hungarian capital.
On October 25, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division of Major General G.I. approached Budapest. Obaturov (from the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania) and the 128th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel N.A. Gorbunova (from the Carpathian Military District). Both divisions became part of the Special Corps. Thus, the total number of troops operating in Budapest was increased to 20 thousand people.
Nevertheless, rebel resistance, especially in the center of the capital, continued to grow. In this regard, the 33rd Division was tasked with “clearing the armed forces” from the central part of the city, where the rebels had established strongholds (in the Kebanya sector, Yllei Street, areas adjacent to the Danube, the Kilian barracks and the cinema area " Corwin"). By this time, the rebels were already armed with not only weapon, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, anti-tank grenades and petrol bottles.
It should be noted that some units of the 33rd Division suffered losses immediately upon entering the city. A tank and an armored personnel carrier containing the commanders of two regiments were shot down, and the headquarters radio stations were destroyed. The division's artillery regiment on Ferenczi Avenue was ambushed and almost completely lost the second division. Regiment commander E.N. Khanovich was mortally wounded. How this happened was described in his memoirs by the former instructor of the political department of the Special Corps, Colonel V.I. Fomin:
"The head of its column (33rd division, - A. O.), following in marching order, according to the Hungarians, appeared on the outskirts of the city at about six o’clock in the evening. The division commander, Major General Obaturov, arrived to General Lashchenko for instructions much earlier. He arrived in a staff car, dressed, like the driver, in a soldier’s uniform: a raincoat, a cap on his head. The Hungarian guards asked me to help check the documents of a soldier who claimed that he was a general, but did not show his ID. I accompanied the division commander to the corps commander. And in the evening it became known about an attack on a convoy of armed groups in the area of Prater Square and on Yllei Street. Having let the tanks pass, the rebels took the division's artillery, which was moving with the gun barrels uncovered, and the rear units under crossfire. Many soldiers and officers died, including the artillery regiment commander. He never had time to give the command “to fight.” The division got lost in the city and lost control. General Obaturov, as Hero of the Soviet Union, retired Colonel G.D. later told me. Dobrunov, then commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized division, found himself in a very difficult situation. It was necessary for an experienced intelligence officer, who knew Budapest well, to help the division commander in plotting the location of his units on the city plan issued back in 1945! But all the troops of the Special Corps were supplied with such plans in 1956, which, in the absence of officers who knew the language and the Hungarian capital, created great difficulties in orientation on its streets: in eleven years not only the names of many streets and squares changed, but also their configuration" .
Already in the city, the tank of regiment commander Litovtsev (number “072”) was hit by a direct hit from a shell. Of the entire crew of the vehicle, only Colonel Litovtsev managed to escape.
In total, on October 25-26, the 33rd Mechanized Division lost 130 troops on the streets of Budapest, without taking part in any of the actions against the rebel armed groups. Other units also suffered losses, in particular, on October 24 alone, more than 40 soldiers and officers of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division died at the hands of militants. At the same time, there were not isolated cases of violation of the bodies of the dead, as well as atrocities and bullying by the rebels towards captured Soviet soldiers. So, according to the memoirs of L.V. Petukhova, in the village of Dunakeszi, 20 km north of Budapest, the rebels attacked a convoy of Soviet fuel tankers. The fuel trucks slipped through, two drivers were injured, and a shell hit the security car. Group senior captain G.I. Miseenkov and ten guard soldiers were shell-shocked and taken prisoner. The guards were immediately shot, and the captain was demanded that he voluntarily go over to the side of the rebels. G.I. Miseenkov refused. Then, while he was still alive, they cut off his arm to the elbow, his leg to the knee, doused him with diesel fuel and set him on fire.
According to the former senior instructor of the OK political department for special propaganda, retired colonel Vitaly Fomin, the large losses in the first days were largely explained by the morale of the personnel of the Soviet troops. “Brought up on respect for the sovereignty and independence of the fraternal people,” recalled V. Fomin, “our soldiers found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Just yesterday they were welcome guests at industrial enterprises, production cooperatives and state farms. Now they had to meet with the people of Budapest far from in a friendly atmosphere. They were clearly not ready for this, as well as for opening fire first. And in this case, the instructions from the corps command not to do this were superfluous.
Figure 145
The crew of the T-34/85 tank from the 33rd GMD after the suppression of the mutiny. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)
As for the order to avoid provocations, it turned out to be even more difficult to fulfill. As subsequent events showed, extremists and terrorists of all stripes widely used the friendly feelings of Soviet military personnel towards Hungarian citizens for their insidious purposes."
On the morning of October 28, an assault on the center of the capital was planned together with units of the 5th and 6th Hungarian mechanized regiments. However, just before the start of the assault, the Hungarian units received an order from their command not to participate in hostilities. This was explained by the fact that the rebels were allegedly ready to lay down their arms. Indeed, Imre Nagy negotiated with the leaders of the armed groups Laszlo Ivankovic, Gergely Pogranac and others and accepted their demands. Following this, he telephoned the Ministry of Defense and warned that if the Corvin was stormed, he would resign. As a result, the operation was disrupted. From that moment on, units of the VNA, at the request of the government of I. Nagy, did not provide resistance to the rebels, and did not receive orders to conduct actions against the rebels. A Revolutionary Military Council was created in Budapest, consisting of Major General B. Kiraly, L. Kahn, I. Kovacs, Colonel P. Maleter and others.
On the same day at 5 p.m. 20 minutes. Budapest time, I. Nagy spoke on the radio with a declaration of the new government. The Hungarian leadership condemned the previous assessment of the uprising as a counter-revolution, recognizing it as a “broad national democratic movement” that united the entire Hungarian people in the struggle for national independence and sovereignty. The declaration outlined a program for the speedy satisfaction of fair social demands of workers, announced the dissolution of troops and state security agencies and an agreement reached between the Hungarian and Soviet governments on the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. Regarding the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, the declaration said: “The Hungarian government will take the initiative of negotiations on relations between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union - in particular, on the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces located on the territory of Hungary - in the spirit of Hungarian-Soviet friendship, based on the principles equality of socialist countries and national independence."
Figure 146
Soviet tank on the street of Budapest. 1956
Soviet representatives Mikoyan and Suslov made the following conclusion about the behavior of Nagy and his supporters: “The most dangerous thing is that, having corrupted the morale of the state security cadres - the most persistent fighters - with their declaration, they have not yet been able to do anything in return, which the reaction is taking advantage of.” In the West, on the contrary, the text of the Declaration evoked positive responses.
I. Nagy's statement on October 28 became a turning point in the development of October events. Defenders of the constitutional order were demoralized. The party activists, who defended public buildings, ministries and district committees, received an order from the Hungarian government to immediately surrender all available weapons. The most disciplined communists carried it out, and later many of them paid for it with their lives.
The government’s decision to abolish state security agencies effectively put all employees of the Hungarian intelligence services outside the law. Thus, the head of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Orban, told the Soviet adviser that “he will gather officers and will make his way into the USSR.” Former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Dean, fearing a massacre of organ workers and their families, decided to “create a detachment of employees and move to the Soviet border with weapons,” and if he failed, then “guerrilla underground and beat the enemies.” The regional department of state security in the city of Szabolcs went to Romania, and employees of the Debrecen department approached the Soviet border in the Uzhgorod area and asked the border guards to let them into the USSR. Large groups of state security workers also concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, waiting to be allowed into this country.
An overestimation of the nature of events also put an end to the presence of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital. The consequence was a violent campaign against Soviet military personnel.
On October 30, Nagy's government demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Budapest.
At this time, an active search for a way out of the increasingly deteriorating situation continued in Moscow. Back on October 28, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, Marshal Zhukov proposed to refrain from suppressing the center of resistance in the Budapest Kilian barracks and in the Corvin cinema, located in residential areas, and called for political flexibility.
Figure 147
Officers of the 128th Guards Rifle Division in positions near Budapest. November 1956
Khrushchev offered to support the new Hungarian government and help it in the provinces. He was supported by Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov. Voroshilov, Molotov and Bulganin had a different opinion.
As a result of this meeting, the “Declaration of the USSR Government on the fundamentals of development and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries” was adopted. The Declaration said: “As recent events have shown, the need has arisen to make an appropriate statement about the position of the Soviet Union in the relations of the USSR with other socialist countries, primarily in the economic and military fields.” This Declaration was already broadcast on October 30, and the next day it was published in the press.
On the evening of October 30, the withdrawal of troops from the city began. Due to the continued attacks on Soviet military personnel, the withdrawal of troops was carried out under the protection of tanks. They were “interspersed” in transport columns with guns deployed to the right and left. This kind of “herringbone” made it possible to suppress the machine-gun nest of the rebels at any moment. And they did not even spare the ambulances transporting the wounded from the Soviet hospital in Budapest. In one of them, a paramedic was killed and the soldiers he was accompanying were wounded again.
Nevertheless, by the end of the day, all Soviet formations and units were withdrawn from the city and concentrated 15-20 kilometers from Budapest. The headquarters of the Special Corps was deployed at the airfield in Tekele, the location of one of its aviation units. In areas where troops were concentrated, equipment and weapons were put in order, ammunition, fuel and food were stocked.
It would seem that political methods of exiting the conflict arose.
However, by this moment the situation in Moscow had changed one hundred and eighty degrees. The documents known to date do not allow us to definitively answer the question about the reasons that forced N.S. Khrushchev sharply reconsidered his views on the Hungarian events. Obviously there are several of them.
Main role, in our opinion, external factors played a role. The Suez crisis at the end of October (October 30-31, Israeli, British and French troops began military operations against Egypt) was perceived in the Kremlin as a symptom of the unacceptable weakening of Soviet influence in the world. This prompted the Soviet leadership to demonstrate military power in Hungary. If we leave Hungary, it will encourage the Americans, the British and the French. They will regard this as our weakness and will attack..., reasoned N.S. Khrushchev. Moreover, the anti-Egyptian action of the three countries, which, by the way, was not supported by the United States and was condemned by many Western, and not only left-wing, politicians, became the external background against which the Soviet action in Hungary could cause a more lenient attitude. In addition, the states of Eastern Europe were, following the results of World War II, a recognized zone of influence of the USSR and members of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Therefore, direct confrontation there with the West seemed unlikely. The United States and NATO, considering the events in Hungary a purely internal affair of the Soviet bloc, did not make any serious efforts to put pressure on the USSR. According to the former Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany F.-I. Strauss, “there was no question of military intervention by NATO.” Moreover, the US government, using various diplomatic channels, was able to bring to the attention of the Kremlin its determination to maintain complete neutrality regarding possible Soviet actions in Hungary . And American President Eisenhower himself was busy with the election campaign.
No less significant, in our opinion, reasons lay in the unbalanced, impulsive character of N.S. Khrushchev, as well as the struggle for power in the CPSU Central Committee that began after Stalin’s death. Thus, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR V. Micunovich said that during a meeting with Tito, which took place incognito on November 2-3, 1956 on the island of Brijuni, Khrushchev said that the USSR could not allow the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. This is due to the fact that there are many people in the Soviet Union who would take all this something like this: under Stalin, everyone was obedient and there were no riots. And since these... (here Khrushchev used a strong expression in relation to the Soviet leaders) came to power, the collapse began, Hungary is leaving... And everything happens precisely at the moment when the Soviet leadership began a campaign to condemn Stalin.
According to Khrushchev, as V. Michunovich recalled, the Soviet army would be the first to say something like this.
The course of events in Hungary had a certain influence on the uncompromising position of the Soviet leaders: the intensified rampant terror and, in particular, the defeat of the Budapest city party committee, as a result of which the secretary of the city committee, Imre Meze, was mortally wounded and 24 Hungarian soldiers who defended him were brutally killed.
On November 1, Prime Minister Imre Nagy handed Andropov a note demanding that he begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On the same day, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers of Hungary was held, which unanimously adopted a resolution on the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the Declaration of Neutrality of Hungary. I. Nagy addressed the United Nations with a message in which he asked for the help of the four great powers to protect Hungarian neutrality. In the evening at 19:45, Imre Nagy addressed the Hungarian people on the radio with a speech in which he announced the Declaration of Neutrality. He concluded his speech with the words:
“We call on our neighbors, both near and far, to respect the unchangeable decision of the Hungarian people. There is no doubt that our people are as united in this decision as, perhaps, never before throughout their history.
Millions of Hungarian workers! Preserve and strengthen, with revolutionary determination, selfless labor and the restoration of order, a free, independent, democratic and neutral Hungary."
I. Nagy's appeal was perceived by the rebels as a call to intensify the struggle. On November 3, a renewed Hungarian government was formed, in which the communists received only three minor ministerial portfolios.
The declaration of neutrality, the appeal to Western countries for help and the deprivation of power by the communists left no doubt in Moscow that we're talking about literally about the loss of Hungary. This was already a blow to the entire socialist camp. Hungary's withdrawal from the eastern military alliance would mark the collapse of its entire defense system. And the reaction came immediately.
The leadership of the Soviet troops in Hungary was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev. Preparations have begun for the military operation to restore order in Hungary under the code name "Whirlwind".
Meanwhile, around Budapest, the rebels hastily created a defensive belt, reinforced with hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. IN populated areas, adjacent to the city, outposts with tanks and artillery appeared.
Figure 148
Soviet officers from the 33rd GMD who distinguished themselves during Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, November 1956 (AVL archive)
The most important objects were occupied by armed detachments; the streets were patrolled by military personnel and national guard. The number of personnel of the Hungarian units in Budapest reached 50 thousand people. In addition, more than 10 thousand people were part of the “national guard”, armed groups and detachments. The rebels had about 100 tanks.
Meanwhile, negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, which began on November 3, continued in the parliament building. The USSR delegation was headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General M.S. Mlinin, Hungarian - General P. Maleter. The Soviet side conducted them formally, trying to gain time and misinform the Hungarian leadership.
The discussion of specific issues related to the withdrawal of units of the Soviet army, late in the evening of November 3, at the suggestion of the Soviet side, was moved to the Soviet military base Tekel. Members of the Hungarian delegation took part here in a gala dinner hosted for them by Soviet military representatives. It was almost midnight when the reception was interrupted by the arrival of the head of Soviet state security, General I.A. Serova. Accompanied by NKVD officers, he entered the hall and ordered the entire Hungarian delegation to be detained. The military leadership of Nagy's government was beheaded. The arrests were made by the Minister of Defense, General Pal Meleter, the Chief of the General Staff, General Istvan Kovacs, the Chief of Operations, Colonel Miklos Szuch and Ferenc Erdei.
At 5:15 a.m. on November 4, on the waves of Szolnok Radio (according to some reports, the broadcast was carried out from Soviet city Uzhgorod) there was an appeal from the new Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, allegedly created in Szolnok, headed by J. Kadar. This message has been compiled in the form open letter, which was signed by Kadar and three other former members of Imre Nagy's government. They stated that they left the government of Imre Nagy on November 1 because the government was unable to fight the “counter-revolutionary danger.” To "suppress fascism and reaction" they formed the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.
At 6 o'clock in the morning, on the same waves, Kadar announced the new composition of the government. He argued that “reactionary elements wanted to overthrow the socialist social system in Hungary and restore the rule of the landowners and capitalists.” Kadar further said that the new government appealed to the command of the Soviet troops to “help our people defeat the black forces of reaction and counter-revolution, restore the people's socialist system, restore order and tranquility in our country.”
All political formalities were observed, and Soviet troops began the operation to restore order in Budapest and other cities of Hungary. It should be noted here that the decision to provide “joint military assistance” to Hungary was supported by the highest political leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nevertheless, the defeat of the forces of the armed opposition rested entirely with the Soviet troops.
In accordance with the plan of the operation, called "Whirlwind", the Soviet divisions had to solve the following tasks:
2nd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the north-eastern and central part of Budapest, seize bridges over the Danube River, the buildings of parliament, the Central Committee of the VPT, the Ministry of Defense, the Nyugati station, the police headquarters and block the military camps of the Hungarian units, preventing the rebels from approaching Budapest by roads from the north and east.
33rd Guards Mechanized Division to capture the south-eastern and central parts of Budapest, capture bridges over the Danube River, the Central Telephone Station, the Corwin stronghold, Keleti station, the Kossuth radio station, the Csepel factory, the arsenal, blockade the barracks of Hungarian military units and prevent the rebels from approaching Budapest along the roads from the southeast.
The 128th Guards Rifle Division will capture the western part of Budapest (Buda), capture the Central Air Defense Command Post, Moscow Square, Gellert Mountain and the fortress, block the barracks and prevent the rebels from approaching the city from the west.
Disarm the Hungarian units. At the same time, the disarmament of units that do not offer resistance should be carried out directly in military camps.
To capture the most important objects, one at a time was created in all divisions - two special forward detachments as part of an infantry battalion, as well as 150 paratroopers of the 108th Guards. PDP on armored personnel carriers, reinforced with 10-12 tanks. In these detachments were responsible officers of the KGB of the USSR K.E. Grebennik, P.I. Zyryanov, A.M. Korotkov and others. They were supposed to capture members of Imre Nagy's government and the leaders of the armed uprising.
In addition, to capture bridges across the Danube River and other important objects, detachments were formed in the regiments as part of a rifle company, reinforced with tanks, guns and sapper units.
The heavy tank-self-propelled regiment of the 11th mechanized division was assigned to the 33rd mechanized division of General G.I. Obaturova, who had to perform the most difficult tasks.
In total, the following units participated in the operation to restore order in Hungary: units of the Special Corps (2nd Nicholas-Budapest Red Banner Order of Suvorov and 17th Enakievo-Danube Red Banner Order of Suvorov Guards Mechanized Divisions, 177th and 195th Guards Aviation Divisions); 8th Mechanized Army (31st Tank Vistula Red Banner Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov, 11th Rivne Red Banner Order of Suvorov and 32nd Berdichev Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky Guards Mechanized, 61st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division); 38th Combined Arms Army (70th Glukhovskaya Order of Lenin twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 128th Turkestan Red Banner Guards Riflemen, 27th Cherkasy Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky and 390th Guards Poltava Order of Lenin and twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov, mechanized, 60th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division); Separate mechanized army (33rd Guards Kherson Red Banner twice Order of Suvorov mechanized division); 35th Guards Kharkov Twice Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Mechanized Division of the Odessa Military District; 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions; 1st Guards Railway Brigade and other units. They were armed with more than 3,000 tanks.
Before the start of the operation, Order No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces was communicated to all personnel of the Soviet troops in Hungary.
COMMANDER-CHIEF OF THE UNITED ARMED FORCES
Comrade soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals! At the end of October, in our brotherly Hungary, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution rose up in rebellion with the goal of destroying the people's democratic system, liquidating the revolutionary gains of the working people and restoring the old landowner-capitalist order in it.
Events have shown that the active participation of former Horthyists in this adventure leads to the revival of fascism in Hungary and creates a direct threat to our Fatherland and the entire socialist camp. We must not forget that in the last war, Horthy Hungary opposed our homeland together with Hitler’s Germany.
In accordance with the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Pact concluded between the countries of the socialist camp, obliging us to take “coordinated measures necessary to strengthen their defense capabilities in order to protect the peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories and ensure protection from possible aggression", Soviet troops began to fulfill allied obligations.
There is no doubt that the working class and working peasantry of the Hungarian People's Republic will support us in this just struggle.
The task of the Soviet troops is to provide fraternal assistance to the Hungarian people in defending their socialist gains, in defeating the counter-revolution and eliminating the threat of a revival of fascism.
I ORDER:
All personnel of the Soviet troops, with full consciousness of their military duty, must show persistence and firmness in fulfilling the tasks set by the command. Provide assistance to local authorities in their efforts to restore public order and establish normal life in the country.
To hold high the honor and dignity of the Soviet soldier, to strengthen fraternal friendship with the working people of Hungary, to respect their national traditions and customs.
I express my firm confidence that the soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals of the Soviet troops will fulfill their military duty with honor.
Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev
The text of the order is unusual and therefore requires some clarification. Its content does not meet the most basic requirements for combat orders.
Documents of this kind reflect conclusions from an assessment of the situation and the enemy, the plan of action and combat missions of formations and units, indicate the demarcation lines between active forces, issues of interaction, ammunition consumption, troop readiness time, and more. In order No. 1, these components are completely absent. What's the matter? Obviously, it is a purely propaganda document, aimed mainly at the world community. The troops acted according to the rules prescribed by the combat regulations in accordance with another order of Marshal I.S. Koneva. Its real content was brought to narrow circle persons in the strictest confidence. This is confirmed by archival documents - reports from commanders to higher management about the work done to carry out the order of Marshal I.S. Konev No. 01.
Retired Lieutenant General E. I. Malashenko spoke in his memoirs about how Operation Whirlwind proceeded:
“On October 4 at 6 o’clock, at the signal “Thunder”, which meant the beginning of Operation Whirlwind, the formed detachments to capture objects and the main forces of the three divisions of the Special Corps in columns along their routes simultaneously from different directions rushed to the city and, having overcome resistance on the outskirts of the Hungarian capital, by 7 o'clock they rushed into Budapest.
Formations of the armies of generals A. Babajanyan and X. Mamsurov began active actions to restore order and restore authorities in Debrecen, Miskolc, Győr and other cities.
Airborne units disarmed Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries blocking the airfields of Soviet aviation units in Veszprém and Tekel.
Imre Nagy and part of his entourage left parliament, having previously announced on the radio that “the government is in its place,” and took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. General Bela Kiraly gave the order to conduct military operations and moved his headquarters to Mount Janos, from where he tried to control the Hungarian units and armed units of the “national guard”.
Units of the 2nd Guards Division at 7:30 am. They captured bridges across the Danube, parliament, the buildings of the Central Committee of the Party, the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs, the City Council and the Nyugati station. In the parliament area, a security battalion was disarmed and three tanks were captured.
Colonel Lipinsky's 37th Tank Regiment disarmed approximately 250 officers and "national guards" during the capture of the Ministry of Defense building.
The 87th Heavy Self-Propelled Tank Regiment captured the arsenal in the Fot area and also disarmed the Hungarian tank regiment.
During the day of the battle, units of the division disarmed up to 600 people, captured about 100 tanks, two artillery depots, 15 anti-aircraft guns and a large number of small arms.
Units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, without initially encountering resistance, captured an artillery depot in Pestszentlerinets, three bridges across the Danube, and also disarmed units of the Hungarian rifle regiment, which had gone over to the side of the rebels.
The 108th Parachute Regiment of the 7th Guards Airborne Division, with sudden actions, disarmed five Hungarian anti-aircraft batteries that were blocking the airfield in Tekele.
Figure 149
Soviet soldier killed on the street in Budapest. 1956
128th Guards Rifle Division Colonel N.A. Gorbunova, through the actions of forward detachments in the western part of the city, by 7 o'clock captured the Budaers airfield, capturing 22 aircraft, as well as the barracks of the communications school, and disarmed the mechanized regiment of the 7th mechanized division, which was trying to resist."
To quickly defeat the armed detachments in Budapest, on the instructions of Marshal I.S. Konev's Special Corps additionally received two tank regiments (100 tank regiments 31td and 128 tank regiments 66 Guards Infantry Division), the 80th and 381st parachute regiments of the 7th and 31st Guards. airborne division, rifle regiment, mechanized regiment, artillery regiment, as well as two divisions of heavy mortar and rocket brigades.
Most of these units were assigned to reinforce the 33rd Mechanized and 128th Rifle Guards Divisions.
Particularly difficult operations in Budapest were the battles to capture rebel strongholds in the center of the capital: the Corvin district, University Town, Moscow Square and the Royal Fortress. To suppress these pockets of resistance, significant forces of infantry, artillery and tanks were brought in, incendiary shells, flamethrowers, smoke grenades and bombs were used. The attack on a strong resistance center in Corvin Lane, which began on November 5 at 15:00, was preceded by massive artillery preparation, in which 11 artillery battalions took part, consisting of about 170 guns and mortars, as well as several dozen tanks. By evening, the 71st Guards Tank Regiment of Colonel Litovtsev and the 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Yanbakhtin captured the ruins of the former city quarter. During their assault, the crew of the "765" tank of the 71st Tank Regiment, 33rd Guards Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Guard Senior Sergeant A.M. distinguished themselves. Balyasnikova. At the height of the battle, his thirty-four burst into enemy positions at full speed, in the area where the rebel headquarters was located. Despite the damage to the vehicle (shells hit the track and engine), the tank crew continued to fight, throwing hand grenades at the enemy and shooting from personal weapons. These minutes allowed the infantry to support the attack and soon capture the fortification. For the courage and heroism shown during the battle, the commander of the guard tank, senior sergeant A.M. Balyasnikov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Ordinary crew members also received high awards: gunner Latyshev and loader Tokarev were awarded the Order of Glory III degree, driver R. Guk was awarded the Order of the Red Star.
Figure 150
A damaged Soviet self-propelled artillery unit ISU-152K from the 128th self-propelled tank regiment. Budapest, November 1956
The commander of the tank platoon, Lieutenant S.S., was also awarded the Gold Star medal. Tsik, who led the assault group. For the battles in the Hungarian capital, the company commander of the 114th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 31st Guards Airborne Division (commander - Major General P. Ryabov), Captain Sharip Migulov, received his Order of Alexander Nevsky. This was the first and only award of such an order to officers after the end of the Great Patriotic War.
“In Budapest, I was wounded four times,” Migulov recalls, “I was shot in the leg, there was a shrapnel in the head, in the shoulder and in the side. The company went ahead. They let the company through. And I was in the rearguard. So they slashed at us. Noise, groans... All the guys around were killed, and I fell with a shot in the leg, but noticed that they were shooting from the fourth floor. Next to me, the grenade launcher was lying lifeless. I reached for the grenade launcher, crawled over a big tree. Shot. And about two floors collapsed on them. The fire stopped from there..."
And there were many such heroic episodes. For example, the feat of Lieutenant F.I. Shipitsyn, described in the newspaper "Red Star" for 1957.
"...It was November 6, 1956 on Zsigmond Moritz Square in Budapest. A group of fascist rebels, led by the Horthy general Bela Kiraly, hiding in the basements and attics of buildings, fired at Hungarian workers and soldiers of the Hungarian People's Army, who decided to knock the rebels out of their shelters. Together with the Hungarian patriots, Soviet soldiers took part in the battle... The tanks were accompanied by Hungarian officers who knew the location of the city well. Major Hafiek Laszlo was in the car along with Lieutenant Fedor Shipitsyn. This crew included the driver-mechanic Senior Sergeant Gross, gunner Sergeant Melin, loading private Ormankulov...
The counter-revolutionaries managed to set fire to the tank... The Hungarian officer was wounded in the shoulder by a tracer bullet. His clothes caught fire. Such a situation was created that it was necessary to immediately leave the burning tank. But Laszlo had no strength. Lieutenant Shipitsyn and Private Ormankulov rushed to help their Hungarian friend. With the assistance of Sergeant Melin, they opened the tank hatch and helped Hafiek Laszlo get out of the burning car. At this moment, the Hungarian comrade received several more wounds. Lieutenant Shipitsyn was also wounded. Private Ormankulov was struck to death by a machine-gun burst. Overcoming excruciating pain, Lieutenant Shipitsyn dragged the Hungarian officer to a ditch with water and extinguished the burning clothes on him. Then he took the seriously wounded Hungarian officer in his arms and wanted to hide him in a nearby house. However, Shipitsyn was able to take only a few steps - he received new wounds, and his strength left him. Bleeding, the Soviet officer fell to the ground dead. Hafiek Laszlo was left alone. Having regained consciousness for a minute, gathering his last strength, he crawled under the gate of the house and buried his face in the cold ground. So Laszlo lay there until dawn the next day. On the morning of November 7, two Hungarian workers picked him up in an unconscious state and sent him to safety...
For courage and bravery, Lieutenant Fyodor Ivanovich Shipitsyn was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin...”
Despite the stubborn resistance of the rebels, on November 7, parts of the division of General G.I. Obaturov took over the Kossuth radio station. In the area of the pier, units of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division captured boats of the Danube Flotilla. Regiments of the 128th Guards Rifle Division stormed the Royal Fortress and Horthy Palace on Castle Hill. More than 1,000 people operated in the area of the fortress; during their capture, 350 machine guns, the same number of rifles, several mortars, and a large number of pistols and grenades were seized. The troops of generals A.Kh. operated no less successfully in other cities and towns of Hungary. Babajanyan and Kh.U. Mamsurova.
On the same day, the new leadership of Hungary, headed by J. Kadar, was delivered to Budapest in a Soviet armored vehicle, accompanied by tanks.
Several pockets of resistance inside Budapest held out until November 8, and on the outskirts for several more days. On November 8, in the area of the suburban working village of Chepel, where up to 700 people were armed with heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the rebels managed to shoot down a Soviet Il-28R reconnaissance aircraft from the 880th Guards Regiment of the 177th Guards Bomber Air Division. Its entire crew was killed: the squadron commander, Captain A. Bobrovsky, the squadron navigator, Captain D. Karmishin, and the squadron communications chief, Senior Lieutenant V. Yartsev. Each crew member was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The fact that during the assault on Csepel, Soviet troops lost only three tanks is the undoubted merit of the heroic crew.
With the defeat of the armed detachments in Csepel and Buda, the fighting in Budapest was essentially completed.
By November 11, armed resistance was broken not only in the Hungarian capital, but throughout the country. The remnants of the armed units went underground. To eliminate groups hiding in the forests adjacent to Budapest, these areas were combed. The final liquidation of the remaining small groups and ensuring public order were carried out jointly with the created Hungarian officer regiments.
Following the results of the hostilities on December 18, 1956, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, more than 10 thousand Soviet military personnel were awarded orders and medals, 26 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Of these, 14 were posthumous: captain AA. Bobrovsky, private Yu.V. Burmistrov, senior lieutenant P.G. Volokitin, Sergeant I.M. Goryachev, senior lieutenant G.M. Gromnitsky, senior lieutenant M.S. Zinukov, captain D.D. Karmishin, senior lieutenant M.P. Karpov, Colonel S.N. Kokhanovich, junior sergeant A.I. Kuzmin, captain G.P. Moiseenkov, captain N.V. Mura-lion, Sergeant A.D. Soloviev, senior lieutenant V. Yartsev.
The total losses of Soviet troops during the fighting in Hungary amounted to 706 people killed (75 officers and 631 soldiers and sergeants of conscript service), 1,540 wounded, 51 people missing. A large number of tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment were destroyed and damaged. Only units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, nine armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, four BM-13s, six anti-aircraft guns, 45 machine guns, 31 cars and five motorcycles in Budapest.
The losses of the Hungarian side were also significant. According to official Budapest, from October 23, 1956 to January 1957, until individual armed clashes between the rebels and the Hungarian authorities and Soviet troops ceased, 2,502 Hungarians were killed and 19,226 people were wounded. Other figures are given by the West German magazine "Stern" (1998. No. 9). According to him, during the Hungarian events, 2,700 local residents were killed and thousands were injured. The Soviet side lost 2,170 people, including 669 killed. In the first months after the suppression of the uprising, over 200 thousand people left Hungary (out of a total population of 10 million people), mainly young people of the most active and working age. As a result of subsequent trials (22 thousand cases), 400 people were sentenced to death and 20 thousand were interned. The fate of Imre Nagy was also tragic.
Figure 151
A soldier of the 128th Guards Rifle Division on the street of Budapest. November 1956
Even at the height of the fighting in Budapest, on November 4, he, with his remaining loyal ministers and members of their families, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. According to the agreement with the new government of Janos Kadar, everyone who wished to stay in Hungary was allowed to return home without hindrance, while the rest could leave the country. Everyone was guaranteed immunity.
On the evening of November 22, Nagy and his associates agreed to leave the Yugoslav embassy. But Janos Kadar did not keep his word. When leaving the embassy, the former Hungarian leaders were arrested by Soviet soldiers and a day later they were taken to Romania with the consent of his government. The entire action was agreed upon in advance with Moscow and Bucharest. Kadar claimed that the Yugoslavs were aware of the agreement, although they later protested why Nagy was taken to Romania.
At the end of March 1957 in Moscow, Kadar reached an agreement with the Soviet leadership that Nagy and his group could not escape responsibility. In April 1957, they were arrested in Romania, where they enjoyed the right of “temporary asylum,” and were secretly transported to the People’s Republic of Hungary. The investigation lasted until the autumn of 1957. By this time, 74 more “active participants in the counter-revolutionary rebellion” had been detained in connection with the “Nadya case.” From among them, according to the proposal of the Soviet competent authorities, a “leading core of conspirators” was identified in the amount of 11 people. In June 1958, a closed trial took place. Imre Nagy and several of his associates, including the Minister of Defense P. Maleter, the famous publicist M. Ghimes and J. Sziládi, received capital punishment by hanging. On June 16 at 5 a.m. the sentence was carried out. It should be noted that the Soviet leadership opposed the execution of I. Nagy. N. Khrushchev advised J. Kadar to handle the case of the former Hungarian leader “with soft mittens” (put him in prison for 5-6 years, and then get a job as a teacher at some agricultural institute in the province). Kadar did not listen. According to some researchers, behind this lay “personal grievances” and Magyar stubbornness.
More than 50 years have passed since the October events in Hungary. In December 1991, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, in a speech on the occasion of the reception of Hungarian Prime Minister J. Antall, condemned the 1956 invasion. Nevertheless, to this day the question remains controversial: who constituted the main armed force of the “popular uprising”, as the Western media characterized the rebellion?
According to experts from various political views, the number of those who took part in armed battles in Budapest was 15-20 thousand (with a total population of the capital of about 1.9 million people). Moreover, the “revolutionary vanguard” - workers and peasants, apparently occupied the smallest percentage in this series, although many “revolutionary committees” were called workers and peasants. It is likely that individually a significant number of workers nevertheless took direct part in the demonstration and armed struggle. This is confirmed by the materials of the trials. However, what is significant is that on October 23, work was not stopped at any factory, there were no strikes in support of the demonstration and then an uprising, and armed centers were not organized at any factory. The same can be said about agricultural cooperatives and state farms.
In connection with the issue raised, it is important to cite the observations of the Hungarian philosopher, Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. József Foriz. In the article “On the counter-revolution in Hungary in 1956,” he notes: “Armed centers were organized in such squares, in such public buildings, which from a military point of view were well defended and made it possible to conduct armed activities secretly and with impunity.” The competent and skillful actions of the rebels during the assaults and defense of various objects were noted by many eyewitnesses of the events. An analysis of the fighting also suggests that their leaders had good professional military skills. And also, in a number of cases, clearly special training - for conducting combat operations in urban conditions. This is confirmed by the professional choice of positions for organizing firing points, the use of snipers, and more.
Many sources mention the participation of a large number of military personnel of the Hungarian People's Army and internal troops in the struggle. Even facts of individual military units going over to the side of the rebels were broadcast on the radio. For example, András Hegedüs speaks about the transition of the personnel of the Miklós Zrini Military Academy to the side of the rebels in his autobiographical work. But J. Forizh refutes this information. He, in particular, writes that on October 28, 1956, the Military Academy with its full complement went out to suppress the rebels in Corvin Kez, which was thwarted by the speech of Imre Nagy. A little later, on the basis of the academy’s personnel, the 2nd revolutionary regiment of internal troops was formed. “This,” as Forizh emphasizes, “meant speaking out for socialism.”
Laszlo Durko, a famous Hungarian writer, in his book mentions only one such part - the construction one, located in the Kilian barracks. In it, as he writes, “children of class-alien families were drafted, but not into armed service.”
Former chief of staff of the Special Corps, Colonel E.I. Malashenko writes that a small part of the Hungarian army went over to the side of the rebels. Thus, in Budapest, the rebels were supported and provided armed resistance by units of two mechanized and one rifle regiments, several construction battalions, and about ten anti-aircraft batteries. At the same time, most researchers note that in general the army did not side with the rebels and did not oppose the Soviet troops. Moreover, a significant number of Hungarian military personnel took part in the fight against armed rebel groups and assisted Soviet troops.
Here, in our opinion, it is important to touch upon the issue of armed assistance from external forces, namely Western countries interested in destabilizing relations in the socialist bloc. First of all, the USA. This assistance was not provided at the state level. An analysis of National Security Council documents suggests that the rapidity of events in Hungary took American leaders by surprise. To provide military assistance to Hungary, the United States had to secure the consent of its allies, but they were busy with the war in Egypt. Under these conditions, the US Security Council removed the issue of military assistance to Hungary from the agenda. Moreover, Austria would hardly risk its neutrality to allow military transport aircraft to pass through its airspace.
Nevertheless, it is known that during the Hungarian events, the “legend” of American intelligence, the former head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), General William D. Donovan, was in Austria as the head of the International Assistance Committee. According to the Washington Daily News, at the end of November he returned to Washington from Hungary, whose border, according to the newspaper, he crossed several times during his stay in Austria. In Washington, Donovan told the press that "providing weapons to those who are still fighting" is best opportunity"provide assistance" to the Hungarians. Asked whether the United States should "encourage continued fighting," Donovan replied, "Of course!" . With the outbreak of the rebellion, then US Vice President R. Nixon also visited Austria. He also traveled to the Hungarian border and even talked with the rebels. During the trial of I. Nagy and his associates in February and June 1958, the names of the British military attaché, Colonel D. Cowley and member of the West German parliament, Prince H. von Lowenstein, were mentioned. The first of them was accused of direct participation in leading the uprising, the second was called a link with “the large imperialist capitalists in West Germany.”
To a greater extent, Western intelligence services were prepared for the Hungarian events. Thanks to their direct assistance, active work was launched to form and prepare combat detachments and sabotage groups for deployment to Hungary. Moreover, it began long before the October events. Popular American journalist Drew Pearson reported interesting facts on November 8, 1956. As early as 1950, he heard from the Hungarian emigrant Dr. Béla Fabian about “underground preparations” in Hungary, with which Fabian was closely associated.
“The Hungarian people want to rebel,” Fabian told Pearson. “Hungary wants to be the first to oppose its Soviet masters... I know about the restlessness among the peasants... If you help a little, a fire will break out in Hungary.”
Pearson asked Fabian what the United States government could do to help.
“You can’t win anything in this life if you don’t risk something,” Fabian replied. “Let them risk shedding a little blood!” .
Pearson's recollections are consistent with the words of D. Angleton, who in 1956 was in charge of counterintelligence and subversive operations at the CIA. A conversation with him was published in the New York Times on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the October events. Here's how the newspaper reported Angleton's story:
“By the mid-fifties, we had brought into line the task forces that were created by divine order in 1950,” Angleton said, citing the directive establishing the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination. – Auth.), the concept of which included the use of quasi-military task forces in order to “in no way agree to the status quo of Soviet hegemony.” Mr. Wisner, recommended by General J. Marshall (then US Secretary of Defense. - Author) to head the subversive program, and Mr. Angleton “undertook extensive training”... Eastern Europeans, partly members of pre-war peasant parties in Hungary, Poland; Romania and Czechoslovakia, were trained at secret CIA centers in West Germany under the guidance of CIA experts. Mr. Angleton added that the units were led by "a natural leader from Yugoslavia who had received military training in Habsburg Austria-Hungary."
One of the training camps for “freedom fighters” was located near Traunstein in Upper Bavaria. It is known that in October 1956 a group of Hungarian Germans arrived there, many of whom had previously served in the SS. From them, cohesive core groups of rebel detachments were formed, which were then transported by plane to Austria, and from there, by ambulance planes and vehicles, to Hungary.
It should be noted that the basis of the Hungarian combat units were mainly the Horthys who fled to the west in 1945.
William Colby, a former employee of the OSS and, since 1950, the CIA, also mentions special CIA detachments trained to participate in combat operations in socialist countries, including Hungary. In his memoir, My Life in the CIA, he writes:
“Since the creation of the OIC under the leadership of Frank Wiesner, the CIA had the task, or believed that it had a task, to provide OSS-style military support to resistance groups seeking to overthrow totalitarian communist regimes. In Hungary, such groups we called freedom fighters ... As soon as the uprising began in Hungary, Wisner and the senior leadership of the Directorate of Plans (as the OPK was called since 1952, which merged with other divisions of the CIA. - Auth.), especially those involved in subversive work, were fully prepared for action - to come to the aid of freedom fighters with weapons, communications and air transport. This is exactly the kind of work that the CIA's quasi-military units were designed for."
Thanks to the support of Western intelligence services, underground paramilitary groups were created in Hungary itself. Such as “White Partisans”, “National Resistance Movement”, “Union of Junkers”, youth organization “Lux” and others. By the mid-1950s, their activities intensified sharply. In 1956 alone, security agencies uncovered 45 underground organizations, a number of West German intelligence and US CIA agents were detained.
Emigrant organizations were also actively involved in the formation of combat detachments to be sent to Hungary, in particular the Hungarian Bureau (Austria), Caritas (Austria) and the Legion of Hungarian Freedom (Canada). The latter, according to the newspaper Neues Deutschland on October 31, planned to transfer three thousand volunteers - former officers and soldiers of the Horthy army.
Emigrant recruitment centers, supported by Western intelligence services, operated in Salzburg, Kematen, Hungerburg and Reichenau. In Munich, on Lockerstrasse, there was a recruiting center headed by an American army captain. From here, former Nazi supporters headed to the scene of events. On October 27, one of the groups (about 30 people) was transferred to Hungary with the help of border neutral Austria. More than 500 “volunteers” were transferred from England. Several dozen groups were sent from Fontainebleau, France, where NATO headquarters was then located.
In total, according to some data, during the period of active armed resistance, more than 20 thousand emigrants were brought into the country with the help of Western intelligence services. About 11 thousand people who were part of the “expeditionary force” were awaiting orders to march near the Hungarian border. And the border restaurant of Nikkelsdorf (Austro-Hungarian border), as the Osterreichische Volksstimme wrote, was “like a transit point where people from West Germany arrived, speaking Hungarian and dressed in American uniforms ... each of them had camping equipment.”
Other national anti-communist organizations of the world, including Russians, did not remain indifferent to the events in Hungary. The author does not have any facts about the participation of Russian emigrants in hostilities on the side of the rebels. Nevertheless, there is information about a sabotage group of approximately 200 people, which was planned to be transported to Hungary from the territory of Austria. The saboteurs were led by Nikolai Rutchenko, a member of the NTS since 1942. Information about this group was presented in the documentary film "The Hungarian Trap", shown on November 9, 2006 on the Rossiya TV channel.
More is known about the activities of representatives of Russian organizations in the field of propaganda. NTS and RNO were particularly active in this direction. Here is a sample of one of the RNO's appeals to Soviet soldiers and officers, broadcast over the radio.
"RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.
Like a terrible spider, the Soviet Union keeps the countries of the so-called Eastern bloc in its web. Many of you visited and saw there the remnants of those freedoms and prosperity that were created before the war under the conditions of a democratic regime, which our Motherland has been deprived of for almost forty years.
The Soviet government, with the help of its agents, enslaved these states, deprived their people of any rights and introduced a communist regime of terror and lawlessness into them.
The first outbreak of popular anger was the Poznan uprising of Polish workers. At the recent trial it definitely became clear that the Poles fought for bread and freedom. The cruel and inhumane actions of the communist police with their provocation, lack of legality and mockery of the population were also revealed.
Then genuine popular indignation broke out in Poland. Soviet troops were sent to Poland, but at the last moment the collective leadership gave in and the regime of freedom began to be restored in Poland.
And Poland was immediately followed by Hungary. Driven to despair by poverty and lack of rights, the Hungarian people rose up and overthrew the despicable and corrupt communist government. AND THE WORST THING HAPPENED IN HUNGARY. By order of the collective leadership, Soviet troops were sent to suppress the PEOPLE'S UPRISING. Soviet aircraft began to bomb Hungarian cities, Soviet tanks shot Hungarian freedom fighters.
We know gratifying cases when Russian officers and soldiers refused to shoot at the Hungarians. Moreover, in certain cases they helped the rebels, expressed their sympathies for the Hungarian patriots and fraternized with them. But the overall impression for the entire free world is terrible: on the orders of the Soviet government, which falsely and hypocritically declares itself to be the defender of the working people, Russian soldiers found themselves in the role of suppressors of the popular uprising.
RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.
Tomorrow other countries enslaved by communism will follow the example of Poland and Hungary. You will be sent to pacify popular uprisings in Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Executing the orders of an oppressive government, you will shoot at crowds of people just because they want freedom.
The Russian soldier, a centuries-old synonym of heroism, sacrifice and humanity, will become in the eyes of other peoples the executioner of freedom. This will affect the future relations of the countries liberated from the communist yoke with the future free Russia.
RUSSIAN SOLDIERS.
Do not carry out the inhumane and illegal orders of the communist government, which has kept our people in terrible slavery for 39 years.
Help the rebel peoples who are fighting for their and YOUR freedom.
Show these peoples all the generosity that RUSSIAN is capable of.
Turn your bayonets, machine guns and tanks against the communist tyrants who hold our people, other peoples in terrible slavery and disgrace the name of our homeland.
RUSSIAN GENERALS AND OFFICERS. Set an example for your soldiers. The fate of Russia and its people is in your hands. Overthrow the communist government. Create a people's government, responsible to the people and caring only about the interests of our Fatherland.
Down with the dishonest, slave-owning, communist regime.
LONG LIVE FREE RUSSIA.
LOG LIVE THE UNION and FRIENDSHIP OF FREE RUSSIA with OTHER FREE PEOPLES."
Western “psychological warfare” services played a special role in the events in Hungary in October–November 1956. Primarily the radio stations Voice of America and Free Europe. The latter, as G. A. Kissinger noted in his book “Diplomacy,” was under the special patronage of John F. Dulles. These radio stations not only called for open protest against the ruling regime, promising support from NATO countries, but were actually the coordinating body of the uprising. Moreover, even the Western media were forced to admit that many Free Europe radio broadcasts grossly distort the actual state of affairs. “Radio Free Europe,” said an article in the American magazine “News Week,” “specialized in presenting the communist system in the worst possible light.”
Hungarian broadcasts were compiled with the active participation of Hungarian emigrants, most of whom collaborated with the Germans during the Second World War. For example, radio broadcasts of “Free Europe” organized specifically for Hungary under the name “Voice of Free Hungary” were opened on October 6, 1951 by Count D. Dejeffi, a participant in the anti-republican conspiracy in Hungary. Former Horthy diplomat A. Gellert participated in the radio broadcasts. One of the leading commentators on the Hungarian section of Radio Free Europe was former Horthy army captain J. Borsanyi, who spoke under the pseudonym “Colonel Bell.”
At the end of October 1956, a secret meeting of representatives of American intelligence and leaders of Hungarian emigrant organizations took place in Munich. At this meeting the question of how the propaganda of “Free Europe” should contribute to the development of a “revolutionary situation” in Hungary was considered. The tactics of “two stages” were adopted: the first – the destruction of state security agencies, the banning of the Communist Party, the declaration of “neutrality”, economic and later military accession to the Western bloc; the second is the overthrow of the socialist system, the bourgeois revolution. From that moment on, Radio Free Europe became, in essence, the governing body and organizer of rebellious protests. Having switched to round-the-clock broadcasting, it began to broadcast, along with general propaganda statements, specific combat instructions. Advice was given to illegal radio stations on what wavelength and how to broadcast. Those who did not surrender their weapons were encouraged to continue resistance. For example, when the government of Imre Nagy issued a call for a ceasefire, Free Europe immediately called on its listeners to disrupt the truce. The already mentioned military expert and Free Europe commentator, “Colonel Bell,” believed that a ceasefire was “as dangerous as a Trojan horse.”
“Imre Nagy and his friends,” he said on October 29, “want to insidiously, in a modern way, repeat the story of the Trojan horse. A ceasefire, like the Trojan horse, is necessary so that the Budapest government, which is still in control at the moment, power, could maintain its position as long as possible... Those who fight for freedom must not forget for a minute about the plan of the government opposing them, because otherwise the tragedy of the Trojan Horse will repeat itself."
As is known, it was under the active influence of the propaganda of Radio Free Europe and as a result of the intervention of some Western missions that the truce was actually disrupted. The next day, literally a few hours after the above radio broadcast, an attack began on the city party committee on Republic Square and other organizations, as well as mass attacks on the communists, which resulted in numerous casualties.
On October 31, "Colonel Bell" demanded that the portfolio of the Minister of Defense be transferred to the "freedom fighters", and soon, on November 3, this post was taken by Colonel Pal Maleter. On the same day, Radio Free Europe issued new instructions: “Let them liquidate the Warsaw Pact and declare that Hungary is no longer a party to the treaty.” The next day, November 1, Imre Nagy announced his withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. And many such examples can be given.
The leading role of “Free Europe” in inciting the armed conflict in Hungary was recognized even by representatives of the Western press. Here, for example, is how the Parisian correspondent of the France Soir newspaper Michel Gorde, who was in Hungary during the rebellion, characterized the broadcasts of this radio station. “We could listen to foreign radio broadcasts, which was our only source of information from the outside world. We heard many false reports about what was happening in Hungary.
We listened to broadcasts from Radio Free Europe in Munich, intended for satellite countries. Her impatient tone and excited calls for rebellion undoubtedly caused much harm.
Over the past few days, many Hungarians have told us that these radio broadcasts have led to great bloodshed." A correspondent for another French publication, the weekly Expresse, wrote the following about his impressions in Budapest: "Everywhere in Budapest I met Hungarians of the most varied social status who, with bitterness, and even spoke with hatred about the Americans, about Radio Free Europe, about the balloons being sent with propaganda leaflets." And one more piece of evidence. The West German newspaper "Freies Wort" wrote: "We are convinced that, first of all, the aggressive propaganda of the Free Europe transmitter" is largely responsible for the bloodshed in Hungary... Propaganda, which is ultimately paid for with the blood of misled people, is a crime against humanity."
Speaking about the “psychological warfare” launched by Western propaganda services, it is important to touch upon two mythological stories, which have become widespread on the pages of many “free” media. Echoes of these stories can be heard to this day.
The first myth. According to Western media, during the Hungarian events a large number of Soviet troops went over to the side of the rebels. Thus, in particular, in the Parisian emigrant magazine "Renaissance" it was noted that already in the first days, among the wounded rebels who were evacuated to Austria, there were many Russian officers and soldiers. In total, according to Pastor, a member of the Budapest Revolutionary Committee, “3,000 Russians with 60 tanks went over to the side of the “revolution.” The same figures are cited in some other emigrant publications. At the same time, A.N. Pestov, a Russian White emigrant, talking about his stay in Hungary on the pages of the authoritative emigrant magazine “Chasovoy”, writes that rumors about large armed detachments allegedly leaving for the mountains were “extremely exaggerated.” Although he mentions “one Soviet unit that joined the Hungarian detachment.” True, and this is not true. In any case, there is no data on the transition of any groups of Soviet military personnel to the rebels. Only about five cases of escape to Austria are known. Soviet soldiers who went over to the side of the Hungarian rebels did not “surface” on the pages of propaganda publications in subsequent years.
Nevertheless, special committees were even organized to assist the “Russian heroes who joined the Hungarians in their struggle for freedom.” The collection of donations was initiated by a number of Russian emigrant organizations, including the Tolstoy Foundation, the Union of Officials of the Russian Corps, and the Russian National Association (RNO).
"Russian people!
According to the latest information received, many officers and soldiers of the Soviet army went over to the side of the Hungarian freedom fighters and fought in their ranks. Russian soldiers have already arrived in Austria.
Seven Russian organizations have already addressed a special memorandum to the International Red Cross, drawing its attention to the extremely difficult legal situation of Russians who rebelled against the usurper Soviet power, and demanding the application of the legitimate norms of international law to them.
But at the same time, urgent sanitary and material assistance is needed. Germany is already organizing the sending of sanitary and food aid to Hungary. A special Russian Help Committee was formed in Munich.
We appeal to all Russian people in Belgium with a request for urgent assistance with monetary contributions in favor of Russian officers and soldiers who raised the banner of the struggle against communism in Hungary.
Every contribution, even the smallest one, will be accepted with gratitude.
All collected amounts will be urgently sent to the Russian Committee in Munich, in whose hands this assistance will be centralized.
Please send all contributions to SSR - 60.039 to the address: de I "Union Nationule Russe, 4, rue Paul-Emile Janson, Bruxelles, or collect them by subscription sheets, transferring them to the Office of the Russian National Association."
According to the magazine "Our News", in just ten days, more than 200 Russian emigrant families in Corinthia and Styria donated about 13,000 shillings to the needs of new refugees.
True, where the funds collected by Russian emigrants went “for the thousands of compatriots who left the “communist paradise”, the author was unable to find on the pages of the same emigrant newspapers and magazines.
The second myth is related to the alleged “atrocities of Soviet soldiers.” Many pages of the Western media of those years were devoted to these “facts”. According to an eyewitness to the events, Russian White emigrant A. Pestov, who is difficult to suspect of sympathizing with the Soviet Union, this is not true. In the essay “I Was in Hungary,” he notes the strict discipline in Soviet units, which were under the complete control of their commanders. A former officer of the Volunteer Army describes his impressions of Soviet soldiers as follows:
“When I looked at these Russian guys and saw them every day and in the most varied situations, I did not find in them those “Bolsheviks” who were pictured to me and are pictured to thousands of my comrades abroad. We imagine an unbridled robber, with a swirl of hair, with with brutal eyes and an evil grimace, this is how we remember the “Bolsheviks” from civil war. Now these are the same Russian guys with shaved heads, with kind faces, with a desire to joke and laugh, like the soldiers of that company that I, a young warrant officer, first led into battle in the August forests at the beginning of the war. My boys shed their blood for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland. And they shed it selflessly. These, too, perhaps a few of the “armed peoples” of the civilized world, will go into battle, even without a supply of crackers, without any canned chicken, without field cinematographers and lupanars, and without artillery preparation sweeping away everything and everyone in front of them.”
In addition, he notes the “truly humane attitude” on the part of Soviet soldiers towards local residents, especially women and children. And not only in the first days, but also after the suppression of the rebellion. Despite the often emphasized hostility of the population of Budapest towards the soldiers, A. Pestov claims that there was neither a thirst for revenge nor reprisals, emphasizing the respect of Soviet soldiers for the church and the execution of orders so that the population suffered the least.
In conclusion, the essay should be said about the consequences of the Hungarian events. They influenced not only the aggravation of relations with Western countries, but also caused a negative reaction in some states of the socialist bloc. Thus, one of the university professors in Brno, in an article published in the newspaper Literaturny Noviny, noted:
“Our youth are also infected with the “Hungarian disease”. We have youth in front of us and do not really know who we have in front of us. Youth organizations are indifferent to the majority of our youth... The “Communist Manifesto” is considered by our students only as material for preparing for the next seminar..."
Some leaders of countries “friendly” to the USSR also condemned Soviet policy in Hungary. The prime ministers of India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, in a joint declaration adopted on November 14, condemned the armed solution to the political crisis in Hungary. In their declaration, they wrote that “Soviet armed forces must be withdrawn from Hungary as soon as possible” and that “the Hungarian people must be given complete freedom to make decisions about their future and the form of government.”
Uprising in Hungary
Budapest, 1956
What was avoided in Poland happened in Hungary, where the intensity of passions was much greater. In Hungary, the internal struggle between communists turned out to be more acute. than anywhere else, and the Soviet Union found itself drawn into it more than in Poland or other countries. Of all the leaders still in power in Eastern Europe in 1956, Rakosi was the most involved in the export of Stalinism. Returning to Budapest from Moscow after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Rakosi told his friends: “In a few months, Khrushchev will be declared a traitor and everything will return to normal.”
The internal political struggle in Hungary continued to escalate. Rakosi had no choice but to promise an investigation into the trials of Rajk and the other Communist Party leaders he executed. At all levels of government, even in the state security agencies, the most hated institution in Hungary by the people, Rakosi was demanded to resign. He was almost openly called a “murderer.” In mid-July 1956, Mikoyan flew to Budapest to force the resignation of Rakosi. Rakosi was forced to submit and leave for the USSR, where he eventually ended his days, cursed and forgotten by his people and despised by Soviet leaders. Rakosi's departure did not cause any real changes in government policy or composition.
In Hungary, arrests followed of former state security leaders responsible for trials and executions. The reburial of victims of the regime - Laszlo Rajk and others - on October 6, 1956 resulted in a powerful demonstration in which 300 thousand residents of the Hungarian capital participated.
Under these conditions, the Soviet leadership decided to once again call Imre Nagy to power. A new USSR ambassador (future member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the State Security Committee) was sent to Budapest.
The people's hatred was directed against those who were known for their torment: state security officers. They represented everything that was disgusting about the Rákosi regime; they were caught and killed. Events in Hungary took on the character of a genuine popular revolution, and it was precisely this circumstance that frightened the Soviet leaders. The USSR had to take into account at that moment that an anti-Soviet and anti-socialist uprising was taking place. It was obvious that this was a far-reaching political plan, and not just a desire to destroy the existing regime.
Not only the intelligentsia, but also industrial workers were drawn into the orbit of events. The participation of a significant part of the youth in the movement left a certain imprint on its character. The political leadership found itself at the tail end of the movement, rather than leading it, as happened in Poland.
The fundamental issue was the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Eastern European countries, that is, their actual occupation.
The new Soviet government preferred to avoid bloodshed, but was ready for it if it came to the question of the satellites secession from the USSR, even in the form of declaring neutrality and non-participation in blocs.
On October 22, demonstrations began in Budapest demanding the formation of a new leadership led by Imre Nagy. On October 23, Imre Nagy became prime minister and made a call to lay down his arms. However, there were Soviet tanks in Budapest and this caused excitement among the people.
A grandiose demonstration arose, the participants of which were students, high school students, and young workers. The demonstrators walked towards the statue of the hero of the 1848 Revolution, General Bell. Up to 200 thousand gathered at the parliament building. Demonstrators toppled a statue of Stalin. Armed groups formed, calling themselves “Freedom Fighters.” They numbered up to 20 thousand people. Among them were former political prisoners released from prison by the people. The Freedom Fighters occupied various areas of the capital, established a high command led by Pal Maleter, and renamed themselves the National Guard.
At the enterprises of the Hungarian capital, cells of the new government were formed - workers' councils. They put forward their social and political demands, and among these demands there was one that aroused the ire of the Soviet leadership: to withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest, remove them from Hungarian territory.
The second circumstance that frightened the Soviet government was the restoration of the Social Democratic Party in Hungary, and then the formation of a multi-party government.
Although Nagy was made prime minister, the new Stalinist leadership led by Gere tried to isolate him and thereby worsened the situation even further.
On October 24, Mikoyan and Suslov arrived in Budapest. They recommended that Gehre be immediately replaced as First Secretary by János Kádar. Meanwhile, on October 25, an armed clash with Soviet troops took place near the parliament building. The rebellious people demanded the departure of Soviet troops and the formation of a new government of national unity, in which various parties would be represented.
On October 26, after the appointment of Kadar as the first secretary of the Central Committee and the resignation of Gere, Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Moscow. They followed to the airfield in a tank.
On October 28, while fighting was still ongoing in Budapest, the Hungarian government issued an order for a ceasefire and the return of armed units to their quarters to await instructions. Imre Nagy, in a radio address, announced that the Hungarian government had come to an agreement with the Soviet government on the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and the inclusion of armed detachments of Hungarian workers and youth in the regular Hungarian army. This was seen as the end of the Soviet occupation. Workers quit their jobs until the fighting in Budapest ceased and Soviet troops withdrew. A delegation from the workers' council of the industrial district of Miklós presented Imre Nagy with demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary by the end of the year.
The report of Mikoyan and Suslov on the situation in Hungary, made by them immediately after returning from Budapest on October 26 to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, reflected, as can be seen from the editorial of the Pravda newspaper of October 28, an alleged readiness to agree with the democratization program, provided that this program maintains the dominance of the Communist Party and keeps Hungary within the Warsaw Pact system. The article was just a disguise. The order for Soviet troops to leave Budapest served the same purpose. The Soviet government sought to gain time to prepare for reprisals, which were to follow not only on behalf of the remaining participants in the pact, but also Yugoslavia and China.
This way the responsibility would be shared among everyone.
Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest, but concentrated in the area of the Budapest airfield.
On October 30, when Mikoyan and Suslov were in Budapest, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee adopted, as Khrushchev testifies, a unanimous resolution on the armed suppression of the Hungarian revolution, which stated that it would be unforgivable for the USSR to remain neutral and “not provide assistance to the working class of Hungary in its struggle against counter-revolution."
At the request of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, a Chinese delegation led by Liu Shaoqi arrived in Moscow for advice. Liu Shaoqi declared that Soviet troops should withdraw from Hungary and let the working class of “Hungary m” themselves suppress the counter-revolution. Since this was completely contrary to the decision to intervene, Khrushchev, informing the Presidium on October 31 about the Chinese response, insisted on the immediate use of troops. Marshal Konev, summoned to a meeting of the presidium, stated that his troops would need 3 days to suppress the “counter-revolution” (in fact, a revolution, and received an order to put the troops on combat readiness. The order was given behind the back of Liu Shaoqi, who at the same time day returned to Beijing in full confidence that there would be no Soviet intervention. It was decided to inform Liu Shaoqi about the intervention at the time of the farewell at the Vnukovo airfield. In order to make a greater impression on Liu Shaoqi, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee appeared in Vnukovo in full force. Talk about “the good of the Hungarian people.” In the end, Liu Shaoqi surrendered. Thus, Chinese support was ensured.
Then Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov - representatives of the Presidium of the Central Committee - went successively to Warsaw and Bucharest, where they quite easily received consent to the intervention. The last leg of their trip was Yugoslavia. They came to Tito expecting serious objections from him. There were no objections on his part; as Khrushchev reports, “we were pleasantly surprised... Tito said that we were absolutely right, and we must move our soldiers into battle as soon as possible. We were ready for resistance, but instead we received his wholehearted support. I would even say that Tito went even further and convinced us to solve this problem as soon as possible,” Khrushchev concludes his story.
Thus the fate of the Hungarian revolution was decided.
On November 1, the massive invasion of Soviet troops into Hungary began. To Imre Nagy's protest, Soviet Ambassador Andropov replied that the Soviet divisions that entered Hungary arrived only to replace the troops already there.
3,000 Soviet tanks crossed the border from Transcarpathian Ukraine and Romania. The Soviet ambassador, again summoned to Nagy, was warned that Hungary, in protest against the violation of the Warsaw Pact (the entry of troops required the consent of the relevant government), would withdraw from the pact. The Hungarian government announced on the evening of the same day that it was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, declaring neutrality and appealing to the United Nations to protest against the Soviet invasion.
But all this no longer bothered the Soviet government much. The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion (October 23 - December 22) in Egypt diverted the attention of the world community from the events in Hungary. The American government condemned the actions of England, France and Israel. Thus, a split in the camp of the Western allies was obvious. There was no sign that the Western powers would come to Hungary's aid. Thus, the conflict over the Suez Canal in 1956 and the subsequent war of England, France and Israel against Egypt distracted the Western powers from the events in Hungary. International situation was extremely favorable for the intervention of the Soviet Union.
What happened on the streets of Budapest? Soviet troops faced fierce resistance from Hungarian army units, as well as from the civilian population. The streets of Budapest witnessed a terrible drama, during which ordinary people attacked tanks with Molotov cocktails. Key points, including the Ministry of Defense and Parliament buildings, were taken within a few hours. Hungarian radio went silent before finishing its appeal for international help, but dramatic accounts of the street fighting came from a Hungarian reporter who alternated between his teletype and the rifle he was firing from his office window.
The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee began preparing a new Hungarian government; The first secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, János Kádár, agreed to the role of prime minister of the future government.
On November 3, a new government was formed, but the fact that it was formed on the territory of the USSR became known only two years later. The new government was officially announced at dawn on November 4, when Soviet troops stormed the Hungarian capital, where a coalition government led by Imre Nagy had been formed the day before; The non-party general Pal Maleter also joined the government.
By the end of the day on November 3, the Hungarian military delegation led by Defense Minister Pal Maleter arrived at headquarters to continue negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, where they were arrested by KGB Chairman General Serov. It was only when Nagy was unable to connect with his military delegation that he realized that the Soviet leadership had deceived him.
On November 4 at 5 o'clock in the morning, Soviet artillery rained fire on the Hungarian capital, half an hour later Nagy notified the Hungarian people about this. For three days, Soviet tanks destroyed the Hungarian capital; armed resistance in the province continued until November 14. Approximately 25 thousand Hungarians and 7 thousand Soviet soldiers were killed.
After the suppression of the uprising-revolution, the Soviet military administration, together with state security agencies, carried out reprisals against Hungarian citizens: mass arrests and deportations to the Soviet Union began.
Imre Nagy and his staff took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. After two weeks of negotiations, Kadar gave a written guarantee that Nagy and his employees would not be prosecuted for their activities, that they could leave the Yugoslav embassy and return home with their families. However, the bus in which Nagy was traveling was intercepted by Soviet officers, who arrested Nagy and took him to Romania. Later, Nagy, who did not want to repent, was tried in a closed court and shot. This message was published on June 16, 1958. General Pal Maleter suffered the same fate. Thus, the suppression of the Hungarian uprising was not the first example of the brutal defeat of political opposition in Eastern Europe - similar actions on a smaller scale were carried out in Poland just a few days earlier. But this was the most monstrous example, in connection with which the image of Khrushchev the liberal, which he seemed to promise to leave in history, faded forever. These events were perhaps the first milestone on the path that would lead a generation later to the destruction of the communist system in Europe, as they caused a “crisis of consciousness” among the true supporters of Marxism-Leninism. Many party veterans in Western Europe and the United States were disillusioned, because it was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to the determination of Soviet leaders to maintain power in the satellite countries, completely ignoring the aspirations of their peoples.
Introduction
Hungarian uprising of 1956 (October 23 - November 9, 1956) (in the communist period of Hungary known as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in Soviet sources as the Hungarian counter-revolutionary uprising of 1956) - armed uprisings against the regime of people's democracy in Hungary, accompanied by massacres of communists from the VPT , employees of the State Security Administration (AVH) and internal affairs (about 800 people).
The Hungarian uprising was one of the important events of the Cold War period, demonstrating that the USSR was ready military force maintain the inviolability of the Warsaw Pact (WPT).
1. Prerequisites
The uprising, which in the USSR and Hungary until 1991 was called a counter-revolutionary revolt, in modern Hungary - a revolution, was largely caused by the difficult economic situation of the local population.
In World War II, Hungary took part on the side of the fascist bloc, its troops participated in the occupation of the territory of the USSR, and three SS divisions were formed from Hungarians. In 1944-1945, Hungarian troops were defeated, its territory was occupied by Soviet troops. But it was on the territory of Hungary, in the area of Lake Balaton, in the spring of 1945 that Nazi troops launched the last counteroffensive in their history.
After the war, free elections were held in the country, provided for by the Yalta agreements, in which the Party of Small Farmers received a majority. However, the coalition government imposed by the Allied Control Commission, which was headed by the Soviet Marshal Voroshilov, gave half the seats in the cabinet to the winning majority, while key posts remained with the Hungarian Communist Party.
The communists, with the support of Soviet troops, arrested most of the leaders of the opposition parties, and in 1947 they held new elections. By 1949, power in the country was mainly represented by communists. The Matthias Rakosi regime was established in Hungary. Collectivization was carried out, a policy of forced industrialization was launched, for which there were no natural, financial and human resources; Mass repressions carried out by AVH began against the opposition, the church, officers and politicians of the former regime and many other opponents of the new government.
Hungary (as a former ally of Nazi Germany) had to pay significant indemnities to the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, amounting to up to a quarter of GDP.
On the other hand, the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU gave rise to attempts at liberation from communists in all Eastern European states, one of the most striking manifestations of which was the rehabilitation and return to power of the Polish reformer Wladyslaw Gomulka in October 1956.
An important role was also played by the fact that in May 1955, neighboring Austria became a single neutral independent state, from which, after the signing of a peace treaty, allied occupation forces were withdrawn (Soviet troops had been stationed in Hungary since 1944).
A certain role was played by the subversive activities of Western intelligence services, in particular the British MI6, which trained numerous cadres of “people's rebels” at its secret bases in Austria and then transferred them to Hungary
2. Strengths of the parties
More than 50 thousand Hungarians took part in the uprising. It was suppressed by Soviet troops (31 thousand) with the support of Hungarian workers' squads (25 thousand) and Hungarian state security agencies (1.5 thousand).
2.1. Soviet units and formations that took part in the Hungarian events
Special building:
2nd Guards Mechanized Division (Nikolaev-Budapest)
11th Guards Mechanized Division (after 1957 - 30th Guards Tank Division)
17th Guards Mechanized Division (Yenakievo-Danube)
33rd Guards Mechanized Division (Kherson)
128th Guards Rifle Division (after 1957 - 128th Guards Motorized Rifle Division)
7th Guards Airborne Division
80th Parachute Regiment
108th Parachute Regiment
31st Guards Airborne Division
114th Parachute Regiment
381st Parachute Regiment
8th Mechanized Army of the Carpathian Military District (after 1957 - 8th Tank Army)
38th Army of the Carpathian Military District
13th Guards Mechanized Division (Poltava) (after 1957 - 21st Guards Tank Division)
27th Mechanized Division (Cherkasy) (after 1957 - 27th Motorized Rifle Division)
In total, the following took part in the operation:
personnel - 31550 people
tanks and self-propelled guns - 1130
guns and mortars - 615
anti-aircraft guns - 185
cars - 3830
3. Beginning
The internal party struggle in the Hungarian Labor Party between Stalinists and supporters of reforms began from the very beginning of 1956 and by July 18, 1956 led to the resignation of the General Secretary of the Hungarian Labor Party, Matthias Rakosi, who was replaced by Ernő Gerő (former Minister of State Security).
The removal of Rakosi, as well as the Poznan uprising of 1956 in Poland, which caused great resonance, led to an increase in critical sentiment among students and the writing intelligentsia. From the middle of the year, the Petőfi Circle began to actively operate, in which the most pressing problems facing Hungary were discussed.
On October 16, 1956, some university students in Szeged organized an organized exit from the pro-communist “Democratic Youth Union” (the Hungarian equivalent of the Komsomol) and revived the “Union of Students of Hungarian Universities and Academies,” which existed after the war and was dispersed by the government. Within a few days, branches of the Union appeared in Pec, Miskolc and other cities.
Finally, on October 22, students from the Budapest University of Technology (at that time the Budapest University of Construction Industry) joined this movement and formulated a list of 16 demands to the authorities (the immediate convening of an extraordinary party congress, the appointment of Imre Nagy as prime minister, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country , destruction of the monument to Stalin, etc.) and planned for October 23 a protest march from the monument to Bem (Polish general, hero of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848) to the monument to Petőfi.
At 3 o'clock in the afternoon a demonstration began, in which about a thousand people took part - including students and members of the intelligentsia. The demonstrators carried red flags, banners with slogans about Soviet-Hungarian friendship, the inclusion of Imre Nagy in the government, etc. On the squares of Jasai Mari, on the Fifteenth of March, on the streets of Kossuth and Rakoczi, radical groups joined the demonstrators, shouting slogans of a different kind. They demanded the restoration of the old Hungarian national emblem, the old Hungarian national holiday instead of the Day of Liberation from Fascism, the abolition of military training and Russian language lessons. In addition, demands were put forward for free elections, the creation of a government led by Nagy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
At 20 o'clock on the radio, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the WPT, Erne Gere, made a speech sharply condemning the demonstrators.
In response to this, a large group of demonstrators stormed the broadcasting studio of the Radio House, demanding that the program demands of the demonstrators be broadcast. This attempt led to a clash with the Hungarian state security units AVH defending the Radio House, during which the first dead and wounded appeared after 21:00. The rebels received weapons or took them from reinforcements sent to help guard the radio, as well as from civil defense warehouses and captured police stations. A group of rebels entered the Kilian Barracks, where three construction battalions were located, and seized their weapons. Many construction battalion members joined the rebels.
Fierce fighting in and around the Radio House continued throughout the night. The head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kopachi, ordered not to shoot at the rebels and not to interfere with their actions. He unconditionally complied with the demands of the crowd gathered in front of the headquarters for the release of prisoners and the removal of red stars from the facade of the building.
At 11 p.m., based on the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, ordered the commander of the Special Corps to begin moving to Budapest to assist the Hungarian troops “in restoring order and creating conditions for peaceful creative labor.” Formations and units of the Special Corps arrived in Budapest at 6 a.m. and began fighting with the rebels.
On the night of October 23, 1956, the leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party decided to appoint Imre Nagy as Prime Minister, who had already held this post in 1953-1955, distinguished by his reformist views, for which he was repressed, but shortly before the uprising he was rehabilitated. Imre Nagy was often accused of sending a formal request to Soviet troops to help suppress the uprising without his participation. His supporters claim that this decision was made behind his back by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party Ernő Gerő and former Prime Minister András Hegedüs, and Nagy himself was opposed to the involvement of Soviet troops.
On the night of October 24, about 6,000 Soviet army troops, 290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, and 156 guns were brought into Budapest. In the evening they were joined by units of the 3rd Rifle Corps of the Hungarian People's Army (HPA). Some of the Hungarian military personnel and police went over to the side of the rebels.
Members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee A. I. Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov, KGB Chairman I. A. Serov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Army General M. S. Malinin arrived in Budapest.
In the morning, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division approached the city, in the evening - the 128th Guards Rifle Division, joining the Special Corps. At this time, during a rally near the parliament building, an incident occurred: fire was opened from the upper floors, as a result of which a Soviet officer was killed and a tank was burned. In response, Soviet troops opened fire on the demonstrators, resulting in 61 people killed and 284 wounded on both sides.
Ernő Gerő was replaced as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party by Janos Kadar and went to the headquarters of the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Szolnok. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio, addressing the warring parties with a proposal to cease fire.
Imre Nagy spoke on the radio and stated that “the government condemns the views that view the current anti-popular movement as a counter-revolution.” The government announced a ceasefire and the start of negotiations with the USSR on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
Imre Nagy abolished the AVH. The fighting in the streets stopped, and for the first time in the past five days, silence reigned on the streets of Budapest. Soviet troops began to leave Budapest. It seemed that the revolution had won.
József Dudas and his militants seized the editorial office of the newspaper Szabad nep, where Dudas began publishing his own newspaper. Dudas announced the non-recognition of the government of Imre Nagy and the formation of his own administration.
In the morning, all Soviet troops were withdrawn to their places of deployment. The streets of Hungarian cities were left virtually without power. Some prisons associated with the repressive AVH were taken over by the rebels. The security offered virtually no resistance and partially fled.
Political prisoners and criminals who were there were released from prisons. Locally, trade unions began to create workers' and local councils that were not subordinate to the authorities and not controlled by the Communist Party.
Béla Kiray's guards and Dudas' troops executed communists, AVH employees and Hungarian military personnel who refused to submit to them. In total, 37 people died as a result of lynchings.
The uprising, having achieved certain temporary successes, quickly radicalized - there were murders of communists, employees of the AVH and the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and shelling of Soviet military camps.
By order of October 30, Soviet military personnel were prohibited from returning fire, “succumbing to provocations,” and leaving the unit’s location.
There were recorded cases of murders of Soviet military personnel on leave and sentries in various cities of Hungary.
The Budapest City Committee of the VPT was captured by the rebels, and over 20 communists were hanged by the crowd. Photos of hanged communists with signs of torture, with faces disfigured by acid, went around the whole world. This massacre was, however, condemned by representatives of the political forces of Hungary.
There was little Nagy could do. The uprising spread to other cities and spread... The country quickly fell into chaos. Railway communications were interrupted, airports stopped operating, shops, shops and banks were closed. The rebels scoured the streets, catching state security officers. They were recognized by their famous yellow boots, torn into pieces or hung by the legs, sometimes castrated. The captured party leaders were nailed to the floors with huge nails, with portraits of Lenin placed in their hands.
On October 30, the government of Imre Nagy decided to restore the multi-party system in Hungary and create a coalition government consisting of representatives of the VPT, the Independent Party of Smallholders, the National Peasant Party and the reconstituted Social Democratic Party. It was announced that free elections would be held.
4. Re-entry of Soviet troops
The development of events in Hungary coincided with the Suez crisis. On October 29, Israel and then NATO members Great Britain and France attacked Soviet-backed Egypt with the aim of seizing the Suez Canal, near which they landed their troops.
On October 31, Khrushchev at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee said: “If we leave Hungary, this will encourage the American, British and French imperialists. They will understand our weakness and will attack.” It was decided to create a “revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ government” headed by J. Kadar and conduct a military operation to overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. Plan of the operation, called " Vortex", was developed under the leadership of the USSR Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov.
On November 1, the Hungarian government, when Soviet troops were ordered not to leave the units’ locations, decided to terminate the Warsaw Pact by Hungary and presented a corresponding note to the USSR Embassy. At the same time, Hungary turned to the UN asking for help in protecting its neutrality. Measures were also taken to protect Budapest in the event of a “possible external attack.”
In Tekel near Budapest, right during the negotiations, the new Minister of Defense of Hungary, Lieutenant General Pal Maleter, was arrested by the USSR KGB.
Early in the morning of November 4, new Soviet military units began entering Hungary under the overall command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the Soviet Operation Whirlwind began. Officially, Soviet troops invaded Hungary at the invitation of the government hastily created by János Kádar. The main objects in Budapest were captured. Imre Nagy spoke on the radio:
Detachments of the “Hungarian National Guard” and individual army units tried to resist the Soviet troops to no avail.
Soviet troops carried out artillery strikes on pockets of resistance and carried out subsequent mopping-up operations with infantry forces supported by tanks. The main centers of resistance were the suburbs of Budapest, where local councils managed to lead more or less organized resistance. These areas of the city were subjected to the most massive shelling.
Fights in the streets.
5. The end
By November 8, after fierce fighting, the last centers of resistance of the rebels were destroyed. Members of Imre Nagy's government took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. On November 10, workers' councils and student groups approached the Soviet command with a ceasefire proposal. Armed resistance ceased.
Marshal G.K. Zhukov “for the suppression of the Hungarian counter-revolutionary rebellion” received the 4th star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Ivan Serov in December 1956 - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.
After November 10, until mid-December, the workers' councils continued their work, often entering into direct negotiations with the command of Soviet units. However, by December 19, 1956, the workers' councils were dispersed by state security agencies and their leaders were arrested.
Hungarians emigrated en masse - almost 200,000 people (5% of the total population) left the country, for whom refugee camps had to be created in Austria in Traiskirchen and Graz.
Immediately after the suppression of the uprising, mass arrests began: in total, the Hungarian secret services and their Soviet colleagues arrested about 5,000 Hungarians (846 of them were sent to Soviet prisons), of which “a significant number were members of the VPT, military personnel and students.”
Prime Minister Imre Nagy and members of his government were lured out of the Yugoslav Embassy, where they were hiding, on November 22, 1956, and taken into custody on Romanian territory. They were then returned to Hungary and put on trial. Imre Nagy and former Defense Minister Pal Maleter were sentenced to death on charges of treason. Imre Nagy was hanged on June 16, 1958. In total, according to some estimates, about 350 people were executed. About 26,000 people were prosecuted, of whom 13,000 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but by 1963 all participants in the uprising were amnestied and released by the government of János Kádár.
After the fall of the socialist regime, Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were ceremonially reburied in July 1989. Since that time, Imre Nagy has been considered a national hero of Hungary.
6. Losses of the parties
According to statistics, in connection with the uprising and hostilities on both sides, during the period from October 23 to December 31, 1956, 2,652 Hungarian citizens were killed and 19,226 were injured.
The losses of the Soviet Army, according to official data, amounted to 669 people killed, 51 missing, 1540 wounded.
7. Consequences
The Hungarian events had a significant impact on the internal life of the USSR. The party leadership was frightened by the fact that the liberalization of the regime in Hungary led to open anti-communist protests and, accordingly, the liberalization of the regime in the USSR could lead to the same consequences. On December 19, 1956, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee approved the text of the Letter of the CPSU Central Committee “On strengthening the political work of party organizations among the masses and suppressing the attacks of anti-Soviet, hostile elements.” It said:
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to appeal to all party organizations ... in order to attract the attention of the party and mobilize communists to strengthen political work among the masses, to resolutely fight to suppress the attacks of anti-Soviet elements, which have recently, due to some aggravation of international situation, intensified their hostile activities against the Communist Party and the Soviet state " Further, it was said about the recent “ intensification of the activities of anti-Soviet and hostile elements " First of all, this " counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Hungarian people ", conceived under the sign " false slogans of freedom and democracy " using " discontent of a significant part of the population caused by serious mistakes made by the former state and party leadership of Hungary.
also stated:
Recently, among individual literary and art workers, slipping from party positions, politically immature and philistine-minded, there have been attempts to question the correctness of the party line in the development of Soviet literature and art, to move away from the principles of socialist realism to the position of unidealized art, and demands have been put forward to “liberate” literature and art from the party leadership, to ensure “freedom of creativity”, understood in the bourgeois-anarchist, individualistic spirit.
A direct consequence of this letter was a significant increase in 1957 in the number of people convicted “for counter-revolutionary crimes” (2948 people, which is 4 times more than in 1956). Students who made any critical statements on this topic were expelled from the institutes.
There is still no consensus in Hungary regarding the assessment of the events of 1956. As Russian media have repeatedly reported, in 2006, during the celebration of the 50th anniversary, many residents of the country (about 50%), primarily in remote and rural areas, still perceive them as a fascist rebellion inspired by milestone. This happens, in particular, because the country's rural residents received a lot from the nationalization of landowners' lands as a result of the communists coming to power. And many of the organizers of the rebellion, including Imre Nagy, constantly called for the return of the land to the previous owners. It is also worth recalling that the Hungarian workers’ squads played an active role in suppressing the rebellion.
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Introduction
hungarian uprising cold war
Hungarian Uprising of 1956 (October 23 - November 9, 1956) (in the post-communist period of Hungary known as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in Soviet sources as the Hungarian Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion of 1956) - an armed uprising against the pro-Soviet regime of the People's Republic in Hungary in October - November 1956, suppressed by Soviet troops.
The Hungarian uprising was one of the important events of the Cold War period, demonstrating that the USSR was ready to maintain communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact countries by military force.
Throughout the existence of the USSR, this revolution was considered counter-revolutionary, and the suppression of the uprising was positioned as the suppression of the new emergence of fascism on the territory of Hungary. In books and printed publications, only one point of view was “expressed” - the opinion of the communist authorities. Few people could openly voice the story from eyewitnesses in those days. After gaining independence from the communist system and changing the constitution in 1989, new facts from the history of the 1956 uprising began to emerge, which forced many people to reconsider their attitude to the events of those years.
What was the catalyst and cause of the revolution? What are the requirements and consequences? This work describes the previous prerequisites, as well as the events themselves in Hungary in 1956.
1956 in Hungary: causes and consequences of events
On February 13, 1945, after a two-month operation, the Red Army completed the Budapest campaign and took the city; a red flag was hoisted in the capital of Hungary. In a country that was an ally of Nazi Germany in World War II, Moscow created a puppet government and established Soviet power. In Hungary, the fascist regime was replaced by the Red dictatorship. This system, which operated in Hungary for fifty years, existed only thanks to the support of the Red Army and Soviet intelligence services.
After the Second World War, the establishment of a communist regime began in Hungary, which belonged to the sphere of Soviet influence. In 1949, the communists held formal elections in the country and formalized their rise to power. This process was led by the leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, Matthias Rakosi.
The Hungarian Communist Party did not come to power; it had neither opportunities nor support in society. There were not enough followers; in the elections the communists received only 1/6 of the votes. The guarantor of their strength was the Soviet Red Army, units of which were located in Hungary. The Communist Party came to power thanks to their efforts. The Soviet army used violent methods to remove democratically elected representatives from power. With the help of soldiers, the Hungarian police were governed.
The construction of communist Hungary proceeded at an accelerated pace, Hungarian communism was an analogue of the Soviet-Stalinist model, Rakosi, who considered himself a student of Stalin, imitated the “Leader” in everything. A one-party system was established in the country. Security services persecuted members of opposition parties. Freedom of speech was limited. The active propagation of the Russian language and culture began. The government announced the nationalization of banks, businesses and the transport system. A reform was carried out that implied collectivization. As a result, the country's standard of living fell catastrophically. These reforms strengthened the anti-communist sentiment that existed in Hungarian society. Hungary was on the verge of an uprising.
On July 13, 1953, the leader of the Hungarian communists, Matthias Rakosi, was summoned to the Kremlin and subjected to severe criticism for the severe situation in the country. economic situation. The dictatorship imposed in Hungary was so unpopular, it placed an unbearable burden on Hungarian society, that it was felt in Moscow. It became clear that Hungary was not following the path of stabilization, but on the contrary, the situation was becoming more and more aggravated. Every day the attitude of Hungarian residents towards communism worsened, which not unreasonably gave cause for concern to the Kremlin. Rákosi, who was always considered a devoted supporter of Stalin, lost his leadership position in Hungary after the death of the “Leader”. The new leaders of the Kremlin did not trust him; a new leader was supposed to come to power in Hungary, although Rakosi retained leadership of the party, but Moscow considered that his tenure as head of the republic was not advisable. On the recommendation of the Kremlin, fifty-seven-year-old Imre Nagy became the new prime minister.
Imre Nagy, who had been a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1917, was an acceptable figure for Moscow, being a good specialist and well versed in agriculture. At the same time, he was a Moscow cadre and played an important role in providing food. Also, one of his advantages was his good knowledge of the Russian language, since it was easier to negotiate with him and keep in touch at any time. After the establishment of the socialist regime in Hungary, he always held high positions in the Hungarian government, the only exception was 1949, when Nagy criticized the collectivization of Hungary, he was removed from his position in the Rakosi government and expelled from the party, but after repentance he was reinstated in the party and returned to the government.
After his appointment as Prime Minister, Imre Nagy immediately began to implement reforms to liberalize Hungary. He wanted to painlessly transform the Stalinist system created by Rakosi, the process of forced collectivization was stopped, and the release and amnesty of political prisoners began. Censorship was partially lifted from the Hungarian press.
Nagy tried to democratize, but not dismantle the socialist system, but these processes were met with hostility by Matthias Rakosi and his supporters. There were big disagreements between Rakosi and Nagy, there was a real struggle
At that time, their influence in the party was still quite strong, but the new course was supported by most of the intelligentsia and students. The press published articles that criticized errors in the socialist system.
Moscow reacted negatively to the reforms carried out by Imre Nagy, as it was afraid that Nagy might have gone too far with his reforms. For the Soviet leaders of that time, the changes that came as a result of the reforms were not acceptable. The head of the Hungarian government was summoned to Moscow. On January 8, 1955, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, in which Nagy took part, Nikita Khrushchev accused the Chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers of factionalism. Three months later, on instructions from the Kremlin, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) dismissed Imre Nagy from the post of head of government and expelled him from the party again.
Nagy's resignation increased dissatisfaction with the communist system in Hungarian society. Representatives of the intelligentsia, students, and party members who supported Nagy demanded that his course be continued. Literature prohibited by censorship was distributed among the population, including revolutionary poems by the famous poet Sandor Petofi.
For Hungary, Petőfi means as much as Rustaveli for Georgians, Shakespeare for the British, Pushkin for the Russians, and Shevchenko for the Ukrainians. In Hungary, his name is associated not only with poetry, but also with the struggle for freedom. In 1848, Sándor Petőfi was one of the leaders of the Hungarian revolution; the Young Hungary organization he founded became the flagship of the revolution. In 1849, the poet died fighting for freedom. He was killed in a battle with Russian Cossacks. A hundred years later, a new revolution was associated with the name of Petőfi, now the Hungarians opposed the Soviet occupation, and only youth were at the forefront. In 1955, students formed the Sandor Petofi circle in Hungary, it became the center of debate, at the meeting they openly protested against the Soviet system, which in turn became the reason for a close look at the organization from Moscow. The USSR Ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov, informed the Kremlin almost every day about anti-Soviet meetings. In the summer of 1956, the communists banned the circle, but this did not lead to the desired result.
The situation in Hungary was getting more and more out of control. The communists tried to defuse the situation with personnel changes in the government. On July 17, 1956, Matthias Rákosi, the first secretary of the VPT, was removed from his post and the chairman of the economic committee of the government, Erne Görö, was elected in his place. But this was not enough.
Erne Gerö was an orthodox Stalinist, the former right hand of Rakosi, who committed the same crimes as Rakosi himself. For the Hungarians, this again became a tragedy; the Kremlin again brought a communist to power, and not someone who the people would trust and who could correct the situation.
Two months after Gero's appointment, the congress of the Writers' Union openly expressed its support for Imre Nagy and demanded his rehabilitation. The communist leadership, which was gradually losing its influence in the country, was forced to reinstate Nagy in the party. But this was already able to stop the anti-communist movement. The first large-scale march, which was of an anti-communist nature, took place on October 6, 1956. The occasion was the reburial of the ashes of Rajko Laszlo, a communist executed in 1949 and rehabilitated after the death of Stalin. More than one hundred thousand people took part in the procession; it was then that anti-Stalinist slogans appeared on the streets of Budapest; as it later turned out, this was just the beginning.
On October 16th, university students in Szeged left the pro-communist Democratic Youth League and revived the union of students of Hungarian universities and academies. The union had clear anti-Soviet demands. Almost all higher education institutions in Hungary have joined the new union. At noon on October 22nd, a meeting took place at the Budapest University of Technology, which at that time was called the Budapest University of Civil Engineering and Industry. Students numbering 600 people drew up a manifesto, which consisted of 16 points, the main demands being the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, the holding of free elections, the release of political prisoners, the restoration of national symbols and holidays, the abolition of communist censorship, and the return of Imre Nagy to the post of chairman of the government.
At 14:00 on October 23, the central streets of Budapest were filled with people, demonstrators walked to the monument to Józef Bem, one of the leaders of the 1848 revolution. As they walked, the number of demonstrators increased, and ordinary citizens joined the students. By 15:00, 200,000 Hungarians had gathered at the Bam monument, demonstrators cut off communist symbols from Hungarian flags and chanted anti-Soviet slogans. From the monument to Bam, people moved towards parliament, some of the students went to the state radio building.
By 6 o'clock in the evening, students approached the radio building, they demanded to read live a manifesto consisting of 16 points of demands. By this time, the building was taken under the protection of reinforced state security units, which brought weapons and ammunition into the building in ambulances. Representatives of the student delegation were allowed in to negotiate with the radio management, but they never returned. By 9 p.m., as thousands of demonstrators stood in front of the radio, tear gas grenades were thrown at protesters from the windows of the building, and a few minutes later security personnel opened fire on unarmed people.
Demonstrators disarmed the guards around the radio perimeter and began storming the building, with people coming to help from all over the city. On October 24 at 2 a.m., to suppress anti-Soviet protests, the first Soviet tanks appeared on the streets of Budapest.
After a meeting of the presidium with the first members of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev decides to send troops to the capital of Hungary. By order of the Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, a special corps of Soviet troops located on the territory of Hungary was to suppress the protests.
To defuse the situation, on the night of October 24, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the VPT, it was decided to return Imre Nagy to the post of Prime Minister, but this had no effect on the people who took to the streets. The appearance of the Soviet army on the streets of Budapest led to an increase in patriotic sentiment. The Soviet military tried to come to the aid of the Hungarian security forces besieged in the radio building, but encountered fierce resistance and were forced to retreat.
On the morning of October 24, the radio station building had already completely come under the control of demonstrators. In parallel with this, the rebels captured the base of one of the Hungarian units and took weapons. By 14:00, Soviet troops took control of the parliament building, the Central Committee, the airport and the railway station. Almost all residents of Budapest joined the resistance movement; unarmed people expressed their protest by destroying communist symbols: monuments to Stalin, burning the works of Lenin, red flags.
On October 24 at 15:00, Imre Nagy addressed the population on the radio and called on everyone to remain calm. He promised the rebels that no harsh measures would be taken against them if they laid down their arms. Despite the authority of the prime minister, not a single Hungarian abandoned the armed struggle. Several thousand soldiers and officers of the Hungarian army went over to the side of the rebels, and the rebels had a difficult time military equipment. The real battle began in Budapest. Hungarians shot at Soviet soldiers from roofs and attics multi-storey buildings, erected barricades and blocked the streets.
To fight the rebels, the Soviet leadership transferred a mechanized division stationed in Romania to Hungary, which entered Budapest on October 25th. Its composition was approximately 6,000 soldiers and officers, up to 400 armored vehicles and 156 artillery pieces. About 3,000 Hungarians fought against them, the bulk of them were workers and students, there were also professional soldiers of the Hungarian army who went over to the side of the rebels, their tactics were determined by the available weapons. The rebels fought Soviet troops in small groups, mostly armed with grenades, machine guns and Molotov cocktails. Soviet tank crews, who did not know the city and found it difficult to maneuver in the narrow streets, were easy targets for the Hungarian fighters. The Hungarians fired at Soviet equipment and Soviet soldiers from all sides. After six days of fierce fighting, the losses of the Soviet division amounted to more than 60 tanks and about 400 people killed.
On October 25, the Kremlin dismissed Erne Gero from his post as secretary, and instead appointed Politburo member János Kador. At the same time, to overcome the crisis, Imre Nagy began negotiations with a delegation of workers who supported the rebels. It was at these meetings that Nagy realized that without accepting the demands of the rebels, the fighting would not stop.
On October 27, Nagy held negotiations with Suslov and Mikoyan; he explained to Kremlin representatives that partial satisfaction of the rebels’ demands would not create a danger to socialism in Hungary. To defuse the situation, Nagy asked for Soviet troops to be withdrawn from Budapest.
On October 28th in Moscow, at a meeting of the Central Committee, Nikita Khrushchev gives the order for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. Moscow is studying the current situation and awaiting further developments. It takes time to mobilize additional armed forces of the USSR, since it was clearly impossible to stop the offensive with the available forces.
On October 29, units of Soviet troops began to leave Budapest. Several units remained in the city that provided security for the Soviet embassy and the building of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Street fighting stopped in Budapest, but the situation still remained tense. The rebels demanded the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the entire territory of Hungary, the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality.
On October 30, Imre Nagy abolishes the one-party system and announces the creation of a coalition government; all this, and primarily the danger of Hungary leaving the Warsaw Pact, caused a harsh reaction from Moscow.
On October 30, an event in the Middle East was added to these events - the “Suez Crisis”. Israel, France and Great Britain carried out military intervention against Egypt, a state friendly to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev, who always closely monitored the balance of power in the international arena, toughened his position towards Hungary.
On October 31, the next emergency meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee was held in Moscow, at which Khrushchev demanded the creation of a new workers' and peasants' government in Hungary under the leadership of Janos Kador. By decision of the Kremlin, the suppression of the protest in Budapest was entrusted to Marshal Konev.
On the morning of November 1, Imre Nagy was informed that new military units of the Soviet army would be introduced into Hungary. The Prime Minister demanded an explanation from the Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov, the answer was extremely vague. In such a situation, Nagy convened a government meeting at which he raised the question of the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which was supported unanimously.
On November 1, Soviet troops surrounded Budapest. The command distributed a special order among the military; the need for the operation was explained to the soldiers as follows: “At the end of October, in our brotherly Hungary, the forces of reaction and counter-revolution rose up in rebellion with the aim of destroying the people’s democratic system, eliminating the gains of the revolutionary working people and restoring the old landowner-capitalist order in it... The task of the Soviet troops is to assist the Hungarian people in defending their socialist gains, in defeating the counter-revolution and eliminating the threat of the return of fascism."
On November 4, 1956 at 5:30 am, the Soviet military command launched Operation Whirlwind. About 60,000 soldiers, approximately 6,000 armored vehicles, artillery and aircraft took part in the operation. Despite the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet army, the population of Budapest selflessly fought against the invaders; the Hungarians showed particular resistance in battles in front of the parliament, the royal palace, and Moscow Square. The most difficult thing for the Soviet troops was to take the Korvin cinema, where the Hungarian headquarters was located. They were able to take it only on November 7th, thereby breaking the main resistance of the Hungarians, although fighting continued in the city. The last center of resistance in Csepel was destroyed by Soviet troops on November 9th.
In addition to Budapest, the Red Army was fought in other cities of Hungary; the Soviet soldiers were resisted by Dior, Miskolc, Pecs, Deblenc and Dekezcsab. Despite the general uprising, the popular anti-communist uprising was defeated.
On November 7, the new head of government, Janos Kador, entered Budapest under the protection of Soviet tanks. With his first order, he restored in Hungary the administration that had operated in Hungary before the uprising began. Imre Nagy, who had been hiding for some time in the Yugoslav Embassy, was arrested.
As a result of Operation Whirlwind, Soviet losses amounted to more than 700 people killed and more than 1,500 wounded, about 3,000 Hungarian citizens were killed, a huge number of civilians were injured, and most of Budapest was completely destroyed.
After the suppression of the uprising in Hungary, mass repressions began; arrests were led by the chairman of the State Security Committee, Ivan Serov. During the entire period of repression, more than 15,000 people were arrested, most of them were placed in prison. From 1956 to 1960, the court sentenced 270 people to capital punishment.
To escape political terror, Hungarian citizens tried to flee abroad, the rebels and their families fled to Austria and Yugoslavia. After the uprising was crushed, about 200,000 people fled their homeland. Due to the huge flow of refugees, the Austrian government was forced to open refugee camps on its territory.
On June 9, 1958, a closed trial began in the People's Court of Hungary in the case of former Prime Minister Imre Nagy and several of his associates, he was accused of high treason and conspiracy.
On June 15, Imre Nagy was sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out the next day. Hungarian freedom was delayed for another forty years.
Conclusion
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 ended in failure and suffered very heavy human losses, but it cannot be said that this event was meaningless. Important lessons were learned, especially for ourselves as the Hungarian people. I would like to highlight and emphasize a couple of main points:
First. In your desire to be independent and free people, you can only rely on yourself. Imre Nagy, being a good and authoritative official, somewhat overestimated the capabilities of Hungary’s “Western” allies. His calculation relied on the help of the UN and the USA, but in fact, and in connection with the Cold War, the allies did not want to openly intervene in the conflict, so as not to further aggravate relations between the USA and the USSR. If Hungary left the socialist camp, the status quo on the world stage of the Soviets would be greatly shaken, and would become a precedent for similar revolutions in other countries that are part of the USSR.
Second. Although there was a physical defeat in the revolution, it was a victory from the point of view of ideas and thoughts, the thought of the revival of an independent Hungary. Yes, we had to wait 40 long years for it, but the “germ” of freedom was laid precisely in 1956 by the forces of workers, students and intelligentsia defending their civic position.
Literature
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