We were told in the 90s that no one had ever intended or was going to attack us, that it was We, the Russians, who were a threat to the whole world! Now let's look at the facts and quotes.
Quotes that are impossible to dispute
“No, and there can be no other alternative other than war with the Soviet Union, unless the Soviet Union agrees to surrender...”
1981 Richard Pipes, adviser to President Reagan, professor at Harvard University, member of the Zionist, anti-communist organization "The Present Danger Committee"
“The coming destruction of the Soviet Union must be the decisive, final battle - the Armageddon described in the Bible.”
Reagan. October 1983 Interview with the Jerusalem Post newspaper.
“The Soviet Union will be finished within a few years.”
1984 R.Pipes:
1984 Evgeny Rostov, one of the main founders of the “Committee of Existing Danger,” emphasized:
“We are not in the post-war period, but in the pre-war period.”
“I signed the legislative prohibition of the Soviet Union.
The bomb attack will begin in five minutes.”
1984 Reagan.
NATIONAL ATTACK PLANS (USA) ON THE SOVIET SOUTH WEST
1. JUNE 1946 plan called “PINSCHER” - “PICKS”.
Reset 50 nuclear bombs for 20 cities of the USSR.
5. End of 1949 plan “DROPSHOTS” - INSTANT IMPACT.”
Reset 300 atomic bombs on 200 cities of the USSR within a month, if the USSR does not surrender, continue bombing with conventional charges in the amount of 250 thousand tons, which should lead to the destruction of 85% of Soviet industry.
Simultaneously with the bombing, in the second stage they occupy the starting positions for the offensive ground forces in the amount of 164 NATO divisions, of which 69 are US divisions.
In the third stage, 114 NATO divisions from the west go on the offensive.
From the south, in the area between Nikolaev and Odessa (where NATO “peacekeepers” are constantly practicing the invasion in the “SI-BREEZ” exercises), 50 naval and airborne divisions are landing on the Black Sea coast, whose task is to destroy the Soviet armed forces in Central Europe.
By the time of the invasion, it was planned to accumulate the maximum number of NATO ships in the Black Sea in order to prevent the Black Sea Fleet from blocking the Bosporus Strait, and, consequently, the entry of NATO ships into the Black Sea to the shores of the USSR.
To ensure maximum effectiveness of combat operations and minimal losses, the task was set to constantly conduct reconnaissance of coastal defenses and terrain folds of the Black Sea coast before the invasion, using any opportunities, including excursions, friendly, sports meetings, etc.
IN THE PROCESS OF THE WAR AGAINST THE USSR, it was planned to involve:
250 ground divisions - 6 million 250 thousand people.
In addition, aviation, navy, air defense, support units - plus 8 million people.
NATO's plans for the Black Sea region, described in "The US is preparing to attack Russia", coincide with the Drop Shot plan.
After the occupation, the USSR is DIVIDED INTO OCCUPIATION ZONES:
1. Western part of Russia.
2. Caucasus - Ukraine.
3. Ural - Western Siberia- Turkestan.
4. Eastern Siberia - Transbaikalia - Primorye.
OCCUPATION ZONES are divided into 22 SUB-AREAS of responsibility
It is determined that AFTER THE OCCUPATION, NATO OCCUPATION FORCES are stationed on the TERRITORY of the USSR to carry out OCCUPATION FUNCTIONS in the amount of 38 ground divisions of 1 million people, of which 23 divisions perform their functions in the Central part of the USSR.
DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATION FORCES centered in cities:
Two divisions in Moscow. One division each in: Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev, Odessa, Murmansk, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Kharkov, Sevastopol, Rostov, Novorossiysk, Batumi, Baku, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Tashkent, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok.
The occupation forces include 5 air armies, 4 of which are dispersed on Russian territory.
They are introduced into the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea via an aircraft carrier formation.
To the above, the expression of the ideologist of the colonization of the USSR B. Brzezinski is appropriate: “... RUSSIA WILL BE Fragmented AND UNDER GUARDIANESS.”
1991
NATO is preparing for military actions on the territory of Russia and other Eastern European states.
One NATO document states:
“We must be prepared for military intervention in this region.”
“There may be a need to intervene in the affairs of the Arab world-the world of Islam.” The question of intervention in the Mediterranean is being considered: “In Algeria, Egypt, the Middle East - in regions where we must be prepared for military actions.”
“NATO must be prepared to intervene anywhere in the world.”
Pretext:
“Terrorist activity of a particular state, accumulation and storage chemical weapons etc."
The need to prepare public opinion and process it by means of mass media, conducting propaganda preparations for the intervention
REASONS WHY NATO COUNTRIES DIDN'T ATTACK THE USSR
NATO was opposed by a powerful military bloc of the Warsaw Pact countries,
with its mighty army, vast territory, reserves of manpower, which in turn:
1. It did not allow a lightning war to be carried out, even in the event of a treacherous attack.
2. In 20 days, the USSR was able to occupy all of Western Europe.
3. In 60 days, England would have been destroyed along with its bases, which were of paramount importance for the attack.
4.The United States would not be able to protect its territory from retaliation.
5. The unity of our people in all respects was frightening.
6. Our enemies remembered the courage and heroism of our people in all wars to defend our Fatherland and in fulfilling their international duty.
7. The enemy understood that partisan warfare would be organized in the occupied territory, and only a few would be lackeys and traitors.
CONCLUSION: IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DEFEAT OUR PEOPLE! And now???
The NATO countries, knowing that they would receive a retaliatory blow, still did not abandon the idea of attacking the USSR, constantly improving their plans.
The so-called “brothers” imposed on us have already achieved a lot from their plans. “new strategic partners”, all that remains is to buy up everything (including land) for their own papers or to fool them for consumer goods, put their soldier on our necks, leave the required number of slaves, reducing the population according to the principle: a slave must make a profit or die (Who needs a slave who will eat and not work?) Will something change in the actions of the occupier, in his attitude towards us, towards our children, grandchildren, if we let him go voluntarily, “entering” NATO?
The Great Patriotic War
German attack plan on the USSR
Adolf Hitler studying a map of Russia
The Soviet-Finnish war served as a harsh lesson for the country's leadership, showing that our army, weakened mass repressions, To modern warfare not ready. Stalin made the necessary conclusions and began to take measures to reorganize and re-equip the army. In the upper echelons of power there was complete confidence in the inevitability of war, and the task was to have time to prepare for it.
Hitler also understood our unpreparedness. In his inner circle, he said shortly before the attack that Germany had made a revolution in military affairs, ahead of other countries by three to four years; but all countries are catching up, and Germany may soon lose this advantage, and therefore it is necessary to solve the military problems on the continent in a year or two. Despite the fact that Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack the Soviet Union, as it was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the “Third Reich”. German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German one - it was less organized, less prepared and, most importantly, the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. It should be emphasized that the British intelligence service MI6 also played a role in inciting Hitler against the USSR. Before the war, the British managed to acquire the German Enigma encryption machine and thanks to this they read all the encrypted correspondence of the Germans. From Wehrmacht encryption they knew the exact timing of the attack on the USSR. But before Churchill sent a warning to Stalin, British intelligence tried to use the information they received to spark a German-Soviet conflict. She also owns a fake that was distributed in the United States - supposedly the Soviet Union, having received information about Hitler's impending attack, decided to get ahead of him and was itself preparing a preemptive strike on Germany. This disinformation was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and reported to Stalin. The widespread practice of fakes caused him to distrust all information about the imminent Nazi attack.
Plan Barbarossa
In June 1940, Hitler instructed Generals Marx and Paulus to develop a plan for an attack on the USSR. On December 18, 1940, the plan, codenamed Plan Barbarossa, was ready. The document was produced in only nine copies, of which three were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air force and navy, and six were hidden in the safes of the Wehrmacht command. Directive No. 21 contained only a general plan and initial instructions on waging war against the USSR.
The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the Red Army and occupy the Soviet Union. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment that belonged to Germany and the effect of surprise. The attack on the USSR was planned in the spring-summer of 1941, the final date of the attack was made dependent on the success of the German army in the Balkans. Setting a deadline for aggression, Hitler said: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.” The generals convinced him that a victorious war would last no more than 4-6 weeks.
At the same time, Germany used the memorandum of November 25, 1940 to put pressure on those countries whose interests were affected by it, and above all on Bulgaria, which in March 1941 joined the fascist coalition. Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate throughout the spring of 1941, especially with the invasion of Yugoslavia by German troops hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to achieve a major success by signing a non-aggression pact with Japan on April 13, which significantly reduced tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.
Tank group
Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, until the very beginning of the war with Germany, could not believe in the inevitability of a German attack. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly due to the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. In order to demonstrate its “trust” to Germany, the Soviet government refused to take into account the numerous reports received since the beginning of 1941 about an attack on the USSR being prepared and did not take the necessary measures on its western borders. Germany was still viewed by the Soviet Union "as a great friendly power."
According to the “Barbarossa Plan,” 153 German divisions were involved in aggression against the USSR. In addition, Finland, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary intended to participate in the upcoming war. Together they fielded another 37 divisions. The invasion force consisted of about 5 million soldiers, 4,275 aircraft, 3,700 tanks. The troops of Germany and its allies were united into 3 army groups: “North”, “Center”, “South”. Each group included 2-4 armies, 1-2 tank groups, and from the air German troops were supposed to cover 4 air fleets.
The most numerous was the army group "South" (Field Marshal von Rundstedt), consisting of German and Romanian soldiers. This group was tasked with defeating Soviet troops in Ukraine and Crimea and occupying these territories. Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Belarus and advance to Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow. Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb), with the support of Finnish troops, was to capture the Baltic states, Leningrad, and the Russian North.
Discussion of the OST plan
The final goal of the “Barbaros plan” was the destruction of the Red Army, access to the Ural ridge and the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. The basis of German tactics was tank breakthroughs and encirclements. The Russian company was supposed to become a blitzkrieg - a lightning war. Only 2-3 weeks were allotted to defeat the Soviet troops located in the western regions of the USSR. General Jodl told Hitler: “In three weeks this house of cards will fall apart.” The entire campaign was planned to be completed in 2 months.
German troops received instructions to carry out a policy of genocide towards the Slavic and Jewish populations. According to the OST plan, the Nazis intended to destroy 30 million Slavs, and the rest were to be converted into slaves. Were considered possible allies Crimean Tatars, peoples of the Caucasus. The enemy army was an almost perfect military mechanism. The German soldier was rightfully considered the best in the world, the officers and generals were excellently trained, the troops had a wealth of experience in combat operations. The most significant drawback of the German army was the underestimation of the enemy’s forces - German generals considered it possible to wage war in several theaters at once: in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, in Africa. Later, already during the Great Patriotic War, such miscalculations as lack of fuel and unpreparedness for combat operations in winter conditions would take their toll.
Gabriel Tsobekhia
On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the plan for war against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a fleeting, lightning-fast war, as a result of which it was planned that German troops would reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line, and subsequently to the Urals. Decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is “the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to the end of Soviet resistance.”
This plan provided for two strikes - north and south of Polesie. The northern attack was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these attacks, a “private operation to capture the Baku region” was planned. The implementation of the plan took from 9 to 17 weeks.
Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command under the leadership of General Paulus. This check revealed a serious flaw in the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main group towards Moscow. The Supreme Command headquarters decided to reconsider the plan.
In connection with Keitel's report about the bad engineering training On August 9, 1940, Hitler’s command issued an order called “Aufbau Ost” as a springboard for an attack on the USSR. It outlined measures to prepare a theater of military operations against the USSR, repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order that stated: “I order an increase in the number of occupation troops in the east over the next weeks. For security reasons, Russia should not create the impression that Germany is preparing for an offensive in the eastern direction.”
On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military meeting, Halder’s report was heard on the “Otto” plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groupings of the Red Army by developing an offensive on Kyiv and Leningrad before the capture of Moscow. In this form the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler said: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the very first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the French army in 1940.”3. Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.
The meeting participants had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be ended quickly; CPOK~ weeks were also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler’s General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: “In the High Command of the Armed Forces and in the High Command of the Ground Forces, they so confidently expected to finish the campaign by the beginning of winter that in the ground forces Winter uniform was provided only for every fifth soldier." German generals subsequently tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the winter campaign troops to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame. He writes: “I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that Hitler alone is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the fall of 1941.”4.
Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and generals when, with his characteristic self-confidence, he said in the circle of his entourage: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.”
The day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive on the war against the USSR based on the decisions made at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont presented the text of Directive No. 21 to Yodel, who made several corrections to it, and on December 17 it was handed to Hitler for signature. The next day the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.
When meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, a war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell out of favor forever.
The fascist German generals developed and put into effect a plan for war against the USSR, which met the most predatory desires of the imperialists. Germany's military leaders unanimously supported the implementation of this plan. Only after Germany’s defeat in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders, for self-rehabilitation, put forward a false version that they objected to the attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition shown to him, still started a war in the East. For example, the West German general Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted on his own. With a firm hand he took the helm and led Germany onto the rocks of complete defeat.” In reality, not only the “Führer”, but also the entire German generals believed in the “blitzkrieg”, in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.
Directive No. 21 stated: “The German armed forces must be prepared to win through a fleeting military operation Soviet Russia" - the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows: "The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advance of tank units. It is necessary to prevent the retreat of combat-ready units into the vastness of Russian territory... The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off the common Arkhangelsk-Volga line from Asian Russia.”
On January 31, 1941, the headquarters of the main command of the German ground forces issued the “Troop Concentration Directive,” which set out the general plan of the command, defined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the location of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the “first intention” of the German army, set before it the task of “splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes of powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy the separated groupings of enemy troops."
Thus, two main directions for the advance of German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. North of Polesie the main blow was delivered by two army groups: “Center” and “North”. Their task was defined as follows: “North of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having brought powerful tank formations into battle, it makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys them together with the Finnish army and the German troops sent from Norway for this purpose, finally depriving the enemy of his last defensive capabilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured to carry out subsequent tasks in cooperation with German troops advancing in southern Russia.
In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north will no longer be necessary and the question of an immediate attack on Moscow may arise.”
It was planned to launch an offensive south of Polesie with Army Group South. Its task was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group “South” under the command of Field Marshal Rutstedt, using a swift strike of powerful tank formations from the Lublin area, cuts off Soviet troops located in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the Kiev area and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver to solve subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or to carry out new tasks in the south of Russia.”
The most important strategic goal of Plan Barbarossa was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction hoped to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donetsk basin. In respect of great importance was attached to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the German command, was supposed to bring decisive political, military and economic success to Germany. Hitler's command believed that his plan for war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.
In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task under Directive No. 21 and an order to conduct a war game to test the expected course of battles and obtain material for a detailed development of the operational plan.
In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of military operations against the USSR was postponed by 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order that stated: “The start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the German High Command made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941. The increased transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last, so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.
On June 17, 1941, the German High Command issued the final order, which stated that the implementation of Plan Barbarossa should begin on June 22. The headquarters of the High Command was moved to the Wolfsschanze command post, established in East Prussia near Rastenburg.
Long before the attack on the USSR, the head of the Gestapo, Himmler, on behalf of the German government, began developing the master plan "Ost" - a plan for the conquest of peoples by fire and sword. of Eastern Europe, including the peoples of the Soviet Union. The starting points of this plan were reported to Hitler as early as May 25, 1940. Himmler expressed confidence that as a result of the implementation of the planned measures, many peoples would be completely exterminated, in particular the Poles, Ukrainians, etc. For the complete elimination of national culture, it was planned to destroy all education except primary in special schools. The program of these schools, as Himmler proposed, should have included: “simple counting, up to 500 at the most; the ability to sign, the inculcation that the divine commandment is to obey the Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. “The ability to read,” Himmler added, “I consider unnecessary.” After reviewing these proposals, Hitler fully approved them and approved them as a directive.
Special teams and “equipment” for mass extermination were created in advance civilians. The German armed forces and authorities in the occupied territories had to be guided by the corresponding instructions of Hitler, who taught: “We are obliged to exterminate the population - this is part of our mission to protect the German population. We will have to develop the technique of exterminating the population... If I send the flower of the German nation into the heat of war, shedding precious German blood without the slightest pity, then, without a doubt, I have the right to destroy millions of people of the lower race who multiply like worms.”
Bibliography
To prepare this work, materials from the site http://referat.ru were used
Balkans - in the south. The war against the countries of Western Europe allowed Germany to largely provide a strategic rear. Military operations on the Soviet-German front. June 22, 1941 treacherous attack fascist Germany The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people began on the Soviet Union, which became the most important component of the Second World War. Forced entry of the USSR into the war...
Labonne will have to meet, since relations between France and the USSR have become strained. The Ambassador should take into account the concerns of Soviet leaders. Having won a victory over France, the German Reich would undertake aggression against the USSR. Therefore, it can be assumed, the instructions said, that the Soviet Union is interested in changing the balance of forces between Germany and the Anglo-French coalition. However not...
Foothills of the Carpathians. And by the end of March 25, formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the state border of the USSR. Exit to the border. The summer of 1944 arrived. The German command believed that the Red Army would continue its offensive in the southern direction. However, since the spring of 1944, preparations have been underway for an operation code-named “Bagration”. The front configuration at the site of the operation was...
The USSR resigned. Changes in the Russian political system in the first half of the 1990s. The beginning of changes in the Russian political system is associated with the election of B.N. Yeltsin as Chairman Supreme Council(May 1990) and the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty Russian Federation(June 1990), which in fact meant the emergence of dual power in the country. By this time...
UK air weapons
One of the decisive factors when considering the state of the Air Force as a branch of the armed forces is military doctrine. According to the “Military Encyclopedic Dictionary”, military doctrine is understood as “a system of views adopted in the state for a given (certain) time on the essence, goals, nature of a possible future war, on the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for it and on the methods of waging it. The main provisions of the Doctrine military are determined by the socio-economic and political system of the state, the level of development of the economy and means of warfare, as well as the geographical location of one’s country and the country (countries) of a potential enemy.
Military doctrine has two closely related and interdependent sides - socio-political and military-technical. The socio-political side covers issues related to the methodological, economic, social and legal foundations for achieving the goals of a possible future war. It is decisive and has the greatest stability, since it reflects the class essence and political goals of the state, which are relatively constant over a long time. The military-technical side, in accordance with socio-political goals, includes issues of direct military development, technical equipment of the Armed Forces and their training, determination of forms and methods of conducting operations by the Armed Forces and war in general."
Let's move on to consider the air force of Great Britain, one of the most developed capitalist countries in the world.
The English military-political doctrine was defined by researcher D. Fuller, who emphasized in his work “The Second World War 1939-1945" that "Britain sought... to divide the great continental powers through rivalry and to maintain a balance between them... The enemy was not the worst state, but the one that... was usually the strongest of the continental powers. .. Therefore, the goal of the war was to weaken the strongest state so that the balance of power could be restored." The political content of the British military doctrine also determined its military-technical side. The sharp difference from the German doctrine was the theory of war of attrition - a long-term and coalition war, requiring enormous tension. This was completely reflected in the air force, which was considered as a strategic means of waging war and which was entrusted with important tasks. Since 1923, the offensive doctrine of “air deterrence” was adopted in England. The military leadership believed that relying on fleet and aviation, England can undermine the enemy’s military-economic potential by destroying its political and industrial centers by air bombing, and ground forces will only complete the blow against the enemy.
The increased attention to strategic air warfare was also explained by the fact that the Chief of the General Staff of the British Air Force and its leader during the period from the end of the First World War to 1930 was Air Marshal Trenchard, who commanded a formation of strategic bombers during the First World War. Until 1933, when the Nazi government came to power in Germany, the headquarters of the British Air Force considered France and the USSR the most likely enemy. At the beginning of 1936, he developed a set of requirements for a new heavy bomber, and on May 27 of the same year, a conference specially convened for this purpose opened. “Achieving the required range of 3,000 miles (4,827 km) for attacks on the USSR was considered very desirable...”, noted V. Kornilov, a researcher of the history of aviation technology, speaking about it. In 1937, the Air Ministry began planning military operations against a specific enemy - Germany. The research group came to the conclusion that it was necessary to develop fighter aircraft as well, which urgently began to be implemented in 1938. As for many issues in the theory and practice of the construction and use of tactical aircraft, they were never resolved. This was due to the fact that the role of the ground forces themselves (which, according to Field Marshal Montgomery, were completely unprepared for conducting major combat operations) was never truly defined in British military doctrine until September 1939. And since 1938, the air force began to be considered the first important branch of the armed forces.
As noted above, long-range bombers played a special role in the British Air Force. Back in November 1938, the British set an absolute world record for flight range on the Vickers Wellesley bomber, which lasted until 1945. “To assess the progress of air operations in the Second World War, it is important to note that the British had long considered a heavy bomber with powerful weapons best suited for waging a strategic air war. Even before the start of the Second World War, the British air force had two types of similar bombers in service - the Armstrong-Whitworth "Whitley" and the Vickers "Wellington", notes G. Feuchter, further emphasizing that they “were such successful models that the German armed forces did not have a single aircraft that could even approximately compare with them in their armament, bomb load and flight range.” “Design and preparation for production of four-engine Schott Stirling bombers,” Handley Page “Halifax” and Avro “Lancaster”, which were the main aircraft for strategic air operations against Germany from 1941 until the end of the war,” notes G. Feuchter, “were also started long before the Second World War,” saying concluding that “this shows how correctly the British assessed the possibilities of strategic air warfare and how purposefully they acted.” “The Royal Air Force, alone among the European air forces, pinned its hopes on operational bombing,” reported the English historian A. Taylor in his work “The Second World War,” emphasizing that “the British were constantly feeling the threat ... from Germany, hoped for the opportunity... to threaten it." “The Royal Air Force had an impressive core of strategic bomber aircraft for that time (which Germany did not have). British aircraft could strike Northern Germany and the Ruhr. Thus, a formidable weapon was ready for immediate action,” assessed the English researcher D. Kimhe the state and capabilities of the British Air Force at the beginning of the Second World War.
"Southern option"
By the beginning of the Second World War, the Baku oil industry produced 80% of high-grade aviation gasoline, 90% of naphtha and kerosene, 96% of motor and tractor oils of the total production in the USSR. The attention of the Anglo-French allies to the Baku oil fields and the search for possible ways to disable them appeared almost immediately after the start of the war between Germany and Poland, in which the USSR took part from September 17, 1939. The theoretical possibility of an air attack on Soviet oil fields was for the first time reviewed already in September 1939 by the liaison officer between the General Staff and the French Foreign Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Paul de Villelum. And on October 10, French Finance Minister P. Reynaud asked him a specific question: is the French Air Force “able to bomb oil fields and oil refineries in the Caucasus from Syria.” In Paris it was understood that these plans should be carried out in close cooperation with the British. The US Ambassador in Paris, W. Bullitt, was also informed of these plans by the head of the French government, E. Daladier, and other French politicians in connection with the signing of a mutual assistance treaty between England, France and Turkey on October 19, 1939. He telegraphed to Washington about the possibility of "bombing and destroying Baku" being discussed in Paris. Although the French coordinated their plans with the British, the latter were not far behind them in developing their own similar projects. One of the first properly English documents is dated October 31, 1939 and is a letter from the British Secretary of Supply to the Foreign Secretary. “This letter is written in a realistic spirit and was written by a man who spent a lot of time studying this problem and came to the conviction of the need to have a certain opportunity to deprive his potential enemy of the “carburetor” that feeds his entire mechanism,” the author of the letter said . He noted that “in the armies of many states, a procedure has been established that provides for the compilation of a list of targets that are subject to priority bombing by their aviation forces. I think that in almost all cases, according to generally accepted belief, oil reserves are indicated as target No. 1.” The letter pointed out the vulnerability of Soviet oil sources, the largest of which was Baku, followed by Grozny and Maykop. The author stated that “the study by our General Staff of the issue... of the possibility of destroying oil sources could turn out to be a very effective means of intimidation. If Russian oil fields are destroyed (and all of them are gushing type developments and therefore can be very easily destroyed), not only Russia will lose oil, but also any ally of Russia who hopes to get it from this country." The letter indicated distances from some border points of Turkey and Iran to Baku, Maikop and Grozny, from which it followed that the shortest distance to Baku was from Iranian territory. The author proposed that the British and Iranian general staff jointly consider the possibility of bombing Soviet targets, emphasizing “that it is extremely important to have our own in our hands a kind of trump card when carrying out transactions with the USSR." A copy of this letter was sent on November 6, 1939 by the British Foreign Secretary G. L. Ismay to the Military Chiefs of Staff Committee, the intelligence subcommittee to verify the stated facts and the joint planning subcommittee to study the strategic side this problem and preparing a draft report. From the documents of the British War Cabinet dated December 6 it followed that in London it was planned to create a “system against the USSR” in the Near and Middle East. On December 19, the British Ambassador in Ankara H. Knatchbull-Hugessen reported on negotiations between English, French and Turkish representatives on strengthening Turkish troops at the Soviet borders at the expense of Anglo-French supplies and about secret Turkish measures to prepare an anti-Soviet uprising of the local population in the Soviet border areas.
Until the end of 1939, planning for the bombing of the USSR in France resulted in another option, dated at the end of November, concerning the Caucasus. On December 24, the military attaché of France in the USSR, General Pallas Auguste Antoine, in response to a request dated December 19 from the Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces of France and the 2nd Branch of the Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army, sent information about the theater to Paris Soviet operations in the South Caucasus, where the option was also considered that the USSR, in the event of hostilities, could undertake the occupation of “parts of Turkish Armenia and Iranian Azerbaijan, including air and sea bases that pose a threat to the Baku region” to “ensure the security of an area vital for Russia, which includes centers oil industry in the Caucasus." It was precisely about striking at these developments through Turkey that was discussed in the document of the French General Staff of December 30. And the next day, the English General S. Butler arrived in Ankara to discuss the problems of Anglo-Turkish military cooperation, primarily against the USSR, in particular the question of the British use of airfields and ports in Eastern Turkey. Thus ended 1939 for the Anglo-French allies.
On January 11, 1940, the British embassy in Moscow reported that an action in the Caucasus could “bring Russia to its knees in as soon as possible", and the bombing of the Caucasian oil fields could deal a "knockout blow" to the USSR. On January 15, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry Léger informed the American Ambassador W. Bullitt that Daladier proposed sending a squadron to the Black Sea to blockade Soviet communications and bomb Batumi, as well as attack oil developments from the air Baku. Moreover, the purpose of these operations was not only to prevent the supply of oil from the USSR to Germany. Léger stated: “France will not break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war on it, it will destroy the Soviet Union, if possible - if necessary - with the help guns." A very important document in the light of the Allied war plans with the USSR is dated January 19, 1940. This is a note from the French Prime Minister E. Daladier on the proposed operation to invade the USSR in order to destroy oil sources, which was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in France and the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Military Council, General M. Gamelin, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet, Admiral Darlan. Two copies of this document were sent respectively to General L. Kelz, Commander of the French Ground Forces and General Joseph Vuillemin, Chief of the General Staff of the French Air Force and Commander-in-Chief of its Air Fleet. E. Daladier asked Gamelin and Darlan to prepare their thoughts on the upcoming operation in three options, one of which included a direct invasion of the Caucasus. And on January 24, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented to the War Cabinet a memorandum “The Main Strategy of the War,” where he indicated the following: “in determining our strategy in the current situation, it will be the only right decision to consider Russia and Germany as partners.” Ironside emphasized: “In my opinion, we can provide effective assistance to Finland only if we attack Russia from as many directions as possible and, most importantly, strike Baku, an oil production area, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia.” . Ironside was aware that such actions would inevitably lead to Western allies to war with the USSR, but in the current situation he considered it completely justified. The document emphasized the role of British aviation in the implementation of these plans and, in particular, stated that “economically, Russia is heavily dependent on the supply of oil from Baku for the conduct of the war. This area is within the reach of long-range bombers, but provided that they have the ability to fly over the territory Turkey or Iran." As we see, the issue of war with the USSR has moved to the highest military-political level in the leadership of the Anglo-French bloc.
On January 30, the British chiefs of staff went to Paris, having received General Gamelin's proposal the day before for "direct Allied intervention in Finland." And on January 31, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of England and France, General Gamelin said: “The French high command understands that the political consequence of direct assistance from Finland’s allies would be that they would, in fact, unleash military action against Russia, even if there were no formal declaration of war." Gamelin then specifically stated that best help For Finland, England would send long-range aircraft from the British Isles, which, using forward bases, “could bomb targets deep inside Russia.” Already on February 1, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the British Air Force, Marshal R. Pearce, outlined comments on Gamelin’s proposals: “We take the consequences of military action against Russia very seriously... In general, we would be ready to recommend taking the risk of military action against Russia in order to achieve a great goal. ..".
On February 1, Iranian Minister of War A. Nakhjavan raised the question of purchasing 60 bombers and 20 fighters from England in addition to the 15 fighters already promised by the British to the British military attaché in Tehran H. Underwood, and the minister justified the desire to purchase bombers by the desire to wage war on enemy territory . He even expressed his “readiness to sacrifice half of Iran’s bomber force for the purpose of destroying or damaging Baku”! The minister also proposed "coordination of Iranian and British offensive plans for the war against Russia."
MacLean's note dated February 2 proposed an option that, in his opinion, was possible even without Turkish help: by flying over Turkish and Iranian territories, the British and French “would be able to cause serious damage to oil wells and oil refineries in Baku and the North Caucasus, oil pumping hubs ... and the oil pipeline connecting them." The air risk "would be negligible compared to the significant benefits that could be obtained from these actions."
On February 3, the French General Staff gave the commander of the French Air Force in Syria, General J. Jonot, who held the point of view “the outcome of the war will be decided in the Caucasus, and not on the Western Front,” instructions to study the possibility of carrying out an air attack on the Caucasus. On February 7, the problem of preparing an attack on Soviet oil fields was discussed at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, which came to the conclusion that the successful implementation of these actions “could fundamentally paralyze the Soviet economy, including agriculture.” The Chiefs of Staff Committee was instructed to prepare an appropriate document in the light of the new tasks. General Chardiny, who served as head of the French mission in Tiflis during the Allied intervention against Russia, stated in his report on February 18 that the importance of the destructive operation against Baku justifies any risk. Following this, the 3rd Bureau of the French General Staff, in a special document “Study of the operation aimed at depriving Germany and the USSR of the oil resources of the Caucasus,” noted that the operation “will shake the Soviet government.” This document formed the basis of the R.I.P. plan. (Russian abbreviation of the plan "Russia. Industry. Fuel."), which summarized the details of the future operation.
A month after Daladier's request on January 19, General Gamelin presented a memorandum on February 22 with a plan to attack the USSR from the Caucasus. The plan emphasized that due to the weak road network, the participation of ground forces would be difficult, so the decisive role was assigned to air strikes primarily in the areas of Baku and Batumi. Gamelin pointed out that “the operation against the oil industry of the Caucasus will deal a heavy, if not decisive blow to the military and economic organization of the Soviet Union. Within a few months, the USSR may face such difficulties that this will create the threat of complete disaster. If such a result is achieved, then around Germany, which will lose all supplies from Russia, will close the blockade ring in the East." Since Grozny and Maikop were beyond the reach of allied aviation, Gamelin intended to use forces, concentrating them against Baku. We could be talking about heavy bombers with a total of 6-8 air groups of 13 aircraft each. Emphasizing that Baku provides 75% of all Soviet oil, Gamelin noted that bases for raids should be in Turkey, Iran, Syria or Iraq.
The next day, February 23, the chiefs of staff submitted a report to the British War Cabinet on its instructions regarding contacts with Iran, noting the need to maintain Iranian neutrality “until the time when we need Iranian cooperation for offensive operations against Russia.” The report stated: "Further examination of the offensive operation we could undertake against Russia confirmed our view that the Caucasus is one of the regions where Russia is particularly vulnerable, and that this region can be successfully hit by air attack." The report made the following conclusions: existing aircraft cannot reach the territory of the Caucasus from existing bases in Iraq, and, therefore, successful operations require either re-equipping bomber squadrons in Iraq with long-range aircraft, which will take a lot of time, or if “it will be necessary to act against the Russians oil development in the near future, we will have to resort to active assistance from Iran." This was the conclusion of the British Chiefs of Staff.
As we see, both English and French plans were developed with almost absolute synchronicity in time. The practical plan for accomplishing the task seemed approximately the same to the developers. Both sides informed each other about their decisions, although even without this there was a similarity in both their main goal and the ways to solve it.
On February 28, the headquarters of the French Air Force prepared a document that contained specific calculations about the forces and means necessary to destroy the oil refineries of Baku, Batumi and Poti.
Anglo-French negotiations began on this issue. Thus, on March 7, General Weygand held a meeting with the commanders of the British and French Air Forces in the Middle East. General W. Mitchell, representing Great Britain, informed Weygand that he had received instructions from London to prepare for a possible bombing and had arrived in Beirut on his way to Ankara. Mitchell said he intended to ask the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army, Marshal Cakmak, for permission to inspect Turkish airfields that could be used for intermediate landings of aircraft flying from Cezire. The Jezire base was located in northeast Syria and Mitchell, with Weygand’s permission, visited this French Air Force airfield.
On March 8, a very important event took place in the context of preparations for war with the Soviet Union by Great Britain and France. On this day, the British Chiefs of Staff presented a report to the government entitled “Military Consequences of Military Actions against Russia in 1940.” Compared to Gamelin’s memorandum of February 22, which clearly outlined the area of attack on the USSR from the southern border and proposed specific forms of attack, the English document was more general in nature.
“We are going to present to the War Cabinet assumptions about the main military factors that are relevant for considering the consequences of allied military actions against Russia in 1940 in the context of the main goal in this war - the defeat of Germany,” the authors began their report and then moved on to an analysis of the prospects for the Soviet -German economic and military cooperation, an assessment of the vulnerable points of the Soviet system, and concluded the report with a statement of “methods by which the Allies can strike Russia.”
The report provided for three main directions of military action: - northern, in the areas of Petsamo, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; - Far Eastern, in the areas of Soviet ports; - southern. The first two options involved the use of mainly naval forces or a combination of them with air forces (in the north). But the report outlined the third, “southern” option in most detail, and main role the air force played in it. “Since there are only a few important Russian targets in the Scandinavian region, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff recommends an attack on the southern regions of the USSR. In these areas, the most vulnerable points of the Soviet Union can be hit. At the first stage, such intervention should be limited to air strikes.”
The reason for the authors' preference for the third option was explained by Caucasian oil. The report said: "The fundamental weakness of the Russian economy is its dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus. The armed forces depend on them. Russian agriculture is mechanized... 80% of oil production and 90% of oil refining enterprises are concentrated in the Caucasus. Large-scale disruption of oil supplies from this region will therefore have far-reaching consequences for the Soviet economy." If there is a reduction in oil production, then “there could be a complete collapse of Russia’s military, industrial and agricultural systems.”
Three options for strikes were considered: “firstly, by an attack from the air, secondly, by the actions of naval forces in the Black Sea and, finally, by the actions of Turkish ground forces from Eastern Anatolia.”
“The most vulnerable targets in the Caucasus are the oil industrial areas in Baku, Grozny and Batumi,” the report emphasized. It noted: “A plan to attack these installations is currently being developed by Air Force Headquarters in the Middle East, and is also being considered by the Air Ministry. It is estimated that the destruction of the main oil refineries can be achieved through continuous operations over several weeks by forces of at least three bomber squadrons... Three squadrons of Blenheim Mk-4 aircraft could be provided from the home forces, and if all the preparatory work was carried out at once, they would be ready to operate from bases in Northern Iraq or Syria by the end of April." By the way, the report took into account that the French side had already developed “a plan for attacking the Caucasus with long-range bombers from bases in Syria.”
It was also indicated that “there is a possibility that it will be possible to attract Iran,” in which case it would be possible to “use Tehran as a forward airfield.” Naval forces could also be involved in air strikes: "aircraft carrier raids in the Black Sea to bomb refineries, oil storage facilities or port facilities in Batumi and Tuapse would be a useful complement to the main air raids on the Caucasus region and could lead to the temporary destruction of Russian defenses ".
The report also explained some of the difficulties in implementing the plan. There was a severe shortage of Blenheim MK-4 bombers. At the time of the report, they were needed in the metropolis in case of repelling large German operations and to protect the bases of the British fleet. In addition, ground forces were also needed to support their operations from Syrian and Iraqi airfields.
Summing up the consequences of possible air attacks, the authors of the report believed that oil fields would be out of action for “at least nine months.” “We must state that bombing in the Caucasus will certainly cause significant casualties among the civilian population,” they admitted.
As we see, with a more detailed consideration of various options for action against the USSR, this plan still had a lot in common with Gamelin’s plan of February 22. Both of them intended to choose the oil fields of the Caucasus as the main place for concentrating military efforts; they both emphasized air power in their attack; both the French and British sides intended to use each other's air bases and coordinate their plans; both plans involved military cooperation with Turkey and Iran.
The French side recognized its interest in the “southern” option in comparison, for example, with plans to conduct military operations in Finland. This, in particular, follows from Gamelin’s note on the possible participation of Franco-British troops in operations in Finland in connection with the outbreak of hostilities between Finland and the USSR on March 10. Gamelin notes that “if we proceed from the weight of the results, then the most appropriate are military actions in the Balkans and the Caucasus, where Germany can be cut off from sources of oil.” He also reported to Prime Minister Daladier on March 12 that, in his opinion, “further development of the issue of an attack on Baku and Batumi” is necessary. On the same day, he gave specific instructions to Weygand, informing him that operations in the Middle East should be carried out under the leadership of the British High Command, and Weygand himself was ordered to take part in all preparatory work. Ground operations in the Caucasus will be carried out by Turkish troops under Turkish command and will involve the Allied Air Force and, possibly, special contingents of the Allied Forces. Weygand was allowed to enter into contact with Chakmak on this issue.
On the same day, March 10, Weygand was informed by the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Middle East, General Wavell, that London had received instructions from the British War Ministry to “study the preconditions for possible actions against the Caucasus in the event of a war with Russia.” And from March 9 to 13, negotiations were held in Ankara between the military representatives of England and France - Mitchell and Jono - with the leadership of the Turkish general staff. From these meetings of representatives of the allied command, including the above-mentioned meeting between Weygand and Mitchell on March 7, a period of active Anglo-French cooperation began, not only at the highest levels on the European continent, but also directly at the proposed springboard for planned military operations against the USSR in the Near and Middle East .
On March 12, at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, the report of the Chiefs of Staff of March 8 was discussed. Speaking to justify the provisions of the report, the Chief of the Air Force Staff, Air Chief Marshal Newall, emphasized: “An attack on the Caucasus oil fields is the most effective way in which we can strike at Russia.” He expressed hope that within one and a half to three months the oil fields would be completely out of commission, and also informed the military cabinet that modern long-range bombers had been sent to Egypt, which could be used to staff squadrons intended to carry out air strikes in the Caucasus.
When discussing the report, Halifax expressed some doubts about the reasonableness of the actions outlined in it, in particular regarding the “expediency of declaring war on Russia.” "She doesn't want a war with us," he said, suggesting that they hold off on sending bombers to the Middle East. It was considered possible to delay the political decision.
This was the situation with the Anglo-French strategic plans for an attack on the USSR from the south at the end of the Soviet-Finnish or “Winter” War on March 13, 1940. It should be noted that there were concerted efforts between England and France, the priority of London in the proposed operations and the role of air weapons in the methods of their implementation. All that was missing was a political decision to attack. The “Winter War” itself sharply intensified the development of such plans and it was very important to monitor their implementation after its end, when the formal pretext for an attack in the light of the hostilities ongoing between the USSR and Finland simply ceased to exist.
Allied preparation of air strikes against the USSR from the end of the Winter War to the beginning of the Western campaign
The conclusion of a peace treaty with Finland did not remove the problem of confrontation with the Anglo-French allies from the USSR. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and these two Western countries reached a critical point - the British ambassador left Moscow, the Soviet plenipotentiary in France was declared “persona non grata” on March 19. The government crisis in France led to the fall of the cabinet of E. Daladier, accused of insufficient assistance to Finland, and a government led by P. Reynaud came to power.
Meanwhile, preparations for an air strike in the Caucasus have by no means stopped. Moreover, she received an additional boost.
Already on March 22, 1940, the day after Paul Reynaud became chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied ground forces, General Gamelin, prepared a note on the proposed operation in the Caucasus, with the aim of depriving Germany and the USSR of sources of oil. And on March 25, Reynaud sent a letter to the British government, where he persistently called for action to “paralyze the economy of the USSR,” insisting that the allies must take “responsibility for the break with the USSR.”
On March 26, the British chiefs of staff came to the conclusion that it was necessary to come to an agreement with Turkey; in their opinion, this would allow “if we have to attack Russia, to act effectively.”
On March 27, members of the British War Cabinet examined in detail Reynaud's letter of March 25. It was decided that "we should state that we wish to prepare such plans, but should not make any commitments in relation to this operation."
On the same day, a meeting of the Allied Chiefs of Staff took place. Chief of Staff of the British Air Force Newall reported that the British had completed preparation of the plan, the implementation of which was scheduled to begin in a month. It was planned to send three squadrons of long-range Blenheim-type aircraft to Egypt. They were supposed to fly to the Caucasus from Syria, crossing the territory of Turkey. This was one of the difficulties in implementing the plan.
Spy raids
These are one of many documents that were alarming signals for the Soviet leadership from the southern borders of the country...
"The sun had not yet risen over the gray sand dunes near the British military camps in Habbaniya, Iraq. The engines of the Lockheed 12A aircraft parked on the tarmac were already warm. Its original registration number was G-AGAR, but now all its markings were painted over The numerous aerial photography devices with which the plane was equipped were also not noticeable to prying eyes.
A week ago, on March 23, 1940, this plane took off from London and, after making two intermediate landings in Malta and Cairo, arrived in Habbaniya. The crew for this mission was selected by the British Secret Service, namely the head of the SIS air unit, Colonel F.W. Winterbotham (F.W. Winterbothem). He employed the best British aerial spy, Australian Sidney Cotton. Shortly before sunrise on March 30, 1940, Lockheed rose from Habbaniya Base into clear, cloudless skies and headed northeast.
The mission assigned to the four-man crew, commanded by Hugh Mac Phail - Cotton's personal assistant - was to conduct aerial reconnaissance (espionage) of Soviet oil fields in Baku. At an altitude of 7000 m, Lockheed circled over Baku. The shutters of automatic cameras clicked, and two crew members - photographers from the RAF - took additional pictures with hand-held cameras. Closer to noon - after 10 o'clock - the spy plane landed in Habbaniya. Four days later he took off again. This time he made a reconnaissance of oil refineries in Batumi. At the same time, Mac Phail had to go through shelling from Soviet anti-aircraft artillery.
Aerial photographs have already been transmitted to the headquarters of the British and French air forces in the Middle East. Moreover, already in January 1940 there was a task from the British and French governments, simply a “grand” plan: an air strike on the Caucasian oil fields in the Soviet Union. Within 10-45 days, nine squadrons of bombers were to destroy to the ground 67 oil refineries in Baku, 43 in Grozny and 12 in Batumi. “The destruction of the targets in question,” as the British Air Force headquarters indicated, should “sooner or later lead to the complete destruction of the military potential of the USSR and could decide the outcome of the war.”
This is what English spy raids looked like as described by the German researcher O. Groler on the pages of his monograph “The Struggle for Air Supremacy”, in the chapter “Plan Barbarossa”.
The stationary photographic equipment installed on the Lockheed 12A consisted of three F.24 cameras: from an altitude of 6000 m they could photograph stripes 18.5 km wide. Since the shooting took place at a high altitude, the exhaust from the engines warm air used for conditioning cameras. Sidney Cotton's special unit, in which, in addition to Lockheed-12A aircraft, a Supermarine Spitfire aircraft was equipped for aerial reconnaissance in 1940, was based at Heston commercial airport near London.
NKVD message about violation of the Soviet border by an aircraft from Turkish territory
April 5 p.m. At 11.15, in the area of the Soviet village of Sarp (14 km southwest of Batumi), at an altitude of 2000 m, one twin-engine silver aircraft flew over the border from Turkey. Identification marks are not defined. The plane was heading towards Batumi.
At 11.22 the plane is over the island. Nuryu-Gel, on the southwestern outskirts of Batumi, was shelled by four artillery shots, after which it headed northeast, towards the Batumi oil refinery (about 15 km from the border).
Having been fired a second time by 30 anti-aircraft artillery shells and anti-aircraft machine guns, the plane headed east and disappeared into the mountains. A few minutes later the same plane flew over the village at an altitude of 2000 m. Adjaris-Tskali and in the area of the border village. Oglauri fled to Turkey. A protest is lodged with the Turkish border commissioner. Komkor Maslennikov."
TELEGRAM OF THE Plenipotentiary REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I. M. MAISKY TO THE NKID USSR
April 20, 1940 Immediately
From a source, the absolute reliability of which I cannot vouch for, but which certainly deserves attention, I received the following information: on the twentieth of March, at the airfield in Heston (London), two bomb carriers of the latest American type were disguised as civilian aircraft and equipped with cameras. One of these planes flew to Iraq, and from there, from the airfield in Khabaniya, flew to Baku specifically for photographic filming of oil fields and areas. Around April 12th the said plane returned to London, bringing with it well-taken photographs of Baku and an area covering an area of approximately 100 square miles. According to the aircraft's crew, the flight went without any difficulties, only once the aircraft was fired upon (but without damage) while it was over Soviet territory. The plane was branded "G-AGAR". The second camouflaged plane, contrary to initial assumptions, was not sent to Baku, since the first one brought quite sufficient photographic material. On April 15, the bomber squadron flew from Heston (London) to Habaniya (Iraq). All this, apparently, must be considered not in the plane of any immediate action by the British against us (the general military-political situation is now of a somewhat different order), but in the plane of preparation in the event of a conflict with the USSR in the further course of the war.
May"
As you can see, the information from the USSR plenipotentiary in England was quite objective, despite the reservations. Such information - from a variety of sources - could not help but force the Soviet leadership to take urgent action.
Specific activities of the USSR (until recently) were not considered. In reality, the reaction of the USSR followed immediately. Already on April 4, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov wrote a note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, which, in particular, spoke about the transfer of formations returning from the front to the south and the strengthening aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the southern borders of the country: additionally 17 medium-caliber divisions were formed and consolidated into regiments for the air defense of Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi, Tuapse and Novorossiysk, and 7 small-caliber artillery divisions were formed for the air defense of Baku alone.
10 days later, at a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army, J.V. Stalin said, speaking about the results of the Winter War: “The question is, who did we defeat?... The entire defense of Finland and the war were conducted at the behest, at the instigation, on the advice of England and France... Result talks about this.
We defeated not only the Finns - this is not such a big task. The main thing in our victory is that we defeated the technology, tactics and strategy of the advanced states of Europe, whose representatives were the teachers of the Finns. This is our main victory."
The influence of the “English factor” (the “allied” or Anglo-French factor simply ceased to exist from the end of June 1940) remained in the specific outlines of Soviet military plans until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. This is not surprising if we consider that even on May 10, 1940, the day of the German offensive in the West, Reynaud called Churchill to report Weygand’s readiness to bomb Baku from May 15, and the British circles themselves did not rule out a German attack on the USSR. the possibility of strikes on Baku in order to prevent Germany from using Soviet oil.
Example - Order of the People's Commissar of Defense on establishing a training system and procedure for staffing air force universities and improving the quality of training of flight and technical personnel No. 080 dated March 3, 1941, where in section D on the training of Air Force staff commanders it is stated that the intended opponents are Germany , Japan, Turkey and England.
The collection of documents "1941. Documents", published in 1998, practically for the first time confirmed the materials leaking into the open press about the Anglo-Soviet confrontation of 1939-1941. In a conversation between Komsomolskaya Pravda columnist Sergei Maslov and one of the collection’s compilers, the famous historian Lev Bezymensky (The Truth about June 22.- TVNZ, June 18, 1998), the latter stated: “As for Stalin, he, of course, did not like the strengthening of Germany and its transformation into a European hegemon. But he, pushing Hitler to military adventures, hoped to deal with his most sworn enemy. And from many of Stalin’s speeches it followed that he considered England as the main enemy of the Soviet Union.”
The available material allows us to trace the influence of the “English factor” not only on the example of the crisis of the spring of 1940 in the south or the general “anti-English” activities of the USSR in 1939-1941, but also on a specific example, even more visual and impressive than the general background itself. example of the development (and deformation) of Soviet military aviation in the two years preceding the Great Patriotic War...
For the first time, the question of the influence of the so-called “English factor” on the development of Soviet military aviation was raised in 1990 by researcher V.A. Belokon (at that time - candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, head of the interfaculty laboratory of Forecasting Problems of Moscow State University, graduated from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in aerodynamics and worked at TsAGI.
This is how he presented this thesis:
“Another important point, which is still ignored by our even the most knowledgeable historians, is that after the signing of the friendship treaty between the USSR and Germany in September 1939, and even more so after the outbreak of the war with Finland, Stalin predicted a war with Great Britain: he claimed control over the Turkish straits and redistribution of the world map in the region of Iraq and Iran. According to S. M. Yeger and R. di Bartini, when the ANT-58 model was approved, the typical targets for bombing were the battleship Nelson and the British Navy base in Scapa Flow By the same logic, the radio operator gunner was removed from the Il-2, since the small-caliber machine guns of the Hurricanes and Spitfires of that time could not hit the Il pilot, who was protected by powerful armor, including the transparent armored glass of the cockpit "For the same reason, it was the Mig-3 that was put into mass production, primarily as an interceptor of high-altitude British bombers."
Belokon (now an academician) restated his concept in the article “What prevented Stalin from conquering the world” (Ogonyok, 1998, No. 25, pp. 42-45). He noted the existence of two versions of the general concept of the outbreak of the war between the USSR and Germany, which led to the defeat of the Western group of Soviet troops: first - war took the USSR preparing for a defensive war by surprise, the second - Hitler’s sudden offensive took the USSR troops, who were preparing for an offensive war against Germany, by surprise. Belokon offers a third version - failures befell the USSR due to the fact that it focused on war not with Germany, but with Great Britain: “... an impartial analysis of the aircraft fleet of the USSR Air Force shows the possibility of the existence of a completely different, third version of the start of the war.” Belokon notes that in addition to its heavy bombers, Great Britain could rely on supplies of B-17 and B-24 aircraft from the United States.
I would like to note that the publication of the “techie” Belokon practically coincided in time with the publication of the mentioned materials in the collection “1941. Documents”. His 1990 publication could not rely on this data, so even without direct evidence of the USSR’s anti-British policy, he still came to similar conclusions by analyzing the development of Soviet military aircraft. Thus, the latest publications confirm the main conclusions of V. A. Belokon.
The top leadership of the USSR was well aware of the British aircraft industry. For example, the monthly production of fighters during the Battle of Britain in August - September 1940 was 460-500 aircraft, and according to Soviet data it was 480-549. These and other data were contained in the report of the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army on military equipment and the economy of foreign states, sent to the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR Shakhurin N665027ss - similar reports regularly came to the NKAP. A report dated January 9, 1941, announced the launch of four-engine bombers at the Birmingham Austin plant and the cessation of production of single-engine Battle aircraft. Post-war materials English side indeed they say that on November 7, 1940, 344 Battles were excluded from Austin’s order (however, before the switch to Stirling, 100 of them were still released). And the report dated January 12 spoke of minor damage to the Austin plant in Coventry, where Stirlings are produced. Having made their first flight on May 14, 1939, these aircraft were first used in combat on the night of February 10-11, 1941. Thus, the USSR knew about these aircraft even before their first real combat flight.
Awareness of Great Britain's plans in terms of considering it as one of the possible opponents could not but affect the prospects for the development of the Red Army Air Force. The sad fate of the MiG-Z, which was discontinued during a critical period for the country due to the inconsistency of its inherent qualities with the real situation of the war with Germany, is well known. But until now, none of the Russian works by both military historians and historians of technology has given a specific explanation of the reason for the launch of the Mig-Z high-altitude fighter, which became the most popular Soviet aircraft of the new series at the largest aircraft plant in the country No. generation, although many publications note that the Soviet leadership knew about the lack of heavy bombers in the German Air Force operating within the MiG ceiling. But after all, Great Britain was the only country (besides the United States) that developed and subsequently massively used bombers of this class.
Thus, we can conclude that the “English factor” has a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Red Army Air Force at a critical time for the country. This important problem is still practically not considered by Russian researchers.
