The capture of Plevna by the troops of Alexander II turned the tide of the war against the Ottoman Empire.
The long siege claimed the lives of many soldiers on both sides. This victory allowed Russian troops to open the road to Constantinople and liberate them from Turkish oppression. The operation to capture the fortress included military history as one of the most successful. The results of the campaign forever changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and the Middle East.
Until the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire controlled most of the Balkans and Bulgaria. Turkish oppression extended to almost all South Slavic peoples. The Russian Empire has always acted as the protector of all Slavs, and foreign policy was largely aimed at their liberation. However, as a result of the previous war, Russia lost its fleet in the Black Sea and a number of territories in the south. Treaties of alliance were also concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. If the Russians declared war, the British pledged to provide military assistance to the Turks. This situation excluded the possibility of expelling the Ottomans from Europe. In return, the Turks promised to respect the rights of Christians and not persecute them on religious grounds.
However, the 60s of the 19th century were marked by new persecution of Christians. Muslims had great privileges before the law. In court, the voice of a Christian against a Muslim carried no weight. Also, most local government posts were occupied by Turks. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs caused mass protests in Bulgaria and the Balkan countries. In the summer of 1975, an uprising begins in Bosnia. And a year later, in April, popular riots engulfed Bulgaria. As a result, the Turks brutally suppress the uprising, killing tens of thousands of people. Such atrocities against Christians cause outrage in Europe.
Under pressure public opinion Great Britain abandons its pro-Turkish policy. It frees up your hands Russian Empire, which is preparing a campaign against the Ottomans.
On the twelfth of April the capture of Plevna began and it would actually be completed in six months. However, there was a long way to go before this happened. According to the plan of the Russian headquarters, the troops were supposed to attack from two directions. The first group will go through Romanian territory to the Balkans, and the other will strike from the Caucasus. In both these directions there were insurmountable obstacles. prevented a quick strike from the Caucasus, and the “quadrangle” of fortresses from Romania. The situation was also complicated by possible British intervention. Despite public pressure, the British still continued to support the Turks. Therefore, the war had to be won as quickly as possible so that the Ottoman Empire would capitulate before reinforcements arrived.
The capture of Plevna was carried out by troops under the command of General Skobelev. At the beginning of July, the Russians crossed the Danube and reached the road to Sofia. On this campaign they were joined by the Romanian army. Initially, the Turks were going to meet the allies on the banks of the Danube. However, the rapid offensive forced Osman Pasha to retreat to the fortresses. In fact, the first capture of Plevna took place on June 26. An elite detachment under the command of Ivan Gurko entered the city. However, the unit had only fifty scouts. Almost simultaneously with the Russian Cossacks, three battalions of Turks entered the city and drove them out.
Realizing that the capture of Plevna would give the Russians complete strategic advantage, Osman Pasha decided to occupy the city before the arrival of the main forces. At this time, his army was in the city of Vidin. From there the Turks had to advance along the Danube to prevent the Russians from crossing. However, the danger of encirclement forced the Muslims to abandon original plan. On July 1, 19 battalions set out from Vidin. In six days they covered more than two hundred kilometers with artillery, convoys, provisions, and so on. At dawn on July 7, the Turks entered the fortress.
The Russians had the opportunity to take the city before Osman Pasha. However, the negligence of some commanders played a role. Due to the lack of military intelligence, the Russians did not learn in time about the Turkish march on the city. As a result, the capture of the Plevna fortress by the Turks took place without battles. Russian General Yuri Schilder-Schuldner was only a day late.
But during this time the Turks had already managed to dig in and take up defensive positions. After some deliberation, the headquarters decides to storm the fortress.
Russian troops marched on the city from both sides. General Schilder-Schuldern had no idea about the number of Turks in the city. He led the right column of troops, while the left marched at a distance of four kilometers. According to the original plan, both columns were supposed to enter the city at the same time. However, due to an incorrectly drawn up map, they only moved away from each other. At about one o'clock in the afternoon the main column approached the city. Suddenly they were attacked by the advance troops of the Turks, who had occupied Plevna just a few hours earlier. A battle ensued, which escalated into an artillery duel.
Schilder-Schuldner had no idea about the actions of the left column, so he ordered to move away from the positions under fire and set up camp. The left column under the command of Kleinhaus approached the city from Grivitsa. Cossack reconnaissance was sent. Two hundred soldiers advanced along the river with the aim of reconnaissance of the nearest villages and the fortress itself. However, hearing the sounds of battle, they retreated to their own.
On the night of July 8, a decision was made to attack. The left column was advancing from the direction of Grivitsa. The general and most of the soldiers came from the north. Osman Pasha's main positions were near the village of Opanets. About eight thousand Russians marched against them on a front up to three kilometers away.
Due to the low ground, Schilder-Schuldner lost the ability to maneuver. His troops had to launch a frontal attack. At five o'clock in the morning artillery preparation began. The Russian vanguard launched an attack on Bukovlek and drove the Turks out of there in two hours. The road to Plevna was open. The Arkhangelsk regiment reached the main enemy battery. The fighters were within shooting distance of the Ottoman artillery positions. Osman Pasha understood that the numerical superiority was on his side, and gave the order to counterattack. Under pressure from the Turks, two regiments retreated into the ravine. The general requested support for the left column, but the enemy advanced too quickly. Therefore, Schilder-Schuldner ordered a retreat.
At the same time, Kridener was advancing from Grivitsa. At six o'clock in the morning (when the main troops had already begun artillery preparation), the Caucasian Corps struck the right flank of the Turkish defense. After the unstoppable onslaught of the Cossacks, the Ottomans began to flee to the fortress in panic. However, by the time they took positions at Grivitsa, Schilder-Schuldner had already retreated. Therefore, the left column also began to retreat to its original positions. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops was stopped with heavy losses for the latter. The lack of intelligence and the general’s inept decisions had a lot to do with it.
After the unsuccessful assault, preparations began for a new attack. Russian troops received significant reinforcements. Cavalry and artillery units arrived. The city was surrounded. Surveillance began on all roads, especially those leading to Lovcha.
Reconnaissance in force was carried out for several days. Constant gunfire was heard both day and night. However, it was never possible to find out the size of the Ottoman garrison in the city.
While the Russians were preparing for the assault, the Turks were rapidly erecting defensive structures. Construction took place in conditions of a lack of tools and constant shelling. On the eighteenth of July another assault began. The capture of Plevna by the Russians would mean defeat in the war. Therefore, Osman Pasha ordered his soldiers to fight to the death. The attack was preceded by a long artillery preparation. After this, the soldiers rushed into battle from two flanks. The troops under the command of Kridener managed to capture the first lines of defense. However, near the redoubt they were met with overwhelming rifle fire. After bloody skirmishes, the Russians had to retreat back. The left flank was attacked by Skobelev. His fighters also failed to break through the Turkish defense lines. The battle continued all day. By evening, the Turks launched a counter-offensive and drove Krinder's soldiers out of their trenches. The Russians had to retreat again. After this defeat, the government turned to the Romanians for help.
After the arrival of Romanian troops, the blockade and capture of Plevna became inevitable. Therefore, Osman Pasha decided to break out of the besieged fortress. On August 31, his troops carried out a diversionary maneuver. After which the main forces left the city and struck the nearest outposts.
After a short battle, they managed to push back the Russians and even capture one battery. However, reinforcements soon arrived. Close combat ensued. The Turks wavered and fled back to the city, leaving almost one and a half thousand of their soldiers on the battlefield.
To complete it, it was necessary to capture Lovcha. It was through her that the Turks received reinforcements and provisions. The city was also occupied by auxiliary detachments of bashi-bazouks. They coped well with punitive operations against civilians, but quickly abandoned their positions at the prospect of meeting with a regular army. Therefore, when the Russians attacked the city on August 22, the Turks fled from there without much resistance.
After the capture of the city, the siege began, and the capture of Plevna was only a matter of time. Reinforcements arrived for the Russians. Osman Pasha also received reserves.
After completely encircling the city, the Turks remained completely cut off from the outside world. Osman Pasha refused to capitulate and continued to strengthen the fortress. By this time, 50 thousand Turks were hiding in the city against 120 thousand Russian and Romanian soldiers. Siege fortifications were built around the city. From time to time Plevna was shelled by artillery. The Turks were running out of food and ammunition. The army suffered from disease and hunger.
Osman Pasha decided to break out of the blockade, realizing that the imminent capture of Plevna was inevitable. The breakthrough date was set for December 10th. In the morning, Turkish troops installed effigies in the fortifications and began to break out of the city. But the Little Russian and Siberian regiments stood in their way. And the Ottomans came with looted property and a large convoy.
Of course, this complicated maneuverability. After the start of the battle, reinforcements were sent to the breakthrough site. At first, the Turks managed to push back the advanced detachments, but after being hit on the flank they began to retreat into the lowlands. After bringing artillery into the battle, the Turks ran randomly and eventually capitulated.
After this victory, General Skobelev ordered to celebrate December 10 as Military History Day. The capture of Plevna is celebrated in Bulgaria in our time. Because as a result of this victory, Christians got rid of Muslim oppression.
140 years ago, on November 28 (December 10), 1877, the Russian army took Plevna after a long siege. The Turkish army of Osman Pasha was defeated while trying to break out of the encirclement and capitulated. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops was a key event in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which predetermined the successful completion of the campaign on the Balkan Peninsula and the defeat of the Turkish Empire.
Background
After crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa, the Russian Danube Army advanced its Western detachment (9th Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener) to capture Nikopol and Plevna. After the successful assault on Nikopol on July 4 (16), the Russian command did not take any action for two days to capture Plevna, located 40 km from it, although there were no serious enemy forces there. The Russians could actually simply enter the enemy's strategic fortress. While the Russian troops were inactive, the army of Osman Pasha advanced from Vidin. She forced a march, covering 200 km in 6 days, at dawn on 7 (19) she reached Plevna and took up defensive positions on the outskirts of the city. The Ottomans immediately began to strengthen the defenses of the fortress, turning it into a fortified area.
On the morning of July 8 (20), a Russian detachment under the command of Lieutenant General Yu. I. Schilder-Schuldner attacked the fortress. But the Turks repelled the attack. On July 18 (30), the second assault on Plevna took place, which also failed and cost the Russian troops about 7 thousand people. Meanwhile, the Ottomans short time They restored the destroyed defensive structures, erected new ones and turned the closest approaches to Plevna into a heavily fortified area with the number of troops defending it over 32 thousand people with 70 guns. Osman Pasha's group posed a threat to the Danube Army from the flank. This failure forced the Russian command to suspend offensive operations in the main Constantinople direction.
The Western detachment had to be increased to a whole army, more than three times - 84 thousand people, 424 guns, including Romanian troops - 32 thousand people, 108 guns. The supreme leadership of Russia and Romania, Alexander II, was also located here. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Minister of War D.A. Milyutin, Romanian Prince Charles (he was formally the commander of the Western detachment). In the middle of the day on August 30 (September 11), the third assault on the Turkish stronghold began. In the 2nd half of the day, Skobelev’s detachment managed to break through the enemy defenses and open the way to Plevna. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves, which the next day, repelling strong counterattacks of the Turks, was forced to retreat under the pressure of superior enemy forces to its original position. Thus, the third attack on Plevna, despite the high military valor, dedication and perseverance of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Errors in management took their toll. In particular, the intelligence of the Turkish troops and their defense system was weak, which caused the enemy to be underestimated; the attacks were carried out in the previous directions, where the enemy was already expecting an attack and was well prepared; interaction between the troops advancing on each of them was not organized; artillery preparation turned out to be ineffective; the breakthrough of Skobelev’s detachment could not be used, etc.
The unsuccessful outcome of the offensive forced the Russian high command to change their strategy. On September 1 (13), Tsar Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether the troops should be withdrawn from the fortress. The chief of staff of the Western detachment, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, and the chief of army artillery, Lieutenant General Prince N. F. Masalsky, spoke in favor of retreat. The continuation of the fight for the fortress was advocated by the assistant chief of staff of the Danube Army, Major General K.V. Levitsky and Minister of War D.A. Milyutin. Milyutin proposed abandoning direct assaults and breaking the enemy's resistance with a siege. Milyutin noted that the troops, without large-caliber artillery mounted fire, could not reliably destroy the defensive structures of the Ottoman army and achieve success in an open attack. In the event of a complete blockade, success is guaranteed, since the Turkish garrison does not have enough supplies for a long fight. Indeed, the enemy was already experiencing a shortage of supplies. On September 2 (14), Osman Pasha reported to the high command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements and losses had greatly weakened the garrison, forcing him to a dangerous retreat.
Alexander II supported Milyutin. The council members decided not to retreat from Plevna, strengthen their positions and wait for reinforcements from Russia, after which they planned to begin a proper siege of the fortress and force it to capitulate. To lead the siege work, the famous engineer-general E.I. Totleben, who became famous during the defense of Sevastopol, was appointed assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles. Arriving at the theater of military operations, Totleben came to the conclusion that the Plevna garrison was provided with food for only two months, and therefore could not withstand a prolonged blockade. General Zotov returned to his previous duties as commander of the 4th Corps. All cavalry was subordinated to I.V. Gurko. These changes improved troop control. The western detachment was again reinforced - the newly arrived Guards Corps (1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, Guards Rifle Brigade) joined it.
Sally from Plevna. December 1877 Painting by an unknown artist published in the English illustrated magazine The Illustrated London News in February 1878.
Siege
General Totleben skillfully led the siege work. To reduce losses in the troops, he ordered to dig strong trenches, build comfortable dugouts, and bring distant hospitals closer to the front. The artillery had to carry out a thorough shooting, and then proceed to the methodical destruction of enemy fortifications.
Russian-Romanian troops surrounded Plevna from the north, east and south. In the west and southwest the enemy had the opportunity to pass. Particularly important for the Turkish garrison was the Sofia Highway, along which Osman Pasha’s army received its main supplies. To defend this communications, the Turks strengthened the points of Gorny Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish. To completely block the enemy garrison, it was necessary to cut off its communication with Sofia. First, small cavalry detachments of Krylov and Loshkarev were sent here. However, this was not enough. It was necessary to take enemy strongholds on the highway. This task was to be solved by a newly formed detachment under the leadership of I.V. Gurko.
Gurko's detachment was a very powerful force, an entire army - 50 thousand people with 170 guns. At its core was the guard, which had recently arrived at Plevna. They decided to strike the first blow at Gorny Dubnyak, where a 4.5 thousand Turkish garrison with 4 guns sat. Turkish troops occupied good positions on hills, fortified by two redoubts and trenches. 20 battalions, 6 squadrons and 48 guns were allocated to attack enemy positions. The troops were supposed to simultaneously advance in three columns - from the north, east and south. At 8 o'clock on October 12 (24), the Russians attacked the enemy. It was not possible to attack the enemy at the same time. The right column was the first to go forward, the other columns moved late. The guardsmen, participating in battle for the first time, bravely went on the offensive in close formation and suffered unreasonably large losses. The Turks were able to repel individual attacks by Russian columns. As Gurko noted: “... a whole series of individual attacks followed. All units, met with extremely destructive fire, were unable to reach the main redoubt.” By 12 o'clock our troops took the Small Redoubt and surrounded the Big Redoubt, but due to heavy fire they could not break through further and lay down.
Gurko decided to resume the offensive in the evening. At this time, our soldiers, using dashes and crawls, individually and in small groups accumulated near the redoubt. To move, the soldiers used folds of the terrain, ditches, ditches and pits. By 6 p.m., enough troops had accumulated in the ditch to attack. They were in a dead zone and could not come under enemy fire. When dusk came, our troops stormed the redoubt. During the bayonet battle, the enemy was defeated and capitulated. However, the victory came at a high price. The losses of Russian troops amounted to 3.3 thousand killed and wounded. The Turks lost about 1.5 thousand killed and wounded and 2.3 thousand prisoners.
The second blow was struck at Telish. On October 13 (25), our troops attacked an enemy stronghold, but without success. Then Gurko decided to take the fortification with an “artillery attack.” The fortifications of the Turkish garrison and the surrounding area were studied. The artillerymen prepared firing positions, the corresponding engineering training offensive The artillery preparation was thorough - 6 hours. A strict order of artillery preparation was established: from 12 to 14 o'clock - a powerful fire strike with all artillery; at 14 and 14 30 minutes - three salvos with all artillery, and then methodical fire; at 16:30 - three volleys, then again methodical fire; at 18 o'clock - three last salvos. Ammunition consumption was stipulated at 100 shells per gun. They planned that if the enemy did not give up after such a powerful fire strike, the troops would launch an assault with three sides. Such careful preparation led to success.
On October 16 (28), the assault on Telish began. 4 brigades and 72 guns took part in the attack. Powerful and well-aimed fire from Russian batteries demoralized the Ottoman troops. After a 3-hour artillery barrage, 5 thousand. the Turkish garrison capitulated. Russian losses did not exceed 50 people. On October 20 (November 1), the enemy surrendered Gorny Dubnyak without a fight. On the same day, the advanced units of the 3rd Grenadier Division that arrived in Bulgaria approached locality northwest of Plevna - to the Mountain Metropolis, interrupting communications with Vidin. Thus, the blockade of Plevna became complete.
The Turkish command decided to release the army of Osman Pasha. To do this, they began to concentrate a 25 thousand group in the Orhaniye region. However, this enemy plan was destroyed by the actions of Gurko’s detachment. The general began moving towards Orhaniye with the goal of defeating the enemy corps and securing the path to Trans-Balkania. The Turkish command, not daring to enter into an open battle with the Russians (the durability of Turkish troops in open battle was questionable), withdrew troops from Orhaniye to fortifications at Arab Konak. Our troops, having reached this line, stopped. They completed their main task. The blockade of Plevna was secured and our troops took a convenient position for the future movement for the Balkans.
Surrender
By the beginning of November, the number of Russian-Romanian troops near Plevna reached 130 thousand people, 502 field and 58 siege weapons. The troops were divided into six sections: 1st - Romanian General A. Cernat (consisted of Romanian troops), 2nd - Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener, 3rd - Lieutenant General P.D. Zotov, 4 1st - Lieutenant General M.D. Skobelev, 5th - Lieutenant General V.V. Kataleya and 6th - Lieutenant General I.S. Ganetsky.
The position of the Turkish army became more and more difficult. Ammunition and food supplies are running low. From October 13 (25), Turkish soldiers were given 0.5 rations. The fuel has run out. Thousands of soldiers were sick. On October 22 (November 3), the high command in Constantinople allowed to leave Plevna, but it was too late. However, it was no longer possible to remain in the fortress - supplies had run out, and the demoralized soldiers were afraid of the Russian offensive and abandoned their posts at night, hiding in the city. Osman Pasha convened a military council on November 19 (December 1). Its members made a unanimous decision to fight their way out of Plevna. The Turkish commander expected to cross to the left bank of the Vid River, strike at Russian troops in a northwest direction towards Magaletta, and then move, depending on the situation, to Vidin or Sofia.
On the night of November 27-28 (December 9-10), his troops set out from Plevna. The troops were followed by convoys. Osman Pasha was also forced to take with him about 200 families from among the Turkish residents of Plevna and most of the wounded. Tahir Pasha's division crossed the river. View and, forming in deep columns, at 7:30 am attacked the positions of the 3rd Grenadier Division in the 6th sector. Despite all the precautions taken, the crossing of the Turkish army turned out to be a complete surprise for the Russian command. 7 companies of the 9th Siberian Grenadier Regiment could not withstand the attack of 16 Turkish battalions. The Turks drove the Russian grenadiers out of the trenches, capturing 8 guns. By 8:30 a.m., the first line of Russian fortifications between Dolny Metropol and Kopanaya Mogila was broken through. Under the pressure of desperately attacking, superior forces, the 9th Siberian Regiment retreated to the second line of defense. The 10th Little Russian Regiment came to his aid, but it also could not stop the enemy and was overturned. Ottoman troops captured the second line of defense at about 9 o'clock.
However, the Turks were already exhausted, they were caught in the crossfire and were unable to develop an offensive. At the beginning of 11 o'clock, the 2nd brigade of the 3rd Grenadier Division (11th Phanagorian and 12th Astrakhan regiments) approached from the direction of the Mountain Metropolis. As a result of the ensuing counterattack, the Russian grenadiers recaptured the second line of fortifications occupied by the enemy. The 3rd brigade was supported by the approaching 7th Grenadier Samogitsky and 8th Grenadier Moscow regiments of the 2nd division. The Russian reserves that arrived in time attacked the enemy from three sides. The Turks retreated to the first line. Osman Pasha was waiting for the arrival of the second division from the right bank of the Vid, but its crossing was delayed by convoys. The Turkish troops lost even the semblance of mobility, taking with them carts of civilians and wounded, losing even the minimal chance of breaking out from the encirclement of the most combat-ready part of the army. The defeated Turkish troops, having received no reinforcements, could not hold on to the first line. By 12 noon the enemy was knocked out of the first line of fortifications. As a result of the counterattack, Russian troops not only recaptured 8 guns captured by the Turks, but also captured 10 enemy ones. Turkish troops lost about 6 thousand killed and wounded in this battle. Russian losses left about 1,700 people.
General Ganetsky, still fearing a new attack by the Turks, did not plan to pursue the enemy. He ordered to occupy the forward fortifications, bring artillery here and wait for a new enemy offensive. However, the situation was radically changed by the initiative of junior commanders. The 1st Brigade of the 2nd Grenadier Division, which occupied the fortified position of the Dolne-Dubnyaksky detachment, seeing the retreat of the Turks, went forward and began to envelop them from the left flank. Following her, the rest of the troops of the 6th section went on the offensive. Under the pressure of the Russians, the Turks at first slowly and in relative order retreated to Vid, but soon the retreating ones encountered their convoys. Panic began among those following the convoys civilians, it spread to the soldiers. At that moment Osman Pasha was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Pertev Bey, commander of one of the two regiments covering the convoys, tried to stop the Russians, but to no avail. His regiment was overthrown, and the retreat of the Turkish army turned into a disorderly flight. Soldiers and refugees, guns, carts and pack animals were crowded in a dense mass at the bridges. The grenadiers approached the enemy at 800 steps, firing aimed rifle fire at him.
It was a disaster. In other sectors, Russian troops also went on the offensive and, having captured the fortifications of the northern, eastern and southern fronts, occupied Plevna and reached the heights to the west of it. The 1st and 3rd brigades of the Turkish division of Adil Pasha, which covered the retreat of the main forces of Osman Pasha's army, laid down their arms. The wounded Osman Pasha, having lost hope of a successful breakthrough, at 13:00 on November 28 (December 10), 1877, sent his adjutant Neshed Bey to the Russian command with an announcement of surrender. 10 generals, 2,128 officers, and more than 41 thousand soldiers surrendered.
Results
The fall of Plevna was of strategic importance. Türkiye lost an entire army, which constrained the further advance of Russian troops beyond the Balkans. This made it possible for the Russian command to free up more than 100 thousand people for an offensive across the Balkans, which generally predetermined Turkey’s defeat in the war.
The Romanian army also released its main forces and was regrouped. A large group was sent to Vidin and Belgrade. On December 10 (22), Romanian troops took Arnar-Palanki, located on the Danube. The main forces of the Romanian army blocked Vidin in January 1878. On January 12 (24), the Romanians took the outer fortifications of the fortress. Vidin himself capitulated after the truce was concluded.
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December 10, 1877 during Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 Russian troops, after a difficult siege, captured Plevna, forcing the surrender of the 40,000-strong Turkish army. This was an important victory for Russia, but it came at a considerable cost.
Heavy battles near Plevna, which cost the Russian army tens of thousands of killed and wounded, are reflected in painting. The famous battle painter V.V. Vereshchagin, who was a participant in the siege of Plevna (one of his brothers was killed during the Third assault on the fortress, and the other was wounded), dedicated the canvas “The Vanquished. Requiem service." Much later, after the death of V.V. Vereshchagin himself in 1904, another participant in the events near Plevna, scientist V.M. Bekhterev, responded to this picture with the following poem:
The entire field is covered with thick grass. Not roses, but corpses cover him. The priest stands with his head naked. While swinging the censer he reads... And the choir behind him unanimously, drawlingly sings one prayer after another. He pays eternal memory and sorrow to all those who fell for their homeland in battle.
One of the factors that determined the high losses of the Russian army during the three unsuccessful assaults on Plevna and a number of other battles for the capture of Turkish strongholds around this fortress was the high density of fire from the Turkish infantry.
Often, Turkish soldiers had two types of firearms at the same time - an American Peabody-Martini rifle for long-range shooting and Winchester repeating carbines for close combat, which made it possible to create a high density of fire at a short distance.
Of the famous battle paintings where the Turks are depicted simultaneously with rifles and carbines is the painting by A. N. Popov “Defense of the Eagle’s Nest by the Oryol and Bryants on August 12, 1877” (events at the Shipka Pass) - the appearance of the Turkish soldiers near Plevna was similar .
With name Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev A number of striking episodes of the Russian-Turkish war are connected. Noteworthy is the preparation of Skobelev's 16th division for the crossing of the Balkans after the capture of Plevna. Firstly, Skobelev rearmed his division with Peabody-Martini rifles, which were taken in huge quantities from the Plevna arsenals.
Most Russian infantry units in the Balkans were armed with the Krynka rifle, and only the Guard and the Grenadier Corps had more modern Berdan rifles. Unfortunately, other Russian military leaders did not follow Skobelev’s example.
Secondly, Skobelev, using the shops (warehouses) of Plevna, provided his soldiers with warm clothing, and when moving to the Balkans also with firewood - therefore, moving along one of the most difficult sections of the Balkans - the Imetli Pass, the 16th Division did not lose a single person to frostbite .
The Russo-Turkish War and the siege of Plevna were marked by enormous difficulties in military supply, which, under very dark circumstances, was entrusted to the Greger-Gerwitz-Cogan Partnership. The siege of Plevna was carried out in extremely difficult conditions of the beginning of the autumn thaw. Diseases increased and there was a threat of famine.
Up to 200 people were out of action every day. During the war, the size of the Russian army near Plevna constantly increased, and its needs increased. Therefore, in September 1877, two civilian transports were formed, consisting of 23 departments of 350 horse-drawn carts each, and in November 1877, two more transports, consisting of 28 departments of the same composition. By the end of the siege of Plevna in November, 26 thousand 850 civilian carts and a large number of other transport. Fighting the autumn of 1877 was also marked by the first appearance field kitchens in the Russian army much earlier than other European countries.
After the Third unsuccessful assault on Plevna on August 30-31, 1877, the famous engineer, hero of the defense of Sevastopol E. I. Totleben was called to lead the siege work. He managed to establish a tight blockade of the fortress, destroy Turkish water mills in Plevna by releasing streams of water from open dams, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to bake bread. The outstanding fortifier did a lot to improve the life of the troops besieging Plevna, preparing the Russian camp for the inclement autumn and the approaching cold weather.
Refusing frontal attacks on Plevna, Totleben organized constant military demonstrations in front of the fortress, forcing the Turks to maintain significant forces in the first line of defense and suffer heavy losses from concentrated Russian artillery fire. Totleben himself noted: “The enemy is only defensive, and I conduct continuous demonstrations against him so that he assumes on our part the intention to storm.
When the Turks fill the redoubts and trenches with men, and their reserves approach, I order volleys of a hundred or more guns to be fired. In this way I am trying to avoid losses on our part, thereby inflicting daily losses on the Turks.”
After the capture of Plevna, Russia once again faced the threat of war with England, which was extremely sensitive to any Russian successes in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Back in July 1877, the English fleet was introduced into the Dardanelles. And after the fall of Plevna, English Prime Minister Disraeli even decided to declare war on Russia, but did not receive support from the cabinet.
On December 1, 1877, a memorandum was sent to Russia threatening to declare war if Russian troops occupied Istanbul. In addition, active efforts were launched to organize collective international mediation (intervention) to conclude peace. However, at that time, Russia rejected such a development of events, indicating agreement only to direct Russian-Turkish negotiations.
The siege and capture of Plevna by Russian troops became one of key events war of 1877-78 After the fall of this fortress, the path through the Balkans was opened for Russian troops, and the Ottoman Empire lost its first-class 50,000-strong army. Further rapid actions of the Russian troops made it possible to carry out a rapid transition through the Balkan Mountains and achieve the signing of the San Stefano Peace Treaty, which was beneficial for Russia. And yet, the siege of Plevna went down in Russian military history as one of the bloodiest and most difficult. During the siege, the losses of Russian troops amounted to more than 40 thousand people killed and wounded.
The beginning of the siege. After the successful crossing of the Danube by Russian troops at Sistovo, the Turkish command on July 2 (14) began the transfer of Osman Pasha’s corps to Plevna from Vidin (northwest Bulgaria), which was tasked with striking the right flank of the Russian troops. On July 4, 1877, the 9th Army Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress on the banks of the Danube north of Plevna.
The Russian command allocated a nine-thousand-strong detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner to occupy Plevna, which on the evening of July 7 reached the outskirts of the city and the next morning attacked Turkish positions. The 15,000-strong garrison of Plevna repelled scattered attacks by Russian regiments, inflicting serious losses on them (2.5 thousand people).
After the concentration of Kridener's entire corps (26 thousand soldiers, 140 guns) near the city, a second assault on Plevna was launched on July 18. By this time, Osman Pasha concentrated about 23 thousand people and 58 guns in the city. Kridener had no information about the Turkish forces, exaggerated their numbers and acted indecisively. The attacks were carried out from the east and southeast head-on against the most fortified areas, troops were brought into battle in parts. The assault ended in failure. Russian losses amounted to 7 thousand people, Turks - about 4 thousand people.
Plevna was of great strategic importance; its strong garrison threatened the crossings of the Danube and could attack the advancing Russian army in the flank and rear. Therefore, the Russian command postponed the transfer of the main forces through the Balkan Mountains (the Shipka Pass was captured on July 8) and during July-August concentrated an 83,000-strong army with 424 guns near Plevna, of which 32,000 people and 108 guns were from the allied Romanian army.
Third assault on Plevna. The Allies besieged Plevna from the south and east. On the right flank, opposite the Grivitsky redoubts, the Romanians settled down. From the east the city was besieged by Kridener's corps, from the southeast by General Krylov's 8th corps. In the southern direction there was a left-flank detachment of General M.D. Skobelev. From the north, the Turkish garrison was reliably covered by the heights of Yanyk-Bair, and from the west it was supplied along the Sofia-Plevna road. By the end of summer, the Turks increased the size of the Plevna garrison to 34 thousand people with 72 guns. The nominal commander of the allied army near Plevna was the Romanian king Carol I; in fact, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, was in charge. But near Plevna there was also the headquarters of the Russian Emperor Alexander II and the commander-in-chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Sr.
The third assault on Plevna took place on August 26-31. The Turks predicted the directions of attack of the Russian and Romanian troops and managed to hold their line of defense, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The decisive day was August 30, when the Romanians, with the support of the Russian 18th Infantry Regiment, managed to capture one of the two Grivitsky redoubts. On the same day, Skobelev’s detachment, delivering an auxiliary attack, found a weak point in the Turkish positions, broke through their defenses in the Green Mountains area, captured the Issa and Kavanlyk redoubts and reached the southern outskirts of the city. The Turks hastily transferred reserves from the north and east against Skobelev.
On August 31, the Russian command did not take offensive actions and did not support Skobelev with reserves. As a result, under the pressure of superior forces, Skobelev’s detachment was forced to return to its original positions. In the third assault on Plevna, Russian and Romanian troops lost 16 thousand people, the Turks - about three thousand.
Siege and capture of Plevna. On September 1, it was decided to proceed to a thorough siege of Plevna, for the leadership of which the best specialist in siege work in Russia, engineer-general E. I. Totleben, was called in. To successfully conduct a siege, the Russians needed to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the Turks received reinforcements. To solve this problem, the guards units were created strike force General I.V. Gurko. He managed to capture Gorny Dubnyak on October 12, Telish on October 16, Dolny Dubnyak on October 20 - strongholds on the Sofia road, thereby completely closing the blockade ring of the Pleven garrison, whose number by that time amounted to 50 thousand people.
The lack of food forced the Turkish commander Osman Pasha to attempt an independent liberation of Plevna. On November 28, having withdrawn troops from defensive positions, he attacked Russian troops northwest of Plevna. Units of the 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Divisions and the 5th Infantry Division of the Russian Army repelled the Turkish attack. Having lost 6 thousand soldiers and unable to escape from encirclement, Osman Pasha surrendered with 43 thousand soldiers. The fall of Plevna freed up a hundred thousand Russian-Romanian army for a subsequent offensive across the Balkans.
In the fighting near Plevna, forms and methods of besieging fortresses were further developed. The Russian army developed new methods of infantry combat tactics, a combination of movement and fire from rifle chains, and the use of infantry self-entrenchment in the offensive began. At Plevna, the importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the role of heavy artillery in preparing an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined. In memory of the battles for Plevna, a mausoleum was built in the city in memory of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers (1905), a park-museum of M. D. Skobelev (1907), and an artistic panorama complex “Liberation of Plevna in 1877.” In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument to the grenadiers who fell near Plevna.
Based on materials from Internet resources
