Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born in 1931. He began working at the age of 13 (1944), periodically worked on a collective farm, and from the age of 15 he was an assistant combine operator at a machine and tractor station. In 1950 he graduated from school and entered the law faculty of Moscow state university(MSU) named after M.V. Lomonosov. He was a member of the Komsomol faculty committee. In 1952 he joined the CPSU.
Soon he became secretary of the Komsomol organization of the faculty and a member of the party committee of Moscow State University. After graduating from university in 1955, he worked at Stavropol region specialty, then - in 1955-1956. - Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Komsomol Regional Committee, First Secretary of the Stavropol City Komsomol Committee (1956-58), Second (1958-60), First Secretary of the Komsomol Regional Committee (1960-62)
In November 1961, he was a delegate to the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the participants of which, along with draft party documents, received a newly printed issue of “New World” with A.I. Solzhenitsyn’s story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich”, and at which Nikita Khrushchev for the first time publicly (and not at a closed meeting, as in 1956) spoke about the crimes of Stalin and his circle. Since March 1962 - party organizer of the regional committee of the CPSU of the Stavropol territorial production collective and state farm administration; From December 1962 to December 1964 - head of the department of party bodies of the Stavropol rural regional committee of the CPSU. From December 1964 to September 1966 - head of the department of party bodies of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU.
Since September 1966 - first secretary of the Stavropol city party committee. From August 1968 - second, and from April 1970 - first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU. Elected member in 1970 Supreme Council(VS) USSR. Until 1974, he was a member of the nature protection commission of one of the chambers of the USSR Armed Forces. Member of the CPSU Central Committee (1971-1991) Became a member of the Central Committee at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU. Chairman of the Commission on Youth Affairs of the Union Council of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1974-1979) From November 1978 - Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Agriculture, at the same time he moved to Moscow permanently. Before him, the post of Secretary of the Central Committee for Agrarian Issues had been held since 1964 by Fyodor Kulakov, who had previously been Gorbachev’s predecessor as First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee. Chairman of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1979-1984)
From 1979 to 1980 - candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. According to Gorbachev himself, on the day of entry Soviet troops to Afghanistan in December 1979, he was on vacation in Pitsunda with Eduard Shevardnadze, “and no one called us there about this.” As for the plenum of the Central Committee, which approved the Politburo's decision to invade Afghanistan, Gorbachev subsequently did not deny that he voted with everyone in favor. From October 1980 to August 1991 - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. According to the Panorama expert center, Gorbachev was one of the associates of Andropov, who became the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1982 after the death of Brezhnev. At this time, a group of reform-minded politicians gradually began to form in the Politburo, which included Gorbachev. According to some members of the Central Committee apparatus, Andropov proposed that in his absence Gorbachev should preside over Politburo meetings.
After Andropov's death, Gorbachev was the alleged rival of Konstantin Chernenko in the fight for the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. During his short reign, Chernenko was unofficially the second-in-command in the party and served as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for Ideology.
In 1984-1985 he served as Chairman of the Commission on foreign affairs Council of the Union of the USSR Armed Forces (this post was held by Mikhail Suslov under Leonid Brezhnev, and by Konstantin Chernenko under Yuri Andropov).
In December 1984, at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, he delivered a report on “The Living Creativity of the People,” in which he spoke about the need to overcome dogmatic ideas about production relations under socialism, develop self-government in the economy, support innovative initiatives, expand publicity and “socialist democracy.” The report was published only six months later and contained the main theses on the basis of which the “perestroika” program later emerged. After the death of Chernenko on March 11, 1985, at an extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee, Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. On instructions from the Politburo, Andrei Gromyko proposed his candidacy. In the very first months of work in this position, he began personnel changes in the party leadership, sending the most conservative “Brezhnevites” into retirement. New appointments were received: Nikolai Ryzhkov - Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Yegor Ligachev - Secretary of the Central Committee for Ideology, Boris Yeltsin - Secretary of the Central Committee for Construction Issues, and then - First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee, Eduard Shevardnadze - Minister of Foreign Affairs. Occupying the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev was Chairman of the USSR Defense Council and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Armed Forces. Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1985-1988) In May 1985, speaking in Leningrad, Gorbachev for the first time openly spoke about the slowdown in economic growth, the lag in domestic mechanical engineering, and the need to improve people's living standards. Gorbachev's speech was published in newspapers in an abbreviated form beyond recognition, and was shown on television only 4 days later. In June of the same year, at an economic meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, he put forward the slogan of accelerating scientific and technological progress. The word "acceleration" in 1985 - 1986 became the main term for denoting the beginning of changes in economics and politics. At the same time, some policy innovations were designed to attract the sympathy of hardliners. In May 1985, a resolution of the Central Committee and a number of decisions of the government and the Presidium of the Supreme Council were adopted, which marked the beginning of an anti-alcohol campaign, which led, among other things, to the prosperity of moonshine and contributed to destabilization financial system countries. In 1985-1988, Gorbachev made radical changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (February - March 1986), he unveiled the Soviet program for building a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. In the same year, during a visit to India, he signed the Delhi Declaration on the Principles of Nonviolence and Freedom nuclear weapons peace. According to the Panorama expert center, in May 1985, at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the victory over fascism, Gorbachev mentioned the name of Joseph Stalin in a positive context for the first time in 20 years, which caused a storm of applause from those present. At the first (closed) meeting with the creative intelligentsia, he said that now is not the time to resume the anti-Stalinist campaign: “We will push people together!”
From November 1985 to December 1988, Gorbachev held 5 meetings with US President Ronald Reagan, during which agreements were developed to reduce certain types of nuclear and conventional weapons. At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU (February - March 1986) he made a report in which he spoke out for the economic renewal of the country, increasing the independence of enterprises, reducing government orders, democratic transformations in society, and increasing the political activity of the people.
Since June 1986, this policy has been called "perestroika". Alexander Yakovlev was elected Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee immediately after the congress. In 1986, the press department of the Central Committee, headed by Yakovlev, replaced many heads of magazines and newspapers, appointing as editors-in-chief supporters of the consistent “de-Stalinization” of the country. The weakening of censorship in the press was called the “glasnost” policy and culminated in 1990 with the adoption of the Law on the Press, which abolished state censorship. In December 1986, Gorbachev returned academician Andrei Sakharov from political exile and allowed him to participate in international anti-war meetings in Moscow. At the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in January 1987, he declared for the first time that the Soviet system needed democratization and announced the development of new electoral legislation. At the anniversary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in October 1987, he delivered a report in which he spoke openly about the “criminal role of Stalinism” for the first time. The rehabilitation of many repressed members has begun communist party. At the same plenum, Gorbachev for the first time encountered open criticism of the Central Committee from Boris Yeltsin, who demanded the activation of “perestroika.” At the suggestion of the Secretary General, the Plenum adopted a resolution recognizing Yeltsin’s speech as “politically erroneous.” In June 1988, the 19th party conference was held, convened to consolidate Gorbachev’s political course. For the first time in the last 60 years, a heated debate on political issues. The main outcome of the conference was the beginning political reform Councils and the preparation of elections of people's deputies on an alternative basis, as well as the resolution "On Glasnost", which contributed to progress towards freedom of speech. At the conference, it was decided to combine the posts of chairmen of the Soviets with the corresponding party posts. This decision was most sharply condemned by the radical reformist wing of the party as undemocratic and contrary to the principle of the “separation” of powers into party and state.
In fact, it was, however, in line with the new course towards a smooth transfer of power from party to state structures.
During this period, Gorbachev repeatedly emphasized his commitment to the ideals of socialism, the “testaments of Lenin.” In October 1988, Gorbachev made major changes in the party and state leadership. The Secretariat of the Central Committee as a collegial body virtually ceased to exist. Yegor Ligachev was removed from the leadership of the ideology and foreign policy in the Politburo. Alexander Yakovlev became the Secretary of the Central Committee for International Affairs. Gorbachev himself was elected instead of Gromyko as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
Since October 1988 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. People's Deputy of the USSR from the CPSU from March 1989 to March 1990. From May 1989 to March 1990 - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. At the end of 1989, during a meeting with the new US President George W. Bush on the island of Malta, Gorbachev said for the first time that the USSR was ready not to consider the United States as its military adversary. On December 25, 1991, M. S. Gorbachev opposed the dismemberment of the country and resigned as head of state. From January 1992 to the present - President of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Science Research (Gorbachev Foundation). At the same time, since March 1993 - President of the International Green Cross. Outstanding State and political figure, M. S. Gorbachev laid the foundation for perestroika, the reform of Soviet society and the improvement international situation. In recognition of his leading role in the peace process, which today characterizes an important part of the life of the international community, on October 15, 1990, he was awarded Nobel Prize peace.
According to experts at the Panorama Center, Gorbachev currently recognizes the utopianism of the communist idea and condemns the totalitarian regime that existed in the USSR. He advocates the development of private property, a market economy, democratic reforms, and the prevention of political violence.
March 11, 2015 marks 30 years since the election of M.S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
As you know, the coming to power of a new leader was greeted with enthusiasm, but after 6 years the state he had taken over lay in ruins, and society was struck by apathy, ethnic conflicts, sects and hypnotic experiments of Kashpirovsky, and other manifestations of social decay.
In this regard, you always involuntarily return to the same question: was another possible development of events in March 1985? Was perestroika so objectively predetermined that it would have happened in any case, even if M.S. Gorbachev had not existed?
For 30 years, propaganda, organized at one time during Gorbachev’s reign, has been trying to convince everyone that in 1985 the USSR was on the verge of economic collapse and social disunity, the people’s lack of faith in their government. Nowadays, Mikhail Sergeevich repeats long-memorized words: “Change was knocking on the windows and doors. It was necessary to decide on them, no matter how risky and even dangerous it was. But change could not begin on its own. They became possible because a new generation of politicians came to leadership in the USSR, capable of modern thinking and ready to take responsibility...”
However, was it worth sacrificing the state and social harmony for the sake of “change” - this is the main question that I would like to ask Mr. Gorbachev.
The perestroika he announced initially did not have clearly defined boundaries; they were always blurred, approximate, and verbose. And this is understandable, because the main goal was the restructuring of socialism into capitalism, and declaring this was politically risky from the very beginning.
The theses that, they say, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko were already “old” are ridiculous. I would like to remind you that this “age” at the time of death was: Brezhnev - 75 years old, Andropov - 69 years old, Chernenko - 73 years old. Is this a lot? I don’t think so, especially considering that US President Ronald Reagan was the same age as Chernenko (b. 1911) and died only in 2004, and in the US no one considered him a “sick old man”. Continuing the list, we can make more interesting comparisons: L.I. Brezhnev’s wife, Victoria Petrovna Brezhneva (b. in 1907), died only in 1995, and K.U. Chernenko’s wife, Anna Dmitrievna Chernenko (b. 1913) - died only in 2010 (!).
One cannot help but recall the living party and statesmen the times of perestroika, which are long past: M.S. Gorbachev - 84 years old, A.I. Lukyanov - 85 years old, N.I. Ryzhkov - 86 years old, Dolgikh V.I. – 91 years old, E.K. Ligachev is 95 years old.
So why did the wives of general secretaries and the “heirs” of general secretaries outlive them by 15–20 years, while the leaders of the state and party themselves, having first-class medical care, looked as if they were not 70, but 120 years old?
Of course, here this question should be addressed to the Kremlin doctors and, first of all, to Mr. E.I. Chazov.
V.A. Kaznacheev, Gorbachev’s ally in leadership positions in Stavropol, cites interesting information: “I have already talked about how Academician Chazov, when coming to the Stavropol region, shared a lot with Gorbachev, in particular, he regularly informed about the lifestyle of the Kremlin inhabitants. From the outside it seemed like friendship. But it only seemed so.
Being aware of the health status of all Kremlin leaders, the academician hinted to Gorbachev that death was taking the leaders one after another as soon as their relations with the United States worsened. Moreover, they get sick and die in some strange, absurd way. So, Brezhnev, a man with extraordinary energy, suddenly fell ill with asthenic syndrome. His slow reaction and difficult speech caused ridicule and served as material for pop artists.
Chernenko is developing phlegmon with incredible speed. Also, Andropov’s illness suddenly worsened. The military leaders of Russia (meaning the USSR - D.L.) and Czechoslovakia Ustinov and Dzura fell ill with the same disease after the maneuvers, which led to their death. If it is possible to argue about the deaths of general secretaries whether they were accidental, then the passing of Ustinov and Dzur is clear evidence that a purposeful action was taken against them.”
Thus, it was difficult not to notice the all too obvious suspicion of the deaths of 3 Secretary Generals in a row. It is no coincidence that even now all the US’s opponents are getting sick “strangely,” “ridiculously,” and in the same way. Suffice it to recall the sudden oncological diseases of the President of Venezuela Hugo Chavis, the President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff and the President of Argentina Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. And, apparently, the American technique was “tested” on Soviet leaders.
However, it seems that Chazov’s words about the health of party and state leaders did not greatly upset M.S. Gorbachev. However, they did not upset his wife, R.M. Gorbachev, who did not miss a single day without inquiring from the security: “what information is from Moscow?”
In December 1984, D.F. Ustinov died. It must be said that he died very successfully, at the most opportune moment, since Ustinov was the person who determined the candidacy of the future Secretary General. This was the case with the nomination of Andropov, and this was the case with the nomination of Chernenko. Now Ustinov is gone.
Just 3 months later, K.U. Chernenko also passed away. Surprisingly, 2 times, declaring his intention to leave the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chernenko received categorical objections and advice from the Politburo and its individual members to “just get a little treatment.” Why was this so? I think it was because there were experienced people in the Politburo who understood that no one just leaves their post. If Chernenko leaves, he will definitely name a successor, and the members of the Politburo wanted to elect a new secretary general themselves, and, therefore, for this they must wait until the death of the previous one.
And this death occurred on March 10, 1985. And this death also came very successfully and very timely, since out of 10 members of the Politburo, 4 were absent in Moscow, and, as is believed, Gorbachev’s opponents: Vorotnikov was in Yugoslavia, Kunaev was in Alma- ate, Romanov was on vacation in Lithuania, Shcherbitsky headed the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the USA.
However, at the evening meeting of the Politburo on March 10, 1985, the new Secretary General was not identified, so the meeting was postponed to 14.00 on March 11, so that everything could be thought over and weighed at night.
But it was on this night from March 10 to 11, 1985 that Ligachev, Gorbachev and Chebrikov remained in the Kremlin and made preparations for M.S. Gorbachev to be elected Secretary General. Also, Zagladin, Alexandrov, Lukyanov and Medvedev were summoned to the Kremlin at night to write a speech for the person who would be elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
If you believe V.A. Pechenev, then an interesting dialogue took place between A.I. Volsky and M.S. Gorbachev: “Arkady Ivanovich (Volsky - D.L.), looking into Gorbachev’s bright, sad eyes, confidentially asked him: “ Mikhail Sergeevich, will you make a report at the Plenum?” “Arkady, don’t worry about it,” Gorbachev answered diplomatically.”
Thus, it is obvious that M.S. Gorbachev prepared the speech of the future Secretary General not “for someone,” but exclusively for himself.
At the same time, all night long E.K. Ligachev called the first secretaries of the regional branches of the party, that is, members of the Central Committee, and campaigned for them in favor of Gorbachev. The next day, March 11, 1985, until 14.00, i.e. Before the fateful meeting of the Politburo, direct meetings between E.K. Ligachev and members of the Central Committee had already taken place.
March 11, 2015 marks 30 years since the election of M.S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
As you know, the coming to power of a new leader was greeted with enthusiasm, but after 6 years the state he had taken over lay in ruins, and society was struck by apathy, ethnic conflicts, sects and hypnotic experiments of Kashpirovsky, and other manifestations of social decay.
In this regard, you always involuntarily return to the same question: was another possible development of events in March 1985? Was perestroika so objectively predetermined that it would have happened in any case, even if M.S. Gorbachev had not existed?
For 30 years, propaganda, organized at one time during Gorbachev’s reign, has been trying to convince everyone that in 1985 the USSR was on the verge of economic collapse and social disunity, the people’s lack of faith in their government. Nowadays, Mikhail Sergeevich repeats long-memorized words: “Change was knocking on the windows and doors. It was necessary to decide on them, no matter how risky and even dangerous it was. But change could not begin on its own. They became possible because a new generation of politicians came to leadership in the USSR, capable of modern thinking and ready to take responsibility...”
However, was it worth sacrificing the state and social harmony for the sake of “change” - this is the main question that I would like to ask Mr. Gorbachev.
The perestroika he announced initially did not have clearly defined boundaries; they were always blurred, approximate, and verbose. And this is understandable, because the main goal was the restructuring of socialism into capitalism, and declaring this was politically risky from the very beginning.
Gorbachev's rise to power to this day causes a lot of talk and speculation. And this is no coincidence. It is difficult to find an example in history when, in peacetime, 3 (!) heads of state pass away in a row within 3 years.
The theses that Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko were already “aged” are ridiculous. I would like to remind you that this “age” at the time of death was: Brezhnev - 75 years old, Andropov - 69 years old, Chernenko - 73 years old. Is this a lot? I don’t think so, especially considering that US President Ronald Reagan was the same age as Chernenko (b. 1911) and died only in 2004, and in the US no one considered him a “sick old man”. Continuing the list, we can make more interesting comparisons: the wife of L.I. Brezhnev - Victoria Petrovna Brezhneva (b. in 1907) - died only in 1995, and the wife of K.U. Chernenko - Anna Dmitrievna Chernenko (b. in 1913) - died only in 2010 (!).
One cannot help but recall the living party and government figures from the times of perestroika, who have long been “far beyond”: M.S. Gorbachev - 84 years old, A.I. Lukyanov - 85 years old, N.I. Ryzhkov - 86 years old, Dolgikh V .AND. - 91 years old, E.K. Ligachev is 95 years old.
So why did the wives of general secretaries and the “heirs” of general secretaries outlive them by 15 - 20 years, while the leaders of the state and party themselves, having first-class medical care, looked as if they were not 70, but 120 years old?
Of course, here this question should be addressed to the Kremlin doctors and, first of all, to Mr. E.I. Chazov.
V.A. Kaznacheev, Gorbachev’s colleague in leadership positions in Stavropol, provides interesting information: “I have already said that academician Chazov, when coming to the Stavropol region, shared a lot with Gorbachev, in particular, regularly informed about the lifestyle of the Kremlin inhabitants . From the outside it seemed like friendship. But it only seemed so.
Being aware of the health status of all Kremlin leaders, the academician hinted to Gorbachev that death was taking the leaders one after another as soon as their relations with the United States worsened. Moreover, they get sick and die in some strange, absurd way. So, Brezhnev, a man with extraordinary energy, suddenly fell ill with asthenic syndrome. His slow reaction and difficult speech caused ridicule and served as material for pop artists.
Chernenko is developing phlegmon with incredible speed. Also, Andropov’s illness suddenly worsened. The military leaders of Russia (meaning the USSR - D.L.) and Czechoslovakia, Ustinov and Dzura, fell ill with the same disease after the maneuvers, which led to their death. If it is possible to argue about the deaths of general secretaries whether they were accidental, then the passing of Ustinov and Dzur is clear evidence that a purposeful action was taken against them.”
Thus, it was difficult not to notice the all too obvious suspicion of the deaths of 3 Secretary Generals in a row. It is no coincidence that even now all the US’s opponents are getting sick “strangely,” “ridiculously,” and in the same way. Suffice it to recall the sudden oncological diseases of the President of Venezuela Hugo Chavis, the President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff and the President of Argentina Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. And, apparently, the American technique was “tested” on Soviet leaders.
However, it seems that Chazov’s words about the health of party and state leaders did not greatly upset M.S. Gorbachev. However, they did not upset his wife, R.M. Gorbachev, who did not miss a single day without inquiring from the security: “what information is from Moscow?”
In December 1984, D.F. Ustinov died. It must be said that he died very successfully, at the most opportune moment, since Ustinov was the person who determined the candidacy of the future Secretary General. This was the case with the nomination of Andropov, and this was the case with the nomination of Chernenko. Now Ustinov is gone.
Just 3 months later, K.U. Chernenko also passed away. Surprisingly, 2 times, declaring his intention to leave the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chernenko received categorical objections and advice from the Politburo and its individual members to “just get a little treatment.” Why was this so? I think it was because there were experienced people in the Politburo who understood that no one just leaves their post. If Chernenko leaves, he will definitely name a successor, and the members of the Politburo wanted to elect a new secretary general themselves, and, therefore, for this they must wait until the death of the previous one.
And this death occurred on March 10, 1985. And this death also came very successfully and very timely, since out of 10 members of the Politburo, 4 were absent in Moscow, and, as is believed, Gorbachev’s opponents: Vorotnikov was in Yugoslavia, Kunaev was in Alma- ate, Romanov - vacationed in Lithuania, Shcherbitsky - headed the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the USA.
However, at the evening meeting of the Politburo on March 10, 1985, the new Secretary General was not identified, so the meeting was postponed to 14.00 on March 11, so that everything could be thought over and weighed at night.
But it was on this night from March 10 to 11, 1985 that Ligachev, Gorbachev and Chebrikov remained in the Kremlin and made preparations for M.S. Gorbachev to be elected Secretary General. Also, Zagladin, Alexandrov, Lukyanov and Medvedev were summoned to the Kremlin at night to write a speech for the person who would be elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
If you believe V.A. Pechenev, then an interesting dialogue took place between A.I. Volsky and M.S. Gorbachev: “Arkady Ivanovich (Volsky - D.L.), looking into Gorbachev’s bright, sad eyes, confidentially asked him: “ Mikhail Sergeevich, will you make a report at the Plenum?” “Arkady, don’t give a damn,” Gorbachev answered diplomatically.”
Thus, it is obvious that M.S. Gorbachev prepared the speech of the future Secretary General not “for someone,” but exclusively for himself.
At the same time, all night long E.K. Ligachev called the first secretaries of the regional branches of the party, that is, members of the Central Committee, and campaigned for them in favor of Gorbachev. The next day, March 11, 1985, until 14.00, i.e. Before the fateful meeting of the Politburo, direct meetings between E.K. Ligachev and members of the Central Committee had already taken place.
The results of the elections of the Secretary General at the Politburo and then at the Plenum are known...
After the death of Brezhnev, the Plenum was convened only on the 3rd day, after the death of Andropov - on the 4th day, after the death of Chernenko - the Plenum was convened in just 20 hours. The military ensured the transportation of members of the Central Committee by military aircraft.
According to Pechenev V.A. everything that happened was a “small coup d’etat”, and in our opinion, a brilliantly worked out special operation...
M.S. Gorbachev. 30th anniversary of Perestroika and modern times. Lecture given at the international university on February 12, 2015 // Gorbachev Foundation website. URL: http://www.gorby.ru/userfiles/30_letie_perestroyki_i_sovremennost.pdf. Date of access to the site: 03/10/2015
Treasurer V.A. The last Secretary General. M., 1996. S.s. 180-181.
Pribytkov V.V. Chernenko. Series "ZhZL". M., 2009. S.s. 132-133.
Right there. P. 202.
Ostrovsky A.V. Who installed Gorbachev? M., 2010. S.s. 502-502.
Right there. P. 504.
Right there. S.s. 507, 514.
Right there. P. 521.
Who made M.S. Gorbachev General Secretary
The security officers instructed me to name the candidacy of M.S. Gorbachev. to the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. You understand that the voice of the security officers, the voice of our activists, is also the voice of our people.
Victor Chebrikov
To make it clearer against what background Gorbachev’s promotion to General Secretaries, it is necessary to identify some important events of 1983-85 that are related to the struggle for power between supporters and opponents of the “perestroika” planned by Andropov.
It must be said that in the first 7 months of Andropov’s rule, no reform goals were voiced to the people, and Andropov, just like a real security officer, carried out “active measures”, i.e. engaged in disinformation and misled the public about his plans. He tried to create for himself the image of a kind of hard-nosed communist orthodox who would tighten all the screws and “hold on and not let go”: on television and in newspapers attacks against Western countries and the “aggressive NATO bloc”; Andropov stated the need to strengthen labor discipline; in shops and cinemas, the police began to raid people who entered there during work time. It was believed that if a person walked into a store or cinema in broad daylight, it means that he is a malicious truant and he must be taken to the department, properly “screened” (this is Andropov’s expression) and a letter sent to the place of work demanding “to take action against the labor violator.” discipline."
However, in June 1983, Andropov made a sharp U-turn and began to openly talk about upcoming reforms. Apparently, everything was ready for “perestroika” at that time, and it was necessary to begin gradual preparations public opinion. A word from E. Chazov: “I am sure that Andropov’s entourage remembers how he carefully prepared for the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in June 1983. By this time, he and his close circle had formed proposals for leading the country out of the crisis. Let’s not be unfounded and remember what Yu. Andropov said at this plenum: “The Party proceeds from the fact that the coming years. and decades will bring significant changes also in the political and ideological superstructure, in the spiritual life of society.” The question is raised about the transformation, “perestroika” of the Soviet system, Soviet society. In this speech, the concept of “glasnost” was heard for the first time in the mouth of the head of the Soviet state. “Wouldn’t it help,” said Yu. Andropov, “to bring closer the activities of party and government agencies greater transparency in the work to the needs and interests of the people?” .
M. Gorbachev started talking about “perestroika” and “glasnost” only in 1986-87, and Yu. Andropov announced this back in June 1983! Moreover, Andropov spoke almost openly about the directions of this “perestroika”. The essence of the ideological superstructure of Soviet society is socialism and the pursuit of the ideals of communism, and the political superstructure is a one-party system with no freedom of speech and one candidate in elections. And Andropov openly announced that all this would change! How can this be changed? Instead of socialism - capitalism, instead of a one-party system - a multi-party system, instead of one candidate - alternative elections (when the “electorate” is brainwashed and does not understand that it is trading for soap). And the “glasnost” that Andropov announced is freedom of speech. In short, Andropov’s statements at the June Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1983), for those who were “in the know,” sounded absolutely clear: the USSR will be reformed along Western lines.
Main mystery Soviet history: why the barely announced “perestroika” immediately slowed down and resumed only 5 years after its announcement by Andropov (if we talk not about verbal, but specifically about real “perestroika”, then decisions about real changes in the “political and ideological superstructure” were made only in June 1988) Let's try to solve this historical riddle.
Chazov writes about how carefully Andropov prepared for this Plenum. Such careful preparation could not escape the attention of the old party elite, for whom the transition to capitalism and Western democracy was completely uninteresting and, at the same time, extremely dangerous.
The election of Yu. Andropov as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was the result of a kind of compromise reached with the party leadership, and as a result, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for ideology, i.e. K. Chernenko became the second person in the party to lead meetings of the Secretariat and Politburo in the absence of the General Secretary. Andropov was generally not liked in the party, and Chernenko became the informal leader of the old party nomenklatura, which did not want any “perestroika.” Considering that Chernenko was in very poor health, and the further, the worse, the party apparatus chose G. Romanov for him as an understudy - the same head of Leningrad, whom the KGB in 1976 compromised with rumors about the allegedly broken service of Catherine II at her daughter’s wedding . In June 1983, Romanov became secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and moved to Moscow. IN in this case again a deal was reached - we will allow you to give a speech about reforms, and in return you will transfer the orthodox communist Romanov to Moscow.
Thus, it turned out to be a confrontation between two “tandems” - “old sick Andropov plus young healthy Gorbachev” and “old sick Chernenko plus young healthy Romanov.” Gorbachev and Romanov were only relatively young: Gorbachev was 52 and Romanov was 60, but compared to most other party leaders, who were 70 and older, this could be called youth.
K. Chernenko and the Minister of Internal Affairs V. Fedorchuk, who was on friendly terms with him, tried to find compromising materials on Andropov so that they could present them at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and achieve the removal of the General Secretary. And it was necessary not only to remove Andropov, but also to discredit the very idea of reforms. For example, present evidence that the “Jewish Mason” and “bourgeois” who have infiltrated the party are calling for the destruction of socialism and the transition to capitalism.
As previously described, in the summer of 1983 a man was detained who was collecting information about Andropov’s parents. It would be a bomb if Chernenko declared at the Plenum of the Central Committee that the disguised bourgeois who hates Soviet power is calling for changes to the “political and ideological superstructure”! However, the security officers managed to detain the person who was collecting incriminating evidence, and the scandalous exposure did not take place.
They also looked for dirt on Gorbachev. Earlier it was said about the relatives of Gorbachev and his wife who were prosecuted under political charges. However, the Chernenko-Fedorchuk-Romanov group began to dig in a different direction. What kind of direction this was became clear from the following excerpt from the interview: “I did not work with Gorbachev for long. (...) Immediately after his election, the new secretary general began firing people in batches. In January 1986, it was my turn. By the way, he accused me of once collecting dirt on him, although this was not true.
What exactly was the compromising evidence?
I do not remember exactly. Some bribes, gifts - in general, large sums. But I knew nothing about these materials. All this came up without me. It was just beneficial for someone to report me to Gorbachev. And he removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs not only me, but also a number of responsible employees of the Main Directorate of the BKhSS, whom he also suspected of involvement in this operation.”
Well, “although it was not true,” an entire brigade that was once involved in collecting incriminating evidence was nevertheless expelled from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it is unlikely that Gorbachev accused Fedorchuk of this without any reason. Collecting incriminating evidence is one of the areas of work of some departments (especially the department from which Fedorchuk moved to the Ministry of Internal Affairs), and there is nothing so unusual about it.
But if Fedorchuk really knew nothing about collecting dirt on Gorbachev (“all this came to light without me”), and some people from the BKhSS were doing this without permission, then a completely different, and much more interesting picture emerges.
On suspicion of this collection of incriminating evidence taking place “once upon a time” ( exact time this “once” is impossible to determine, but the approximate period is 1983-85), as Fedorchuk mentioned, “a number of responsible employees of the Main Directorate of the BHSS” were fired. BHSS is a fight against theft of socialist property.
In 1983-86. the head of the Department for Combating the Theft of Socialist Property (UBKHSS) of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs (GUVD) of the Moscow City Executive Committee was A.N. Sterligov, who, while remaining a member of the KGB (in the DR), was sent to the police. In 1986, he was fired from the police and transferred as an assistant to the HOZU of the USSR Council of Ministers. For participation in collecting dirt on Gorbachev, or just a coincidence?
In 1990, after B.N. Yeltsin became Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Sterligov took the position of Administrator of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. All this time he remained in the KGB DR.
In 1985-87 Yeltsin was the 1st secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU - he replaced V.V. in this post. Grishin, accused of various abuses. Shevyakin writes about Yeltsin that “the Cheka helped him become the first person in Moscow. Specifically, the head of the BHSS of the Moscow City Administration of Internal Affairs, Sterligov, who “drowned” V.V. Grishin and his entire team." .
Sterligov then launched a number of criminal cases against directors of Moscow stores, and Grishin was accused of patronizing these thieving directors, which made it possible to send him into retirement and appoint Yeltsin to this place (in December 1985). It is possible that already in 1985 the KGB was making plans to replace Gorbachev with Yeltsin.
But let’s return to the events of 1983. After what Chernenko tried to do, it would be logical to expect a retaliatory strike from Andropov. And such a blow followed. Previously, examples have already been given of what such a struggle for power in the Soviet elite sometimes resulted in: the capsizing of the boat of Kosygin, who miraculously survived, the mysterious death of Kulakov, the “suicide” of Tsvigun from a guard’s pistol, the poisoning of Suslov with some “new pill,” the death of Brezhnev after receiving the “yellow” pills from Andropov.
And at the end of August 1983, a mysterious incident happened to K. Chernenko, who was vacationing in Crimea. “Minister of Internal Affairs Fedorchuk, who was actively supported by Chernenko, who was vacationing there in Crimea, sent him home-cooked smoked fish as a gift. We had a rule - to conduct strict checks of all products that the country's leadership received. For this purpose, special laboratories were organized both in Moscow and Crimea. Here, either the security looked through it, or they relied on the quality of the products sent by a close friend, who was also the Minister of Internal Affairs, in short, no such check was carried out. Unfortunately, the fish turned out to be of poor quality - Chernenko developed a severe toxic infection with complications in the form of heart and pulmonary failure... The condition was so threatening that I, and the pulmonologist professor A.G. Chuchalin who observed him, as well as other specialists, were afraid for outcome of the disease.
Andropov, whom I informed about Chernenko’s condition, reacted sympathetically, but completely calmly to the current situation... he replied: “I can’t help him in any way. And Gorbachev will remain in the Central Committee, who is aware of all matters and will calmly cope with the work. (...)
Chernenko’s illness was difficult (...) it was impossible to restore his health and performance to the original level. He was discharged from the hospital disabled. (...)
It became clear to me that Chernenko was unlikely to remain in the Politburo after the next Plenum of the Central Committee.”
However, the former head of the 4th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health did not describe this story entirely accurately (and in his books, Chazov repeatedly emphasized that he was on friendly terms with both Andropov and Gorbachev). V. Fedorchuk made very significant clarifications: “Firstly, it was not I who treated him, but my son-in-law - at that time I was not in Crimea at all
was. Chernenko was relaxing at the dacha, and his son-in-law was vacationing nearby at the Central Committee Holiday House. He was an avid fisherman. One day I caught a whole bucket of fish. He called me in Moscow and asked: “What should I do with her?” I say: “Treat Chernenko, you’re relaxing there nearby.” He took it. The whole Chernenko family ate the same fish; they ate it at the holiday home. And no one got sick. So the fish has absolutely nothing to do with it. I’m surprised that Chazov could write something like that.”
So, food poisoning supposedly from the fish, but only one person among all who tasted this fish is poisoned. It can be assumed that K.W. Chernenko was deliberately poisoned in such a way as to shift the blame for the poisoning onto his friend V.V. Fedorchuk. By putting poison in the fish (or in some other product served along with the fish), they “killed two birds with one stone” - they removed one enemy and compromised the other. The fact that Chernenko survived is thanks to Professor Chuchalin, who pulled him out from the other world.
And then there was a retaliatory strike from the other side. In August, Chernenko was poisoned, and on September 30, Andropov, who was in the same Crimea, suddenly, unexpectedly, became seriously ill, and he was taken to Moscow. He never left the hospital and for the last few months of his life he led the country from his hospital room.
The circumstances of Andropov’s unexpected illness are not entirely clear. Chazov writes that Andropov caught a cold, and this caused a sharp complication, but this still raises doubts. The dates coincide too much, it is very similar to the exchange of blows between the “perestroika” and the opponents of “perestroika”: in August they poison Chernenko, and in September they poison Andropov.
The Crimean region was part of the Ukrainian SSR, and Ukraine was led by V. Shcherbitsky, Brezhnev’s failed successor. Former assistant secretary of the CPSU Central Committee E.K. Ligacheva V. Legostaev reports on the rumors that circulated about this: “Various kinds of whisperers say that Andropov should not have gone to Shcherbitsky’s farm. He also has pride and his own KGB. But who can prove or disprove anything here now? However, the fact is a fact: Andropov got along more or less well with his illnesses for 20 years, but as soon as he achieved what he had strived for all his life - supreme power - death picked him up."
Because of these showdowns in the style of the Italian Middle Ages, “perestroika” slowed down, and given the illness of the main leaders of the “perestroika” and “anti-perestroika” - Andropov and Chernenko - the problem of succession to the throne comes to the fore.
Yu.V. Andropov groomed M.S. to be his heir. Gorbachev. As Chazov writes: “M. Gorbachev is increasingly moving to the leading roles in the leadership of the country. Even the “old men” - N. Tikhonov, V. Grishin, A. Gromyko - are forced to reckon with him. He develops friendly relations with D. Ustinov, the person closest to Andropov. M. Gorbachev himself is changing. This is no longer the modest secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in charge of issues Agriculture. This is one of the leaders who determine the life of the party and the country - confidence, breadth of views and political ambition appear.
(...) I understood that Gorbachev was burdened and irritated by the duality of his position: on the one hand, he was the first in Yu. Andropov’s entourage, on the other, formally such a person was K. Chernenko. In addition, Chernenko, although he was very restrained, sometimes, especially when he learned about Gorbachev’s activity in the Central Committee during his illness, statements “about the young and the early” burst out.
In such a situation, the KGB begins to understand that in the event of Andropov’s death, it is far from a fact that Gorbachev will be elected General Secretary, and gives Andropov an idea on how to ensure continuity of power: appoint a successor for himself during his lifetime, and retire himself. It is unlikely that Andropov was happy with this idea, but it came precisely from the KGB. E. Chazov recalls: “One day, after some phone calls and a meeting with KGB officers, being in a depressed state, he suddenly called N.I. Ryzhkov and asked what financial support would be determined for him if he was sent to retire. I was an involuntary witness to this conversation. I didn’t hear the answer, but seeing Andropov’s reaction, I felt that Nikolai Ivanovich was dumbfounded by such a question and did not know what to say. Soon the excited M. Gorbachev called and, talking about the conversation, asked to calm down Yu. Andropov - no one has any thoughts of raising the question of removing him from power.”
In November-December 1983, the unfavorable prognosis of the disease was clear, and many members of the Politburo already knew that Andropov’s days were numbered. Discussions have begun about who will be the next Secretary General. And Gorbachev had practically no chance in the event of Andropov’s death. Chazov again: “Hopes for renewal, proposed and not implemented by Yu. Andropov, were dashed. M. Gorbachev was depressed, realizing that in the current situation his position was becoming not only difficult, but also precarious. The “old men” (Chernenko, Tikhonov, Grishin, Gromyko), who will determine the policy of the Politburo after Yu. Andropov leaves the stage, will not forgive M. Gorbachev for primacy and will do everything to limit his activity, push him into the background, if not remove him altogether from the Politburo. In those days it was quite possible. (...)
There was only one figure in the Politburo who could adequately defend M. Gorbachev, which, however, happened when the sick and weak-willed K. Chernenko came to power. This was Andropov's closest friend - D. Ustinov.
It was he who instilled in me optimism about the future of M. Gorbachev, for whom I was sincerely, in a friendly way, worried. We often met with Ustinov at this time, discussing Andropov’s health problems. He repeatedly repeated that Andropov does not see any other person in the Politburo other than Gorbachev, who could replace him as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I believed in D. Ustinov’s sincerity, his honesty, his integrity, and assumed that he would defend Andropov’s opinion before other members of the Politburo. And again I was wrong." On February 9, 1984, Andropov died. The circumstances of his death raise questions. O. Kalugin: “An agent of the Leningrad KGB, who returned from Moscow shortly after Andropov’s death, reported: “At the 1st Medical Institute, among those associated with the 4th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health, there is talk about the mystery of the death of the General Secretary. According to a number of experts, those who treated Andropov at the early stage of the disease deliberately followed the wrong course, which subsequently led to his untimely death. At a later stage, the country's leading experts were powerless to do anything, despite all the measures they took. The people who “healed” Andropov are associated with a group (conditional name) of some of the party apparatchiks in Moscow, which did not like the positive changes and reforms started by Andropov, in particular the intention to abolish the “Kremlin ration”, calls for party workers to observe personal modesty , Leninist norms. A certain former senior official of the USSR State Planning Committee confirmed the above and added that Andropov was “removed.” Such were the morals in Lenin’s party, such were the “Leninist norms.” Mysterious deaths Stalin, Brezhnev, Andropov, Suslov, Tsvigun and many other party and state leaders, so obviously similar to murder - this was a normal practice of political struggle of the Soviet period. It is wrong to say that “bad Gorbachev made his way into the good Politburo” or “Andropov walked to power over corpses.” Both the “perestroika” and their opponents - both of them acted using the same methods. System.
It became clear that the fears of the KGB, which advised Yuri Vladimirovich to retire and ensure the lifetime transfer of power, were completely confirmed: Gorbachev was not elected General Secretary, there was not even any talk about it.
Chazov again: “On the eve of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, at which the issue of the candidacy of the General Secretary was to be discussed, we met with D. Ustinov at the government clinic on Granovsky Street. I remembered his recent intentions, and I felt uneasy when he said that at a meeting of a group of Politburo members (Chernenko, Tikhonov, Gromyko and himself) it was decided to nominate K. Chernenko to the post of General Secretary. According to him, there was no other way out, because... A. Gromyko claimed this place, and it was far from the best option. I realized that there was not even any talk about Gorbachev’s candidacy. I also understood that “not the best option” was from the position of D. Ustinov, who was more satisfied with the sick and weak-willed Chernenko than with the imperious and, to a certain extent, stubborn Gromyko. Much later, during one of my meetings with A. Gromyko, he confirmed that Chernenko’s candidacy was proposed by Ustinov himself.
The first thing that involuntarily escaped me after D. Ustinov’s confession was: “How could you, knowing that Chernenko is disabled, that he is not able to work, nominate him for this position? The entire Politburo knows this fact - after all, back in the fall of 1983 there were our official conclusions about the state of his health. And how could he himself agree to this proposal, since it will only hasten his death?” Embarrassed, D. Ustinov tried to retreat quickly. And I thought: “Lord, what a dirty business this is - a struggle for power.”
Based on this, we can conclude that the KGB officers, after meeting with whom Andropov called Ryzhkov and asked “what material support will be determined for him if he is sent to retire,” found out that Defense Minister Ustinov was only pretending to be a friend and supporter of Gorbachev, and will really promote Chernenko.
That’s why they offered the option of retiring and appointing a successor while Andropov was still alive. If they had managed to persuade Andropov, Gorbachev's election as General Secretary would have been virtually guaranteed. And for this reason, it was simply necessary for Gorbachev’s opponents to remove Andropov before he carried out Operation Successor. Which is what was done.
Why did Ustinov need to support Chernenko? The answer to this question is given by the same Evgeny Chazov: “Sick, also soft in character, easy to compromise, unprincipled Chernenko could hardly resist the persistent, strong and firm Ustinov, who headed the military-industrial complex. And the other participants in this peculiar conspiracy understood that with the sick Chernenko they would not only strengthen their position, but also gain greater independence, which they did not have under Andropov.”
The current President of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, was nominated for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR in 1984, and according to the rules, he was taken to a “bride” with the Secretary General: “I had to sit in the hotel all the time and wait for a call about a meeting with the Secretary General. Three days passed in this wait. Finally they called: “He can’t accept it yet - he’s sick. Fly back."
A week later they called me back to Moscow. I'm sitting in the hotel again. On the third day the phone rang: “Just wait, he’s not in Moscow, it seems he’s resting at his country residence.” A day later, everything repeated: “Can’t accept it, go back to Alma-Ata.”
Only the third attempt succeeded. He brought me to E.K. Chernenko. Ligachev. (...) When we entered the office, Konstantin Ustinovich was sitting at the table, tired, with a completely absent look...
E.K. Ligachev began to talk about me, mentioned that I would be the youngest of all the prime ministers of the union republics. Chernenko sat silently, breathing heavily. When Ligachev finished his monologue, he finally asked the first and only question:
How old is he?
The 44th went, Konstantin Ustinovich. “He will be the youngest prime minister,” Yegor Kuzmich was forced to repeat.
Suddenly, Chernenko got up and headed towards me, but suddenly he gave way all over, and the healthy guy who was nearby barely managed to catch him.
When you come back, say hello to your comrades. The audience, which made a depressing impression on me, is over."
After such meetings, one thing involuntarily comes to mind: such a person is at the helm of the largest state! And other thoughts arose. After all, it was clear that it is unlikely that a person in such a state is capable of seriously influencing anything. This means that it is very convenient for someone to have such a General Secretary in order to live quietly and for their own pleasure under the shadow of this figure. For example, we knew from Kunaev that a special closed resolution of the Politburo had been adopted, prescribing for its elderly members a shortened working day and an additional, third day off every week - on Fridays. Therefore, none of them overexerted themselves particularly, and, as a rule, on Thursdays everyone went to their dachas and breathed there fresh air and hunted in special areas, and on Monday returned to Moscow. Local leaders behaved the same way. All their duties boiled down to holding some kind of meeting from time to time, sometimes going somewhere in the region, to the periphery, and appearing in the media: the leaders, they say, are not asleep.” Chernenko satisfied the Politburo precisely because he did not interfere in anything; whatever was offered to him, he agreed and signed without looking. And this is not only because of the disease. After 1976, Brezhnev, without reading and without thinking, signed the documents that were sent to him by the then relatively healthy Chernenko. The real management of the Soviet Union was carried out not by those “leaders” who were shown on TV, but by those who did not appear on television screens, but prepared documents and presented them to the “leaders” so that they would mindlessly sign. That is, the party apparatus and middle managers. They were completely satisfied with this system, and in order to carry out “perestroika”, it was necessary either to come to an agreement with this apparatus and middle-level managers, or to intimidate them so much that they did not resist. Some, like Lukyanov, themselves possessed “non-standard reformist thinking,” but so far they were in the minority.
But the first task that had to be solved after the election of Chernenko as General Secretary was the preservation of Gorbachev as a member of the Politburo. And he had a real prospect of flying out of there. It has already been said that Chernenko spoke about “the young and the early”, but the problem was not only with the General Secretary, but also with other old members of the Politburo who felt in danger. E. Chazov characterizes the situation as follows: “The sick Chernenko’s attitude towards Gorbachev was complex and peculiar. He could not forget that Andropov, trying to remove him from the political arena, opposed Gorbachev as an alternative. He couldn’t help but know that Andropov saw Gorbachev as his successor. It must be said that most of the oldest members of the Politburo, perhaps with the exception of Ustinov, realizing that Chernenko’s time was short, wanted to get rid of such a figure in the Politburo as the young, gaining authority Gorbachev - the most realistic contender for the post of General Secretary. They understood that if he came to power, their days in the leadership of the party and the country would be numbered. (...) The pressure on Chernenko was so strong that, despite his cool attitude towards Gorbachev, around April 1984, the latter’s position was so precarious that it seemed that the “old men” would get their way.
It’s hard for me to say today who or what saved Gorbachev.”
Moreover, this attitude was not only on the part of the “patriarchs”, but was already evident from the side, who would have thought!, from the side of the “servants”: “M. Gorbachev found himself in the most difficult situation during this period. Until recently, an all-powerful associate of the General Secretary, he overnight becomes only one (and not the most authoritative) of the members of the Politburo and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee. I remember with what bitterness and a touch of undisguised anger he told me about his clashes with K. Chernenko’s entourage - his assistants, the head of the general department of the Central Committee K.M. Bogolyubov and others. Knowing the level and capabilities of these people, I understood the indignation of Gorbachev, who had to coordinate his speeches and proposals with them.” Imagine - a member of the Politburo, until recently the third person in the party, was forced to ask permission from some assistants and department heads! This is such a humiliation for the party leader that it couldn’t be worse: “Gorbachev’s problems during Chernenko’s reign were not limited to his difficult relationships with the General Secretary’s entourage; to a greater extent they were determined by the attitude of the “old men” from the Politburo towards him - Tikhonov, Gromyko, Grishin and some others . They not only bullied him, but also actively, especially N. Tikhonov, opposed him. D. Ustinov, it seems to me, tried to maintain neutrality, although in some cases he tried to help M. Gorbachev.
I could not understand Chernenko’s attitude towards Gorbachev. On the one hand, it was clear that M. Gorbachev was at least not part of his circle of friends and associates. On the other hand, despite pressure from N. Tikhonov and some other members of the Politburo, he not only retains him in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, but also formally leaves him the post of second secretary, i.e. his main deputy.
I am sure that Chernenko was forced to retain Gorbachev, realizing that there was no replacement for him at that time.”
Why Chernenko, with all his hostility towards Gorbachev and with the friendly hatred of the old members of the Politburo, not only did not send him somewhere far away, but also made him his deputy - this is a historical mystery, and it is unlikely that even Gorbachev himself knows the answer to it. One can only make a guess.
Chernenko was indeed forced to retain Gorbachev - against his will and against the will of a significant number of Politburo members. Because the KGB was betting on Gorbachev, and this organization, which guarded the party leaders, had the opportunity to put so much pressure on the sick General Secretary and his slightly less sick elderly colleagues that there was no other choice.
There are a variety of methods of persuasion. The Secretary General is sick and takes pills every day - one can hint that “dear Leonid Ilyich” took the little yellow pills and did not wake up. Or Comrade Suslov, for example, also died after taking a brand new pill. Or, for example, hint that when Chernenko once again gives way and begins to fall, “the healthy guy who was nearby” (the security guard) will turn away at that moment and will not have time to catch him. You can hit the corner. And don't get up again. The whole country will be in mourning.
“You can accomplish more with a kind word and a gun than with a kind word alone.” (“Being aware of the state of health of all the Kremlin leaders, the academician hinted to Gorbachev that death was taking the leaders one after another as soon as their relations with the United States worsened. Moreover, they fell ill and died somehow strangely, absurdly. So, Brezhnev, who had an extraordinary energy, suddenly fell ill with asthenic syndrome.
Chernenko is developing phlegmon with incredible speed. Andropov’s illness also suddenly worsened. The military leaders of Russia and Czechoslovakia, Ustinov and Dzur, fell ill with the same disease after the maneuvers, which led to their death. (If it is possible to argue about the deaths of general secretaries whether they were accidental, then the passing of Ustinov and Dzur is clear evidence that a purposeful action was taken against them." . - A.Sh.)
Why were no kind words spoken before the discussion of the candidacy of the Secretary General? Because Chernenko’s candidacy was proposed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov, and the Soviet army had many times more pistols and other weapons than the KGB. That's why kind word Minister of Defense sounded kinder than any other kind word.
At the same time, Ustinov always treated Gorbachev very well as a person, and if he had been as old and sick, Ustinov would have nominated him as a candidate. Therefore, he did not “drown” Gorbachev after Chernenko’s election and “tried to maintain neutrality,” in Chazov’s words. This was his mistake. As people say, kindness is worse than theft.
For the KGB, such a prospect, when the Minister of Defense himself would appoint the Secretary General, was completely unacceptable. If Chernenko dies, then it is logical to assume that Ustinov will again propose some ancient old man like Tikhonov, so that he does not interfere with him doing his own affairs at his own discretion. And “perestroika” was not included in this personal discretion quite clearly.
Andropov had some leverage over Ustinov, perhaps he knew something completely terrible about him, which, if disclosed, would have destroyed the marshal’s authority, but apparently Andropov took this secret with him to the grave.
Although Ustinov himself was very old - he was 76 years old - he was quite healthy and efficient. As Chazov writes, “I was amazed by the efficiency of D. Ustinov, who began his day at the Central Committee or the Ministry of Defense at 8 am and ended at midnight, did not know days off, he continued to work even on vacation.” It was possible to wait for him to become sick and infirm for many, many more years.
And one more circumstance could not but cause alarm. In Poland, Defense Minister W. Jaruzelski outplayed state security. What if Ustinov and the countries' defense ministers of Eastern Europe Would you like to repeat Jaruzelski's experiment? It is possible that some ministers began to think about it, or even negotiate. And then they died.
From September 5 to 14, 1984, joint combined arms exercises “Shield-84” were held in Czechoslovakia, in which the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries took part. After the end of the exercises, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Ustinov and the Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia, General of the Army M. Dzur, who were present at them, decided to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Slovak National Uprising, which began on August 29, 1944, and went to the mountains for a banquet held at open terrace. After the banquet, Ustinov felt unwell; by all indications, he had caught a cold. At first they thought it was the flu. It turned out to be some kind of infection unknown to science.
E. Chazov reports the following about the nature of the disease: “And Ustinov’s death itself was to a certain extent absurd and left. (...) many questions regarding the causes and nature of the disease. (...) After returning from the maneuvers, Ustinov felt a general malaise, a slight fever and changes in the lungs appeared. We rejected the connection of this process with a previous malignant disease. An amazing coincidence - at approximately the same time, General Dzur fell ill with the same clinical picture. Despite the therapy, Ustinov’s sluggish process persisted, and general intoxication increased. The situation was complicated by the fact that against this background the abdominal aortic aneurysm began to grow progressively. (...)
Ustinov, unfortunately, later died from increasing intoxication despite the use of all possible methods treatment. (...)
D. Ustinov, against the background of reduced body resistance, developed signs of a sluggish infectious process of viral origin. All treatment methods known in world practice had no effect.” And again, a specific diagnosis is not named: “a sluggish infectious process of viral origin.” Both defense ministers died from this unknown virus - Soviet Minister D.F. Ustinov died on December 20, 1984, and the Czechoslovakian minister M. Dzur died on January 15, 1985.
(In addition, on December 7, 1984, I. Olah was appointed Minister of Defense of Hungary. The previous Army General L. Tsinege was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic. On January 12, 1985, M. Baclavik was appointed Minister of Defense of Czechoslovakia. On March 20-24, he visits the USSR. On June 11-15, the USSR is visited by the Minister of Defense of Hungary I. Olah. On November 21, a meeting took place in Prague senior managers states - participants of the Warsaw Pact. November 28 is the 75th anniversary of the Minister of Defense of the GDR, G. Hoffmann, on this occasion he was awarded the Order of Karl Marx. On December 2, a member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee, Minister of National Defense of the GDR, Army General G. Hoffmann, died. On December 3, 1985, Colonel General G. Kessler was appointed Minister of Defense of the GDR. On December 15, 1985, at the age of 59, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Socialist Workers' Party, Minister of Defense of the Hungarian People's Republic, Army General I. Olah, suddenly died. So the picture will be more complete - A.Sh.)
In the case of the disease, Ustinov and Dzur (and then Hoffmann and Olah. - A.Sh.) There is one unclear point - why were only the two of them infected? After all, there were many generals at the banquet, but except for the two of them, no one got sick. If we assume that both ministers of defense simply accidentally caught some kind of infection, then it is impossible to explain such a strange immunity in everyone else who was in the outbreak of infection.
However, if they did not get sick, and drugs related to bacteriological weapons were used against them, then everything falls into place. Bacterial agents include not only pathogenic bacteria, but also the toxins they produce. If the ministers were not infected, but poisoned with bacterial toxins, then outsiders would not be harmed by this method, and those poisoned would have the same symptoms as with normal bacterial infection. Or, as an option, the infection was transmitted only through food, and infection through normal communication, shaking hands, etc. this was excluded. Well, who put the powder with toxins or bacteria in the food - maybe an officer or soldier of some kind, recruited by a special department. He ran around with plates, serving the generals, and even added powder received from the “special officer”.
The fact that a simultaneous illness that led to the death of the defense ministers of the USSR and Czechoslovakia (and the GDR and Hungary. - A.Sh.), was not accidental, as indicated by some other circumstances.
September 5, 1984 - the same day when the Shield-84 exercise began in Czechoslovakia, i.e. immediately after Ustinov’s departure abroad, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov was summoned to the CPSU Central Committee, and Chernenko congratulated him on his new appointment - to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic Direction.
The military describes it this way: “For the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic Direction, N.V. Ogarkov was appointed quietly, considering that he himself could not be asked about it. When the marshal was invited to the CPSU Central Committee, and Chernenko congratulated him on his appointment, the now former Chief of the General Staff asked the General Secretary why no one had talked to him about this removal beforehand. At least by phone. Chernenko replied: “Consider that there is no removal from the post of Chief of the General Staff. There is horizontal movement in positions, this is necessary in the interests of the Motherland. You know very well the meaning of the Western direction.” (Subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief: GSVG, Northern and Central Groups of Forces, Baltic, Belarusian, Carpathian Military Districts, Baltic Fleet, Air Army of the Supreme High Command, 2nd Separate Air Defense Army. - A.Sh.)
Still, it was a downgrade. What was behind it? The enormous authority of the marshal in the Armed Forces? His inherent independence of thinking? (...)
The appointment took place on September 5, 1984. Yes, it was a surprise to everyone. After all, we were talking about the movement of two major military leaders. The first walked, so to speak, horizontally. And the second - Marshal Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev - from 1st deputies became the Chief of the General Staff. It is noteworthy that this reshuffle took place somehow hastily, as if it was being pushed from above.”
The most important thing in this appointment: 1) the position of commander-in-chief of the Western strategic direction (before this, the headquarters and other services existed only on Far East. We have already said this. And in 1984, the Western, Southwestern and Southern strategic directions were introduced. - A.Sh.) had never existed before in peacetime, and was invented specifically for Ogarkov; 2) this position did not give any practical powers (almost like a “wedding general”); 3) the headquarters of the Main Command of the Western Strategic Direction was decided to be located in Legnica (Poland). Thus, Marshal Ogarkov was actually sent into honorable exile. So, almost simultaneously: 1) the Chief of the General Staff, immediately after the departure of the Minister of Defense on a business trip abroad, is removed from his post and sent into honorable exile; 2) the Minister of Defense, during a business trip abroad, is infected with an unknown disease, as a result of which, due to health reasons, he no longer controls the troops and soon dies.
Thus, in September 1984, a special operation was actually carried out to change the top leadership of the Armed Forces. The Minister of Defense, who actually determined who would be the General Secretary, and the Chief of the General Staff, who had independent thinking and was able to argue with his superiors, and therefore unpredictable and potentially dangerous, were eliminated.
Marshal S. Sokolov and Marshal Akhromeyev, who replaced Ustinov and Ogarkov, respectively, for all their military merits, were not politicians and never allowed themselves to argue with the Politburo.
Considering the state Chernenko was in, he clearly did not make the decision to remove Ogarkov on his own. Taking advantage of Ustinov's departure, comrades from the KGB could approach Chernenko and say a kind word to him (even without a pistol), and the terminally ill General Secretary did what was required of him.
Ustinov, as a member of the Politburo, could not be removed from office in absentia; such issues were discussed at the Politburo with the participation of the person being discussed. But in the presence of Ustinov, this was simply impossible - one command was enough to repeat what Jaruzelski had previously done. During the Shield-84 exercise, while abroad, Ustinov could not figure out the resignation of Ogarkov, and in general with his opponents, but after his return anything could happen.
Therefore, Ustinov had to be infected with an unknown disease. Why the same thing happened to General Dzur is difficult to say; Perhaps he and Ustinov talked about Ogarkov’s unexpected resignation, and Dzur said words that would have been better left unsaid (for example, about Jaruzelski’s positive experience). The special department hears everything.
So, in September 1984 Soviet army was withdrawn from political game, and the KGB did not have to fear opposition to the election of Gorbachev and the implementation of “perestroika” from the military.
By the end of the year, according to Chazov, “Chernenko’s own condition was extremely difficult. He was in the hospital and only went to work for a few hours.” And at this time, another reason for the removal of Ustinov and Ogarkov from leadership of the army becomes clear.
In December 1984, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Council Committee on International Affairs M. Gorbachev, at the head of a parliamentary delegation, went on a visit to London. Former acting resident in London O. Gordievsky reports that Gorbachev was presented with three or four intelligence reports every day, most of which he prepared himself. And already in the last months of 1984, “it became clear to the London station that the KGB supported the candidacy of Mikhail Gorbachev as the successor to the dying Chernenko. Even before Gorbachev’s arrival as head of the Soviet parliamentary delegation to Great Britain in December 1984, during which he held negotiations with Margaret Thatcher, the Center began bombarding the London station with requests for materials for Gorbachev.”
Why the KGB paid such attention to this visit becomes clear from the memoirs of one of the members of the delegation, A. Yakovlev. After Andropov returned Yakovlev from Canada, he was mainly engaged in advising Gorbachev, and they went to London together.
A. Yakovlev talks about the true purpose of these negotiations: “The negotiations continued to be of a probing nature until, at one of the meetings in a narrow format (I was present at it), Mikhail Sergeevich pulled out on the table a map of the General Staff with all the secrecy stamps, indicating that the card is genuine. It showed the directions of missile attacks on Great Britain, showing where these attacks could come from and everything else.
Thatcher looked first at the map, then at Gorbachev. In my opinion, she could not understand whether they were playing a joke on her or being serious. The pause was clearly dragging on. The prime minister looked at the English cities, which had been approached by arrows, but not yet by rockets. Gorbachev interrupted the long pause:
Madam Prime Minister, all this needs to end, and as soon as possible.
“Yes,” answered Thatcher, somewhat confused.”
Gorbachev did not have time to complete the negotiations, because This happened on December 20, 1984, and at that time news came from Moscow about Ustinov’s death after a three-month stay in the hospital. So that the “old men” from the Politburo do not have time to process Chernenko in Gorbachev’s absence and appoint their own man to the post of Minister of Defense instead of Marshal Sokolov, who has been acting since September. Minister due to Ustinov’s illness, Mikhail Sergeevich had to drop everything and fly to Moscow. On December 22, 1984, Sokolov was appointed Minister of Defense of the USSR.
The most important question in the story of the General Staff map that Gorbachev showed Thatcher is how did Gorbachev get this map? Here are S. Kurginyan’s thoughts on this matter: “I’ll return (...) to Yakovlev’s memoirs. It states in black and white that Gorbachev, at a meeting with Thatcher, showed a map of the USSR’s nuclear strikes on Great Britain. Moreover, such a secret card that oh and oh! Mikhail Sergeevich does not object to these memoirs!
I don’t want to criticize this from operational or moral journalistic positions. I'm trying to figure out the elite. In such proceedings there is no place for morality and the Criminal Code. (...) Thatcher is not a fool. She will not accept a fake card for consideration. And a low-secrecy card too. They knew so much about us at that time! This means that she had to be “fed” with something truly tasty. And so that there is no suspicion that they are playing with her. Does she know how to count moves herself? And her intelligence is quite good.
In short, she had to be “fed” with something reliable and especially secret. Who gave this? Ustinov? “And he was also in the game?” .
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Late Russian historian Dmitry Volkogonov, who was the first to gain access to the secret minutes of Politburo meetings, provided the following data: Chernenko died on the evening of March 10, 1985, and the meeting dedicated to nominating a new leader began less than a day later - at two o’clock in the afternoon on March 11.
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the oldest and most authoritative surviving member of the Brezhnev Politburo, was the first to take the floor and, without much preamble, proposed electing Mikhail Sergeevich as Secretary General.
All 18 speakers supported Gorbachev's candidacy. It was possible to inform the participants of the Plenum of the Central Committee about the unanimously adopted decision.
The choice seemed obvious. Most members of the Politburo could no longer aspire to the highest post due to their age. In addition, Chernenko, immediately after his own election, made Gorbachev an unofficial deputy, instructing him to lead Politburo meetings in his absence.
However, not everything was so simple. Gorbachev had opponents. Apparently, Operation “Successor” was carried out with such speed so as not to allow them to come to their senses and organize themselves.
Gorbachev, Grishin or Romanov?
As Chernenko’s former assistant Vadim Pechenev and academician Georgy Arbatov recalled, the head of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolai Tikhonov and the head of the party organization of Ukraine Vladimir Shcherbitsky were very cool towards Mikhail Sergeevich.
The first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, Viktor Grishin, even compiled his own list of the new Politburo, in which Gorbachev did not appear at all.Alexander Yakovlev wrote in his memoirs that “Chernenko’s inner circle was already preparing speeches and a political program for Grishin.”
A potential rival to Gorbachev was 61-year-old Grigory Romanov, another nominee of Yuri Andropov, who was transferred from Leningrad to the key post of Secretary of the Central Committee for Heavy and Defense Industry.
Russian researchers Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova living in the West argued in their book “Conspirators in the Kremlin” that the behind-the-scenes struggle in 1984 was serious.
Its outcome was largely determined, as Gorbachev himself put it, " human factor". Smiling and flexible, looking like a respectful son, Mikhail Sergeevich liked the older members of the Politburo more than the tougher Romanov.
Negotiations with Gromyko
But the curator of the defense industry, Romanov, enjoyed the support of the military. His position was greatly weakened by the death of the influential Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov at the end of December 1984. Three and a half months earlier, another prominent marshal, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, was unexpectedly relieved of his post by everyone, including himself, precisely at the moment when Romanov was at the head of the delegation in Ethiopia.
The decisive meeting of the Politburo was preceded by behind-the-scenes negotiations, in which three academicians participated: Gromyko’s son Anatoly, who worked as director of the Institute of African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the future “architect of perestroika”, director of the Institute of World Economy and international relations Alexander Yakovlev and director of the Institute of Oriental Studies Evgeny Primakov.“In those troubled days [before Chernenko’s death], Primakov came to me at IMEMO and, citing a request from Anatoly Gromyko, asked if it was possible to hold probing, non-binding negotiations between Gromyko and Gorbachev,” Yakovlev wrote in his memoirs. “I "I went to Old Square. Gorbachev, after some deliberation, suggested not to shy away from negotiations. Returning to the institute, I immediately called Anatoly Gromyko. He came immediately."
Gromyko Jr. explained without mincing words that his father was tired of working in the Foreign Ministry and would be ready to “play an initiative role at the upcoming meeting of the Politburo” if in exchange he was offered the high, but considered sinecure in the USSR, post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. Gorbachev responded by saying that he “knows how to keep his promises.”
Extraordinary plenum
According to Yakovlev, then a personal meeting took place between Gromyko Sr. and Gorbachev, during which they, apparently, agreed on everything.
As a result, the Politburo meeting went off without a hitch. Grishin, followed by Romanov, took the floor and also supported Gromyko - they realized that the issue was a foregone conclusion.The Extraordinary Plenum took place immediately: while the Politburo meeting was going on, the urgently summoned members of the Central Committee were waiting in the next room.
Future member of the Politburo, and then head of the department of organizational and party work of the Central Committee, Yegor Ligachev, subsequently claimed that he, too, made a significant contribution to the election of Gorbachev, having held preliminary conversations with the secretaries of key regional committees.
Unlike the minutes of Politburo meetings, speeches delivered at the Plenum were published in Soviet newspapers.
The meeting was opened by Mikhail Sergeevich himself. After several appropriate phrases about the loss suffered by the party in connection with the death of Chernenko, he immediately gave the floor to Gromyko.
The speech of the dean of the Politburo was delivered in a distinctly conversational, informal manner. Gromyko never once said “communism” or “communist”; He used the word “communist” only once, and several times he used the abbreviation “CPSU.”
The beginning of a new era
In accordance with party custom, Gromyko did not speak on his own behalf, but immediately stated that the characterization of Gorbachev he presented represented a collective opinion. In essence, the members of the Central Committee were offered a retelling of what had just been said, or allegedly said, about Gorbachev at the Politburo meeting.
Gromyko placed the main emphasis on the intellectual qualities of the candidate, paying tribute to his broad erudition, analytical abilities and “the ability to quickly and accurately grasp the essence of the matter.”
As expected, the new Secretary General made a speech in response. It is curious that it did not contain words of gratitude for the election. Gorbachev limited himself to the most general and completely traditional statements about the tasks facing the country. The term “perestroika” was not used in the speech.
Historian Andrei Dantsev compared the number "11" with drumsticks, giving a signal to the already bridled and ready to set off at the gallop of time.
There were 2367 days left until August 24, 1991: exactly the same number of days allotted to Gorbachev for his tenure as Secretary General.
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