In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis’ dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.
Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, airplanes - this was Adolf Hitler's order - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, demonstrably, taking revenge for all previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.
(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)
It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was no match for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: “We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks.”
The Battle of Kursk began on July 5 and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the “Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of Victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.”
Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:
In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”). To carry it out, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk ledge.
German sources wrote: “The Kursk salient seemed a particularly suitable place for such a strike. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful group of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to destroy those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge will significantly shorten the front line... True, some even then argued that the enemy was expecting a German offensive in this area and... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that Operation Citadel would be a success if undertaken soon."
The Germans prepared for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. Its start was postponed twice: the guns were not ready, the new tanks were not delivered, and the new aircraft did not have time to pass tests. On top of that, Hitler feared that Italy was about to leave the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to original plan. The fanatical Hitler believed that if you strike in the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this battle, then
“The victory at Kursk,” he said, “will capture the imagination of the whole world.”
Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk salient, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that in terms of the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to an ambitious strategically correct developed plan and the latest weapons, which, according to military experts, Soviet army It will be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority will be absolutely vulnerable and useless.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time. The Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin’s initial support for Vatutin’s plan, they approved Rokossovsky’s safer plan - “to wait, wear down and go on a counteroffensive.” Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and primarily by Zhukov.
However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.
(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images) Having waited for the latest equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, the Germans began their offensive on the night of July 5, 1943.
That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:
- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!
-What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.
– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.
Rokossovsky was not mistaken.
On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was Hitler’s own visa. He staged it three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.
Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions about who “Werther” really was - some believe that Hitler’s personal photographer was a Soviet agent.
Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of an alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even as part of the top of the Third Reich during World War II, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. During the entire time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not make a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.
Hitler’s personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The leaders of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss station as if they were requesting information from some information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that during all phases of the war in Russia, agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Some of the information transmitted could only have been obtained from the highest German military circles
- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”
« Kursk Bulge": Tank T-34 against "Tigers" and "Panthers" The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.
Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.
Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.
Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.
Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).
Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company and a direct participant in the battle:
According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on an armistice.
In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives detailed description disposition of the battle, its course and result:
“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.
The unexpected attack on the deeply advanced spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.
The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.
The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed."
As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.
The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.
“Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.”
It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded - as he had not lived up to the high hopes placed on him by Headquarters.
One way or another, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.
It is believed that Hitler himself gave the order to end the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that Western allies The USSR landed in Sicily on July 10, and during the fighting the Italians were unable to defend Sicily and it became necessary to send German reinforcements to Italy.
Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95 When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.
On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.
On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing Nazi forces and reached Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.
“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. Painting “The Tale of a Real Man.” Photo: Kommersant The book of the writer Boris Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.
But not everyone knows that the fame of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.
Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope Hard time. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.
Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him as his partner. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.
On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.
This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops exceeded the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irrevocable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.
After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it favorable conditions to launch a general strategic offensive.
In memory of the heroic victory Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of those who died, the Day of Military Glory has been established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge" Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.
August 23, 1943 - is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the most extensive and long routes of retreat on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.
As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and steadfastness of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts or hesitations left in making the right choice sides in this war. And the thoughts that let the Russians and Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the outside, faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which will receive vast territories at the end of the war. However, that's another story...
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Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
General in the battle for the Kursk ledge:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470
killed, captured, missing
608 833
wounded, sick
153 thousand small arms units
6064
tanks and self-propelled guns
5245
guns and mortars
1626
combat aircraft
1000
tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data
less 1696
airplanes
| The Great Patriotic War |
|---|
| Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkiv Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right Bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomir Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague |
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks) from the calculations. The following table contains some estimates:
| Source | Personnel (thousands) | Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns | Guns and (sometimes) mortars | Aircraft | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | USSR | Germany | |
| RF Ministry of Defense | 1336 | over 900 | 3444 | 2733 | 19100 | about 10000 | 2172 2900 (including Po-2 and long range) |
2050 |
| Krivosheev 2001 | 1272 | |||||||
| Glanz, House | 1910 | 780 | 5040 | 2696 or 2928 | ||||
| Müller-Gill. | 2540 or 2758 | |||||||
| Zett., Frankson | 1910 | 777 | 5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000 |
2451 | 31415 | 7417 | 3549 | 1830 |
| KOSAVE | 1337 | 900 | 3306 | 2700 | 20220 | 10000 | 2650 | 2500 |
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:
...I believe that the enemy will launch the main offensive operations against these three fronts, so that, having defeated our troops in this direction, he will gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having gathered the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aircraft, will strike with his Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and by the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.
Thus, although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command.
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought on Berlin time - translated to Moscow 5 a.m.), 30-40 minutes before the start of the operation, artillery and aviation counter-preparation was carried out.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoe was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, the courage and fortitude they showed, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, in this direction The Wehrmacht's plans were “substantially adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan at all.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of 48 Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were good engineering training terrain by Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches along almost the entire length of the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), fire from divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against enemy tanks accumulated in front of engineering barriers, competent location of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the zone 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division zone), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the battalions of the 196th Guards Regiment (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky , timely maneuver by the divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 otptabr Colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 TD (lieutenant colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 glanders (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.
A machine gun crew fires at advancing German units
Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkasy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.
The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a combat group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 glanders) held in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five for about a day enemy divisions (three of them are tank divisions). In the battle of July 5 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: “it was a lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkassk on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head infantry division, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions and especially Das Reich forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of not complete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte MD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich MD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich MD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich MD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich MD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, parts of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).
After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
Belfry in memory of those killed on the Prokhorovsky field
The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
The Battle of Kursk in its scale, military, as well as political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.
The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography, the Battle of Kursk, is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).
Historians call the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk two of the most significant victories of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht forces, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.
In this article we will find out the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.
The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk is difficult to overestimate. If not for the exploits of Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, again moving towards Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the Wehrmacht's combat-ready units on the Eastern Front, and it lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, since they were already depleted.
In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Military Glory of Russia. In addition, the battles included the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history, and also involved a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.
The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Arc of Fire - all because of the critical importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.
The Battle of Stalingrad, which occurred earlier than the battle on the Kursk Bulge, completely destroyed the German plans for the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the Blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now Soviet Union gathered his strength and was able to pose a serious challenge to the Wehrmacht.
During the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943, historians estimate that at least 200 thousand soldiers were killed and more than half a million were wounded. It is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may have been much more significant. It is mainly foreign historians who speak about the bias of these data.
Soviet intelligence played a huge role in the victory over Germany, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began receiving reports of this operation at the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the Soviet leader’s desk, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its conduct, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was difficult to imagine what would have happened if intelligence had not done its job. Probably, the Germans would still have been able to break through the Russian defense, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they prepared for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.
At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered this important knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers, John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called “Cambridge Five” (a group of British intelligence officers who were recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).
There is also an opinion that information about the plans of the German command was conveyed by the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado.
Some historians believe that all the information about Operation Citadel was conveyed to Moscow by one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War, Rudolf Ressler, who was in Switzerland at that time.
Substantial support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz encryption machine, which transmitted messages between members of the senior leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept the plans for the summer offensive in the area of Kursk and Belgorod, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.
Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive would proceed. German army. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.
Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation “Citadel” and was able to adequately prepare for it so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.
At the beginning of 1943, the German and Soviet armies carried out offensive actions that led to the formation of a bulge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the “Kursk Bulge”. In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles would soon begin for this ledge, which could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.
There was no consensus at German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not develop an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed it was time to go on the defensive or launch an offensive in the summer.
Despite the fact that the most experienced military leader of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler still agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.
The Battle of Kursk in 1943 was the Union’s chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation for the operation was taken with previously unprecedented seriousness.
The situation at the USSR headquarters was much better. Stalin was aware of the German plans; he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would attack, Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications and laid minefields to meet them in order to repel the attack and then launch a counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, after two years of military operations, were still able to develop the tactics and strategy of waging war among the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed even before it began.
The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to launch descending attacks from the north (area of the city of Orel) and from the south (area of the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans had to unite in the area of the city of Kursk, thus completely encircling the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts. In addition, the German tank units had to turn in an eastern direction - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and would not help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.
To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people in Eastern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. This a large number of Panzer divisions were commonplace for the Germans. The Wehrmacht forces always used lightning attacks from tank units to prevent the enemy from even having a chance to group and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.
The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht forces were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were commanded by General Hermann Hoth.
Before the start of the battle, the German army received long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.
"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" were some of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If Soviet soldiers had already seen the “Tigers” and learned to fight against them, then the “Panthers” and “Ferdinands” caused many problems on the battlefield.
The Panthers were medium tanks that were slightly inferior in armor to the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.
"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank gun (tank destroyer), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to USSR tanks, since at that time it had perhaps the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to fire sub-caliber shells. The most vulnerable point in the tank’s defense was the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.
In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already out of date at that time.
The 2nd Panzer Army during the Battle of Kursk included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (it aka "Death's Head").
The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In the number of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet army, and some sources indicate a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.
The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line capable of holding off a massive offensive by German armored forces. According to the command's plans, the Red Army was supposed to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counter-offensive at the most unfavorable moment for the enemy.
During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and effective generals in the army - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took upon themselves the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk ledge. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was a native of the Voronezh region, Army General Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders fell the task of defending the southern front of the salient. USSR Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the Red Army.
The ratio of troop numbers was far from being on Germany's side. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than twice as inferior: 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of forces before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. Great Patriotic War historian Alexey Isaev says that the strength of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of fighters of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations amounted to more than 500 thousand people).
Before you give Full description events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:
This picture shows the diagram of the Battle of Kursk. A map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat units acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk you will also see symbols that will help you understand the information.
The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans would soon face resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front in order to provide a response artillery barrage, which the Germans would not expect.
The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was scheduled for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was supposed to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare a defense. Manstein told Hitler more than once that this offensive at the moment no longer made sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try to first repel the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.
Start - Arc of Fire
On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkassy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. The strong defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to penetrate 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.
The Germans were unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, since they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the Wehrmacht's elite tank divisions were barely making any progress. As soon as it became clear that German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the Prokhorovsk direction.
On July 11, heavy fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered German tanks, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted its offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.
It is difficult to answer how many tanks were involved on both sides, since data from different sources differs. If we take average data, then the number of USSR tanks reached about 1 thousand vehicles. While the Germans had about 700 tanks.
The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four tank divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were sent from the south.
The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, since the rising sun shone directly into the Germans’ tank observation devices. The battle formations of the sides quickly became mixed up, and just a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to tell where whose tanks were.
The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks lay in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation maneuverability was key. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, since they had a chance to target the vulnerable spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (this is especially true of the famous T-34).
However, the Germans still gave a serious rebuff with their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tank crews - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form formations.
While the bulk of the tank forces were engaged in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet army. To repel this attack it was necessary to use the tank reserves of the Red Army. In the southern direction, already by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push back German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.
Tank losses on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation were as follows:
The above figures are irrecoverable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly greater. For example, after the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.
The Battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that lasted only one day. And here's the most major battle occurred two years earlier also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3,700 units of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.
Despite such a numerical advantage of the Union tank units, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the Germans' tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that “tanks do not fight tanks.” Most tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle became a catastrophic failure for the USSR.
The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of the bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and bleeding, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks that took part in the battle of Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed, or fell into enemy hands.
The loss ratio during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.
As a result of the defensive operation, Soviet troops reached the line they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went into deep defense.
During the Battle of Kursk, a radical change occurred. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, Soviet troops carried out the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive.
The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the enemy’s Donbass group so that the enemy would not be able to transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk Bulge. Despite the fact that the enemy threw perhaps his best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and pin down and encircle the Donbass German group with powerful blows. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.
From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull fresh German reserves from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant air forces and tank units to protect the city. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.
The offensive stage of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”.
The offensive Operation Kutuzov began on July 12, 1943 in the area of the city of Orel, where Soviet troops were confronted by two German armies. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold a bridgehead; on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943 that for the first time during the entire period of hostilities with Germany, a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully completed.
The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called “Rumyantsev”. The operation was carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front.
Just two days after the start of the operation, on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the German Kharkov-Poltava railway line. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the Red Army forces continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.
The Battle of Kursk was already won by Soviet troops at that moment. The German command also understood this, but Hitler gave a clear order to “stand until the last.”
The Mginsk offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally disrupt the German plan of attack on Leningrad, to prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and to completely destroy the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.
The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.
Despite strong artillery bombardment, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the Red Army forces managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy’s defense, they were unable to advance further.
At the beginning of August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, USSR soldiers managed to capture the enemy’s defensive fortifications in the village of Porechye. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.
A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded over Sinyaevo and Sinyaevskie Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they went back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the spacecraft command decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and switch to a defensive defense. Thus, the Mgin offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use reserves that were supposed to go to Kursk.
Until the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible that the Wehrmacht could send under the Kursk to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy’s defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.
The operation ended in success, since it marked the beginning of the liberation of Belarus. However, most importantly, the military leaders of the Battle of Kursk achieved pinning down as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from heading to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.
To weaken the enemy’s positions near Kursk, the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbass offensive. The parties’ plans for the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German group in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.
The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle and managed to break through the enemy defenses. Of all the regiments, the 67th stood out especially in battles. The successful offensive continued and on August 30 the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.
On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, but the Donbass offensive operation continued - the spacecraft forces had to push the enemy beyond the Dnieper River.
Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death loomed over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to retreat beyond the Dnieper.
On September 1, all German units in this area began to retreat from Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino, or as the city is now called, Donetsk, was taken.
The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running low on ammunition for their artillery guns. During the retreat, German soldiers actively used “scorched earth” tactics. The Germans killed civilians and burned villages and small towns along the way. During the Battle of Kursk 1943, retreating through cities, the Germans plundered everything they could get their hands on.
On September 22, the Germans were pushed back across the Dnieper River in the area of the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After this, the Donbass offensive operation came to an end, ending in complete success for the Red Army.
All of the above operations led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to retreat beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.
The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one doubted anymore that victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. Germany’s allies also understood this, and they began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.
Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.
On July 10, the Allies launched an attack on Sicily and Italian troops surrendered to British and American forces with virtually no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler’s plans, since in order to retain Western Europe he had to transfer some troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the German positions near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and go into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.
Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases involves the KV-1 tank.
During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German tank Pz.IV, which could not penetrate the armor of the KV-1. German tank crews they tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing worked. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base to deal with the tankers there. They hooked up the KV-1 and began towing it. About halfway there, the KV-1 engine suddenly started and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tank crews were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.
If victory in Battle of Stalingrad completed the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.
After a report (message) about the victory in the Battle of Kursk arrived on Stalin’s desk, the General Secretary stated that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.
The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the line.
The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.
A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the Allies' attitude towards the USSR. A report to the US President, written in August, stated that the USSR now occupied a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily against the combined forces of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.
The US was very worried about the Russian successes on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a “second front” would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit for itself. Consequently, the opening of a “second front” should follow as quickly as possible, while US assistance was needed at all.
The failure of Operation Citadel entailed the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which had already been prepared for execution. A victory at Kursk would make it possible to develop an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans set off to occupy Sweden.
The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front gave the Americans and British the opportunity to turn around in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat for Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke the agreement with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his faithful ally.
Success, of course, came at a heavy price. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were enormous, as were the German ones. The balance of forces has already been shown above - now it’s worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.
In fact, it is quite difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources differ greatly. Many historians take average figures - 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The sides also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and aircraft losses amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German ones - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like 5:1 or 4:1 according to different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can come to the conclusion that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to German ones, whereas at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.
Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by German generals, including Manschein, who was considered the best military leader of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards “For participation in the Battle of Kursk.”
Another interesting fact is that children also took part in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front line, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, hundreds of kilometers were built with the help of children railways, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.
Finally, it is important to secure all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.
Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:
Results of the Battle of the Arc of Fire:
There is no analogue in world history to the Battle of Kursk, which lasted 50 days and nights - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was a decisive turn in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The defenders of our Motherland managed to stop the enemy and inflict a deafening blow on him, from which he could not recover. After the victory in the Battle of Kursk, the advantage in the Great Patriotic War was already on the side of the Soviet army. But such a radical change cost our country dearly: military historians still cannot accurately estimate the losses of people and equipment on the Kursk Bulge, agreeing on only one assessment - the losses of both sides were colossal.
According to the plan of the German command, the Soviet troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk region were to be destroyed as a result of a series of massive attacks. The victory in the Battle of Kursk gave the Germans the opportunity to expand their plan of attack on our country and their strategic initiative. In short, winning this battle meant winning the war. In the Battle of Kursk, the Germans had high hopes for their new equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighters and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft. Our attack aircraft used new anti-tank bombs PTAB-2.5-1.5, which penetrated the armor of the fascist Tigers and Panthers.
The Kursk Bulge was a protrusion about 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west. This arc was formed during the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine. The battle on the Kursk Bulge is usually divided into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation, which lasted from July 5 to 23, the Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and the Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23).
The German military operation to seize control of the strategically important Kursk Bulge was codenamed “Citadel”. The avalanche attacks on Soviet positions began on the morning of July 5, 1943, with artillery fire and air strikes. The Nazis advanced on a broad front, attacking from heaven and earth. As soon as it began, the battle took on a grandiose scale and was extremely tense. According to data from Soviet sources, the defenders of our Motherland were confronted by about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. In addition, aces of the 4th and 6th air fleets fought in the air on the German side. The command of the Soviet troops managed to assemble more than 1.9 million people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. Our soldiers repelled attacks by enemy strike forces, showing unprecedented tenacity and courage.
On July 12, Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge went on the offensive. On this day, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 km north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The battle of Prokhorovka lasted all day, the Germans lost about 10 thousand people, over 360 tanks and were forced to retreat. On the same day, Operation Kutuzov began, during which the enemy’s defenses were broken through in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions. Our troops advanced into German positions, and the enemy command gave the order to retreat. By August 23, the enemy was thrown back 150 kilometers to the west, and the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.
Aviation played a significant role in the Battle of Kursk. Air strikes destroyed a significant amount of enemy equipment. The advantage of the USSR in the air, achieved during fierce battles, became the key to the overall superiority of our troops. In the memoirs of the German military, one can feel admiration for the enemy and recognition of his strength. German General Forst wrote after the war: “Our offensive began, and a few hours later a large number of Russian aircraft appeared. Air battles broke out above our heads. During the entire war, none of us saw such a spectacle.” A German fighter pilot from the Udet squadron, shot down on July 5 near Belgorod, recalls: “Russian pilots began to fight much harder. Apparently you still have some old footage. I never thought that I would be shot down so soon...”
And the memories of the battery commander of the 239th mortar regiment of the 17th artillery division, M.I. Kobzev, can best tell how fierce the battles were on the Kursk Bulge and the superhuman efforts with which this victory was achieved:
– “The fierce battles on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in August 1943 are especially etched in my memory,” Kobzev wrote. - It was in the Akhtyrka area. My battery was ordered to cover the retreat of our troops with mortar fire, blocking the path of the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. The calculations of my battery had a hard time when the Tigers began to shower it with a hail of fragments. They disabled two mortars and almost half the servants. The loader was killed by a direct hit from a shell, an enemy bullet hit the gunner in the head, and number three had his chin torn off by a shrapnel. Miraculously, only one battery mortar remained intact, camouflaged in the thickets of corn, which, together with a scout and a radio operator, the three of us dragged 17 kilometers for two days until we found our regiment retreating to its assigned positions.
On August 5, 1943, when the Soviet army clearly had an advantage in the Battle of Kursk in Moscow, for the first time in 2 years since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute thundered in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. Subsequently, Muscovites often watched fireworks on the days of significant victories in the battles of the Great Patriotic War.
Vasily Klochkov
