The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945

Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.

Their fighters dominated the battlefield.

Their bombers wiped entire cities off the face of the earth.

And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.

The Air Force of the Third Reich - the famed Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. The resounding victories of the Wehrmacht would have been impossible in principle without air support and air cover.

Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was forbidden to have combat aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build a modern and efficient air force in the shortest possible time, but also to maintain air supremacy for many years, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy. .

This book, published by the British Air Office in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the war that had just ended, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. This is a detailed and highly competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and disastrous fall of the Third Reich air force.

Summer campaign of 1942 (June - December)

Sections of this page:

Summer campaign 1942

(June - December)

Faced with the prospect of continuing large-scale hostilities on the Eastern Front, German strategists were forced to admit that operations built on the same principles as the previous summer's offensives could hardly produce the desired result. The great length of the Eastern Front inevitably led to the conclusion that in order to obtain a satisfactory result, it was necessary to concentrate the maximum possible forces on one sector. Therefore, it was decided to conduct the main fighting on the southern sector of the front in order to capture the Caucasus (which would cut off Soviet Union from the main sources of oil and at the same time to provide oil to the ever-increasing needs of Germany) and open the way to the Middle East at the same time as Rommel's strike through Egypt in the Mediterranean theater.

The first condition necessary for the implementation of this plan was the complete occupation of the Crimea, necessary to cover the southern flank of the German troops. Therefore, during April, Soviet troops were driven out of the Kerch Peninsula, and only Sevastopol, which was stubbornly defending, remained in the Crimea. In May, the VIII Air Corps was transferred from the central front to the Crimea and subordinated to the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, about 600 aircraft of various types were concentrated at the Crimean airfields, which were ready to take part in the full-scale assault on Sevastopol. The place of the VIII Air Corps on the central sector of the front was taken by the V Air Corps, withdrawn from the southern sector at the beginning of 1942. It was renamed the Luftwaffe Command East and received the status of an air fleet (see map 17).

The choice of the VIII Air Corps to participate in this assault was consistent with the already established practice of sending this formation under the command of Richthofen to support the most important operations, given its experience and effectiveness in participating in massive ground support operations.

At this stage of the war in the Soviet Union, the Germans attached great importance to operations in the Crimea, since the success of their summer offensive in the Caucasus depended on the occupation of the peninsula. Kerch had already fallen, but Sevastopol continued to stubbornly resist. Accordingly, the VIII Air Corps, which during this period of the war was usually assigned to carry out the most important operations, was transferred from the Moscow direction to the Crimea, where it entered the disposal of the 4th Air Fleet. The support of the VIII Air Corps, no doubt, contributed a lot to overcoming the resistance of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

The section of the front liberated by the VIII Air Corps was occupied by the V Air Corps, which was renamed the Luftwaffe East Command. This command had the status of an air fleet and was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. In March, the IV Air Corps had to bear the burden of repelling the powerful and successful offensives of Soviet troops in the south, therefore, to strengthen it, parts of the direct support of ground troops from other air corps that fought on the Eastern Front were transferred.

The assault on Sevastopol began on June 2 and ended on June 6, and all this time the fortress was subjected to massive air strikes. On average, about 600 sorties were performed per day, with a maximum of more than 700 (June 2). Approximately 2,500 tons of explosive bombs were dropped, many of which were of the maximum caliber . Nevertheless, on June 4, the German infantry, which had gone on the offensive, suddenly found that the fortifications had largely survived, and the morale of the defenders had not been broken. However, the Germans stormed so stubbornly that the resistance of the Soviet soldiers was overcome in a relatively short time.

While the operations against Sevastopol were underway, the sudden advance of the Soviet troops on Kharkov forced the Luftwaffe to transfer part of the forces from the Crimea to help stop the advance of the enemy, and intensive air operations were required to save the situation. preemptive strike Soviet army not only inflicted losses that needed to be replenished, but also delayed preparations for the planned main summer campaign. However, in early June, the VIII Air Corps was again transferred to the north. Its headquarters was located near Kursk, in the northern part of the zone of responsibility of the 4th air fleet (see map 18). From May to June, active measures were taken to accumulate large stocks of bombs, fuel, etc. on the Southern Front, for which the railways were fully involved. At the same time, reinforcements were returning to the Eastern Front, re-armed after six months of fighting and additionally reinforced by aircraft withdrawn from the Mediterranean Sea after the completion of the air attack on Malta. Thus, by the beginning of July, the number of German aviation on the Eastern Front again reached the level of 2750 aircraft and, thus, reached the level of the forces involved in the operations of the previous summer. However, now 1,500 of them were on the Southern Front as part of the 4th Air Fleet. That is, deterrence forces remained in the central sector of the front - about 600 aircraft, in the Leningrad direction - no more than 375, and another 200 aircraft were based in Northern Norway and Finland.

The German offensive began in the first week of July with the actions of the VIII Air Corps on a relatively narrow sector of the front, where its aircraft supported the first German attack in the direction of Voronezh. Gradually, the area of ​​operations of the corps expanded to the south as the tank units advanced along the Voronezh-Rostov railway east of the Donets River. The forces of direct support of the ground forces quickly followed the German units advancing along the Don, and after the transfer of part of the long-range bombers to the south in the Voronezh region, which was subjected to heavy attacks by the Soviet army from the northeast to the flank of the advancing Germans, only insignificant forces remained. Nevertheless, near Voronezh, the Soviet troops managed to be contained without resorting to the help of the forces participating in the offensive to the south with the constant support of long-range bomber aircraft and units of direct support of ground forces.

Having completed its task on the extreme southern sector of the Eastern Front, the VIII Air Corps was now transferred to a new important direction. The corps was transferred from the southern section of the 4th Air Fleet's area of ​​responsibility to the northern one. The redeployment took place during the preparation by the Germans of the offensive from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh.

As a result of the movement of the VIII Air Corps, the southern sector of the front, adjacent to the Black Sea, was occupied by the IV Air Corps.

All the time that the German troops were rapidly advancing along the Don from Voronezh in the direction of Stalingrad and from the Rostov region to the Caucasus in the direction of Maikop and Armavir, a significant part of the long-range bomber aircraft participated in systematic raids on communications behind enemy lines. These operations covered vast areas, including the North Caucasus, where bridges, ferry crossings and railways were subjected to massive strikes. Deeper lines of communication were also bombed strategically to cut off supply lines between Stalingrad and Moscow, but no attempt was made to bomb towns far behind the front lines that were not under immediate threat of occupation. On the contrary, long-range bomber aviation concentrated its efforts exclusively on indirect support of the offensive, trying to disable Soviet communications. For this purpose, strikes were carried out on ports Black Sea coast Caucasus up to Poti, and also small-scale attempts were made to mine the Volga and were subjected to air strikes by vessels on the Volga as far as Astrakhan.

Unlike the attack on Stalingrad, which was supported by about 1,000 aircraft of all types, the German offensive into the Caucasus after crossing the Don received almost no air support until the advance was slowed down by hilly terrain that prevented the massive use of tanks. Then it became necessary to strengthen the IV Air Corps, which was responsible for air operations in the Caucasus, and fighter units were transferred to the bases located along the line running approximately from east to west through Krasnodar, armed with single-engine and twin-engine fighters.

In September and October, the determining factor in air strategy was the inability of the German high command to achieve decisive success either at Stalingrad or in the Caucasus. Near Stalingrad, VIII Air Corps, which made up the bulk of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet, conducted active operations. Dive bombers were especially active, often making 4 or more sorties per day.

Despite active hostilities for four months, until October, the strength of the Luftwaffe remained surprisingly stable: 2450-2500 aircraft. Quite a few aviation units during August and September were withdrawn to the rear for re-equipment, but their places were occupied by fresh units, fully equipped with equipment and crews. Nevertheless, the concentration of forces in the south left only small forces for the Moscow and Leningrad directions. Probably, in this area, the advantage in the air was Soviet aviation, since the offensive of the Soviet troops near Rzhev and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bLake Ilmen forced the Germans in September to transfer part of the aviation that participated in the battle for Stalingrad to the north. However, the reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in the Leningrad region that took place in September was planned, as well as the reinforcement of ground troops in this direction, in preparation for a full-scale offensive, planned with the expectation that Stalingrad would not last long. By the beginning of October, 550-600 aircraft were concentrated on the Leningrad sector of the front, but Stalingrad did not fall, and the preparations and movements of Soviet troops in the Moscow region and, to a lesser extent, in the south, forced the Luftwaffe to redistribute forces and weaken the group near Leningrad. In the second half of October, at least 300 aircraft were withdrawn from this sector.

At this stage, the dangers to which German aviation was exposed in the Soviet Union became apparent: its supply lines were stretched; she moved away from the bases equipped in the winter of 1941/42, and operated from poorly prepared airfields; its main forces were so involved in the battles near Stalingrad that it was impossible to ensure air superiority anywhere else; parts of the direct support of the ground forces acted intensively, many crews made three or four sorties per day, which affected the state of equipment and crews and ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. At the same time, a continuous series of local operations and the threat of an offensive by Soviet troops in the north required constant redeployment of units, leaving no pauses for rest and restoration of combat effectiveness.

In the Soviet Union, by the end of the summer, the area of ​​responsibility of the IV Air Corps expanded to the Caucasus, and the VIII Air Corps was tasked with supporting the offensive against Stalingrad. Taking into account the concentration of forces of the VIII Corps and the situation in the Don basin, it was decided to create a new operational formation to direct operations north of the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet, on the Voronezh sector of the front. Accordingly, the 1st Air Corps from the 1st Air Fleet was transferred here (it fought there from the very beginning of the campaign), which received a new designation - the Luftwaffe Don Command and, presumably, was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. Not a single air corps remained in the 1st Air Fleet.

The map shows the approximate position German armies on the Eastern Front.

The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began at the end of October and was accompanied by the preparation and concentration of troops in the middle reaches of the Don below Voronezh, where the Germans had only a small force of 70-80 aircraft, covering a front of about 500 km. However, this section of the front was considered important enough for the 1st Air Corps, which received the designation Don Luftwaffe Command, to be transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet. Thus, in addition to a frontal attack from the east, the Germans also faced the threat of a flank attack from the northwest. The actions of aviation near Stalingrad and in the bend of the Don were hampered by the disruption of communications, lack of fuel and bad weather, and by mid-November it was decided to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

The Soviet offensive from the bend of the Don in a southwestern direction deprived the Germans of advanced airfields and forced them to withdraw air support for ground troops to the rear. As a result, Stalingrad was out of range of German single-engine fighters, and Soviet aviation won superiority in the sky over the encircled German group. At the same time, the tension of constant fighting began to affect, and the withdrawal of some units to the rear for reorganization became an urgent need. With the start of the Allied offensives in Libya and Tunisia, it was necessary to withdraw additional forces from the front to reinforce the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean, and by early December the number of German aviation in the USSR had decreased to about 2000 aircraft, of which a significant part was inoperative. The number of VIII and I air corps in the Don region, which had previously reached 1000 aircraft, fell to about 650-700 aircraft.

After the transfer of approximately 400 aircraft to the Mediterranean, it became clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to cope with all the tasks on the Eastern Front, and activity in the Caucasus began to wane. After the transfer of almost all long-range and dive bombers, as well as part of single-engine fighters to other sectors of the front, the initiative in this direction passed to the Soviet troops, who took advantage of the numerical superiority in the air to support the offensive through the Kalmyk steppes to Rostov and through the western part of the Caucasus in the direction of Kerch strait.

The encirclement of the German 6th Army near Stalingrad and the almost complete encirclement of the 17th Army in the Kuban that followed it posed another serious task for the Luftwaffe: supplying the encircled troops by air. To do this, Xe-111 bombers were removed from combat missions and transferred to transport aviation. They suffered heavy losses, not only because of unfavorable weather conditions, but also because of the constant blows to transport aircraft in the air and on the ground. These strikes forced the Germans to commit fighter escorts, reducing the number of single-engine fighters that could be assigned to close ground support. By the end of December 1942, there were only about 375 single-engine fighters on the entire Eastern Front, and it was this lack of fighter cover that could be one of the reasons for the exceptionally high losses during the last few weeks of 1942. However, there was another reason for the high losses: non-combat losses of aircraft left on the ground during the retreat, and losses as a result of adverse weather conditions. If we add to this the loss of combat aircraft used as transport, then the losses in the second half of 1942, apparently, will be equal to the losses in the last six months of 1941, which, as is known, led to a noticeable weakening of the striking power of German aviation in 1942 year, reducing its number to less than 4,000 vehicles by the end of the year after another peak - 4,800 vehicles in July 1941.

The shortage of first-line aircraft at the end of 1942 is evidenced by the commissioning of second-line units and the use of obsolete types of aircraft (Xe-146) and reconnaissance aircraft for bombing. During December the number of German first-line aviation in the East was reduced by about 150 aircraft, despite the fact that the Soviet offensive required little less active action than before the onset of winter.

The significant weakening of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942, which was greatly facilitated by the previous six months of the eastern campaign, is discussed in detail in Chapter 9. Therefore, it will suffice here to give only a brief account of the strategy and tactics of the Germans and the development of new ideas for the use of aviation, which became apparent towards the end of the year.

The campaign in the East in 1942, as in 1941, showed that the Luftwaffe continued to strictly follow the traditional tactics of massive strikes aimed at direct support of tank units. Despite the successes in some cases of the Battle of France and the Balkan campaign, by the end of 1942 it became clear that this approach did not give the necessary results on the Eastern Front. The reason for this was not only the huge length of the front, as a result of which any concentration of forces for a strike left the flank of the German troops unprotected, but also the depth of the theater of operations. The Soviet troops took full advantage of these circumstances, retreating, thereby stretching the German lines of communication until the Luftwaffe strike force, detached from its supply bases, was exhausted due to maintenance problems. Thus, despite the huge successes at the initial stage, the specific conditions of the war in the USSR did not allow the Germans to use the proven strategy of combining the most powerful direct support of troops from the air and massive strikes against factories and rear supply bases to achieve final victory.

By the autumn of 1942, the failure to achieve the expected results began to lead to a modification of German tactics and the reorganization of forces, but no radical changes followed. Thus, there was a tendency to increase the flexibility of the structure on a "functional" basis, and new units were specially adapted to the tactical requirements that were dictated by conditions on the Eastern Front. This trend was manifested in a greater attention to defense issues, which was facilitated by the Soviet strategy of organizing counteroffensives in winter, when the Germans could not fight on equal terms. Such a doctrine was supposed to lead to the creation of a balanced grouping of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front, in which offensive and defensive functions would be more evenly distributed. Therefore, it meant a step forward in tactical terms, the development of a more intelligent, albeit less effective strategy and increased flexibility of use compared to previous campaigns.

This concept manifested itself in the organization of auxiliary units and second line units. These included: units equipped with obsolete Xe-46, Khsh-126 and Ar-66, whose tasks included harassing nighttime bombardments of concentrations of Soviet troops; anti-tank units equipped with Khsh-129, Me-110, Yu-87 and Yu-88, carrying special heavy weapons to combat Soviet tanks who broke through the German line of defense; and, finally, special squadrons for strikes against railways, equipped with the Yu-88 in the fighter version and designed to strike at the main transport arteries in order to impede the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. All of these units were relatively new categories that did not fall under the traditional organizational chart of the Luftwaffe. These experiments and innovations mainly took place in early July 1942, after the appointment of the commander of the VIII Air Corps, General Oberst von Richthofen, to the post of commander of the 4th Air Fleet, and there is reason to believe that it was von Richthofen who was the main supporter of the new tactics. His experience as commander of the VIII Air Corps, which was the main formation in close support of the ground forces, could well be used to solve defense problems, the main direction of which would be to eliminate those shortcomings that nullified all the successes achieved earlier in the Soviet Union. However, the events of 1943 showed that these innovations, no matter how original, could not be brought to mind in the face of the ever-increasing lag behind the Luftwaffe, both quantitatively and qualitatively, which became stunningly obvious the next year.

Hitler's inner circle, including the leading figures of the main headquarters of the armed forces, could not fail to learn certain lessons from the failure of the "blitzkrieg" that occurred on the Eastern Front. The collapse of Operation Typhoon in the Battle of Moscow cost the Nazis especially heavy losses in people, weapons and military equipment. It was noted above that fascist Germany managed to make up for these losses, but the combat effectiveness of its army decreased. The certificate of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW dated June 6, 1942 stated: “The combat effectiveness of the armed forces is generally lower than in the spring of 1941, which is due to the impossibility of fully ensuring their replenishment with people and materiel” ( "Top secret! Only for command!”: The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. S. 367.). At the same time, the number and combat effectiveness of many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces increased.

With all their arrogance, the Nazi rulers and strategists were forced to take all this into account. Therefore, continuing to maintain confidence in the superiority of the forces of the German army and striving to achieve victory over the USSR, they no longer dared to conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

What goals did the Nazis set for themselves for 1942, more precisely, for the spring and summer of this year, when it was planned to launch a new offensive? Despite the apparent clarity of the issue, it requires detailed consideration. Let us turn first of all to the testimonies of those who were close to the preparation of a new offensive, knew about it or even took a direct part in it.

Undoubtedly interesting in this regard are the statements of Colonel General Walter Warlimont, the former deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW). He reports in some detail about some of the facts of the planning of the campaign, the implementation of which led the Nazis to the catastrophe on the Volga. In his book “In the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht. 1939-1945" Warlimont ( Warlimont W. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 1962.), in particular, writes: “Even during the period of the greatest strain of forces in the struggle to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops at the headquarters of the German armed forces, the confidence did not weaken for a minute that in the East it would be possible to seize the initiative again, at least no later than the end of winter” ( Ibid. S. 238.). On January 3, 1942, Hitler, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, announced his firm decision, “as soon as the weather is favorable for this, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus. This direction is the most important. It is necessary to go to the oil fields, as well as to Iran and Iraq ... Of course, he, in addition, will do everything to destroy Moscow and Leningrad "( Ibid.).

Elsewhere, Warlimont notes that in January - March 1942, the plan for the summer campaign was in general terms ready. On March 20, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “The Fuhrer again has a completely clear plan for the spring and summer. His goal is the Caucasus, Leningrad and Moscow ... An offensive with devastating blows in certain areas ”( Ibid. S. 241.).

It is noteworthy that the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad appear in Warlimont's statements in both cases. But there is no evidence that in the process of discussing the concept of the campaign, it was originally planned to resume the offensive simultaneously in all three strategic directions, and only later - when calculating the available possibilities - did the specific contours of the plan begin to change their outlines significantly. It is quite obvious that the Nazis could no longer prepare the second edition of the Barbarossa plan. Despite this, Hitler announced on March 15 that during the summer of 1942 the Russian army would be completely destroyed ( Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. M., 1956. S. 229.). It can be assumed that such a statement was made for propaganda purposes, was demagogic and went beyond the real strategy. But there was something else here as well. Adventurist in its essence, Hitler's policy could not be based on deep foresight and calculation. All this fully affected the formation of the strategic plan, and then the development of a specific plan of operations in 1942. Difficult problems arose before the creators of the fascist strategy. The question of how to attack and even whether to attack at all on the Eastern Front became more and more difficult for the Nazi generals. Warlimont writes the following on this subject: “Halder ... for a long time studied the question of whether we should finally go on the defensive in the East, since a second offensive is beyond our strength. But it is absolutely impossible to talk about this with Hitler. And what can all this lead to? If we give the Russians a breather and the American threat intensifies, then we will give the initiative to the enemy and we will never be able to regain it. Thus, we have no choice but to once again attempt an offensive despite all doubts ”( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239.).

So, there was no longer confidence in the success of the offensive - the miscalculation of the Barbarossa plan in relation to the assessment of the forces of the Soviet Union was obvious. Nevertheless, the need for a new offensive was recognized by both Hitler and the German generals. The Wehrmacht command continued to strive for the main goal - to defeat the Red Army before the Anglo-American troops began hostilities on the European continent. The Nazis had no doubt that the second front, at least in 1942, would not be opened. And although the prospects for a war against the USSR were looming for some people completely differently than a year ago, the time factor could not be overlooked. There was complete unanimity in this.

“In the spring of 1942,” writes G. Guderian, “the question arose before the German high command in what form to continue the war: to attack or defend. Going on the defensive would be an admission of our own defeat in the 1941 campaign and would deprive us of the chances of successfully continuing and ending the war in the East and West. 1942 was the last year in which, without fear of immediate intervention by the Western powers, the main forces of the German army could be used in an offensive on the Eastern Front. It remained to be decided what should be done on a front of 3,000 kilometers long in order to ensure the success of an offensive carried out by relatively small forces. It was clear that on most of the front the troops had to go on the defensive" ( Results of the Second World War. M., 1957. S. 126.).

The offensive operations of the summer campaign of 1942, according to the testimony of General Halder, were foreseen as early as the winter of 1941/42. and disrupt their communications along the Volga" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 35.). The OKW directive of December 8, 1941, spoke of creating the prerequisites for conducting an "offensive operation against the Caucasus" ( There.). In that memorable winter for the Germans, Hitler forbade the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper and demanded at all costs to hold positions near Leningrad, in the areas of Demyansk, Rzhev and Vyazma, Orel, Kursk and in the Donbass.

The specific content of the plan for the summer campaign of 1942 at a certain stage and to some extent was the subject of discussion among the Nazi generals. The commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Küchler, initially proposed to carry out an offensive on the northern sector of the Soviet-German front with the aim of capturing Leningrad. Halder ultimately also stood for the resumption of the offensive, but, as before, he continued to consider the central direction decisive and recommended that the main attack on Moscow be carried out by the forces of Army Group Center. Halder believed that the defeat of the Soviet troops in the western direction would ensure the success of the campaign and the war as a whole.

Hitler, unconditionally supported by Keitel and Jodl (OKW), ordered the main efforts of the German troops in the summer of 1942 to be sent south to seize the Caucasus. Due to the limited number of forces, it was planned to postpone the operation to capture Leningrad until the moment when the troops in the south were released.

The fascist German high command decided to launch a new offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, counting on successive operations to defeat the Soviet troops here piece by piece. Thus, although when planning the 1942 campaign, Hitler's strategists for the first time began to waver, nevertheless, as before, the top military and political leadership of the Third Reich came to a single point of view.

On March 28, 1942, a secret meeting was held at Hitler's headquarters, to which only a very limited circle of people from the highest headquarters were invited. General Halder reported in detail the plan for the deployment of troops for the summer offensive, based on the instructions given to him by the Fuhrer.

Warlimont paints a picture of this meeting this way: “No one raised any objections. But, despite this, the displeasure of the chief of the general staff of the land army (Halder. - A.S.) was almost palpably felt, who even earlier had repeatedly spoken out both against the strange layer-by-layer introduction of forces at the beginning of the offensive, and against delivering the main blows during the offensive in divergent directions, and especially against the excessive scale of operations along the front and in depth "( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242.).

Colonel-General Jodl of the Design Bureau, who was not indifferent to the development of Hitler's operational plans, a few weeks after the aforementioned meeting, told Lieutenant-Colonel Scherf, a General Staff officer devoted to him, whom Hitler appointed authorized to write military history, that Operation Siegfried ( Hitler, after the winter defeat of 1941/42, became wary of assigning big names to plans for military operations and on April 5 crossed out the original code name "Siegfried". On June 30, the new code name "Blau" ("Blue") was changed to "Braunschweig" out of fear that the former name could become known to the Soviet side.) due to the lack of forces of Army Group Center and Army Group North will be at great risk if the Russians launch a decisive attack on Smolensk. However, Jodl, like Hitler, seemed doubtful whether the Soviet side had the strength and courage to do so; they believed that with the beginning German offensive in the southern sector of the front, the Russians will automatically begin the transfer of troops to the south ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 242-243.).

Jodl instructed his deputy and responsible officers of the headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces to draw up in the form of a directive of the OKW the plans for the command of the ground forces, proposed on March 28 and approved by Hitler. The headquarters decided to limit the content of the directive to only the formulation of "tasks", without linking the main command of the ground forces with any details. However, Hitler, during the report of the "draft" on April 4 by General Jodl, announced that he himself would rework the directive. The next day, his "historiographer" wrote: "The Fuhrer substantially revised the draft directive No. 41 and supplemented it with important points formulated by himself ... First of all, he re-formulated that part of the draft, which refers to the main operation." The result of these efforts was a document dated April 5, which contained "multiple repetitions and long lengths, confusion of operational directives with well-known principles of troop leadership, vague wording of the most significant issues and a detailed explanation of minor details" ( Ibid. S. 243-244.).

It is easy to see that the former Nazi generals are in every possible way fenced off from Hitler, whose associates and like-minded people they have been for so long. This is done in a different historical setting and at least two decades after the events they describe. In his book, Warlimont also follows this trend, as can be seen from the citations. Wehrmacht generals did not put forward any fundamentally new proposals as opposed to Hitler's plans. The atmosphere of servility to the "Fuhrer", which reigned supreme among the German generals, eliminated any possibility of this. The hidden discontent of the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Halder, did not change anything. His alleged independence of judgment is clearly exaggerated in post-war West German literature. In hindsight, after the end of the war, Halder began to assert that at that time they were offered to throw the main forces of the German troops to capture Stalingrad in order to avoid simultaneous attacks on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The attack on the Caucasus, in his opinion, should have been of secondary importance for securing the southern flank of the Stalingrad group. It is easy to see that, if this was the case, then such a proposal did not contain anything radically different from Hitler's plan. No wonder in his diary, referring to the meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht on March 28, 1942, Halder writes down such a significant phrase: "The outcome of the war is decided in the East" ( Halder F. Military diary. M.. 1970. Vol. 3, book. 2. S. 220.).

All this shows quite clearly that the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 was planned by the German generals, who stood for the continuation of the aggressive and adventurous war against the USSR. Hitler only detailed and refined this plan, made the final decision regarding the choice of the direction of offensive operations. The majority of Hitler's generals showed a complete inability to understand the criminal nature of the war unleashed by the Nazis after the defeat of Germany in World War II. So, Warlimont in his memoirs puts forward own plan continuation of the war in relation to the situation in 1942.

“Without speculation,” he writes, “it will obviously be appropriate here to speak of the prospects that a generous reconciliation with France could still bring. These prospects must have been of particular importance, considering that Germany was now dealing with two major maritime powers. If a devastating blow had been delivered to the enemy's sea lanes and fleet from bases located on the territory of the French state, using a large number of submarines and all air formations suitable for this, then it would have been possible - in accordance with some then and today's estimates - according to at least delay the landing much Western allies on the European continent and in North Africa and thereby create serious obstacles for the enemy in achieving air superiority over the continent. At the same time, the Red Army in the East, which was largely dependent on the imports of the allies by sea, obviously, for a long time, as a result of shifting the main efforts to naval and air warfare in the Atlantic, it would be deprived of the opportunity to conduct large-scale operations, especially if it were possible to attract the Japanese to the joint conduct of the war, at least at sea "( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 239-240.). This plan, conceived many years after the war, does not deserve serious consideration. Suffice it to say that the combat power of the Red Army - contrary to Warlimont's assumptions - was not determined at all by the supplies of the Western Allies. In addition, the transfer of funds to the creation of a more powerful submarine fleet of fascist Germany was bound to lead to a decrease in the equipment of the Wehrmacht ground forces. The landing of Anglo-American troops on the European continent, as is known, was already delayed until the summer of 1944. As for the actions of the allies in Africa, they were of a local nature. Finally, "generous reconciliation" with France depended not only on the desire of the Nazis. All this suggests that Hitler and the German General Staff - contrary to Warlimont's opinion - more correctly than he defined the main theater of the war. But they did not understand the inevitability of the catastrophe that awaited them.

The idea of ​​the Wehrmacht command for 1942 is most fully set out in Directive No. 41 (see Appendix 14), which was of particular importance: stubborn attempts to implement it determined the actions of the enemy on the Soviet-German front until late autumn and the beginning of winter 1942.

Directive No. 41 largely reveals the essence of the policy of the Third Reich in the second year of the war against the Soviet Union. It is quite obvious that in preparing for a new offensive on the Eastern Front, the enemy by no means abandoned the military-political goals formulated a year and a half earlier in the Barbarossa plan - to defeat Soviet Russia. In general form, this task remains in Directive No. 41. “The goal is,” it says there, “to finally destroy the forces still at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military-economic centers” ( See: App. 14. S. 567-571.). Hitler spoke about the same on April 3, 1942, in a conversation with Antonescu. “This summer,” he declared, “I decided to continue the pursuit as deeply as possible for the final destruction of the Russians. American and English help will be ineffective, since new Russian defeats will lead to a loss of communication with the outside world. They have lost the best soldiers and equipment, and now they are only improvising" ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 34.).

It should be noted that some authors in the FRG are trying to retroactively narrow down the tasks of the Nazi plan for the summer campaign of 1942. For example, former Hitler General Mellenthin writes: in the bend of the Don River between Rostov and Voronezh, in order to create a springboard for the subsequent offensive on Stalingrad and the oil regions of the Caucasus. The offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus was planned to begin much later, perhaps not earlier than 1943. Mellenthin F. Tank battles 1939-1945. M., 1957. S. 142.).

The absurdity of such statements is refuted by the Nazi generals themselves. K. Zeitzler, who after F. Halder became chief of the general staff of the ground forces, testifies: “Planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended, first of all, to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The implementation of these intentions, of course, would be of great importance if the German army could cross the Volga in the Stalingrad region and thus cut the main Russian communication line running from north to south, and if the Caucasian oil went to meet the military needs of Germany, then the situation in the East would be radically changed, and our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would be greatly increased. Such was Hitler's train of thought. Having achieved these goals, he wanted to send highly mobile formations to India through the Caucasus or in another way ”( Fatal decisions. M., 1958. S. 153.).

An objective assessment of the plans of the German High Command for the summer of 1942 is incompatible with the unreasonable narrowing of their actual scope and goals. In the document under consideration, as is clear from its text, in addition to the main operation on the southern wing of the front, the Wehrmacht troops were also tasked with “taking Leningrad in the north” and carrying out the operations necessary “to level the front line in its central and northern sections” . Ignoring this part of Directive No. 41 on the part of individual representatives of bourgeois historiography, especially West German, can only be explained by a conscious desire to belittle the scale of the victory of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people in the battle on the Volga. At the same time, one must also see significant differences between Directive No. 41 and the Barbarossa plan.

The ultimate military-political goals of Nazi Germany's aggressive war against the Soviet Union, in connection with the changed situation on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42, seemed unattainable even to the most rabid Nazis within the framework of the next campaign. This led to the well-known inconsistency of the document under consideration and the vagueness of setting in it the main goal of the strategic offensive of 1942. In a general form (without indicating the terms), it sets out the intention to crush the Red Army, and at the same time it also contains an indication that the defensive positions created along the right bank of the Don to ensure the north-eastern flank of the strike group of German troops, should be equipped "taking into account their possible use in winter conditions." The capture of the region of the Lower Volga and the Caucasus, for all its great strategic importance, could not yet lead to the defeat of the USSR. The most powerful grouping of the Red Army was located in the central industrial region. In this regard, we should recall the testimony of Field Marshal Keitel. He said that the German high command, after the capture of Stalingrad by the Nazi army and the isolation of Moscow from the south, intended to carry out a turn with large forces to the north. “I find it difficult to give any time frame for this operation,” added Keitel ( Military-ist. magazine 1961. No. 1. S. 41.).

Thus, the main goal of the enemy offensive on the Eastern Front, according to the above Directive No. 41, was to win victory over the Soviet Union. However, unlike the Barbarossa plan, the achievement of this political goal was no longer based on the strategy of "blitzkrieg". That is why Directive No. 41 does not establish a chronological framework for the completion of the campaign in the East. But on the other hand, it says that, while maintaining positions in the central sector, to defeat and destroy Soviet troops in the Voronezh region and west of the Don, to seize the southern regions of the USSR rich in strategic raw materials. To solve this problem, it was planned to carry out a series of successive operations: in the Crimea, south of Kharkov, and only after that in the Voronezh, Stalingrad and Caucasian directions. The operation to capture Leningrad and establish ground communications with the Finns was made dependent on the solution of the main task in the southern sector of the front. Army Group Center during this period was supposed to improve its operational position through private operations.

Preparing the conditions for the final defeat of the Soviet Union, the enemy decided first of all to seize the Caucasus with its powerful sources of oil and the fertile agricultural regions of the Don, Kuban and the North Caucasus. The offensive in the Stalingrad direction was supposed to ensure, according to the enemy’s plan, successful implementation"first of all" the main operation to conquer the Caucasus. In this strategic plan of the enemy, the acute need of fascist Germany for fuel was very strongly reflected.

Speaking on June 1, 1942 at a meeting of the commanders of Army Group South in the Poltava region, Hitler stated that if he did not receive oil from Maykop and Grozny, he would have to end this war ( See the testimony of Paulus to the International Military Tribunal on February 11, 1946 // Nuremberg trial, M., 1954. T. 1. S. 378; see also: Voen.-ist. magazine 1960. No. 2. S. 81-82.). At the same time, Hitler based his calculations on the fact that the loss of oil by the USSR would undermine the strength of Soviet resistance. "It was a delicate calculation that was closer to its goal than is commonly believed after its final catastrophic failure" ( Liddell Hart BG Strategy of indirect actions. pp. 347-348.).

The choice of the south for the offensive was also determined by a number of other considerations, including those of a specifically military nature.

The enemy troops on the central sector of the front penetrated deeply into Soviet territory and were under the threat of flank attacks by the Red Army. At the same time, the Nazi troops occupied an overhanging position in relation to the southern grouping of Soviet troops. The Red Army had no less forces here than in the western direction. However, the open terrain - the steppe expanses of the Don, the Volga region and the North Caucasus - created the most favorable opportunities for the enemy to use armored formations and aviation. Of certain importance was the fact that in the south it was easier for the Nazis to concentrate the troops of their allies: Romanians, Hungarians and Italians.

The capture of the Caucasus pursued, in addition to the above, other important goals: according to the plans of the enemy, this brought the Nazi troops closer to Turkey and accelerated the decision of its rulers about armed aggression against the USSR; With the loss of the Caucasus, the Soviet Union was deprived of ties with the outside world through Iran; the capture of the Black Sea bases doomed the Soviet Black Sea Fleet to death. Finally, the Nazis hoped, in the event of a successful implementation of the planned offensive, to open their way to the Middle East.

In preparation for carrying out the planned operations, the Nazi leadership carried out a number of preparatory activities. In search of the forces and means necessary for the offensive, the allies of the Third Reich were not forgotten either. Warlimont writes that a few weeks before the final decision on the plan for the 1942 summer campaign was made, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, General Keitel, visited, on Hitler's instructions, the capitals of Germany's European allies, who were to contribute "every available force" to the operation. As a result, the Nazis managed to get a promise from the rulers of Italy and Hungary to allocate one reinforced army each. In Romania, I. Antonescu placed at the disposal of the German command another 26 divisions in addition to the Romanian troops already operating in the East ( Lebedev N. I. The collapse of fascism in Romania. M., 1976. S. 347.). “Hitler, who in this case refused personal correspondence with the heads of state and government, subsequently limited himself to only demanding that the contingents of the Allied troops be part of the armies under their own command. In addition, already in the directive of April 5, when determining the zones for the offensive of the allied forces, it was stipulated, albeit in veiled terms, that the Hungarians and Romanians, who were allies of Germany, but were at enmity with each other, should be separated from each other by a considerable distance, introducing in between are Italian connections. All these troops were assigned defensive tasks, for which they had to be reinforced with German reserves, and above all with anti-tank weapons" ( Warlimont W. Op. cit. S. 244.).

Among the events Hitler's command, aimed at preparing an offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, not the last place was occupied by the plan of the fictitious operation "Kremlin". Its purpose is to misinform the Soviet command regarding German plans for the 1942 summer campaign.

Operation "Kremlin" was developed at the direction of the OKH and Hitler by the headquarters of the army group "Center". In the “Order on the offensive against Moscow”, signed on May 29 by the commander of Field Marshal Kluge and the chief of staff, General Wehler, the troops of the Army Group Center were tasked with: “To defeat the enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy’s capital, Moscow, surrounding the city, and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of operational use of this area "( Dashichev V.P. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. M., 1973. T. 2. S. 312.). To achieve this goal, the order set specific tasks for the 2nd, 3rd tank, 4th, 9th armies and the 59th army corps. The beginning of both operations ("Kremlin" and "Blau") coincided in time.

The enemy did everything, including radio disinformation, so that the plan of Operation "Kremlin" became known to the command of the Red Army. To some extent, this trick succeeded the enemy.

By the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff were faced with the need to develop a new strategic plan - for the next stage of the war. The impossibility of continuing the broad offensive of the Red Army, which remained unfinished, became obvious. A. M. Vasilevsky, who was then deputy, and then chief of the General Staff ( In May 1942, A. M. Vasilevsky was admitted to the duties of Chief of the General Staff, and on June 26 he was approved in this position.), wrote in his memoirs that the winter offensive in April 1942 died out due to the lack of the necessary forces and means to continue it. The troops of the fronts were ordered to go on the defensive.

From the way events unfolded at the front, it was clear that the enemy had begun to recover from the blows inflicted on him and was preparing for active operations. The Soviet leadership had no doubt that with the onset of summer or even spring, the enemy would try to seize the strategic initiative again. The absence of a second front allowed the Nazis to transfer troops from the European countries they occupied to the Eastern Front. All this had to be taken into account when analyzing the situation.

In what direction will the new major offensive of the enemy begin? “Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces,” recalled Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, “tried to more accurately reveal the enemy’s plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to determine as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all perfectly understood that the further development of the entire Second World War, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942 ”( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. M.. 1975. S. 203.).

Military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will unfold first in the southern sector and subsequently spread to the north ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942.” ( History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975. T. 5. S. 112.).

On March 23, the state security agencies reported the same to the GKO: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil" ( There.).

However, intelligence data was not fully taken into account. The Headquarters and the General Staff proceeded from the fact that the strongest grouping of the Wehrmacht, consisting of 70 divisions, continued to be located on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, still threatening the capital. Therefore, it seemed most likely that the enemy would strike the main blow in the Moscow direction. “This opinion, as I am well aware, was shared by the command of most fronts” ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 206.), - testifies A. M. Vasilevsky.

According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believed that in the summer of 1942 the enemy would be able to attack simultaneously in two strategic directions - the western and the south of the country. But Stalin also feared most of all for the Moscow direction ( Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. 2nd ed. add. M., 1974. Book. 2. S. 64.). Later it turned out that this conclusion was not confirmed by the development of events.

An assessment of the situation showed that the immediate task should be an active strategic defense of the Soviet troops, the accumulation of powerful trained reserves, military equipment and all the necessary materiel, followed by a transition to a decisive offensive. These considerations were reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief B. M. Shaposhnikov in the middle of March in the presence of A. M. Vasilevsky. After that, work on the summer campaign plan continued.

The General Staff correctly considered that, while organizing a temporary strategic defense, the Soviet side should not, at the same time, conduct offensive operations on a large scale. Stalin, who was poorly versed in matters of military art, did not agree with this opinion. G.K. Zhukov supported B.M. Shaposhnikov, but believed, however, that at the beginning of summer in the western direction, the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping, which held a vast bridgehead relatively close to Moscow, should be defeated ( There. S. 65.).

At the end of March, the Headquarters again discussed the issue of a strategic plan for the summer of 1942. This was when considering the plan submitted by the command of the South-Western Direction for a large offensive operation in May by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts. “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief agreed with the conclusions and proposals of the Chief of the General Staff,” writes A. M. Vasilevsky, “but ordered, simultaneously with the transition to strategic defense, to provide for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas: on some - in order to improve the operational situation, on others - to preempting the enemy in the deployment of offensive operations. As a result of these instructions, it was planned to carry out private offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lugovsko-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea.

How to evaluate the fact that such an authoritative military figure as B. M. Shaposhnikov, who headed the country's highest military institution, did not try to defend his proposals on the issue, from right decision which so much depended on? A. M. Vasilevsky explains this as follows: “Many who are not aware of the difficult conditions in which the General Staff had to work during the past war can rightly accuse its leadership of failing to prove to the Supreme Commander the negative consequences of the decision to defend and come on at the same time. In those conditions when there was an extremely acute shortage of trained reserves and material and technical means, the conduct of private offensive operations was an unacceptable waste of energy. The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed with their own eyes that only a transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, the refusal to conduct offensive operations, such as Kharkov, for example, would save the country and its armed forces from serious defeats, would allow we will go over to active offensive operations much earlier and recapture the initiative in our own hands.

The miscalculations made by the Headquarters and the General Staff when planning hostilities for the summer of 1942 were taken into account in the future, especially in the summer of 1943, when a decision was made on the nature of hostilities on the Kursk Bulge "( Vasilevsky A. M. Memories of historical battle// Stalingrad epic. M., 1968. S. 75.).

Historians of the past war have not yet exhausted their study of the problem of planning the summer campaign of 1942; it needs further in-depth research. At the same time, one should also take into account the general situation that the failures of the Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1942 were not inevitable ( Vasilevsky A. M. The matter of a lifetime. 2nd ed. S. 207.).

By the beginning of the second year of the war, the Red Army and the rear of the country, which ensured its struggle, had forces and means, if not in everything sufficient, then in the main, to prevent a new deep penetration of the Nazi troops into the vital regions of the Soviet Union. After the successes of the winter offensive of the Red Army, the Soviet people gained confidence in the inevitability of the defeat of Nazi Germany. On the eve of the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, there was no negative impact on the struggle of the Red Army and the entire people of the factor of surprise, which took place at the beginning of the war. Temporary factors gradually lost their effectiveness, while permanent factors exerted a growing influence in all spheres of the struggle. The experience of the participation of Soviet troops in the modern big war has acquired an ever more prominent role. Its first year was a serious test for the entire command and political staff, most of which acquired both hardening and the skill that comes only with practice. In the fire of war, knowledge was improved, the abilities and talents of those who led the combat operations of the troops were tested. The names of many military leaders and political workers became known throughout the country. On the battlefields, the combat and moral might of the Soviet Armed Forces was tested, which, under difficult conditions, thwarted the plan for a "blitzkrieg" war of fascist Germany against the USSR. The mass heroism of Soviet soldiers became the norm of their actions in the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, by the spring of 1942, the Red Army lacked trained reserves, and the formation of new formations and associations was significantly limited by the level of production of the latest types of weapons. Under these conditions, the most expedient use of available forces and means acquired special significance, since the enemy had greater opportunities to continue the aggressive war. In this regard, the Soviet side received a very real idea of ​​​​the strength and professional qualities troops of the Wehrmacht, about the features of their actions in offensive and defensive operations.

The Soviet Supreme High Command correctly assessed the overall balance of forces in the USSR's war against fascist Germany, but the immediate prospects for the development of armed struggle depended on the adoption of correct strategic decisions. Expecting that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the central direction, the Headquarters concentrated strategic reserves in the areas of Kalinin, Tula, Tambov, Bori-soglebsk, Vologda, Gorky, Stalingrad, Saratov, believing that, depending on the development of events at the front, they could be used both southwest and west History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. T. 5. S. 143.). However, the actual development of events did not fully justify these calculations.

Thus, the Headquarters planned for the spring and summer of 1942, along with the transition to the defense, offensive operations in the Leningrad region, near Demyansk, in the Oryol direction, in the Kharkov region, in the Donbass and Crimea. The successful conduct of these operations could lead to the release of Leningrad, the defeat of the Demyansk, Kharkov and other groupings of enemy troops. This was due to the desire to bring as close as possible the timing of the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil. However, at that time there were not yet sufficient prerequisites for this, and the decision taken by the Headquarters was erroneous.

The ability to solve the practical problems of military strategy, taking into account all the factors that determined accurate and correct foresight, was developed at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gradually, as experience in warfare was accumulated.

To fully appreciate the significance of the second German summer campaign in Russia, it is necessary to recall the aims of the first summer campaign. As we have seen, they did not consist in conquering all of Russia, but in attacking the main strategic regions to force the Russian armies to defend them and lose defenders in subsequent battles. The strategic goal was tactical extermination.
We also saw that this strategy failed because the speed of advance was slow, the space too large, and the resistance too strong.
If the crushing strategy failed under the more favorable conditions of 1941, how could it succeed under the less favorable conditions of 1942? Hitler answered this question in the negative; and it would be foolish to resort to it again. Instead of a strategy of crushing, a strategy of attrition should have been used. However, there was no question of solving this problem by tactical attrition; even if it were possible, such a course of action would take too much time. Stirring up a revolution against the Bolsheviks was also out of the question. Consequently, the only possibility remained: to undermine the economic power of Russia, to strike at the material basis of its armed forces. It was decided that for this it was necessary to deprive Russia of the Donetsk industrial region, the Kuban granary and Caucasian oil. In short, to deprive Russia of important strategic areas in the quadrangle Kharkov, Stalingrad, Baku, Batumi, which would eventually put the Russian army out of action.

So, Hitler's plan for 1942, apparently, was as follows: cut off and occupy the Voronezh, Saratov, Stalingrad, Rostov quadrangle with an offensive in two parallel directions: in the north along the Kursk-Saratov line and in the south along the Taganrog-Stalingrad line. Under the cover of this blockade, pass through the Caucasus to Baku.
According to two historians, the existence of such a plan is "confirmed by a document that fell into the hands of the Russians and was mentioned by Prime Minister Stalin in a speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution." The document outlined the procedure for the occupation of the following cities: Borisoglebsk, eastern Voronezh, by July 10, Stalingrad by July 25, Saratov by August 10, Syzran by August 15, Arzamas, south of Gorky, by September 10.
Surprising is the very rapidity of the planned occupation of the cities, but even more surprising is what should be clear even to a novice in strategy: the success of the campaign depended not so much on the capture of important points, but on how much retaliatory action from the Russians could be prevented. As can be seen from the plan, the Russian armies located north of the Voronezh-Saratov line were ignored. Given the space of Russia and the strength of the Russian armies, it was obvious that they could not be exterminated tactically, just as it was impossible to break the Russian people due to their high moral stamina. Therefore, success could only be achieved by strategically paralyzing them, but not by depriving the Russians of the resources needed in the future, such as oil, coal and wheat, should be deprived of the possibility of movement. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to occupy or besiege Moscow. Just as Paris is the central junction of French railways, so Moscow is the central junction of Russian railways. In 1914, due to the fact that the Germans did not occupy Paris, there was a disaster on the Marne. In 1942, as we shall see below, a failure near Moscow led to a catastrophe on the Volga. If Moscow were in the hands of the Germans, then the constant strategic bombing of Vologda, Bui, Gorky, Arzamas and Penza, located at a distance of 250-350 miles from Moscow and, therefore, easily accessible to bombers, would not only stop the supply of supplies from Arkhangelsk and reserves from the Asian part of Russia, but also lead to a chaotic state of traffic on the railways in the central part of Russia, and maybe stop all traffic.

The armies that were to carry out Hitler's plan were commanded by Field Marshal von Bock. The morale and training of the armies were lower than in 1941, but the firepower had increased. The bulky Panzer Division of 400 tanks was reduced to 250 improved tanks, the air force organized into strike groups that interacted more closely with the ground forces than before. The Germans adopted a new tank tactic that Field Marshal Rommel is credited with creating. It was called “motpulk” and, in essence, was a modernized copy of the Hussite mobile camp. Colonel de Waterville describes her as follows:
“The mass of mobile assets was located in such a way that tanks and self-propelled artillery were an external contour, inside which a vulnerable center was placed: infantry in vehicles, anti-tank artillery, mobile repair shops and all the modern equipment needed by the army in battle ... First of all, it was a combat an organism with enormous firepower, extremely agile and covered in thick armor...”
The main German offensive did not begin until June 28, but important battles preceded it. On May 8, Field Marshal von Manstein, who commanded the German 12th Army in the Crimea, launched an attack on Kerch and took the city by storm on May 13. As this battle drew to a close, on May 12, Marshal Timoshenko, in order to delay the German advance, launched a heavy blow south of Kharkov. Rapidly advancing from Lozovaya in the direction of Kharkov and Poltava, on May 16, Russian troops occupied Krasnograd and broke through the outer defense belt of the "overhead" (Kharkov) and two days later started fighting on the outskirts of the city. On May 19, the Germans launched a counteroffensive with large forces. After heavy fighting in the Barvenkovo ​​region, Izyum, Marshal Timoshenko was forced to leave Krasnograd. During the retreat, a significant part of his troops was surrounded and taken prisoner. On June 1, the Germans announced a complete victory, but for them this offensive was an unpleasant event.
Four days later, von Manstein began the bombardment of Sevastopol, preparing to storm the fortress. The outer defensive belt of the fortress was 20 miles long, while the inner one was 8 miles long. The fortress was defended by a garrison of 75 thousand people under the command of General Petrov. On July 1, after a fierce battle, during which 50 thousand tons of artillery shells were fired at the fortress and 25 thousand tons of bombs were dropped, Sevastopol was taken by storm. Thus, the entire Crimea was in the hands of the Germans.
By mid-June, the concentration of German troops on the winter front line west of the Oskol River left the Russians in no doubt that a powerful offensive was being prepared. Von Bock pulled up the following forces here: in the Kursk region - the 2nd Army, the 2nd Panzer Army and the Hungarian Army, all under the command of General von Weich; in the Belgorod area - the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army under the command of General von Goth; to the Kharkov region, the 17th Army and the 1st Panzer Army under the command of Field Marshal von Kleist; the Italian army remained in reserve west of Kharkov. South of this army group was General Schwedler's group, which was to be placed at the disposal of Field Marshal von Manstein's 12th Army; the latter, together with the Romanian army, was transferred from the Crimea in the near future.
The Russians assumed that the German offensive would begin at the Voronezh-Rostov front and would develop along the Saratov-Stalingrad line, so they concentrated a strong grouping north of Voronezh and well fortified the Voronezh and Rostov regions, as well as the line of the Donets River.
On June 22, the Germans suddenly struck from the Izyum region and three days later drove the Russians out of Kupyansk. This was followed on June 28 by the long-awaited offensive, which began with a strike east of Kursk. On July 1, the Russian front between Shchigry and Tim was broken through. On July 2, the Germans went on the offensive with large forces between Belgorod and Kharkov. Again, the Russian front was broken through, and by July 5 the Germans reached the western outskirts of Voronezh in the north and the Svatovo-Lysichansk line in the south.
The battle for Voronezh began, and, as we shall see, for the Germans it was one of the most fatal during the entire war.
On July 6 and 7, von Weich's tanks and motorized infantry crossed the Don and broke into Voronezh, which is located in the corner formed by the Don and a small tributary, so that the city is surrounded on three sides by a water barrier. The German infantry, which entered the battle, was attacked from the flank between the rivers. “Russian troops concentrated... north of Voronezh arrived in time to save the day, they may have saved the Russians the whole campaign” .
There is no doubt that this was the case. Over the next ten days, while fierce fighting was going on in the city, the offensive south of Voronezh developed with great speed. Comparing it to the Russian resistance in Voronezh itself had a strange psychological effect on Hitler.
By July 12, von Goth took Rossosh and Kantemirovka - stations on the Voronezh-Rostov railway, the next day von Kleist's 1st Panzer Army occupied Millerovo. Voroshilovgrad was outflanked and occupied on 20 July. Meanwhile, von Manstein's armies were moving on Rostov, which the Russians evacuated on 27 July.
“The entire Russian front was falling apart... the German army crossed the Don on a broad front. The tone of the Russian communiqués became serious, and growing concern was felt in the radio broadcasts ... There were insistent demands in Russia to open a second front”
The rapid advance towards Stalingrad and the unexpected resistance of the Russians at Voronezh apparently prompted Hitler's decision to leave a barrier in Voronezh from the von Weichs Army Group, and send the von Hoth group directly to the east to act in conjunction with von Manstein against Stalingrad. Only after the fall of Stalingrad was the offensive against Saratov to be resumed.
From a strategic point of view, this mistake borders on insanity. Since no attempt was made to disable the Moscow railway junction, the Russian armies north of Voronezh had complete freedom of movement. The occupation of the Caucasus was the main goal of the German plan. This could be done only in this way: to create a deep defensive area to the north of the Caucasus, that is, as envisaged by the original plan, to occupy the quadrangle of Rostov, Stalingrad, Saratov, Voronezh, which was caused by the need to ensure the depth of defense and space for maneuvering. Having occupied not a quadrangle, but a triangle of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, the Germans formed a wedge. The northern side of the wedge - the line Voronezh, Stalingrad - was open to the Russian offensive in a southerly direction from the line Voronezh, Saratov. The change in line of operations thus prepared the final defeat.
In accordance with the changed plan, von Weichs' armies dug in at Voronezh. Hungarian, Italian and Romanian divisions were used to protect von Hoth's strategic flank along the western bank of the Don. Meanwhile, von Manstein's group, advancing from Rostov, crossed the Don in the lower reaches of Tsimlyanskaya, while von Kleist rushed south to the plains of the North Caucasus.
During the last week of July and the first week of August, von Hoth's troops quickly descended down the Don, and a fierce struggle broke out for bridgeheads at Kletskaya and Kalach, where the Don turns south west of Stalingrad. On August 15, the crossing near Kalach was captured, but only on August 25 was the river forced at Kletskaya. German troops advancing south of the Don were stopped at Kotelnikovo. Only after forcing the river by the troops of General von Goth were they able to continue the offensive. On September 9, the Stalingrad-Borisoglebsk railway was cut, and Stalingrad was heavily bombarded from the air. It seemed to the Germans that the city would soon fall.
While the operations were unfolding in this way, von Kleist's group, which crossed the lower Don, quickly spread over the steppes of the North Caucasus. On August 4, Voroshilovsk fell, on August 8 the Russians destroyed and abandoned the Maikop oil fields, on August 20 Krasnodar was occupied, on August 25 German troops reached Mozdok in the middle reaches of the Terek, 100 miles from the Caspian Sea; The Russians retreated to Grozny. Finally, on September 10, the naval base on the Black Sea, Novorossiysk, fell. Due to difficult terrain, Russian resistance, sprawling communications, and lack of fuel, the Caucasian campaign effectively ended there. Everything was thrown at the capture of Stalingrad. Stalingrad (formerly Tsaritsyn) was a large, sprawling industrial city with a population of about 500,000; it stands on the right bank of the Volga, a few miles above its bend. The advance of the Germans on the city was hampered by the fact that the Volga here has a width of 2 - 2.5 miles and, therefore, is difficult to cross. The city could not be completely surrounded without crossing the river.
The Germans faced the problem of gaining a foothold on the left bank of the Volga. Then a relatively small army could stop all movement along the river and force the garrison of Stalingrad to leave the city by blockade.
With any crossing of the river with a fight, the determining factor is not at all the width of the river, although this is important, but the width of the front of the attacker. If the front is wide, by false attempts to cross in several places, the attackers will divert the attention of the enemy, build a bridge on some undefended or weakly defended sector of the enemy’s defense and create a bridgehead. A wide river, such as the Volga, takes longer to cross than a narrow one, so the front for diverting operations must be wider. The Germans first of all had to create such a front. However, they did not do this, but resorted to a direct blow, trying to take the city by bombardment and storm.

The assault began on 15 September. For a whole month, attack followed attack, but the garrison under the command of General Chuikov put up strong resistance, and the Germans were able to achieve only local, or temporary, successes. The extreme idiocy of such a course of action should have become apparent as soon as it became clear that the city could not be taken on the move. A city is not a fortress, but as long as the garrison holds its ground and its supply lines are in place, turning a city into a pile of rubble is nothing short of the easiest way to create an obstacle that is stronger than any of the purpose-built fortresses.
The losses of the German troops in the senseless assaults were so heavy that on October 15, General Goth received an order to stop the attacks and wipe Stalingrad from the face of the earth with systematic artillery fire and air bombardment. What for? Only one answer is possible: to support the prestige of Hitler, for the city was already in ruins. The industry of Stalingrad was destroyed, the Volga was intercepted, the movement of transports up and down the Volga was suspended. Delivery of oil from Baku to Moscow stopped. Consequently, now it only remained to keep the river blocked, the city itself was tactically of no value.
Thus the Germans lost control of the offensive in Russia, and at the same time they were increasingly losing it in North Africa. Many factors create and maintain initiative, but the main factor is to ensure freedom of movement for oneself or, on the contrary, limit this freedom for the enemy. Both in North Africa and in Stalingrad, essentially throughout Russia, there was one common, all-determining factor - the excessive stretching of German communications, plus the difficulties associated with protecting them.
From Egypt, Rommel's communications stretched 1,200 miles to Tripoli and another 1,300 miles in a straight line to the industrial cities of Germany, which supplied his armies. The length of Gotha's communications through Russia was 1000 miles and through Germany to the central regions - 600 miles. In the first case, as long as the British held Malta firmly, they could operate against the lines of communication of Rommel's army; in the second case, while the Russians held Moscow, they had freedom of maneuver against von Hoth's troops, while the Russian partisan detachments forced the Germans to protect every mile of their communications and, consequently, diverted hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the front.
Nevertheless, in the autumn of 1942, Russia's economic situation was desperate, and, were it not for the constant influx of Anglo-American materials through Arkhangelsk, it is doubtful that the Russians would have been able to take advantage of the ridiculous position in which Hitler had placed his armies.
Since June 6, 1941, as a result of the German occupation, the population under the rule of the Soviet government has decreased from 184 million to 126 million, that is, by more than 30%. Russia suffered huge economic losses. Was lost: food resources - 38%, coal and electricity - 50%, iron and steel - 60%, manganese and aluminum - 50%, chemical industry - 33%.
Therefore, the basic idea of ​​Hitler's strategic plan was correct: to strike at the Russian economy, the basis of its military power. Error after error was made in the implementation of the plan. The size of Russia made it impossible to force the enemy into a general battle; Hitler did not understand that first you need to deprive the enemy of mobility and only then occupy important strategic areas. Russians could be deprived of mobility by occupying the center of Russian communications - Moscow. Instead, Hitler, like Charles XII and more so than Napoleon, lost the initiative.
After the great victory at Poltava in 1709, Peter the Great entered Kyiv. A prayer service was served in the Hagia Sophia. The Russian priest Feofan Prokopovich, addressing the tsar and his soldiers, said: “Our neighbors and neighbors will know and say: as if not into our land, but into a certain sea, the forces of the Swane ascended, plunged like tin into the water, and the messenger from them will not return to their homeland” .
This is the secret of Russian power, which Hitler did not take into account in his strategy. It could be undermined only by depriving the Russian armies of mobility, then the space of Russia would turn for them from an ally into a mortal enemy.

The source of information:
Book: World War II. 1939-1945. Strategic and tactical review

Battles of the Third Reich. Memoirs of the highest ranks of the generals of Nazi Germany Liddell Hart Basil Henry

Plans for 1942

Plans for 1942

During the winter, it was necessary to decide what to do next, that is, about plans for the spring. Their discussion began even before the last attempt to take Moscow was made. Blumentritt said the following about this: “Some generals argued that the resumption of the offensive in 1942 was impossible and that it was wiser to stop there. Halder also had great doubts about the continuation of the offensive. Von Rundstedt was even more categorical and insisted on the withdrawal of German troops into Poland. Von Leeb agreed with him. The rest of the generals did not go as far, but still showed concern about the unpredictable results of the campaign. After the removal of von Rundstedt and von Brauchitsch, opposition to Hitler weakened, and the Fuhrer insisted on continuing the offensive.

In early January, Blumentritt became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He worked directly under Halder and knew better than anyone else the motives behind Hitler's decision. He shared with me the following thoughts.

"First. Hitler hoped to achieve in 1942 what he had failed to achieve in 1941. He did not believe that the Russians could increase their forces, and resolutely did not want to see evidence that this was actually happening. There was a "war of opinion" between him and Halder. Our intelligence had information that Russian plants and factories in the Urals and elsewhere were producing 600-700 tanks a month. Hitler glanced at the information presented to him and declared that it was impossible. He never believed in what he did not want to believe.

Second. He did not want to hear anything about the retreat, but he did not know what to do next. At the same time, he felt that he must immediately do something, but this something should have been only an offensive.

Third. Increased pressure from the leading industrialists in Germany. They insisted on continuing the offensive, convincing Hitler that they could not continue the war without Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat.

I asked Blumentritt whether the General Staff considered the validity of these claims and whether it was true that manganese ore, which is located in the Nikopol region, was vital to the German steel industry, as was reported at the time. He first answered the second question, saying that he did not know anything about it, because he was not familiar with the economic aspects of the war. I found it significant that the German military strategists were not familiar with the factors that were to form the basis for the development of operations. He further stated that it was difficult for him to judge the validity of the claims of the industrialists, since representatives of the General Staff were never invited to joint meetings. In my opinion, this is a clear indication of Hitler's desire to keep the military in the dark.

Having made the fateful decision to continue the offensive and penetrate even deeper into Russian territory, Hitler found that he no longer had the forces necessary for an offensive along the entire front, as he had a year ago. Faced with a choice, he hesitated for a long time, but still resisted the temptation to go to Moscow and turned his gaze towards the Caucasian oil fields, not paying attention to the fact that this meant stretching the flank, like a telescopic pipe, past the main forces of the Red Army. In other words, if the Germans got to the Caucasus, they would be vulnerable to a counterattack at any point for nearly a thousand miles.

Another sector where offensive operations were envisaged was the Baltic flank. The plan of 1942 originally envisaged the capture of Leningrad during the summer, thus ensuring reliable communication with Finland and easing the situation of partial isolation in which it was. All units of the North Army Group, as well as the Center Army Group, not engaged in this operation, were to remain in defensive positions.

Specially for the attack on the Caucasus, a special army group "A" was created, commanded by Field Marshal von List. Army Group South, downsized, remained on its left flank. Reichenau succeeded Rundstedt as commander of the latter, but died suddenly of a heart attack in January. Bock became the commander of the army, who was removed before the start of the offensive. Kluge continued to command Army Group Center, and Bush replaced Leeb as commander of Army Group North. Explaining the latter, Blumentritt said: “Field Marshal von Leeb was so dissatisfied with the decision to continue the offensive that he chose to relinquish command. He did not want to participate in the upcoming adventure. This man sincerely considered the upcoming event completely hopeless from a military point of view and, moreover, was an ardent opponent of the Nazi regime. Therefore, he was glad to have an opportunity to resign. In order for the resignation to be allowed, its reason must have seemed to Hitler good enough.

In the course of further discussion of plans for 1942, Blumentritt made several general observations which I think are very important. “My experience in staff work shows that in times of war, fundamental decisions should be made based not on strategic, but on political factors, and not on the battlefield, but in the rear. Debates leading up to a decision are not reflected in operational orders. The documents are not a reliable guide for the historian. People who sign an order often don't think what they put down on paper. It would be wrong to consider the documents found in the archives as reliable evidence of the thoughts and beliefs of this or that officer.

I began to comprehend this truth quite a long time ago, when, under the leadership of General von Heften, I worked on the history of the war of 1914-1918. He was an amazingly conscientious historian and taught me the technique of doing historical research, pointed out the difficulties encountered. But to the end, I understood and realized everything only when I got the opportunity to draw my own observations and conclusions in the process of working in the General Staff under the Nazis.

The Nazi system produced some strange by-products. The German, who has an innate desire for order and organization, is more than anyone else prone to keeping records. But in the course of the last war, a particularly large number of papers came into being. In the old army, it was customary to write short orders, leaving the performers a lot of freedom. In the last war the situation changed, freedom began to be more and more limited. Now the order should describe every step and everything possible options development of events - the only way to save yourself from the penalty. Hence the increase in the number and length of orders - which went against our previous experience. Bombastic command language and exuberance superlatives adjectives fundamentally contradicted the strict old style, the main advantages of which were accuracy and brevity. However, our new orders were supposed to have a propagandistic, stimulating effect. Many orders of the Fuhrer and the command of the Wehrmacht were reproduced verbatim in the orders of lower authorities. Only in this way could we be sure that if things did not go as we would like, we could not be accused of misinterpreting the orders of superiors.

The conditions of coercion in Germany under the Nazis were much the same as in Russia. I have often had the opportunity to verify their similarity. For example, at the very beginning of the Russian campaign, I was present at the interrogation of two high-ranking Russian officers taken prisoner in Smolensk. They made it clear that they did not agree at all with the plans of the command, but were forced to follow orders so as not to lose their heads. Only in such circumstances could people speak freely - in the grip of the regime they were forced to repeat other people's words and hide their thoughts and beliefs.

National Socialism and Bolshevism have much in common. During one of the conversations in narrow circle, which was attended by General Halder, the Fuhrer admitted that he was very jealous of Stalin, who was pursuing a tougher policy towards recalcitrant generals. In addition, Hitler talked a lot about the purge of the command staff of the Red Army carried out before the war. In conclusion, he remarked that he was jealous of the Bolsheviks - they have an army that is thoroughly saturated with their own ideology and therefore acts as a single entity. The German generals did not possess fanatical devotion to the ideas of National Socialism. “They have their own opinion on any issue, they often object, which means they are not completely with me.”

During the course of the war, Hitler often expressed similar thoughts. But he still needed the old professional military, whom he secretly despised, but at the same time he could not do without them, so he tried to control as much as possible. Many orders and reports of that time seemed to have two faces. Quite often a signed document did not reflect the real opinion of the person who signed it. It's just that a person was forced to do this in order to avoid the well-known dire consequences. Future historical researchers - psychologists and scientists - must certainly keep this special phenomenon in mind.