The most dangerous invention of mankind, nuclear weapons, has more than once brought the planet to the brink of destruction. The world was closest to the end of the world in the fall of 1962. The attention of the international community in October was focused on events unfolding in the Caribbean. The confrontation between the two superpowers became the pinnacle of the arms race and the highest point of tension in the Cold War.
Today, the Cuban crisis, as it is called in the United States, is assessed in different ways. Some consider Operation Anadyr to be a brilliant work of Soviet intelligence services and the organization of military supplies, as well as a risky but smart political move, while others condemn Khrushchev for short-sightedness. It is not correct to assert that Nikita Sergeevich foresaw absolutely all the consequences of the decision to place nuclear warheads on Freedom Island. Cunning and experienced political figure probably understood that the reaction from the United States would be decisive.
"Nikolaev" in the port of Casilda. The shadow of the RF-101 Voodoo, the reconnaissance aircraft that took the photo, is visible on the pier
The actions of the Soviet military leadership in Cuba should be considered taking into account the background to the development of the crisis. In 1959, the revolution finally won on the island, and Fidel Castro became the head of state. Cuba did not receive any special support from the USSR during this period, since it was not considered a stable member of the socialist camp. However, already in the 1960s, after the introduction of an economic blockade by the United States, supplies of Soviet oil began to Cuba. In addition, the Soviets become the young communist state's main foreign trade partner. Thousands of specialists in the field have flocked to the country Agriculture and industry, large capital investments began.
The interests of the Union on the island were dictated by far from ideological convictions. The fact is that in 1960 the United States managed to place its nuclear missiles medium-range flight, which caused extreme indignation in Moscow. A successful strategic position allowed the Americans to control vast Soviet territories, including the capital, and the speed of launching and reaching the target for these weapons was minimal.
Cuba was located in close proximity to the US borders, so the deployment of an offensive weapons system with a nuclear charge could to some extent compensate for the resulting superiority in the confrontation. The idea of placing launchers with nuclear missiles on the island belonged directly to Nikita Sergeevich, and was expressed by him on May 20, 1962 to Mikoyan, Malinovsky and Gromyko. Afterwards the idea was supported and developed.
Cuba's interest in placing Soviet military bases on its territory was obvious. From the moment of approval as political leader and head of state, Fidel Castro became a constant target for various kinds of American provocations. They tried to eliminate him, and the United States was openly preparing a military invasion of Cuba. Evidence of this was the albeit unsuccessful attempt to land troops in the Bay of Pigs. The increase in the Soviet contingent and the build-up of weapons on the island gave hope for the preservation of the regime and the sovereignty of the state.
Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy
Having secured Castro's consent, Moscow launched a broad secret operation to transfer nuclear weapons. The missiles and components for their installation and combat readiness were delivered to the island under the guise of trade cargo, unloading was carried out only at night. About forty thousand military men, dressed in civilian clothes, who were strictly forbidden to speak Russian, left for Cuba in the holds of ships. During the trip, the soldiers could not go out into the open air, as the command was seriously afraid of being exposed ahead of schedule. The leadership of the operation was entrusted to Marshal Hovhannes Khachaturyanovich Bagramyan.
Soviet ships unloaded the first missiles in Havana on September 8, the second batch arrived on the 16th of the same month. The captains of the transport ships did not know the nature of the cargo and its destination; before departure, they were given envelopes that they could open only on the high seas. The text of the order indicated the need to proceed to the shores of Cuba and avoid encounters with NATO ships. The bulk of the missiles were deployed in the western part of the island, and the overwhelming majority of the military contingent and specialists were concentrated there. Some of the missiles were planned to be installed in the center, and several in the East. By October 14, forty medium-range nuclear-capable missiles were delivered to the island and installation began.
The actions of the USSR in Cuba were watched warily from Washington. The young American President John Kennedy convened the ex-executive committee of national security every day. Until September 5, the United States sent U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, but they did not bring information about the presence of nuclear weapons. However, it became increasingly difficult to hide further the intentions of the USSR. The length of the rocket together with the tractor was about thirty meters, so their unloading and transportation was noticed by local residents, among whom there were many American agents. However, it seemed to the Americans that assumptions alone were not enough; only photographs taken on October 14 by Lockheed U-2 pilot Heiser left no doubt that Cuba had become one of the strategic Soviet bases equipped with nuclear missiles.
Kennedy considered the Soviet leadership incapable of such decisive action, so the photographs came as something of a surprise. From October 16, reconnaissance planes begin to fly over the island up to six times a day. The committee put forward two main proposals: to begin military action, or to organize a naval blockade of Cuba. Kennedy was immediately critical of the idea of invasion, as he understood that such a thing could provoke the outbreak of World War III. The president could not take responsibility for the consequences of such a decision, therefore American forces were sent to blockade.
The first image of Soviet missiles in Cuba obtained by the Americans. October 14, 1962
The intelligence activities of the Americans in this incident showed their worst side. The information presented by the intelligence services to the president turned out to be far from the truth. For example, the number of USSR military personnel, according to their information, in Cuba was no more than ten thousand people, while the real number long ago exceeded forty thousand. The Americans also did not know that the island had not only medium-range nuclear missiles, but also atomic weapons near-spectrum action. The bombing, which the American military so persistently proposed, could no longer be carried out, since four launchers were ready by October 19. Washington was also within their reach. The landing also threatened with catastrophic consequences, since the Soviet military was ready to use a complex called “Luna”.
The tense situation continued to escalate as neither side was willing to make concessions. For the United States, the deployment of missiles in Cuba was a security issue, but the USSR was also in the crosshairs of the American missile system in Turkey. The Cubans demanded to open fire on reconnaissance aircraft, but were forced to obey the decisions of the USSR.
On October 22, Kennedy made a public statement to the Americans that offensive weapons were indeed being installed in Cuba against the United States, and the government would consider any act of aggression as the beginning of a war. This meant that the world was on the verge of destruction. The international community supported the American blockade, largely due to the fact that the Soviet leadership hid the true meaning of its actions for a long time. However, Khrushchev did not recognize it as legal and stated that fire would be opened on any of the ships that showed aggression towards Soviet maritime transport. The USSR still ordered most of the ships to return to their homeland, but five of them were already approaching their destination, accompanied by four diesel submarines. The submarines carried weapons on board that could destroy most of the American fleet in this region, but the US was not informed about this.
On October 24, one of the ships “Alexandrovsk” landed on the shore, but a telegram was sent to Khrushchev calling for prudence. The day after the scandalous revelation at a UN meeting, the United States issued an order on combat readiness for the first time in history. 2. Any careless action could cause the outbreak of war - the world froze in anticipation. In the morning, Khrushchev sent a conciliatory letter in which he offered to dismantle the missiles in exchange for a US promise to abandon the invasion of Cuba. The situation calmed down somewhat, and Kennedy decided to postpone the start of hostilities.
The crisis escalated again on October 27, when the Soviet leadership put forward an additional demand for the dismantling of American missiles in Turkey. Kennedy and his entourage suggested that a military coup had taken place in the USSR, as a result of which Khrushchev was removed. At this time, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba. Some believe that this was a provocation on the part of the commandant, who advocated a categorical refusal to withdraw weapons from the island, but most call the tragedy the unauthorized actions of Soviet commanders. On October 27, the world came closest to the brink of self-destruction in its entire history.
On the morning of October 28, the Kremlin received an appeal from the United States, which proposed to resolve the conflict peacefully, and the conditions for resolution were Khrushchev’s first proposal. According to unconfirmed reports, the liquidation of the missile complex in Turkey was also verbally promised. In just 3 weeks, the USSR carried out dismantling nuclear installations, and on November 20 the blockade of the island was lifted. A few months later, the Americans dismantled the missiles in Turkey.
Coverage radius of missiles stationed in Cuba: R-14 - large radius, R-12 - medium radius
The most dangerous moment in human history occurred in the twentieth century, but it also marked the end of the arms race. The two superpowers were forced to learn to find a compromise. Modern politicians often try to evaluate the result of the Cuban crisis as a defeat or victory for the Union. From the point of view of the author of this article, draw an unambiguous conclusion in in this case it is forbidden. Yes, Khrushchev was able to achieve the liquidation of the American base in Turkey, but the risk turned out to be too great. The prudence of Kennedy, who was under intense pressure from the Pentagon to start a war, was not calculated in advance. Attempts to maintain a missile base in Cuba could become tragic not only for the Cubans, Americans and Soviet people, but also to destroy all of humanity.
“The skillful actions of US President John Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which broke out exactly 50 years ago, have been elevated to the rank of a central myth.” cold war" It is based on the thesis that Kennedy, thanks to the military superiority of the United States and his steely will, forced Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev to capitulate and remove missiles secretly stationed there from Cuba... According to the myth, Khrushchev lost everything, but Kennedy gave up nothing. Thus, the end of the crisis was the undivided triumph of America and the unconditional defeat of the USSR,” writes the author of the article.
And these theses seem to him “incorrect.” What does he think is “true”?
"Kennedy's victory in a Cold War battle that was controversial both in its course and in its results became a benchmark for American foreign policy." And this is a historical fact!
"She deified military force and willpower, without placing any value on diplomacy of mutual concessions.
She set a standard of toughness and risky confrontation with the villains, which was simply impossible to meet - if only because this victory did not happen.”
Well, what's wrong with that from the point of view of America itself?
“The view of the Cuban Missile Crisis—that Kennedy succeeded without retreating an inch—has become entrenched in political thinking... It (sic!) still manifests itself today, half a century later, in worries about concessions to Iran over its nuclear weapons or the Taliban in the context of their role in Afghanistan.
American leaders don't like to compromise. And this has a lot to do with the entrenched misunderstanding of those 13 days in October 1962.”
Wow! It turns out that Kennedy, or rather, the algorithm he proposed for resolving the Caribbean, the most deadly crisis, is to blame for how the Yankees are leaving Afghanistan and how they behave with Iran?! We found the last...
“In fact, the crisis did not end in a fiasco of Soviet diplomacy, but in mutual concessions,” notes the author of Foreign Policy. – The Soviets withdrew their missiles from Cuba in exchange for a US promise not to invade Fidel Castro Island and to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
The fact is that the American authorities for a long time kept secret the agreements with Khrushchev on the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The American government could not admit to its citizens that it had “showed weakness” to the Soviets in October 1962!
“From the very beginning, Kennedy's people did everything they could to hide the Jupiter concession. On October 27, Robert Kennedy told USSR Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin the following: “We will remove the Jupiters, but this part of the deal is not subject to disclosure.” The secret was kept for 16 years (!) until a paragraph about this fact appeared in the book of Arthur Schlesinger, who worked on John Kennedy’s team.
Kennedy's advisers then published an article on the 20th anniversary of the crisis, in which they acknowledged the Jupiter clause of the agreement. However, they did this in a way to downplay its significance, saying that Kennedy had already decided to remove the Jupiters from Turkey by that time.
They acknowledged that the secrecy surrounding the Jupiter portion of the deal was so important that any leak "would have a devastating impact on the security of the United States and its allies."
These Kennedy advisers, by keeping the Jupiter guarantees secret, misled their colleagues, compatriots, successors and other allies into the erroneous conclusion that “standing firm on that Black Saturday was enough,” the author writes. "Foreign Policy".
Let us note in passing that many claims can be made against the Americans, but what they cannot be denied is the creation and maintenance of political myths that work for the image of an indestructible America!
The very fact of exposing this part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev deal “would have caused considerable confusion in NATO, where it would have been perceived as a betrayal of Turkey,” writes Foreign Policy.
Robert Kennedy even told Anatoly Dobrynin that these fears were for him main reason, according to which the deal was to remain secret. A. Dobrynin telegraphed Bobby’s words to Moscow: “If such a decision were announced now, it would seriously split NATO.”
These are the stakes around simply announcing the fact of a compromise on the part of the United States!
“Why didn’t the USSR organize a leak?” - asks the American author.
So the USSR did not make a secret of this. It’s just that the “iron curtain,” as the information blockade was called then, closed not only the Soviet Union from the West - the West had its own “iron curtain”, which closed it from the influence of the USSR. And that is why they did not allow Moscow to leak information that the United States, as part of the agreements, had removed its missiles from Turkey.
Even the students of MGIMO, where I studied in those years, knew about this. And Moscow made no secret of this “exchange.” Therefore, I am quite surprised by such assessments heard today in the Foreign Policy article. By the way, it’s time to name its author - this, by the way, is a famous American figure, honorary president of the Council on Foreign Relations Leslie H. Gelb.
As Leslie Gelb himself suggested, "Khrushchev never considered the possibility of a leak because he could not know how the crisis would be presented later - how weak it would appear."
Let's leave such an assessment to Mr. Gelb's conscience. But I never heard that the USSR then looked like a “weakling” in someone’s foreign eyes. But I remember how the Americans and NATO members jumped up when Khrushchev told them: “We will bury you” and threatened them with “Kuzka’s mother,” and even hit him with his boot at the UN. And where is the “weakling” here?
This is how Americans lull themselves to sleep: “We are, they say, stronger than everyone else.” They forget that this has already happened in history: “Deutschland Uber Alles”...
“Politicians, as a rule, are not delighted by the idea of compromise, especially if we're talking about about US foreign policy. The myth of the Cuban Missile Crisis increased arrogance. Myth, not reality, has become the yardstick for negotiating with adversaries.”
A stunning confession on the pages of America's leading foreign policy magazine from the mouth of the President of the Council for international relations, former employee Pentagon!
Since the early 1960s, “few people have been willing to expose themselves by offering even mild compromises with their opponents.”
“To openly admit today that Iran can, under strict control, enrich uranium to militarily insignificant percentages is political suicide, although such enrichment is permitted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapons“,” writes L. Gelb frankly.
“Barack Obama's team is negotiating with the Taliban, and its demands are absolute - the Taliban must lay down their arms and accept the Kabul constitution. No serious exchange of concessions seems possible.”
This is how the attitudes of 50 years ago are “played out” in modern politics.
And at the end of the article, Leslie Gelb simply delivers a “verdict”:
"Too long foreign policy The US emphasized threats and confrontation and minimized the role of compromise.
Yes, compromise is not always a solution, and sometimes it’s completely wrong decision. But politicians of all stripes must be able to openly and fearlessly explore the possibility of compromise, weighing it against alternatives.”
This is the lesson Americans learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In any case, in the editorial office of Foreign Policy magazine...
55 years have passed since the world found itself on the brink of nuclear war. These historical events called the Cuban Missile Crisis. What did the whole world learn from 1962? Did you manage to unravel the mystery of the assassination of US President John Kennedy and figure out why the resignation of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev occurred? And what, many years later, did Obama not manage to finish?
Caribbean crisis The 1962 conflict between the USSR and the USA not only brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, but also caused a change in the leaders of both states. On November 22, 1963, the 35th President of the United States of America, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, was assassinated in Dallas. Singleton Lee Harvey Oswald was accused of murder. But growing evidence suggests that this was a planned plot involving the CIA and senior Pentagon officials. It is believed that they could not forgive John Kennedy for his weaknesses in resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Many could not forgive Kennedy for bringing relations with the Soviet Union to such an acute state, says Natalya Tsvetkova, Doctor of Historical Sciences. - And also the fact that America showed itself to be the losing side. Because it was Kennedy who first picked up the phone to call Khrushchev. And the words “I agree that we will remove missiles from Turkey if you remove yours from Cuba” came from Kennedy. Many experts believe that this was one of the reasons for his murder a year later.
And in the fall of 1964, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was removed from all posts. He was removed from the political arena by his own associates, who became afraid to live under the unpredictable and adventuristic policies of their leader. The Cuban missile crisis was not the last reason that pushed the members of the Central Committee to a desperate step - the removal of the party leader from power.
Khrushchev “went down the drain,” says Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladimir Fortunatov. - And the only winner in this game was the Cuban leader Fidel Castro. According to various estimates, he received up to 37 billion dollars, and then safely ruled the country until 2006. True, there is an opinion that only Fidel Castro himself won, and the Cuban people lost very much, since life did not get better under him.
In fact, in the early days after the revolution and Fidel’s coming to power, Cuba did not evoke much sympathy from the Soviet Union. The fact is that Fidel Castro was not a communist in the Soviet sense; most likely he could be considered a Cuban nationalist, a Latin American freedom fighter. And at first they didn’t convert to the USSR special attention to Cuba, it was believed that it was too close to the United States and was a country with little prospects.
This is what he says Doctor of Historical Sciences Natalya Tsvetkova:
When Fidel Castro hatched as a leader who wanted to overthrow bloody regime Batistas in Cuba, he contacted the CIA. Many colorful stories are associated with this period, films have been made, books have been written. He had agents, connections, and some women: many of the beauties around him were connected to the CIA. Through these channels, information reached President Dwight Eisenhower that Fidel Castro would like to meet with him and receive help to eliminate the Batista regime. The United States faced the prospect of getting its leader on this island in his person. And here Eisenhower made a mistake - he did not help Castro, deciding to support Batista to the end. His famous phrase is: “He’s a son of a bitch, of course, but he’s our son of a bitch!”
As is known, the American authorities several times attempted to overthrow Fidel Castro by force, says Ivan Tsvetkov, associate professor of the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University. - The CIA and other agencies have already put plans for eliminating Fidel Castro on John Kennedy’s desk by October 1962. Of course, this information was only at the level of rumors, but Castro himself felt very uncomfortable.
Historians believe that the immediate cause of the Cuban crisis was Khrushchev’s sharp reaction to the deployment of American missiles in Turkey. By becoming a NATO member, Turkey gave the Americans the opportunity to open their bases on the border with the USSR, and the flight time for American missiles to strategic targets in our country was 10 minutes.
Tells Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladimir Fortunatov:
On May 20, 1962, Khrushchev held a meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Anastas Mikoyan and Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky. He outlined his idea: in response to Fidel Castro’s requests for an increase in military presence, to place nuclear weapons on Cuban territory as a counterweight to American missiles in Turkey.
Thus, the decision was made to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. It seemed to Khrushchev that this would be a good subject for further blackmail and bargaining with the Americans.
The operation was prepared in deep secrecy. For camouflage, the soldiers were even given winter sheepskin coats and hats to confirm the name of Operation Anadyr. The executioner of Novocherkassk, General Pliev, was appointed to command the troops in Cuba. The most difficult thing was to camouflage missiles and other heavy equipment from American reconnaissance aircraft.
In almost three months, one and a half hundred voyages of merchant ships were made, which transported weapons and combat units of the army to Cuba: they were supposed to protect, “in case of anything,” our nuclear weapons from the Americans. The missiles were serviced and guarded by more than 40 thousand Soviet troops. The secrecy was absolute. Even now it is difficult to understand how the CIA and all US military intelligence missed the transfer of such a large military contingent across the Atlantic.
“The CIA warned the US President that Russian submarines could come to Cuba,” says Natalya Tsvetkova. - There were even guesses about the possible installation of Soviet ballistic missiles. But President Kennedy did not believe this. Well, it can’t be that a few dozen miles from the state of Florida, the Russians would decide to do this! He did not believe that Khrushchev could be like today's Trump. But by August 1962, the first photographs appeared indicating that Soviet submarines and ballistic missiles were already stationed in Cuba.”
The Americans received reliable data about the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba in mid-October 1962, when their U-2 reconnaissance aircraft photographed missiles deployed in combat positions.
The Americans realized it quite late, when the missiles had already been delivered and installed, says Vladimir Fortunatov. - Fidel Castro proudly said that Cuba went a meter under water under the weight of Soviet weapons! On October 14, an American reconnaissance aircraft piloted by US Air Force Major Richard Heiser took off from a military air base in California, flew over Cuba and photographed the missiles. On October 15, analysts determined what kind of missiles they were, and on October 16, at 8:45 a.m., the photographs were shown to the president. After this, American Air Force flights over Cuba became 90 times more frequent!
According to international laws, the USSR could place its missiles anywhere, but the operation was so secret that even Soviet diplomats did not know about it.
On October 22, 1962, US President John Kennedy addressed the nation. “My compatriots. With a heavy heart and in fulfillment of my oath of office, I have ordered the United States Air Force to begin conventional military action to wipe out the nuclear missiles stationed in Cuba."
He demanded that the USSR withdraw its missiles and announced the establishment of a naval blockade around Cuba. A real panic began in America, people frantically hid in shelters. The most acute phase of the Caribbean Missile Crisis has begun.
Fidel Castro believed that from October 27 to 28 a massive attack on Cuba and the bombing of Soviet military bases would begin, says Vladimir Fortunatov. - He suggested that Khrushchev launch a preventive nuclear strike on the United States and said that the Cuban people were ready to sacrifice themselves to the cause of victory over American imperialism.
No ship could now enter Cuban ports without being inspected by American inspectors. 180 US Navy ships surrounded Cuba and the blockade of Liberty Island began. The armed forces of both states were brought to a state of full combat readiness. This meant that NATO planes received permission to fly to Moscow and drop bombs. The world was on the brink of nuclear war. Relations between states through official channels were terminated.
“At this time, a very important event is happening related to the activities of the special services,” says Vladimir Fortunatov. “Our intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov, who at that time acted under the name Fomin, met with a correspondent of one of the American television companies.”
Alexander Semenovich Feklisov - legendary Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of Russia. At that time, he was in the United States under the name Fomin and met with BBC columnist John Skyley, an American journalist and unofficial representative of the Kennedy clan.
Already on the second of October, when they discussed possible consequences of this conflict, Alexander Semenovich said that when the United States bombed Cuba, the Soviet Union would have the opportunity to introduce its tanks into the territory of West Berlin, says Candidate of Historical Sciences Oksana Zaitseva.
After the crisis was resolved, Skyley claimed that it was Feklisov who proposed the terms for resolving the conflict. Feklisov himself said that they were simply discussing possible options development of the situation.
In a conversation with the Soviet resident, Skyley said that the United States was ready to end Cuba within 48 hours, and that its troops were in full readiness. In response, Feklisov, on his own initiative, said that the USSR was capable of striking back at another vulnerable place, for example, at West Berlin, which at that time was pain point for the USSR.
This is how he remembers this historical conversation: Alexander Feklisov:
“Skyly twitched and said:
Yes, all NATO troops will defend Berlin!
And who will come to the defense? A thousand American soldiers? Or a battalion of English? Or a French company? Yes soviet tanks they will come in thousands, and above them there will be bombers and attack aircraft. Motorized infantry is behind. Yes, they will sweep away everything without stopping, it won’t even take 24 hours!
So does this mean war is inevitable?
Everything depends on our leaders!”
This information was reported to John Kennedy on the same day. On his instructions, Skyley again met with Feklisov and conveyed the American conditions for resolving the Cuban missile crisis. Here's how it went according to Alexander Feklisov:
“We met again, ordered coffee, and without any preamble he said: here, the American side is offering following conditions. I write down what he says and ask the question: “I don’t understand what the highest power in the United States is?” He minted: “President of the United States John Fitzgerald Kennedy!”
On October 28, 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis was over. The Americans fulfilled all agreements and quietly withdrew their missiles from Turkey. The Soviet leadership could relax. Both Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev tried to appropriate for themselves all the laurels of the winners, smart and sober politicians.
Soviet lecturers from the Central Committee explained the crisis in this way, says Vladimir Feliksov. - In the USA there is such a game - a duel: two cars accelerate and rush towards each other. Whoever turns away is a weakling. According to American ideologists, in this case both sides decided to play the weakling, turned away in time, and this saved the world.
55 years have passed since the Cuban Missile Crisis. After him, a telephone line began to operate between the leaders of the two countries. hotline. The crisis has taught our and American politicians that, with mutual desire, it is possible to reach agreement on any issue without resorting to the last atomic argument. But few people know that such a crisis could happen in our time, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia, under President Obama.
“People who are thinking about turning to nuclear weapons should remember the Cuban missile crisis,” says Vladimir Fortunatov. “Many people believe that in March 2014, after Crimea became part of Russia, Obama had an idea not to Should I bang around Russia? But they explained to him that in Russia there is a Dead Hand or Dead Hand system, and a retaliatory strike from Russia would cause unacceptable damage to America.”
“Imagining that the exit from the crisis marks new era world, completely wrong! The author of this phrase is Fred Kaplan, a military writer for Slate magazine and the creator of the book "Dark Territory."
US President John Kennedy with USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office of the White House.
Photo from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston. 1962
October 14 marked the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis, which in the United States is called the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in Cuba - the October Crisis. During this period, the confrontation between the nuclear giants - the USSR and the USA - reached the extreme point of the Cold War. The world has quite realistically looked into the eyes of an impending nuclear catastrophe. The events that took place then were repeatedly studied by Western and Russian scientists. The National Security Archives (NSA), based in Washington, D.C., recently released more than four dozen top secret documents showing that the White House was seriously preparing to attack Cuba.
QUESTION
The emergence of a crisis in relations between the United States and the CCCP was explained by the Soviet government as a US response to the deployment of American PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles in Turkey. In 1961, 15 of these single-stage liquid-propellant rockets were installed on five starting installations around the city of Izmir. Their maintenance was carried out by Turkish specialists, but the nuclear warheads were controlled and equipped by US military personnel. IRBMs could hit targets located at a distance of up to 2.5 thousand km, and the power of their nuclear charge was almost one and a half megatons.
The deployment of US missile launchers in Turkey caused boundless indignation among Soviet leaders. American missiles were highly mobile at that time, and their pre-launch preparation took only 15 minutes. In addition, the flight time of these MRBMs was less than 10 minutes and the United States received the opportunity to deliver a sudden and extremely destructive strike on the western part of the USSR, including Moscow and the main industrial centers. Therefore, the leaders of the Soviet Union decided to give an adequate response to America and secretly install their own nuclear missiles in Cuba, which would be capable of hitting strategic targets almost throughout the entire United States.
Nikita Khrushchev, who was then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, officially expressed his categorical indignation at the installation of American MRBMs in Turkey. Later, in his memoirs, he wrote that the sending of nuclear missiles and Il-28 strategic bombers to Cuba was the first time that Soviet nuclear weapons carriers left the territory of the USSR.
Recalling those times, Khrushchev noted that the idea of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba first came to him in 1962 during a visit to Bulgaria. One of the members of the delegation, which Khrushchev headed, pointed him to the Black Sea and said that there were American missiles with nuclear warheads capable of striking the main industrial centers of the USSR within 15 minutes.
Nikita Sergeevich, who was an extremely emotional and overly categorical person, reacted very sharply to the Turkish action of the White House. Immediately after returning from Bulgaria, on May 20, he met with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and Anastas Mikoyan, who was Khrushchev’s confidant and, on his instructions, was involved in foreign policy activities. The head of government invited his colleagues to satisfy Fidel Castro’s constant requests to increase the number of USSR military contingents in Cuba and to deploy nuclear missiles there. The next day, the Defense Council supported Khrushchev's proposal by a majority vote. True, not all of its members agreed with this decision. Mikoyan spoke out most categorically against this action.
The military and foreign policy departments were tasked with ensuring the secret delivery of military contingents, nuclear missiles and other weapons to Liberty Island, which had been under an economic blockade by the United States since 1959.
In late May, the Soviet delegation, which included politicians, military men and diplomats, met with Fidel and Raul Castro. The latter headed the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba. Representatives of the USSR proposed sending Soviet troops into the country. This proposal, as noted by the participants in the negotiations, turned out to be completely unexpected for the Cuban leader and even caused him some confusion. However, members of the delegation managed to convince Fidel of high probability and the extreme danger of American aggression. The next day, Castro agreed to Nikita Khrushchev's plan.
All details of the upcoming operation to transfer troops and equipment were clarified during the visit of Raul Castro, who visited Moscow at the end of June 1962. During this visit, Raul Castro and USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky signed a draft secret “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces on the territory of the Republic of Cuba." This document was compiled by specialists of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Fidel Castro made some amendments to this document, the essence of which was outlined to the Soviet leader by Ernesto Che Guevara, who visited Moscow. On August 27, Khrushchev approved Castro's proposals. The final text of the treaty noted that the USSR “to strengthen its defense capability” in the event of a danger of aggression external forces will send its armed forces to Cuba, which will ensure the maintenance of peace throughout the world.” In the event of military action against Cuba or an attack on Soviet armed forces stationed on the island, the governments of allied countries, using the right of individual or collective defense provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter, will take “all necessary measures to repel aggression.”
ENTRY OF SOVIET TROOPS
Military cooperation between Moscow and Havana began in the spring of 1960. At the beginning of March, the French motor ship Le Couvre, which delivered ammunition purchased in Belgium to Cuba, was blown up in the Havana port. Since then, the United States, the leader in the Western world, has blocked all opportunities for the Cuban government to purchase weapons abroad. Almost immediately after this explosion, the plenum of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee resolved the issue of providing military assistance to Cuba. In July 1960, during a visit to Moscow by Cuban Minister of War Raul Castro, a joint communiqué was signed. This document formulated Moscow's long-term obligations to Havana. The communiqué was open in nature. Only during July of that year, the Soviet leadership twice warned the White House of its readiness to provide Cuba with the necessary military assistance, including direct military participation in the defense of the country.
Supplies of Soviet military equipment were carried out from reserves stored in military warehouses since the Second World War. Havana received about three dozen T-34-85 tanks and SU-100 self-propelled artillery systems.
After the events in the Bay of Pigs and the failure of the final version of the plan for “Operation Zapata” approved on April 4, 1961, as a result of which the forces of the so-called “2506 Brigade”, consisting of specially trained and armed Cuban emigrants, were to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro, the government The USSR adopted a resolution to expand military assistance to Cuba. It was decided to supply arms and military equipment to the island preferential terms. On August 4 and September 30, 1961, corresponding agreements were concluded. The total cost of the supplied weapons was $150 million. At the same time, Cuba had to pay the USSR only $67.5 million. By the end of March 1962, the Cuban Armed Forces received 400 tanks, 40 MiG-15 and MiG-19 fighters, several radar stations and some other types of military property. The Cuban military was trained in the maintenance and operation of Soviet military equipment by Soviet instructors both at deployment sites on the island and at training centers, schools and academies of the USSR Armed Forces.
Group Soviet troops, intended for deployment in Cuba (GSVK), was formed by June 20, 1962. The overall management of the development of the plan for the delivery and deployment of the Soviet military contingent in Cuba was carried out by the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Ivan Bagramyan. The plan was directly drawn up by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Semyon Ivanov, and the Head of the Operations Directorate of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Anatoly Gribkov.
The upcoming operation, which was known to an extremely limited circle of people, was carried out in the strictest confidence. In order to mislead the US leadership and give them the idea that these were just strategic exercises and some civilian action in the northern part of the USSR, the operation was given the name “Anadyr”.
The GSVK was to include a division of strategic missiles (16 launchers and 24 R-14 missiles) and two missile regiments armed with 24 launchers and 36 R-12 missiles. These forces were assigned repair and technical bases, as well as support and maintenance units. The power of nuclear charges that could be delivered to targets during the first launch was 70 Mt. It was planned to use four motorized rifle regiments to cover the missile forces.
In addition, a missile defense division was to be deployed in Cuba, which included 12 launchers with 144 S-75 anti-aircraft missiles, and an anti-aircraft artillery air defense division. In addition, this group included a regiment of front-line MiG-21F-13 fighters.
The GSVK Air Force included a separate aviation squadron, a separate helicopter regiment and two regiments of tactical cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. These regiments were armed with 16 launchers, 12 of which were intended for Luna missiles that had not yet been adopted, and 42 Il-28 light bombers.
The naval component of the group was planned to include a division of ships and a brigade of 11 submarines, 2 floating bases, 2 cruisers, 2 missile and 2 artillery destroyers, a brigade of 12 missile boats, a separate mobile coastal missile regiment armed with Sopka missile systems, a mine-torpedo aviation regiment consisting of 33 Il-28 aircraft, and a detachment of 5 support vessels.
The GSVC was to include a field bakery, 3 hospitals for 1,800 people, a sanitary and anti-epidemic detachment, a transshipment base maintenance company and 7 military equipment warehouses.
The Soviet leadership also planned to deploy the 5th Fleet of the USSR Navy in Cuban harbors, consisting of 26 surface ships, 7 diesel ballistic missile submarines carrying 1 Mt warheads, 4 diesel torpedo submarines and 2 mother ships. The relocation of submarines to Cuba was to take place as part of a separate operation codenamed Kama.
The delivery of troops to Cuba was carried out by ships of the Ministry navy THE USSR. The total strength of the redeployed group of troops was almost 51 thousand personnel and up to 3 thousand civilian personnel. In total, more than 230 thousand tons of military equipment and other materiel were to be transported. According to preliminary estimates by Soviet experts, transporting the missiles, which required at least 70 cargo ships, would take about four months. However, in reality, in July–October 1961, 85 cargo and passenger ships were used to carry out Operation Anadyr, which made 183 voyages to Cuba and back. Anastas Mikoyan later claimed that “we spent $20 million on transport alone.”
However Soviet Union failed to fully realize their plans to create the GSVK, although by October 14, 1962, 40 nuclear missiles and most of the equipment were delivered to Cuba. Having learned about such a large-scale transfer of Soviet troops and equipment to the US borders, the White House announced a “quarantine” of Cuba, that is, the introduction of a naval blockade. The Soviet government was forced to stop carrying out Operation Anadyr. The redeployment of surface ships and submarines to the shores of Liberty Island was also suspended. Ultimately, all these actions of the Soviet government led to the Cuban missile crisis. The world stood on the brink of a third world war for 13 days.
The US Navy patrol plane Neptune is trying to detect containers with Il-28 bombers on board a Soviet cargo ship.
Photo from the book Dictionary of American Naval Aviation Squadrons, Volume 2. 1962
SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
On October 14, 1962, an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, making its next flight over Cuba, in the vicinity of the village of San Cristobal, photographed the deployed positions of the P-12 MRBM. These photographs landed on John Kennedy's desk, provoked a sharp reaction from the president, and gave impetus to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy, almost immediately after receiving the intelligence data, held a closed meeting with a group of his advisers on the problem that had arisen. On October 22, this group of government officials, which in addition to the president included members of the US National Security Council, some advisers and experts, in accordance with Kennedy's National Security Arrangements Memorandum No. 196, received official status and became known as the “Executive Committee” (EXCOMM).
After some time, committee members suggested that the president destroy Soviet missiles with targeted strikes. Another possible action was to carry out a full-scale military operation on the territory of Cuba. As the last reaction of the United States to the actions of the USSR, it was proposed to block the sea approaches to Cuba.
A number of meetings of the executive committee were held in strict secrecy. But on October 22, Kennedy made an open appeal to the American people and announced that the Soviet Union had brought “offensive weapons” to Cuba. After this, a naval blockade of the island was introduced.
As follows from top secret documents from that period recently published by the National Security Archives and from statements by officials close to the president, Kennedy was categorically against the invasion of Cuba because he imagined the dire consequences of this war for all humanity. In addition, he was extremely concerned that a nuclear war could break out in Europe, where America had large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. At the same time, Pentagon generals were very actively preparing for war with Cuba and developing corresponding operational plans. The Kremlin also opposed the military outcome of events.
The President instructed the Pentagon to assess America's possible losses in the event of a war with Cuba. On November 2, 1962, in a memo classified “top secret,” the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four-star army general Maxwell Taylor, who quite actively advocated a military solution to the Cuban problem, wrote to the president in a memo that even if the invasion took place without launching nuclear strikes, then in the first According to the experience of conducting similar operations, the losses of the US Armed Forces during 10 days of combat operations can amount to 18.5 thousand people. He also noted that it is almost impossible to conduct such assessments without data on the combat use of nuclear weapons. The general stressed that in the event of a sudden nuclear strike from the Cuban side, the losses would be enormous, but assured the president that a retaliatory strike would be launched immediately.
Due to the deterioration of interstate relations, Kennedy and Khrushchev began to send each other letters every day, proposing various compromise ways out of the crisis. On October 26, the Soviet government made an official statement. Moscow suggested that Washington abandon the attack on Cuba and restrain its allies from such actions. The Soviet government also stated that if the United States ends the naval blockade of Cuba, the situation around the island will change dramatically. The USSR government expressed its readiness to give guarantees to America that they would stop supplying Cuba with any weapons and would recall Soviet military specialists from the country. This proposal received a positive response in Washington. But even before receiving an official response from the White House, the Kremlin put forward new conditions. The Soviet Union proposed that the United States withdraw Jupiter missiles from Turkey in response to the liquidation of its missile bases in Cuba.
By October 27, tensions between Moscow and Washington reached their highest point. Nikita Khrushchev received a message about the downed U-2 reconnaissance plane and a letter from Fidel Castro that the American invasion of Cuba could begin in the next few days. All this greatly worried the Soviet leader, as events moved steadily towards war. However, the next day, with the White House formally agreeing to most of the Kremlin's proposals, the Soviet Union officially announced its willingness to remove nuclear weapons from Cuba. Thus, the Cuban missile crisis came to an end.
It should be noted that both the USA and the USSR, during the discussion of their positions, used unofficial channels and used intelligence officers, journalists and Soviet and American specialists who simply knew each other well and were close to high-ranking politicians to convey their proposals.
Kennedy tried to resolve the crisis by establishing informal contacts with general secretary UN U Thant, to whom on the evening of October 27 one of his emissaries in New York conveyed a top secret message with a proposal to put pressure on Khrushchev. The President also tried to attract Brazil, which had a good relationship with the Cuban leader, to resolve the crisis situation through negotiations directly with Fidel Castro without the participation of the Soviet side. America wanted to invite Castro to give up Soviet missiles. For this, he was guaranteed the establishment of good neighborly relations with the United States and other Western countries. But this initiative of the president lost its meaning, since the Brazilian emissary General Albino Silva, who was authorized to convey Washington’s proposals to Castro, arrived in Havana on October 29, that is, a day after the USSR’s decision to remove its missiles from Cuba.
On October 28, 1962, the USSR Minister of Defense issued a directive on the dismantling of missile launch sites and the transfer of personnel to the Soviet Union. Within a month, all missiles and Il-28 bombers were removed from Cuba. A small contingent of officers, sergeants and soldiers of the Strategic Missile Forces and some auxiliary units remained in Cuba. Then it was decided to transfer the imported weapons and military equipment of the Army, Air Defense, Navy and Air Force to the Cuban army. Within 10 months, the MiG-21, MiG-15uti, Yak-12 and An-2 aircraft were transferred to the Cuban Armed Forces; Mi-4 helicopters; missile boats of the Komar type and a number of other weapons.
ASSESSMENTS OF OVERSEAS EXPERTS
The latest assessments of this crisis were made in the work made available to the general public by the leading US nuclear weapons specialist of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Robert Norris, and the director of the FAS nuclear information program, Hans Christensen.
Scientists note that in the tens of thousands of pages devoted to the analysis of these events, only some types of weapons are considered and the entire military potential of the opposing sides is not assessed. In their opinion, the crisis was much more dangerous than many experts believe. This is due to the fact that during these events, hostilities could begin due to someone’s mistake, miscalculation or misinterpretation of instructions from the leadership. They claim that by the time the naval blockade of Cuba began on October 24, 1962, 158 Soviet nuclear warheads of five types had already been delivered to the island. American intelligence had no idea about this.
Robert McNamara, who was the US Secretary of Defense during the crisis and took an active part in its settlement, wrote in a letter to General Anatoly Gribkov, who at that time represented the USSR Defense Ministry in the US, in 1997: “The USA believed that the USSR never exported and will not remove nuclear warheads from its territory. In 1989 we learned that this was not the case. At that time, the CIA claimed that there were no nuclear weapons in Cuba... The CIA reported that there were 10 thousand Soviet military personnel on the island; at the Moscow conference we learned that there were 43 thousand of them there... Only in 1992 did we learn that there were There were also tactical warheads.”
Scientists estimate that of all these warheads, only 95–100 units could be used, since only a portion of the R-14 missiles were delivered to Cuba, and of all the delivered R-12 MRBMs, only 6–8 missiles were in combat readiness. Several Il-28 bombers were in a state of assembly, and the rest were packed in containers. The greatest danger to the US Armed Forces was posed by two regiments of FRK-1 Meteor cruise missiles, which were equipped with 80 nuclear warheads and could strike the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay and an assault landing force.
According to experts, it is still unknown whether the OKNSh edited its nuclear plans in connection with the proposed invasion of Cuba, although there is evidence that this issue was considered by the generals. But on October 31, they decided not to use nuclear weapons in this operation. The question remains unclear as to whether the commander of the GSVK, General Issa Pliev, had the authority to make a decision at his own discretion on the use of Luna and FRK-1 missiles in nuclear warheads. All this, according to scientists, requires further research.
During the crisis, US strategic forces had significantly greater power and were more reliable than their counterparts in the USSR. America had 3.5 thousand nuclear weapons, with a total capacity of 6.3 thousand Mt, 1,479 bombers and 182 ballistic missiles.
Only 42 Soviet ICBMs in service could reach US territory. The Soviet Union had 150 long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. However, to achieve their goal, they would have to overcome the US-Canadian air defense system, which was quite effective. In the early 90s, Army General Anatoly Gribkov said that Khrushchev and his military advisers knew that the United States had 17 times the USSR's nuclear power.
As American experts note, the Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded at the very early stages of the nuclear arms race, when each of the warring parties was relatively immature in nuclear terms. The US nuclear forces were built on the principle of creating a barrier of intimidation in the path of the main enemy - the USSR. The security of America itself was then in second place. But it was the Cuban Missile Crisis that gave impetus to the process of subsequent negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
Caribbean crisis - a difficult situation on the world stage, which emerged in 1962 and consisted of a particularly tough confrontation between the USSR and the USA. In this situation, for the first time, the danger of war with the use of nuclear weapons loomed over humanity. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was a grim reminder that with the advent of nuclear weapons, war could lead to the destruction of all humanity. This event is one of the brightest events
The Caribbean crisis, the causes of which are hidden in the confrontation between two systems (capitalist and socialist), the imperialist policies of the United States, and the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Latin America, had its own background. In 1959, the revolutionary movement in Cuba was victorious. Batista, a dictator who pursued pro-American policies, was overthrown, and a patriotic government led by Fidel Castro came to power. Among Castro's supporters there were many communists, for example, the legendary Che Guevara. In 1960, Castro's government nationalized American businesses. Naturally, the US government was extremely dissatisfied with the new regime in Cuba. Fidel Castro declared that he was a communist and established relations with the USSR.
Now the USSR had an ally located in close proximity to its main enemy. Socialist transformations were carried out in Cuba. Economic and political cooperation began between the USSR and Cuba. In 1961, the US government near Playa Giron landed troops consisting of opponents of Castro who emigrated from Cuba after the victory of the revolution. It was assumed that American aviation would be used, but the United States did not use it; in fact, the United States abandoned these troops to their fate. As a result, the landing troops were defeated. After this incident, Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for help.
The head of the USSR at that time was N. S. Khrushchev.
Having learned that the United States wanted to violently overthrow the Cuban government, he was ready for the most drastic measures. Khrushchev suggested that Castro deploy nuclear missiles. Castro agreed to this. In 1962, Soviet nuclear missiles were secretly stationed in Cuba. American military reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba spotted the missiles. Khrushchev initially denied their presence in Cuba, but the Cuban Missile Crisis grew. Reconnaissance planes took pictures of the missiles, these pictures were presented. From Cuba, nuclear missiles could fly to the United States. On October 22, the US government announced a naval blockade of Cuba. The USSR and the USA were exploring options for the use of nuclear weapons. The world was practically on the brink of war. Any sudden and thoughtless actions could lead to dire consequences. In this situation, Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to come to an agreement.
The following conditions were accepted: the USSR removes nuclear missiles from Cuba, the USA removes its nuclear missiles from Turkey (an American missile was located in Turkey, which was capable of reaching the USSR) and leaves Cuba alone. This was the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The missiles were taken away and the US blockade was lifted. The Cuban missile crisis had important consequences. It showed how dangerous the escalation of a small armed conflict can be. Humanity has clearly begun to understand the impossibility of having winners in nuclear war. In the future, the USSR and the USA will avoid direct armed confrontation, preferring economic, ideological and other levers. Countries dependent on the United States have now realized the possibility of victory in the national liberation struggle. It has now become difficult for the United States to overtly intervene in countries whose governments do not align their interests with those of the United States.
