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» Livonian War 1558 1583 summary. Reasons for the start of the Livonian War. Background of the Livonian War

Livonian War 1558 1583 summary. Reasons for the start of the Livonian War. Background of the Livonian War


Since 1503, there was a 50-year truce with the Livonian Order with the payment of the Yuriev tribute.

In 1554 it was extended for another 15 years.

In the Baltics, the interests of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania, Sweden, Poland, Denmark and Russia collided.

Reasons for starting Livonian War

1) weakening of the order;

2) suitable for local distribution of land;

3) opportunities for expanding foreign trade (not so much the merchants as the tsar are interested in this, since sales are needed from the palace volosts);

4) hope to weaken the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

Russian diplomatic miscalculation

They defeated Sweden in 1554-57, and considered that it was weakened.

They decided that a union between Sweden and Denmark was impossible.

They decided that Lithuania would be neutral, since in 1556 the truce was extended for six years.

In 1558, accusing Livonia of non-payment of the Yuryev tribute, Moscow was the first to start a war.

Stage 1. 1558 - 1560 - commanded by M.V. Glinsky and Shah-Ali Kazansky. Almost all of Livonia is occupied. The Master of the Order is in captivity. Hasty distribution of estates → discontent of the population.

The Polish king Sigismund II Augustus agreed with the new Livonian master on the vassal dependence of the order on Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. He left the territory of Courland for himself. Part of the Livonian territories went to Denmark (Esel Island) and Sweden (northern Estonia). → new opponents do not intend to give up their possessions to Moscow.

And so - there is no Livonian Order, and the war has become much more dangerous, since the opponents are strong.

Stage 2. 1561 - 1577 - Ivan 4 himself commanded.

The Russians suffer defeats on the territory of Belarus (Polotsk, Orsha).

Kurbsky's betrayal.

Repeated negotiations for a truce have failed.

Actions on the Baltic coast are unsuccessful.

1570 - Russia achieved the proclamation of the Livonian Kingdom. The Danish Duke Magnus became its king.

This year began a five-year period of kinglessness in Poland. Ivan 4 lays claim to the Polish throne.

But in 1575 Stefan Batory became king of Poland.

In 1577, the Russians retook many Livonian fortresses and pushed back the troops of Stefan Batory.

Stage 3. 1578 – 1583

Russian transition to defensive tactics. The Lithuanian troops were replaced by stronger Polish ones. Magnus defected to Poland.

Since 1579, hostilities moved to Russian lands

1579 - Batory's first campaign.

1580 – Batory’s second campaign

1583 - Batory's third campaign.

The Russians lost Polotsk, Sokol, Velikiye Luki, Toropets.

Pskov is under siege. Ivan Petrovich Shuisky was able to hold the fortress.

The Swedes began to advance.

1581 - The Swedes took Narva.

Negotiation.

1582 – Yam-Zapolsky truce with Poland for 10 years. Russia abandoned Livonia, Polotsk, Velizh.

1583 – Truce of Plyus with Sweden. Russia abandoned Yam, Koporye, Ivan Gorod and conquered the territory of Finland.

The outcome of the war is the complete defeat of Moscow.

Until 1584 - hope for an alliance with England to continue the war.

Causes of defeat :

1) lack of internal resources;

2) diplomatic isolation;

3) internal political instability → inconsistency of command.

Consequences of defeat

Deepening economic and political crisis.

Relations with Western Europe after the Livonian War.

1586 - S. Batory died and Fyodor Ioanovich laid claim to the Polish throne. Lost to Prince Sigismund of Sweden.

1590 – 1595 – war with Sweden. Tsar Fedor and the queen were in Novgorod. The command was F. Mstislavsky and D. Khvorostinin. Yam is taken. Narva is besieged.

1595 – Treaty of Tyavzin. Yam, Ivan Gorod, Koporye, Korela were returned.



Main directions foreign policy The Russian centralized state emerged in the second half of the 15th century, under Grand Duke Ivan III. They boiled down, firstly, to the struggle on the eastern and southern borders with the Tatar khanates that arose on the ruins of the Golden Horde; secondly, to the struggle with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland associated with it by the bonds of the union for the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian lands captured by Lithuanian and partly Polish feudal lords; thirdly, to the struggle on the northwestern borders with the aggression of the Swedish feudal lords and the Livonian Order, who sought to isolate Russian state from the natural and convenient access it needs to the Baltic Sea.

For centuries, the struggle on the southern and eastern outskirts was a common and constant thing. After the collapse of the Golden Horde, the Tatar khans continued to raid the southern borders of Russia. And only in the first half of the 16th century, a long war between the Great Horde and the Crimea absorbed the forces of the Tatar world. Moscow's protege has established itself in Kazan. The alliance between Russia and Crimea lasted for several decades, until the Crimeans destroyed the remnants of the Great Horde. The Ottoman Turks, having subjugated the Crimean Khanate, became a new military force that the Russian state faced in this region. After the Crimean Khan attacked Moscow in 1521, the Kazan people broke vassal relations with Russia. The struggle for Kazan began. Only the third campaign of Ivan IV was successful: Kazan and Astrakhan were taken. Thus, by the mid-50s of the 16th century, a zone of its political influence had formed to the east and south of the Russian state. In her person a strength grew that could resist the Crimea and the Ottoman Sultan. The Nogai horde actually submitted to Moscow, and its influence in the North Caucasus increased. Following the Nogai Murzas, the Siberian Khan Ediger recognized the power of the tsar. The Crimean Khan was the most active force holding back Russia's advance to the south and east.

The foreign policy question that has arisen seems natural: should we continue the onslaught on the Tatar world, should we finish the struggle, the roots of which go back to the distant past? Is the attempt to conquer Crimea timely? Two different programs collided in Russian foreign policy. The formation of these programs was determined

international circumstances and the balance of political forces within the country. The elected Rada considered a decisive fight against Crimea timely and necessary. But she did not take into account the difficulties of implementing this plan. Vast expanses of the “wild field” separated what was then Russia from Crimea. Moscow did not yet have any strongholds along this path. The situation spoke more in favor of defense than offensive. In addition to military difficulties, there were also great political difficulties. Entering into conflict with Crimea and Turkey, Russia could count on an alliance with Persia and German Empire. The latter was under constant threat of Turkish invasion and lost a significant part of Hungary. But at the moment much higher value had the position of Poland and Lithuania, who saw in the Ottoman Empire a serious counterweight to Russia. The joint struggle of Russia, Poland and Lithuania against Turkish aggression was associated with serious territorial concessions in favor of the latter. Russia could not abandon one of the main directions in foreign policy: reunification with the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands. The program of struggle for the Baltic states seemed more realistic. Ivan the Terrible disagreed with his parliament, deciding to go to war against the Livonian Order and try to advance to the Baltic Sea. In principle, both programs suffered from the same flaw - impracticability at the moment, but at the same time both were equally urgent and timely. However, before the start of hostilities in the western direction, Ivan IV stabilized the situation on the lands of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, suppressing the rebellion of the Kazan Murzas in 1558 and thereby forcing the Astrakhan ones to submit.

Even during the existence of the Novgorod Republic, Sweden began to penetrate the region from the west. The first serious skirmish concerns XII century. At the same time, the German knights began to implement their political doctrine - the “March to the East”, a crusade against the Slavic and Baltic peoples with the aim of converting them to Catholicism. In 1201 Riga was founded as a stronghold. In 1202, the Order of the Sword Bearers was founded specifically for actions in the Baltic states, which conquered Yuryev in 1224. Having suffered a series of defeats from Russian forces and the Baltic tribes, the Swordsmen and Teutons formed the Livonian Order. The intensified advance of the knights was stopped during 1240 - 1242. In general, peace with the order in 1242 did not protect against hostilities with the crusaders and Swedes in the future. The knights, relying on the help of the Roman Catholic Church, captured a significant part of the Baltic lands at the end of the 13th century.

Sweden, having its interests in the Baltic states, was able to intervene in Livonian affairs. The Russian-Swedish war lasted from 1554 to 1557. Attempts by Gustav I Vasa to involve Denmark, Lithuania, Poland and the Livonian Order in the war against Russia did not yield results, although initially it was

The order pushed the Swedish king to fight the Russian state. Sweden lost the war. After the defeat, the Swedish king was forced to pursue an extremely cautious policy towards his eastern neighbor. True, the sons of Gustav Vasa did not share their father’s wait-and-see attitude. Crown Prince Eric hoped to establish complete Swedish dominance in Northern Europe. It was obvious that after the death of Gustav, Sweden would again take an active part in Livonian affairs. To some extent, Sweden's hands were tied by the aggravation of Swedish-Danish relations.

The territorial dispute with Lithuania had a long history. Before the death of Prince Gediminas (1316 - 1341), Russian regions accounted for more than two-thirds of the entire territory of the Lithuanian state. Over the next hundred years, under Olgerd and Vytautas, the Chernigov-Seversk region (the cities of Chernigov, Novgorod - Seversk, Bryansk), the Kiev region, Podolia (the northern part of the lands between the Bug and the Dniester), Volyn, and the Smolensk region were conquered.

Under Vasily III, Russia laid claim to the throne of the Principality of Lithuania after the death in 1506 of Alexander, whose widow was the Russian sovereign’s sister. In Lithuania, a struggle began between the Lithuanian-Russian and Lithuanian Catholic groups. After the latter's victory, Alexander's brother Sigismund ascended the Lithuanian throne. The latter saw in Vasily a personal enemy who laid claim to the Lithuanian throne. This exacerbated already strained Russian-Lithuanian relations. In such a situation, the Lithuanian Sejm in February 1507 decided to start a war with its eastern neighbor. Lithuanian ambassadors in the form of an ultimatum raised the question of the return of lands that passed to Russia during the last wars with Lithuania. It was not possible to achieve positive results in the negotiation process, and military operations began in March 1507. In 1508, in the Principality of Lithuania itself, the uprising of Prince Mikhail Glinsky, another contender for the throne of Lithuania, began. The rebellion received active support in Moscow: Glinsky was accepted into Russian citizenship, in addition, he was given an army under the command of Vasily Shemyachich. Glinsky conducted military operations with varying success. One of the reasons for the failures was the fear of the popular movement of Ukrainians and Belarusians who wanted to reunite with Russia. Not having sufficient funds to successfully continue the war, Sigismund decided to begin peace negotiations. On October 8, 1508, the “eternal peace” was signed. According to it, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the first time officially recognized the transfer to Russia of the Seversky cities annexed to the Russian state during the wars of the late 15th - early XVI i.v. But despite some success, the government Vasily III did not consider the war of 1508 to be a solution to the issue of Western Russian lands and considered the “eternal peace” as a respite, preparing for the continuation of the struggle. The ruling circles of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were also not inclined to come to terms with the loss of the Seversky lands.

But in the specific conditions of the mid-16th century, a direct clash with Poland and Lithuania was not envisaged. The Russian state could not count on the help of reliable and strong allies. Moreover, the war with Poland and Lithuania would have to be waged in difficult conditions of hostile actions both from the Crimea and Turkey, and from Sweden and even the Livonian Order. Therefore, the Russian government did not consider this foreign policy option at the moment.

One of the important factors that determined the tsar’s choice in favor of the fight for the Baltic states was the low military potential of the Livonian Order. Home military force In the country there was a knightly Order of the Swordsmen. Over 50 castles scattered throughout the country were in the hands of the order authorities. Half of the city of Riga was subordinate to the supreme authority of the master. The Archbishop of Riga (the other part of Riga was subordinate to him) and the bishops of Dorpat, Revel, Ezel and Courland were completely independent. The knights of the order owned estates on fief rights. Large cities, such as Riga, Revel, Dorpat, Narva, etc., were actually an independent political force, although they were under the supreme authority of the master or bishops. Clashes constantly occurred between the Order and the spiritual princes. The Reformation spread rapidly in the cities, while chivalry remained largely Catholic. The only body of central legislative power was the Landtags, convened by the masters in the city of Wolmar. The meetings were attended by representatives of four classes: the Order, the clergy, the knighthood and the cities. The resolutions of the Landtags usually had no real significance in the absence of a unified executive power. Close ties have long existed between the local Baltic population and the Russian lands. Ruthlessly suppressed economically, politically and culturally, the Estonian and Latvian populations were ready to support the military actions of the Russian army in the hope of liberation from national oppression.

The Russian state itself by the end of the 50s. XVI century was a powerful military power in Europe. As a result of the reforms, Russia became significantly stronger and achieved a much higher degree of political centralization than ever before. Permanent infantry units were created - the Streltsy army. Russian artillery also achieved great success. Russia had not only large enterprises for the production of cannons, cannonballs and gunpowder, but also well-trained numerous personnel. In addition, the introduction of an important technical improvement - the carriage - made it possible to use artillery in the field. Russian military engineers have developed a new effective system engineering support for attacking fortresses.

Russia in the 16th century became the largest trading power at the junction of Europe and Asia, whose craft was still suffocated by the lack of

non-ferrous and precious metals. The only channel for the supply of metals was trade with the West through the invoice mediation of Livonian cities. The Livonian cities - Dorpat, Riga, Revel and Narva - were part of the Hansa, a trade association of German cities. Their main source of income was intermediary trade with Russia. For this reason, attempts by the English and Dutch merchants to establish direct trade relations with the Russian state were stubbornly suppressed by Livonia. Back at the end of the 15th century, Russia tried to influence the trade policy of the Hanseatic League. In 1492, opposite Narva, the Russian Ivangorod was founded. A little later the Hanseatic court in Novgorod was closed. The economic growth of Ivangorod could not help but frighten the trade elite of the Livonian cities, which were losing huge profits. In response, Livonia was ready to organize an economic blockade, the supporters of which were also Sweden, Lithuania and Poland. In order to eliminate the organized economic blockade of Russia, a clause on freedom of communications with European countries through Swedish possessions was included in the peace treaty of 1557 with Sweden. Another channel of Russian-European trade passed through the cities of the Gulf of Finland, in particular Vyborg. The further growth of this trade was hampered by contradictions between Sweden and Russia on border issues.

Trade on the White Sea, although it had great importance, could not solve the problems of Russian-Northern European contacts for many reasons: navigation on the White Sea is impossible for most of the year; the path there was difficult and long; contacts were one-sided with a complete monopoly of the British, etc. The development of the Russian economy, which needed constant and unimpeded trade relations with European countries, posed the task of gaining access to the Baltic.

The roots of the war for Livonia should be sought not only in the described economic situation of the Moscow state, they also lay in the distant past. Even under the first princes, Rus' was in close communication with many foreign countries. Russian merchants traded in the markets of Constantinople, and marriage alliances linked the princely family with European dynasties. In addition to overseas merchants, ambassadors of other states and missionaries often came to Kyiv. One of the consequences of the Tatar-Mongol yoke for Rus' was the forced reorientation of foreign policy to the East. The War for Livonia was the first serious attempt to bring Russian life back on track and restore the broken connection with the West.

International life posed the same dilemma for every European state: to ensure an independent, independent position in the sphere of international relations or to serve as a simple object of the interests of other powers. Largely depends on the outcome of the struggle for the Baltics

the future of the Moscow state depended: whether she would join the family European peoples, having received the opportunity to independently communicate with the states of Western Europe.

In addition to trade and international prestige, the territorial claims of the Russian Tsar played an important role among the causes of the war. In the first message of Ivan the Terrible, it is not without reason that he declares: “... The city of Vladimir, located in our patrimony, the Livonian land...”. Many Baltic lands have long belonged to the Novgorod land, as well as the banks of the Neva River and the Gulf of Finland, which were subsequently captured by the Livonian Order.

One should not discount such a factor as social. The program of the struggle for the Baltic states met the interests of the nobility and the upper classes of the townspeople. The nobility counted on local distributions of land in the Baltic states, as opposed to the boyar nobility, which was more satisfied with the option of annexing the southern lands. Due to the remoteness of the “wild field” and the impossibility of establishing a strong central government there, at least at first, landowners - boyars had the opportunity to occupy the position of almost independent sovereigns in the southern regions. Ivan the Terrible sought to weaken the influence of the titled Russian boyars, and, naturally, took into account primarily the interests of the noble and merchant classes.

Given the complex balance of power in Europe, it was extremely important to choose a favorable moment to begin military operations against Livonia. It came for Russia at the end of 1557 - beginning of 1558. The defeat of Sweden in the Russian-Swedish war temporarily neutralized this fairly strong enemy, which had the status of a naval power. Denmark at this moment was distracted by the deterioration of its relations with Sweden. Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were not bound by serious complications of the international order, but were not ready for a military clash with Russia due to unresolved internal issues: social conflicts within each state and disagreements over the union. Proof of this is the fact that in 1556 the expiring truce between Lithuania and the Russian state was extended for six years. And finally, as a result of military operations against the Crimean Tatars, there was no need to fear for the southern borders for some time. The raids resumed only in 1564 during a period of complications on the Lithuanian front.

During this period, relations with Livonia were quite tense. In 1554, Alexei Adashev and clerk Viskovaty announced to the Livonian embassy their reluctance to extend the truce due to:

Failure of the Bishop of Dorpat to pay tribute from the possessions ceded to him by the Russian princes;

The oppression of Russian merchants in Livonia and the destruction of Russian settlements in the Baltic states.

The establishment of peaceful relations between Russia and Sweden contributed to a temporary settlement of Russian-Livonian relations. After Russia lifted the ban on the export of wax and lard, Livonia was presented with the terms of a new truce:

Unimpeded transportation of weapons to Russia;

Guarantee of payment of tribute by the Bishop of Dorpat;

Restoration of all Russian churches in Livonian cities;

Refusal to enter into an alliance with Sweden, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania;

Providing conditions for free trade.

Livonia did not intend to fulfill its obligations under the truce concluded for fifteen years.

Thus, the choice was made in favor of resolving the Baltic issue. This was facilitated by a number of reasons: economic, territorial, social and ideological. Russia, being in a favorable international situation, had high military potential and was ready for a military conflict with Livonia for possession of the Baltic states.

Description of the Livonian War

The Livonian War (1558–1583) was a war of the Russian kingdom against the Livonian Order, the Polish-Lithuanian state, Sweden and Denmark for hegemony in the Baltic states.

Main events (Livonian War - briefly)

Causes: Access to the Baltic Sea. Hostile policy of the Livonian Order.

Occasion: Refusal of the order to pay tribute for Yuriev (Dorpat).

First stage (1558-1561): The capture of Narva, Yuriev, Fellin, the capture of Master Furstenberg, the Livonian Order as a military force practically ceased to exist.

Second stage (1562-1577): Entry into the war of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (since 1569) and Sweden. Capture of Polotsk (1563). Defeat on the river Ule and near Orsha (1564). Capture of Weissenstein (1575) and Wenden (1577).

Third stage (1577-1583): Campaign of Stefan Batory, Fall of Polotsk, Velikiye Luki. Defense of Pskov (August 18, 1581 - February 4, 1582) Capture of Narva, Ivangorod, Koporye by the Swedes.

1582– Yam-Zapolsky truce with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Ivan the Terrible’s refusal from Livonia for the return of lost Russian fortresses).

1583– Plyusskoe truce with Sweden (renunciation of Estland, concession to the Swedes of Narva, Koporye, Ivangorod, Korela).

Causes of defeat: incorrect assessment of the balance of power in the Baltics, weakening of the state as a result domestic policy Ivan IV.

Progress of the Livonian War (1558–1583) (full description)

Causes

In order to start a war, formal reasons were found, but the real reasons were Russia’s geopolitical need to gain access to the Baltic Sea, as it would be more convenient for direct connections with the centers of European civilizations, and the desire to participate in the division of the territory of the Livonian Order, the progressive collapse of which became obvious, but which, not wanting to strengthen Muscovite Rus', prevented its external contacts.

Russia had a small section of the Baltic coast, from the Neva basin to Ivangorod. However, it was strategically vulnerable and had no ports or developed infrastructure. Ivan the Terrible hoped to take advantage of the Livonia transport system. He considered it an ancient Russian fiefdom, which was illegally seized by the crusaders.

The forceful solution to the problem predetermined the defiant behavior of the Livonians themselves, who, even according to their historians, acted unreasonably. Mass pogroms served as a reason for aggravation of relations Orthodox churches in Livonia. Even at that time, the truce between Moscow and Livonia (concluded in 1504 as a result of the Russian-Lithuanian war of 1500-1503) had expired. To extend it, the Russians demanded payment of the Yuriev tribute, which the Livonians were obliged to pay again Ivan III, but in 50 years they have never collected it. Having recognized the need to pay it, they again did not fulfill their obligations.

1558 - Russian army entered Livonia. Thus began the Livonian War. It lasted 25 years, becoming the longest and one of the most difficult in Russian history.

First stage (1558-1561)

In addition to Livonia, the Russian Tsar wanted to conquer the East Slavic lands, which were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 1557, November - he concentrated a 40,000-strong army in Novgorod for a campaign in the Livonian lands.

Capture of Narva and Syrensk (1558)

In December, this army under the command of the Tatar prince Shig-Aley, Prince Glinsky and other governors advanced to Pskov. Meanwhile, the auxiliary army of Prince Shestunov began fighting from the Ivangorod area to the mouth of the Narva River (Narova). 1558, January - tsarist army approached Yuriev (Derpt), but could not capture it. Then part of the Russian army turned to Riga, and the main forces headed to Narva (Rugodiv), where they united with Shestunov’s army. There was a lull in the fighting. Only the garrisons of Ivangorod and Narva fired at each other. On May 11, Russians from Ivangorod attacked the Narva fortress and were able to take it the next day.

Soon after the capture of Narva, Russian troops under the command of governors Adashev, Zabolotsky and Zamytsky and Duma clerk Voronin were ordered to capture the Syrensk fortress. On June 2, the shelves were under its walls. Adashev set up barriers on the Riga and Kolyvan roads to prevent the main forces of the Livonians under the command of the Master of the Order from reaching Syrensk. On June 5, large reinforcements from Novgorod approached Adashev, which the besieged saw. On the same day, artillery shelling of the fortress began. The next day the garrison surrendered.

Capture of Neuhausen and Dorpat (1558)

From Syrensk, Adashev returned to Pskov, where the entire Russian army was concentrated. In mid-June it took the fortresses of Neuhausen and Dorpat. The entire north of Livonia came under Russian control. The Order's army was numerically several times inferior to the Russians and, moreover, was scattered among separate garrisons. It could do nothing against the king's army. Until October 1558, the Russians in Livonia were able to capture 20 castles.

Battle of Thiersen

1559, January - Russian troops marched on Riga. Near Tiersen they defeated the Livonian army, and near Riga they burned the Livonian fleet. Although it was not possible to capture the Riga fortress, 11 more Livonian castles were taken.

Truce (1559)

The Master of the Order was forced to conclude a truce before the end of 1559. By November of this year, the Livonians were able to recruit Landsknechts in Germany and resume the war. But failures never ceased to haunt them.

1560, January - the army of governor Borboshin captured the fortresses of Marienburg and Fellin. The Livonian Order practically ceased to exist as a military force.

1561 - the last master of the Livonian Order, Kettler, recognized himself as a vassal of the King of Poland and divided Livonia between Poland and Sweden (the island of Ezel went to Denmark). The Poles got Livonia and Courland (Kettler became Duke of the latter), the Swedes got Estland.

Second stage (1562-1577)

Poland and Sweden began to demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Livonia. Ivan the Terrible not only did not comply with this demand, but also invaded the territory of Lithuania, allied to Poland, at the end of 1562. His army numbered 33,407 men. The goal of the campaign was well-fortified Polotsk. 1563, February 15 - Polotsk, unable to withstand the fire of 200 Russian guns, capitulated. Ivan's army moved to Vilna. The Lithuanians were forced to conclude a truce until 1564. After the resumption of the war, Russian troops occupied almost the entire territory of Belarus.

But the repressions that began against the leaders of the “elected Rada” - the de facto government until the end of the 50s, had negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Russian army. Many of the governors and nobles, fearing reprisals, preferred to flee to Lithuania. In the same 1564, one of the most prominent governors, Prince Andrei Kurbsky, moved there, close to the Adashev brothers who were part of the elected council and fearing for his life. The subsequent oprichnina terror further weakened the Russian army.

1) Ivan the Terrible; 2) Stefan Batory

Formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

1569 - as a result of the Union of Lublin, Poland and Lithuania formed single state The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Republic) under the leadership of the King of Poland. Now the Polish army came to the aid of the Lithuanian army.

1570 - fighting intensified in both Lithuania and Livonia. To secure the Baltic lands, Ivan IV decided to create his own fleet. At the beginning of 1570, he issued a “charter” to the Dane Karsten Rode to organize a privateer fleet, which acted on behalf of the Russian Tsar. Rohde was able to arm several ships, and he caused significant damage to Polish maritime trade. In order to have a reliable naval base, the Russian army in the same 1570 tried to capture Revel, thereby starting a war with Sweden. But the city unhinderedly received supplies from the sea, and Grozny was forced to lift the siege after 7 months. The Russian privateer fleet was never able to become a formidable force.

Third stage (1577-1583)

After a 7-year lull, in 1577, the 32,000-strong army of Ivan the Terrible launched a new campaign to Revel. But this time the siege of the city brought nothing. Then Russian troops went to Riga, capturing Dinaburg, Volmar and several other castles. But these successes were not decisive.

Meanwhile, the situation on the Polish front began to become more complicated. 1575 - an experienced military leader, the Transylvanian prince, was elected king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He was able to form a strong army, which also included German and Hungarian mercenaries. Batory entered into an alliance with Sweden, and the united Polish-Swedish army in the fall of 1578 was able to defeat the 18,000-strong Russian army, which lost 6,000 people killed and captured and 17 guns.

By the start of the 1579 campaign, Stefan Batory and Ivan IV had approximately equal main armies of 40,000 men each. After the defeat at Wenden, Grozny was not confident in his abilities and proposed to begin peace negotiations. But Batory rejected this proposal and went on the offensive against Polotsk. In the autumn, Polish troops besieged the city and, after a month-long siege, captured it. The army of governors Shein and Sheremetev, sent to the rescue of Polotsk, only reached the Sokol fortress. They did not dare to engage in battle with superior enemy forces. Soon the Poles captured Sokol, defeating the troops of Sheremetev and Shein. The Russian Tsar clearly did not have enough strength to successfully fight on two fronts at once - in Livonia and Lithuania. After the capture of Polotsk, the Poles took several cities in the Smolensk and Seversk lands, and then returned to Lithuania.

1580 - Batory launched a large campaign against Rus', he captured and ravaged the cities of Ostrov, Velizh and Velikiye Luki. At the same time, the Swedish army under the command of Pontus Delagardie took the city of Korela and eastern part Karelian Isthmus.

1581 - Swedish army captured Narva, and the following year occupied Ivangorod, Yam and Koporye. Russian troops were expelled from Livonia. The fighting moved to Russian territory.

Siege of Pskov (August 18, 1581 – February 4, 1582)

1581 - a 50,000-strong Polish army led by the king besieged Pskov. It was a very strong fortress. The city, which stood on the right, high bank of the Velikaya River at the confluence of the Pskov River, was surrounded stone wall. It stretched for 10 km and had 37 towers and 48 gates. However, from the side of the Velikaya River, from where it was difficult to expect an enemy attack, the wall was wooden. Under the towers there were underground passages that provided secret communication between different sections of the defense. The city had significant supplies of food, weapons and ammunition.

Russian troops were dispersed over many points from where an enemy invasion was expected. The Tsar himself, with a significant detachment in number, stopped in Staritsa, not risking going towards the Polish army marching towards Pskov.

When the sovereign learned about the invasion of Stefan Batory, the army of Prince Ivan Shuisky, appointed “great governor,” was sent to Pskov. 7 other governors were subordinate to him. All residents of Pskov and the garrison were sworn that they would not surrender the city, but would fight to the end. The total number of Russian troops defending Pskov reached 25,000 people and was approximately half the size of Batory’s army. By order of Shuisky, the outskirts of Pskov were devastated so that the enemy could not find fodder and food there.

Livonian War 1558-1583. Stefan Batory near Pskov

On August 18, Polish troops approached the city within 2–3 cannon shots. For a week, Batory conducted reconnaissance of Russian fortifications and only on August 26 gave the order to his troops to approach the city. But the soldiers soon came under fire from Russian cannons and retreated to the Cherekha River. There Batory set up a fortified camp.

The Poles began to dig trenches and set up tours to get closer to the walls of the fortress. On the night of September 4-5, they drove up to the Pokrovskaya and Svinaya towers on the southern face of the walls and, having placed 20 guns, on the morning of September 6 began to fire at both towers and the 150 m wall between them. By the evening of September 7, the towers were severely damaged, and a 50 m wide gap appeared in the wall. However, the besieged managed to build a new wooden wall against the gap.

On September 8, the Polish army launched an assault. The attackers were able to capture both damaged towers. But with shots from the large Bars cannon, capable of sending cannonballs over a distance of more than 1 km, the Pig Tower occupied by the Poles was destroyed. Then the Russians blew up its ruins by rolling up barrels of gunpowder. The explosion served as a signal for a counterattack, which was led by Shuisky himself. The Poles were unable to hold the Pokrovskaya Tower and retreated.

After the unsuccessful assault, Batory ordered digging to blow up the walls. The Russians were able to destroy two tunnels with the help of mine galleries, but the enemy was never able to complete the rest. On October 24, Polish batteries began shelling Pskov from across the Velikaya River with hot cannonballs to start fires, but the city’s defenders quickly dealt with the fire. After 4 days, a Polish detachment with crowbars and picks approached the wall from the Velikaya side between the corner tower and the Pokrovsky Gate and destroyed the base of the wall. It collapsed, but it turned out that behind this wall there was another wall and a ditch, which the Poles could not overcome. The besieged threw stones and pots of gunpowder on their heads, poured boiling water and tar.

On November 2, the Poles launched their final assault on Pskov. This time Batory's army attacked the western wall. Before this, it had been subjected to heavy shelling for 5 days and was destroyed in several places. However, the Russians met the enemy with heavy fire, and the Poles turned back without reaching the breaches.

By that time, the morale of the besiegers had dropped noticeably. However, the besieged also experienced considerable difficulties. The main forces of the Russian army in Staritsa, Novgorod and Rzhev were inactive. Only two detachments of archers of 600 people each tried to break through to Pskov, but more than half of them died or were captured.

On November 6, Batory removed the guns from the batteries, stopped siege work and began preparing for the winter. At the same time, he sent detachments of Germans and Hungarians to capture the Pskov-Pechersky Monastery 60 km from Pskov, but a garrison of 300 archers, with the support of monks, successfully repelled two attacks, and the enemy was forced to retreat.

Stefan Batory, convinced that he could not take Pskov, in November handed over command to Hetman Zamoyski, and he himself went to Vilna, taking with him almost all the mercenaries. As a result, the number of Polish troops decreased by almost half - to 26,000 people. The besiegers suffered from cold and disease, and the death toll and desertion increased.

Results and consequences

Under these conditions, Batory agreed to a ten-year truce. It was concluded in Yama-Zapolsky on January 15, 1582. Rus' renounced all its conquests in Livonia, and the Poles liberated the Russian cities they had occupied.

1583 - the Truce of Plus was signed with Sweden. Yam, Koporye and Ivangorod passed to the Swedes. Behind Russia there remained only small area Baltic coast at the mouth of the Neva. But in 1590, after the expiration of the truce, hostilities between the Russians and Swedes resumed and this time were successful for the Russians. As a result, according to the Tyavzin Treaty on “ eternal peace“Rus regained Yam, Koporye, Ivangorod and Korelsky district. But this was only small consolation. In general, Ivan IV's attempt to gain a foothold in the Baltic failed.

At the same time, acute contradictions between Poland and Sweden on the issue of control over Livonia eased the position of the Russian Tsar, excluding a joint Polish-Swedish invasion of Rus'. The resources of Poland alone, as the experience of Batory’s campaign against Pskov showed, were clearly insufficient to capture and retain a significant territory of the Muscovite kingdom. At the same time, the Livonian War showed that Sweden and Poland had a formidable enemy in the east that they had to reckon with.

Introduction 3

1.Causes of the Livonian War 4

2.Stages of war 6

3. Results and consequences of the war 14

Conclusion 15

References 16

Introduction.

The relevance of research. The Livonian War is a significant stage in Russian history. Long and grueling, it brought Russia many losses. It is very important and relevant to consider this event, because any military actions changed the geopolitical map of our country and had a significant impact on its further socio-economic development. This directly applies to the Livonian War. It will also be interesting to reveal the variety of points of view on the causes of this collision, the opinions of historians on this matter. After all, pluralism of opinions indicates that there are many contradictions in views. Consequently, the topic has not been sufficiently studied and is relevant for further consideration.

Purpose This work is to reveal the essence of the Livonian War. To achieve the goal, it is necessary to consistently solve a number of tasks :

Identify the causes of the Livonian War

Analyze its stages

Consider the results and consequences of the war

1.Causes of the Livonian War

After the annexation of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates to the Russian state, the threat of invasion from the east and southeast was eliminated. Ivan the Terrible is faced with new tasks - to return the Russian lands once captured by the Livonian Order, Lithuania and Sweden.

In general, it is possible to clearly identify the causes of the Livonian War. However, Russian historians interpret them differently.

For example, N.M. Karamzin connects the beginning of the war with the ill will of the Livonian Order. Karamzin fully approves of Ivan the Terrible’s aspirations to reach the Baltic Sea, calling them “beneficent intentions for Russia.”

N.I. Kostomarov believes that on the eve of the war, Ivan the Terrible was faced with an alternative - either to deal with Crimea or to take possession of Livonia. A historian explains the contradictory common sense Ivan IV’s decision to fight on two fronts due to “discord” between his advisors.

S.M. Soloviev explains the Livonian War by Russia’s need to “assimilate the fruits of European civilization,” the bearers of which were not allowed into Rus' by the Livonians, who owned the main Baltic ports.

IN. Klyuchevsky practically does not consider the Livonian War at all, since he analyzes the external position of the state only from the point of view of its influence on the development of socio-economic relations within the country.

S.F. Platonov believes that Russia was simply drawn into the Livonian War. The historian believes that Russia could not evade what was happening on its western borders, could not come to terms with unfavorable terms of trade.

M.N. Pokrovsky believes that Ivan the Terrible started the war on the recommendations of certain “advisers” from among the army.

According to R.Yu. Vipper, “The Livonian War was prepared and planned for quite a long time by the leaders of the Elected Rada.”

R.G. Skrynnikov connects the start of the war with Russia’s first success - the victory in the war with the Swedes (1554-1557), under the influence of which plans were put forward to conquer Livonia and establish itself in the Baltic states. The historian also notes that “the Livonian War turned the Eastern Baltic into an arena of struggle between states seeking dominance in the Baltic Sea.”

V.B. Kobrin pays attention to the personality of Adashev and notes his key role in the outbreak of the Livonian War.

In general, formal reasons were found for the start of the war. The real reasons were Russia’s geopolitical need to gain access to the Baltic Sea, as the most convenient for direct connections with the centers of European civilizations, as well as the desire to take an active part in the division of the territory of the Livonian Order, the progressive collapse of which was becoming obvious, but which, unwilling strengthening Russia, hindered its external contacts. For example, the Livonian authorities did not allow more than a hundred specialists from Europe invited by Ivan IV to pass through their lands. Some of them were imprisoned and executed.

The formal reason for the start of the Livonian War was the question of the “Yuriev tribute” (Yuriev, later called Dorpat (Tartu), was founded by Yaroslav the Wise). According to the treaty of 1503, an annual tribute had to be paid for it and the surrounding territory, which, however, was not done. In addition, the Order concluded a military alliance with the Lithuanian-Polish king in 1557.

2. Stages of the war.

The Livonian War can be roughly divided into 4 stages. The first (1558-1561) is directly related to the Russian-Livonian war. The second (1562-1569) involved primarily the Russian-Lithuanian war. The third (1570-1576) was distinguished by the resumption of the Russian struggle for Livonia, where they, together with the Danish prince Magnus, fought against the Swedes. The fourth (1577-1583) is associated primarily with the Russian-Polish war. During this period, the Russian-Swedish war continued.

Let's look at each of the stages in more detail.

First stage. In January 1558, Ivan the Terrible moved his troops to Livonia. The beginning of the war brought him victories: Narva and Yuriev were taken. In the summer and autumn of 1558 and at the beginning of 1559, Russian troops marched throughout Livonia (as far as Revel and Riga) and advanced in Courland to the borders of East Prussia and Lithuania. However, in 1559, under the influence politicians, grouped around A.F. Adashev, who prevented the expansion of the scope of the military conflict, Ivan the Terrible was forced to conclude a truce. In March 1559 it was concluded for a period of six months.

The feudal lords took advantage of the truce to conclude an agreement with the Polish king Sigismund II Augustus in 1559, according to which the order, lands and possessions of the Archbishop of Riga came under the protectorate of the Polish crown. In an atmosphere of acute political disagreements in the leadership of the Livonian Order, its master W. Fürstenberg was removed and G. Ketler, who adhered to a pro-Polish orientation, became the new master. In the same year, Denmark took possession of the island of Ösel (Saaremaa).

The military operations that began in 1560 brought new defeats to the Order: the large fortresses of Marienburg and Fellin were taken, the order army blocking the path to Viljandi was defeated near Ermes, and the Master of the Order Fürstenberg himself was captured. The successes of the Russian army were facilitated by the outbreak of peasant uprisings against the German feudal lords. The result of the campaign of 1560 was the virtual defeat of the Livonian Order as a state. The German feudal lords of Northern Estonia became Swedish citizens. According to the Treaty of Vilna of 1561, the possessions of the Livonian Order came under the authority of Poland, Denmark and Sweden, and its last master, Ketler, received only Courland, and even then it was dependent on Poland. Thus, instead of weak Livonia, Russia now had three strong opponents.

Second phase. While Sweden and Denmark were at war with each other, Ivan IV led successful actions against Sigismund II Augustus. In 1563, the Russian army took Plock, a fortress that opened the way to the capital of Lithuania, Vilna, and Riga. But already at the beginning of 1564, the Russians suffered a series of defeats on the Ulla River and near Orsha; in the same year, a boyar and a major military leader, Prince A.M., fled to Lithuania. Kurbsky.

Tsar Ivan the Terrible responded to military failures and escapes to Lithuania with repressions against the boyars. In 1565, the oprichnina was introduced. Ivan IV tried to restore the Livonian Order, but under the protectorate of Russia, and negotiated with Poland. In 1566, a Lithuanian embassy arrived in Moscow, proposing to divide Livonia on the basis of the situation existing at that time. The Zemstvo Sobor, convened at this time, supported the intention of the government of Ivan the Terrible to fight in the Baltic states until the capture of Riga: “It is unsuitable for our sovereign to give up those cities of Livonia, which the king took for protection, but it is better for the sovereign to stand for those cities.” The council's decision also emphasized that abandoning Livonia would harm trade interests.

Third stage. Since 1569 the war becomes protracted. This year, at the Sejm in Lublin, the unification of Lithuania and Poland took place into a single state - the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with which in 1570 Russia managed to conclude a truce for three years.

Since Lithuania and Poland in 1570 could not quickly concentrate forces against the Moscow state, because were exhausted by the war, Ivan IV began in May 1570 to negotiate a truce with Poland and Lithuania. At the same time, he creates, having neutralized Poland, an anti-Swedish coalition, realizing his long-standing idea of ​​​​forming a vassal state from Russia in the Baltics.

The Danish Duke Magnus accepted Ivan the Terrible’s offer to become his vassal (“gold-holder”) and in the same May 1570, upon his arrival in Moscow, was proclaimed “King of Livonia.” The Russian government pledged to provide the new state, settled on the island of Ezel, with its military assistance and material resources so that it could expand its territory at the expense of the Swedish and Lithuanian-Polish possessions in Livonia. The parties intended to seal the allied relations between Russia and the “kingdom” of Magnus with the marriage of Magnus to the niece of the king, the daughter of Prince Vladimir Andreevich Staritsky - Maria.

The proclamation of the Livonian Kingdom was supposed, according to the calculations of Ivan IV, to provide Russia with the support of the Livonian feudal lords, i.e. all German knighthood and nobility in Estland, Livonia and Courland, and therefore not only an alliance with Denmark (through Magnus), but also, most importantly, alliance and support for the Habsburg Empire. With this new combination in Russian foreign policy, the Tsar intended to create a vice on two fronts for an overly aggressive and restless Poland, which had grown due to the inclusion of Lithuania. Like Vasily IV, Ivan the Terrible also expressed the idea of ​​the possibility and necessity of dividing Poland between the German and Russian states. On a more immediate level, the tsar was concerned about the possibility of creating a Polish-Swedish coalition on his western borders, which he tried with all his might to prevent. All this speaks of the tsar’s correct, strategically deep understanding of the balance of power in Europe and his accurate vision of the problems of Russian foreign policy in the near and long term. That is why his military tactics were correct: he sought to defeat Sweden alone as quickly as possible, until it came to a united Polish-Swedish aggression against Russia.

Since then he has owned most of the modern Baltic states - Estland, Livonia and Courland. In the 16th century, Livonia lost some of its former power. From within, it was engulfed in strife, which was intensified by the church Reformation that was penetrating here. The Archbishop of Riga quarreled with the Master of the Order, and the cities were at enmity with both of them. Internal turmoil weakened Livonia, and all its neighbors were not averse to taking advantage of this. Before the start of the conquests of the Livonian knights, the Baltic lands depended on the Russian princes. With this in mind, the Moscow sovereigns believed that they had completely legal rights to Livonia. Due to its coastal position, Livonia had an important trade value. Afterwards, Moscow inherited the commerce of Novgorod, which it had conquered, with the Baltic lands. However, the Livonian rulers in every possible way limited the relations that Muscovite Rus' conducted with Western Europe through their area. Fearing Moscow and trying to interfere with its rapid strengthening, the Livonian government did not allow European craftsmen and many goods into Rus'. The obvious hostility of Livonia gave rise to hostility towards it among the Russians. Seeing the weakening of the Livonian Order, the Russian rulers feared that its territory would be taken over by some other, stronger enemy, who would treat Moscow even worse.

Already Ivan III, after the conquest of Novgorod, built the Russian fortress Ivangorod on the Livonian border, opposite the city of Narva. After the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, the Chosen Rada advised Ivan the Terrible to turn to the predatory Crimea, whose hordes constantly raided the southern Russian regions, driving thousands of captives into slavery every year. But Ivan IV chose to attack Livonia. The successful outcome of the war with the Swedes of 1554–1557 gave the king confidence in easy success in the west.

Beginning of the Livonian War (briefly)

Grozny remembered the old treaties that obligated Livonia to pay tribute to the Russians. It had not been paid for a long time, but now the tsar demanded not only to renew the payment, but also to compensate for what the Livonians had not given to Russia in previous years. The Livonian government began to drag out negotiations. Having lost patience, Ivan the Terrible broke off all relations and in the first months of 1558 began the Livonian War, which was destined to drag on for 25 years.

In the first two years of the war, Moscow troops acted very successfully. They destroyed almost all of Livonia, except for the most powerful cities and castles. Livonia could not resist powerful Moscow alone. The order's state disintegrated, surrendering piecemeal to the supreme power of its stronger neighbors. Estland came under the suzerainty of Sweden, Livonia submitted to Lithuania. The island of Ezel became the possession of the Danish Duke Magnus, and Courland was subjected to secularization, that is, it turned from a church property into a secular one. The former master of the spiritual order, Ketler, became the secular Duke of Courland and recognized himself as a vassal of the Polish king.

Entry of Poland and Sweden into the war (briefly)

The Livonian Order thus ceased to exist (1560-1561). His lands were divided by neighboring powerful states, which demanded that Ivan the Terrible renounce all the seizures made at the beginning of the Livonian War. Grozny rejected this demand and opened a fight with Lithuania and Sweden. Thus, new participants were involved in the Livonian War. The struggle between the Russians and the Swedes proceeded intermittently and sluggishly. Ivan IV moved his main forces to Lithuania, acting against it not only in Livonia, but also in the regions south of the latter. In 1563, Grozny took the ancient Russian city of Polotsk from the Lithuanians. The royal army ravaged Lithuania all the way to Vilna (Vilnius). The war-weary Lithuanians offered Grozny peace with the concession of Polotsk. In 1566 Ivan IV gathered in Moscow Zemsky Sobor on the question of whether to end the Livonian War or continue it. The council spoke in favor of continuing the war, and it went on for another ten years with the Russians outnumbered, until the talented commander Stefan Batory (1576) was elected to the Polish-Lithuanian throne.

The turning point of the Livonian War (briefly)

By that time, the Livonian War had significantly weakened Russia. The oprichnina, which ruined the country, undermined its strength even more. Many prominent Russian military leaders fell victims to the oprichnina terror of Ivan the Terrible. From the south they began to attack Russia with even greater energy Crimean Tatars, whom Ivan the Terrible frivolously allowed to conquer or at least completely weaken after the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan. The Crimeans and the Turkish Sultan demanded that Russia, now bound by the Livonian War, renounce its possession of the Volga region and restore the independence of the Astrakhan and Kazan khanates, which had previously brought it so much grief with brutal attacks and robberies. In 1571, the Crimean Khan Devlet-Girey, taking advantage of the diversion of Russian forces to Livonia, staged an unexpected invasion, marched with a large army all the way to Moscow and burned the entire city outside the Kremlin. In 1572 Devlet-Girey tried to repeat this success. He again reached the Moscow outskirts with his horde, but the Russian army of Mikhail Vorotynsky at the last moment distracted the Tatars with an attack from the rear and inflicted a strong defeat on them in the Battle of Molodi.

Ivan groznyj. Painting by V. Vasnetsov, 1897

The energetic Stefan Batory began decisive action against Grozny just when the oprichnina brought the central regions of the Moscow state to desolation. The people fled en masse from the tyranny of Grozny to the southern outskirts and to the newly conquered Volga region. The Russian government center is depleted of people and resources. Grozny could no longer easily send large armies to the front of the Livonian War. Batory's decisive onslaught did not meet with adequate resistance. In 1577, the Russians achieved their last successes in the Baltic states, but already in 1578 they were defeated there near Wenden. The Poles achieved a turning point in the Livonian War. In 1579 Batory recaptured Polotsk, and in 1580 he took the strong Moscow fortresses of Velizh and Velikiye Luki. Having previously shown arrogance towards the Poles, Grozny now sought the mediation of Catholic Europe in peace negotiations with Batory and sent an embassy (Shevrigin) to the pope and the Austrian emperor. In 1581