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» The defeat of the Japanese army on the Khalkhin River. Fighting at Khalkhin Gol (1939)

The defeat of the Japanese army on the Khalkhin River. Fighting at Khalkhin Gol (1939)

In Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River, starting in the spring and ending in the fall of 1939, there were battles between Japan and Japan. In the spring of 1939, the Japanese government sent numerous troops to Mongolian territory, in order to ensure the creation of a new border between Mongolia and Manchukuo, so that the new border strip runs along the Khalkhin Gol River. Soviet troops were sent to help friendly Mongolia and, united with the Mongolian military units, prepared to repel the aggressor. After the invasion of Mongolian soil, the Japanese immediately met powerful resistance from Soviet troops and by the end of May were forced to retreat to Chinese territory.
The next attack by Japanese troops was more prepared and massive. Heavy equipment, guns and planes were sent to the border, and the number of soldiers already numbered about 40 thousand people. The strategic goal of the Japanese was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Khalkhin Gol River, which he commanded, and to occupy important heights and bridgeheads for future offensives. The Soviet-Mongolian group was almost three times inferior to the Japanese troops, but bravely entered into battle with enemy forces. Having first achieved strategic results and captured Mount Bain-Tsagan on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese intended to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops, but during stubborn battles for three days, were defeated and were forced to retreat again.
But the Japanese army did not calm down and in August began to prepare a new, even more powerful offensive, bringing additional reserves to Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet troops were also actively strengthening, about 500 tanks appeared, a fighter brigade, a large number of guns and the number of personnel was already almost 60 thousand soldiers. G.K. Zhukov was appointed corps commander and prepared to launch a counterattack against Japanese formations, carefully camouflaging himself and spreading false information that Soviet troops would only be ready to attack by winter. And Japanese troops planned to launch another attack at the end of August.
But the Soviet troops, unexpectedly for the enemy, brought down all their power on August 20 and, having pushed the Japanese 12 km, brought in tank troops and entrenched themselves on important heights. The central, southern and northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops, as planned, pinned down the enemy with constant attacks and by August 23, they captured the main Japanese forces in a tight ring. And by the end of August, the Japanese were fragmented into small units and completely destroyed.
As early as half of September, the Japanese invaders tried to take revenge, breaking through Khalkhin Gol several times both by land and by air, but the skillful actions of the Soviet troops constantly forced them to retreat, suffering heavy losses. Ultimately, the aggressive Japanese government was forced to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, which was signed on September 15.
Victory in this conflict was very important for the USSR, security guarantees appeared in the east of the country, and in the future it was because of this battle that the Japanese did not dare to help the Germans in the war against Soviet Union.

The fighting at Khalkhin Gol was an armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place at the end of August and ended with the complete defeat of the Japanese 6th Army. On September 15, a truce was concluded between the USSR and Japan.

In Fig. map of the fighting near the Galkhin-Gol River on August 20-31, 1939.


Let us turn to one of the key, and perhaps the decisive moment of the battles at Khalkhin Gol - the offensive of Japanese troops with the aim of encircling and defeating the combined Soviet-Mongolian forces. In early July, the Japanese command brought all 3 regiments of the 23rd Infantry Division (ID), two regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, a cavalry division of the Manchukuo Army, two tank and one artillery regiments to the conflict site. According to the Japanese plan, it was planned to deliver two strikes - the main one and the restraining one. The first involved crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and reaching the crossings behind Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river. The group of Japanese troops for this attack was led by Major General Kobayashi. The second strike (Yasuoka group) was to be delivered directly to the positions of Soviet troops on the bridgehead.

The Yasuoka group was the first to attack. It was a kind of mousetrap: the Japanese wanted to draw parts of the Red Army into positional battles, force G.K. Zhukov to reinforce troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, and then slam the mousetrap with a strike from Kobayashi’s group on the crossings on the western bank of the river. Thus, the Soviet troops would have been forced to either evacuate the bridgehead and suffer a moral defeat, or be under the threat of complete defeat.

The Yasuoka group's offensive began on July 2 at 10:00. The Japanese offensive was seriously countered by Soviet artillery. On the evening of July 3, the Japanese launched several attacks. Zhukov, faced with a Japanese advance on the bridgehead, decided to launch a flank attack on the attackers. On the night of July 2-3, the concentration of units intended for a counterattack began: the 11th Light Tank Brigade (separate light tank brigade) and the 7th motorized armored brigade, as well as the Mongolian cavalry. It was this decision that saved the Soviet troops from defeat. At 3:15, Kobayashi’s group began crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River near Mount Bain-Tsagan. The Japanese knocked down the Mongol cavalry guarding the crossing from their positions and dispersed their counterattack with air strikes. By 6:00 in the morning, two battalions had already crossed and immediately moved south, towards the crossings. At 7:00, units of a motorized armored brigade moving towards their initial positions for a counterattack encountered Japanese units. So the direction of the attack of the Japanese forces became completely clear to the Soviet command.

In the photo: Soviet tanks cross Khalkhin Gol.

The commander of the 1st Army Group, G.K. Zhukov reacted with lightning speed. He decided to immediately counterattack the bridgehead formed by the Japanese. For this purpose, the 11th Tank Brigade under the command of M. Yakovlev was used. By original plan she was supposed to cross to the eastern bank of the river in the “ruins” area, that is, north of the point where the Japanese began crossing. The brigade was urgently redirected to attack the bridgehead. All three tank battalions with different directions attacked the Japanese infantry that had crossed.

At 9:00, the lead company of the 2nd battalion - 15 BT tanks and 9 armored vehicles - in an oncoming battle, using a flank maneuver, completely defeated the marching column of the Japanese infantry battalion with a horse-drawn anti-tank battery, moving in a southerly direction. The 2nd battalion could not advance further, since the 71st Infantry Regiment (IR) of the Japanese had already deployed on the southern slopes of Mount Bain-Tsagan.

With the arrival of the main forces of the 11th LTBr, a simultaneous attack began from three directions: northern (1st battalion together with the Mongolian motorized armored division), southern (2nd battalion) and western (3rd battalion together with the 24th motorized rifle regiment). The attack was scheduled for 10:45, but the motorized rifle regiment (MSR) lost its orientation during the march, lost its way and did not reach its original positions by the appointed time. Under these conditions, it was decided to attack the enemy with tanks without infantry support. At the appointed time, the attack began.

In the photo: Soviet tanks support an infantry attack.

The battle lasted 4 hours. Advancing from the south, tank companies of the 2nd battalion (53 BT-5 tanks) encountered Japanese suicide bombers armed with Molotov cocktails and anti-tank mines on bamboo poles. As a result, 3 tanks and two armored vehicles were lost, of which 1 tank and both armored vehicles were evacuated.

On the morning of July 4, Japanese troops attempted a counterattack. After a 3-hour artillery barrage and a raid by a large group of bombers, the Japanese infantry went on the attack. During the day, the enemy attacked unsuccessfully 5 times, suffering heavy losses.

At 19:00, Soviet and Mongolian units launched an assault. The Japanese could not stand it and began to retreat to the crossing at night. At dawn, tanks of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 11th LTBr broke through to the crossing and began shelling it. In order to avoid the capture of the crossing, the Japanese command gave the order to blow it up, thereby cutting off the retreat routes for their group on the western bank of the river, which was attacked and defeated. The Japanese were scattered, abandoning all their weapons. Soviet troops captured all the equipment and heavy weapons; only the steep slopes of the mountain and the floodplain of the Khalkhin Gol River, impassable for tanks, did not allow them to pursue and completely destroy the enemy.

On the morning of July 5, the commander of a tank company of the 11th Leningrad Brigade Art. Lieutenant A.F. Vasiliev led the attack of four BT tanks against 11 Japanese tanks. Using maneuver and constantly firing, Soviet tank crews knocked out 4 Japanese tanks without losing a single vehicle. For this battle, Vasiliev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the photo: an attack by Soviet tanks on Japanese positions in the area of ​​Mount Bayin-Tsagan.

Of the 133 tanks that took part in the attack at Mount Bayin-Tsagan, 77 vehicles were lost, of which 51 BT-5 and BT-7 were irretrievably lost. Losses in the personnel of the tank battalions of the 11th brigade were moderate: the 2nd battalion lost 12 people killed and 9 wounded, the 3rd battalion - 10 killed and 23 missing. The battlefield remained with the Soviet troops and many tanks were restored. Already on July 20, the 11th LTBr had 125 tanks.

In the reporting documents of the 1st Army Group compiled after the battles, the losses of BT tanks are classified as follows:

From anti-tank fire - 75-80%;
from bottlers - 5-10%;
from field artillery fire - 15-20%;
from aviation - 2-3%;
from hand grenades, min 2-3%.

The tanks suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank missiles and from “bottle bottlers” - approximately 80-90% of all losses. From throwing bottles, tanks and armored cars burn; from hits from anti-tank artillery, almost all tanks and armored cars also burn and cannot be restored. The cars become completely unusable, and a fire breaks out within 15–20 seconds. The crew always jumps out with their clothes on fire. The fire produces intense flames and black smoke, visible from a distance of 5–6 km. After 15 minutes, the ammunition begins to explode, after which the tank can only be used as scrap metal." (The style and spelling of the original have been preserved). As one Japanese officer figuratively put it, “the funeral pyres of burning Russian tanks were like the smoke of the steel mills in Osaka.”

The Japanese faced the same problem of the superiority of weapons over the protection of armored vehicles. For example, out of 73 tanks that took part in the Yasuoka group’s attack on the Soviet bridgehead on July 3, 41 tanks were lost, of which 18 were irretrievably lost. Already on July 5, the tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle, “due to loss of combat capability,” and on the 9th they returned to their permanent location. dislocations.

Delay in eliminating the Japanese bridgehead could undoubtedly have fatal consequences. The lack of forces would lead to the impossibility of containing the breakthrough of the Japanese infantry to the crossings in the rear of the Soviet troops. If the Japanese had been left alone, they could have easily walked the 15 km that separated them from the crossings. Moreover, they had already covered half of this distance by the time the marching column was discovered by the advanced units of the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade. Waiting for the lost infantry of a motorized rifle regiment to approach, in a situation of acute time pressure, was suicide. In just 4 months, commanders less decisive than Zhukov will find themselves surrounded by “motties” in Karelia in much less dramatic situations. Because they will not attack the Finns who have infiltrated to the rear with the forces at hand. With his determination, Georgy Konstantinovich managed to avoid encirclement, albeit at the cost of several dozen burnt tanks.

In the photo: a damaged Japanese Ha-Go tank captured by the Red Army.

As a result of the battles for the bridgehead on the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River and the withdrawal from it that dragged on for almost a day under attacks from tanks of the 11th Light Brigade, Soviet artillery and aviation, the Japanese lost 800 people killed and wounded from Kobayashi’s 8,000-strong group. The losses of the tank crews of the 11th Brigade in a decisive attack on the bridgehead without infantry support were more than justified. Their sacrifices were recognized and appreciated: 33 tankmen, based on the results of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, of which 27 were from the 11th Brigade.

FIGHTING AT KHALKIN GOL (1939)

Material from Wikipedia

Battles at Khalkhin Gol- an armed conflict (undeclared war) that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River on the territory of Mongolia (Eastern (Dornod) aimag) near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place in late August and ended with the complete defeat of the 6th Separate Army of Japan. An armistice between the USSR and Japan was concluded on September 15.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. A “puppet” state of Manchukuo was created on the occupied territory, which was planned to be used as a springboard for further aggression against Mongolia, China and the USSR.

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area.

In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end.

On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia.

In 1938, a two-week conflict had already occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended in victory for the USSR.

MAY 1939. FIRST BATTLES

May 11, 1939 A detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. May 11, 1939 - this day is marked in history as the day the Battle of Khalkhin Gol began.

On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.

During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, Japanese troops, having numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely thanks to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin.

The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

JUNE 1939. THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR DOMINANCE

Although there was no collision on the ground in June, there was an air war in the skies. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. Thus, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.

The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, and also had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

At the beginning of June, N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov. Soon after G.K. Zhukov arrived in the area of ​​military conflict in June 1939, he proposed his plan of military operations: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G. K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to converge on the conflict area. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, Army Commander G. M. Stern arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with new strength on the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan, superiority was ensured Soviet aviation over the Japanese and managed to seize air supremacy.

At the same time, on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol.

JULY 1939. ADVANCE OF THE JAPANESE FORCE

By the end of June 1939, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the Red Army’s defenses on the operational sector of the front.

On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, General Kobayashi’s troops crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them.

Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions, numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by G. K. Zhukov, which was promptly put into action.

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka did not complete its task.

The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. More than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.

The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

JULY - AUGUST 1939. PREPARATION FOR COUNTEROFFENSE BY SOVIET FORCES

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G. K. Zhukov, division commissar M. S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack they Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from the heights and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the implementation of the planned by G.K. Zhukov offensive operation against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.

Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards under the command of Major A. Bulyga was transferred from the Transbaikal Military District. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.

During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from the territory of Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the political leadership of the country.

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree The Japanese 6th Separate Army, under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 500 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China.

General Rippo and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During G.K. Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, airplanes and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created.

During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was carried out by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G.K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, until last person. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

Last fights still continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce.

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force the next day.

RESULTS

The USSR's victory at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan's non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States.

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, which prompted the United States to enter World War II. world war. The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet in order to ensure freedom of action for the Japanese army and navy in Southeast Asia.

In the fall of 1941, the USSR leadership received a message from intelligence officer Sorge that Japan was not going to attack the USSR. This information made it possible, during the most critical days of the defense of Moscow at the end of October - beginning of November 1941, to transfer from the Far East up to twenty fresh, fully staffed and well-equipped rifle divisions and several tank formations, which played a key role in the defense of Moscow, and also allowed Subsequently, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941.

TODAY

On September 11, 2008, a regular meeting of the organizing committee under the chief federal inspector in the Trans-Baikal Territory was held in Chita to reconstruct the burial places of soldiers who died in Chita hospitals from wounds received during battles near the Khalkhin Gol River.

According to an employee of the federal inspector’s office, Alexander Baturin, who is a member of the organizing committee, about 30 million rubles are required for the construction of the memorial; to date, about 1.5 million rubles have been collected. Many people are interested in the appearance of the monument - entrepreneurs, regional and city administration structures, students and university management. According to Baturin, today to the old Chita cemetery, where the participants are buried Japanese war, the townspeople are disrespectful. Although the memorial could play a huge role in the military-patriotic education of young people, who, unfortunately, know too little about the Japanese war, which claimed the lives of more than 18.5 thousand people.

“In general, there are many blind spots in the events of the battle at Khalkhin Gol,” says retired Colonel Vladimir Palkin. It is not in vain that the military pensioner argues this way - he knows some details of the war with Japan that historians are not aware of. With some disappointment, Palkin says that all the works do not take into account the huge role that the Transbaikal Military District played in the war.

Palkin believes that there are not enough monuments to the heroes of the Japanese war in Russia. “The Mongols treat Khalkhin Gol with much more respect. For them, this war is like the Great Patriotic War for the Russians. Mongolia has a lot of museums and exhibitions military equipment, the streets are named after heroes. And in Russia, the issue of restoring the memorial at the old Chita cemetery has been resolved for so long. Besides this, we do not have a film about those events,” says Colonel Palkin. He wrote the script for a documentary film, for which there is all the documentation, action maps and a film crew. The only thing missing is funding. In 2006, Vladimir Dmitrievich made requests to the city and regional administrations, but the 2.5 million rubles required for filming were not found. With bitterness, Palkin says that he will have to turn to the Mongols for help in making the film.

70TH ANNIVERSARY OF VICTORY AT KHAKHIN GOL

In February 2009, a working group led by the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defense, Major General M. Borbaatar, worked in Dornod aimag. The main purpose of the group's trip is to get acquainted with the work and expenses necessary for this region to prepare for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the victory at Khalkhin Gol. The working group viewed the monument, visited the museum and the Khan-Uul school complex, then departed for the Khalkhin Gol somon to get acquainted with the condition of the monument erected in honor of the Victory on Khalkhin Gol and inspect historical and memorial sites. The commission scheduled the celebration of the victory at Khalkhin Gol for August 22-28, 2009. There are still 1,600 war veterans living in the country, 76 of whom took part in the war on the Khalkh River.

    Fighting in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. 05/11/1939-09/16/1939. Military chronicle. Photo-illustrated periodical 2-2001. Russian language. Pages 101.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
  • Mongolian War Museum has in its collection more than 8,000 exhibits related to the history of the Mongol army. Located in the eastern part of Ulaanbaatar in the 15th microdistrict.
  • Memorial House - Museum of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. Branch of the Mongolian War Museum. New information. New photos. 2011.
  • Eastern (Dornod) ayak of Mongolia. General information. Attractions.
  • Choibalsan. Administrative center of the Eastern aimag of Mongolia.
PHOTO ALBUM PAGES
NOTES:
  1. In “Western” historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local “Incident at Nomon Khan”. "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of ​​the Manchu-Mongolian border.
  2. Translated into Russian “Khalkin-Gol” - Khalkha River
  3. The troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed marching order
  4. During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Fukuda Takeo, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured.
  5. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
  6. On June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
  7. Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve, which was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In fairness, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation decision turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
  8. The division was formed hastily in the Urals; many soldiers of this division had never held a weapon in their hands, so it was necessary to urgently organize on-site training for its personnel.
  9. A report dated July 16, 1939 to the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army on the moral and political state of the personnel of the 82nd Infantry Division cited facts of soldiers leaving combat positions without orders from one of the regiments of this division, attempts to deal with the political staff of the regiment, etc. Order in such undisciplined units was induced by exceptional measures, including executions in front of the formation.
  10. M.P. Yakovlev died in this battle from a Japanese sniper’s bullet.
  11. At that time he was the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment.
  12. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter: “You want to unleash big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.”
  13. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground was carried out by command personnel only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers.
    At first, the Japanese methodically shelled areas that were sources of noise.
  14. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.
  15. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days.
  16. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle.
  17. Since Sunday, August 20, 1939, was a holiday, General Ogisu Rippo allowed many of his subordinate generals and senior officers to leave his troops for rest.
  18. The commander's closest reserve, the Mongolian armored brigade, was located in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.
  19. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next day they were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. Go.
    So on September 2, 4, 14 and 15, Japanese aviation lost 71 aircraft in air battles, while Soviet aviation lost only 18 aircraft in the entire first half of September.
  20. As you know, through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to stop hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. The final restoration of the status quo on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo took place on June 9, 1940, at the end of negotiations between the USSR and Japan.
  21. During the defense of Moscow on October 12, 1941, Stalin summoned the commander of the Far Eastern Front, I.R. Apanasenko, as well as the commander of the Pacific Fleet, I.S. Yumashev, and the first secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, N.M. Pegov, to the Kremlin to discuss the possible transfer of troops With Far East near Moscow, but no decisions were made that day. However, a few days later, when the situation near Moscow deteriorated sharply, Stalin called Apanasenko and asked how many divisions he could transfer to the west at the end of October and in November. Apanasenko replied that up to twenty rifle divisions and seven or eight tank formations could be transferred, if, of course, the railway services could provide the required number of trains. After this, the transfer of troops from the Far East immediately began, taking place under the personal control of I. R. Apanasenko:

Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhyn Gol - “Khalkha River”, Chinese) is a river in Mongolia and China.
The river is famous for the battles of the Red Army against Japan in April-September 1939
In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. The puppet state of Manchukuo was created in the occupied territory. The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area. In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end. On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia. In 1938, a two-week conflict had already occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended with the victory of the USSR. In 1939, tensions on the border increased. On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied. On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border. During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank. On May 28, Japanese troops, having numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.
The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely thanks to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin. The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions. Although there were no clashes on the ground in June, an air war broke out in the skies. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft. The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union who had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal. At the beginning of June N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov was appointed G.K. Zhukov . Soon after arriving in June 1939 in the area of ​​military conflict, G.K. Zhukov, he proposed his plan of combat operations: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G.K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to gather in the conflict area - the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order. Brigade commander M.A., who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Bogdanov. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry. To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the Far Eastern Army, Commander G.M., arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. Stern. Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft. In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft. In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207, Japan - 162 aircraft. Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counter-offensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So as a result of the battle on June 22
, which became widely known in Japan (During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft. At the same time - on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol - on June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers . July. The offensive of the Japanese group By the end of June 1939, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the Red Army’s defenses on the operational sector of the front. On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobasi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Ban Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Ban-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them. Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions, numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by Zhukov, which was promptly put into action. Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve, into battle from the march, which was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. To be fair, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov. Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Ban Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and at certain moments there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles. On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike group under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete the task assigned to it. The group of Japanese troops on Mount Ban Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Ban Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Ban Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Ban Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost. These events became known as the “Ban-Tsagan Massacre.” The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river. However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of the conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

July August. Preparation for the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops The 57th Special Corps was deployed into the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G. K. Zhukov, division commissar M. S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov. New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th tank brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed. On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned. Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored. From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the offensive operation planned by G.K. Zhukov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead. On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20. Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal Military District under the command of the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment, Major A. Bulyga. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom children of Japanese intelligence officers were identified. During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter: “You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.” As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, opposing it was a Japanese group - specially formed by imperial decree The Japanese 6th Separate Army under the command of General Ryuhe Ogisu (n.), consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments of the Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China. General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Ban Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned. During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, an operational plan was carefully developed and strictly followed.
tactical deception of the enemy. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed to disinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days. During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle. The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was carried out by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan. The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.
August. Strike by Soviet troops. Defeat the enemy
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks. The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G. K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.
Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighter jets shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft. In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed piece by piece.
In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks (the commander’s closest reserve was the Mongolian armored brigade - located in Tamtsak-
Bulak 120 kilometers from the front). Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next day they were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. Go. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death. The Red Army captured about 200 guns, 100 vehicles, 400 machine guns and 12 thousand rifles as trophies. The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce. Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the Khalkhin Gol River area, which came into force the next day. The conflict ended in 1942, in May, with the signing of a final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese - based on the old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats in the Soviet-
on the German front, then there was enough a difficult situation. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Ponese. But it only lasted until 1945.

It is generally accepted that the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan’s non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States. In Japan, the defeat, and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro, and subsequently to the triumph of the so-called “maritime party”, which defended the idea of ​​expansion towards Southeast Asia and the islands Pacific Ocean, which inevitably led to a clash with America. The new Japanese government signed an armistice agreement with the USSR on September 15, 1939, and on April 13, 1941, concluded a Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, which triggered the United States' entry into World War II. "Golden Star"
At the height of the conflict, on August 1, 1939, the highest award of the USSR was established - the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (the title existed since 1934, but heroes did not receive insignia). The fate of the winners
Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown corps commander, after the victory over the Japanese, headed the country's largest Kiev Military District. The commander of the aviation of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and the commander of the Far Eastern Army, G. M. Stern, were awarded the Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. " After the end of the conflict, Ya. V. Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, G. M. Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War. In June 1941, both military leaders were arrested and executed a few months later. Rehabilitated in 1954. The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, did not receive any awards for Khalkhin Gol, and ended the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general. According to researchers who consider the military abilities of G.K. Zhukov to be overrated (B.V. Sokolov, Viktor Suvorov, etc.), it was he who played a key role in developing the operation plan, but there is no evidence of this version. Feklenko N.V. .

Not everyone remembers that in 1939 the USSR won the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, which took place from May 11 to September 16. In this collision...

Not everyone remembers that in 1939 the USSR won the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, which took place from May 11 to September 16. During this collision he managed to show himself with the best side Georgy Zhukov. The fights took place in Mongolia, near the border of the country of Manchukuo, which was created by the Japanese rulers, in the area where the Khalkhin Gol River flows.

Where it all started

From the very beginning of 1939, the Japanese carried out regular attacks on the Mongolian border guards.

In early May, the Japanese became especially active, and on the 11th, a Japanese cavalry detachment advanced fifteen kilometers into Mongolia. Then the ground troops were supported by aviation.

The USSR and Mongolia concluded a “Protocol on Mutual Assistance,” so already on May 17, Soviet troops arrived to help their “younger brother.” Soon, even larger armed forces began to arrive, armored vehicles and aircraft arrived.

At first there was an active air war, which progressed with varying success, then a large-scale battle began on the ground.

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol.

Fight on the ground

At first, Zhukov was sent to Mongolia only to inspect the military situation there. Some believe that Budyonny advocated for him. At the end of May, Zhukov reported that the corps commander N.V. Feklenko did not have sufficient military skills to lead this section of the front. As a result, Feklenko was recalled, and Zhukov was appointed in his place. This is how Stalin always acted - he gave those who criticized the opportunity to show themselves in action. This was a good moment for Zhukov.

The newly formed headquarters under the leadership of Zhukov decided to act according to the following scheme: to firmly defend the territory beyond the Khalkhin Gol River and prepare a counterattack against the Japanese. They were able to carry out this plan in full, since during these days there was a battle in the air, and there was a lull on the ground.

The Japanese, meanwhile, were making their plans. By the end of June 1939, they decided to encircle and kill the Red Army troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, cross the river and break the front line. In early July, Japanese troops went on the offensive, crossed Khalkhin Gol, fortified themselves on Mount Bayan-Tsagan forty kilometers from the border, and the Soviet troops had a hard time. Japanese troops increasingly strengthened their conquests. Georgy Zhukov, taking responsibility to correct

situation, sent a Soviet tank brigade with a division of Mongolian armored vehicles into the fight, although motorized rifles did not protect them. This group of troops justified the hopes of Georgy Konstantinovich. True, half of the armored vehicle division was lost, but the situation leveled out. Help arrived and the Japanese began to retreat. To prevent this, Japanese military leaders ordered to blow up the last bridge over Khalkhin Gol, but a general flight of Japanese soldiers began. The Japanese side lost thousands of people killed, almost all armored vehicles and artillery.

Yakovlev, Mikhail Pavlovich (November 18, 1903 - July 12, 1939), Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.


Broken Soviet armored car BA-10.

On the eastern coast of Khalkhin Gol, Soviet forces rolled back, reducing the occupied territory, but were not broken. To completely defeat the Japanese, it was necessary to clear the eastern bank of them and redefine the border. Zhukov was planning an attack. The Japanese thought the same, but they were already afraid to cross the river. They simply wanted to defeat the Russians by removing them from the eastern bank.

The Soviet side attracted additional troops - a rifle division, tankers, they mobilized combat-ready men in Transbaikalia, organizing two more divisions, and from there they invited a border battalion, which was able to catch many scouts from the Japanese side.

Russian troops numbered 57,000 fighters, they were equipped with more than 500 guns, more than 500 tanks, more than 300 armored vehicles and more than 500 aircraft. On the Japanese side they were opposed by an army of 75,000 soldiers, about 500 guns, and almost 200 tanks.

For four days in early July, the battle for the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol continued, the Red Army soldiers did not budge. There were no battles for ten days, during which time the Russians strengthened their positions, and more motorized riflemen and machine gunners arrived to help. On July 23 and 24, the Japanese went on the offensive, but could not do anything.

M. A. Bogdanov.

Komkor Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan.

Long-awaited victory

The Red Army troops prepared for the main attack in secret, moving equipment only at night, radio conversations were conducted only about defense, and at night, radio stations transmitted recordings of the sounds of moving equipment and aircraft, so that the Japanese’s perception was dulled.

As a result, the Soviet attack at the end of August came as a big surprise to the Japanese, who themselves wanted to attack only 4 days later. Military operation according to the canons of the classics, where tanks and armored personnel carriers struck from the flanks to encircle the enemy and defeat them in the territory between the river and the official border of Mongolia. This is how our Red Army, led by Zhukov, acted, even before the same well-known attacks of the Nazis in Poland and France. 3 groups attacked: Southern - the main attack, Northern - auxiliary attack, Central group - the main battle.

At the beginning of seven in the morning the artillery and aviation moved out, at 9 o'clock the infantry and tanks moved in. The hottest battle took place in the Central Department of the Front, where the enemy was very powerfully fortified. In the next two days, Zhukov involved reserves - a motorized armored group, then in the Central sector - airborne troops and border guards. Aviation helped very effectively. The Japanese were unable to coordinate their actions in time and defend well on the flanks. By August 26, 1939, the Red Army had trapped Japanese troops in a pocket.

The Japanese fighters also fought very bravely, literally stood to the death, did not go into captivity, but still could not escape the encirclement.



In early September, Japanese troops again tried to seize lands beyond the border of Mongolia, but were brutally defeated.

As a result, on September 15, 1939, the USSR, Mongolia and Japan entered into an agreement to end the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River. The final agreement was reached in 1942, it contained many concessions to Japan, since the USSR was at a disadvantage. But in 1945, all the lands given to Japan again passed to Mongolia.

Results:


Memorial "Zaisan", Ulaanbaatar.

  • The fact that the USSR showed its strength during the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River caused Japan to abandon clashes with the Red Army and they began to expand their empire to the south. Before the Great Patriotic War, this was very useful for the Soviet Union, since its friendly Mongolia found itself in the rear.
  • The battles at Khalkhin Gol contributed to the start of the dizzying military career of Georgy Zhukov.