Stairs.  Entry group.  Materials.  Doors.  Locks.  Design

Stairs. Entry group. Materials. Doors. Locks. Design

» Soviet special forces: from creation to our time. Day of Special Forces of the Russian Federation

Soviet special forces: from creation to our time. Day of Special Forces of the Russian Federation

The period of World War II was a time of rapid popularization of special forces. It was then that the army commanders different countries began to realize the effectiveness of units special purpose and widely use them both to support large army operations and to carry out tasks that, for one reason or another, could not be entrusted to conventional units. After the first successes, special forces began to be created in almost all countries participating in the war, and some of these units have successfully survived to this day.

Germany. From Goering to Skorzeny

In the last article I said that the first modern special forces unit can be considered SS Leibstandarte. However, with the outbreak of World War II, the situation changed dramatically. It was decided to include SS troops in the army and use them in military operations. But it turned out that the SS was poorly adapted to operate as part of army units. Therefore, it was decided to reform and expand the SS so that they could act independently of the army. This led to the fact that the SS began to rapidly lose the appearance of a special forces unit - the tasks that the SS troops performed in wartime were not much different from the goals of the army. About no narrow specialization and there was no longer any talk of in-depth special training.
The SS, however, retained separate special forces, mainly engaged in ensuring internal security and fighting partisans. The SS also had their own landing units - 500th Parachute Battalion. However, this unit was quickly eclipsed by the glory of the Air Force paratroopers.
Long before World War II, large-scale maneuvers of the Red Army were carried out in the USSR, not far from Kyiv. Among the many foreign observers was a colonel of the German Air Force Kurt Student. During the exercise, he was amazed by the spectacle of two thousand paratroopers jumping together. Student's enthusiastic report convinced the Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, Marshal Hermann Goering. And by the end of 1935, the creation of a regiment of paratroopers began under the symbolic name "General Goering". A strict selection framework was established - out of three applicants, usually only one was accepted. In addition to intensive jump training, attention was also paid to the development of initiative among personnel - this quality is indispensable for fighters who, presumably, must act as part of small groups and even alone.
When determining the place of the new battalion in military operations, the opinion of the command was decisive ground forces, which proposed using paratroopers to destroy fortifications on the borders with Germany and spoke of a gradual increase in the number of paratroopers. Already on July 1, 1938, it was decided to create the General Goering regiment on the basis 7th Air Division, the command of which was entrusted to Kurt Student.
The soldiers of the 7th Division received their baptism of fire in 1939, during the attack on Poland, when airborne groups were sent behind enemy lines mainly for reconnaissance - the actions of the ground forces in the Polish direction were more than successful, and they did not expose the valuable unit to unnecessary danger. But the lightning-fast capture of Denmark and Norway in the spring of 1940 became possible thanks to the paratroopers, who, in difficult conditions, were able to recapture a number of important objects from the enemy with minimal losses. The most impressive operation of the 7th Division, perhaps, was the assault on the Belgian Fort Eben-Emael, one of the key posts of the defensive line on the border with Germany. Half underground, protected by two-meter thick walls and deep ditches, armed with 18 guns, the fort seemed almost impregnable. But not for airborne assault. On May 11, 1940, the wounded fort capitulated. This became possible thanks to coordinated actions
85 paratroopers who spent several months training on an exact model of the fort.
The combat path of the 7th Division ended with the extremely unsuccessful Cretan operation (May 1942). In two weeks, the paratroopers lost over three thousand people and most of their equipment killed. After the operation, the remnants of the division were reformed into the 1st Parachute Division. However, neither it nor ten other similar divisions were able to repeat the glory of the 7th Division. In essence, these units were selected infantry, trained in the basics of airborne assault and performing standard tasks for an infantry unit.
In addition to the German Air Force, “their own special forces” were created in Abwere- German military intelligence. Abwehr Chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, was a big fan of the general von Vorbeck and even invited one of the veterans of the actions in Tanganyika, captain von Hippel, to the post of Abwehr adviser on partisan operations. By the summer of 1939, a unit was formed under his leadership "Ebbinghaus", specializing in sabotage behind enemy lines. In addition to standard high requirements to physical and military training, special attention was paid to the level of intelligence, knowledge foreign languages, as well as the applicant’s appearance, which necessarily had to be discreet and unmemorable. The detachment received a baptism of fire in Poland. It is interesting that in conditions of rapid advance German army The saboteurs were engaged not so much in damaging rear facilities as in protecting them from the retreating enemy, who was trying to delay the German advance by destroying bridges and railway lines. Both in Poland and in other countries, the first people who were involved in operations behind enemy lines were those who knew the local language and local customs perfectly. This allowed them to wear someone else's uniform and even, posing as an officer, give orders to enemy units.
After the Polish campaign, the Ebbinghaus saboteurs became the basis of a secret secret force formed in the city of Brandenburg. 800th Special Purpose Construction Regiment(the name, naturally, had nothing to do with reality). The unit grew rapidly, and by the end of 1940, most of the saboteurs were withdrawn from Brandenburg
and are stationed in territories bordering countries against which the sabotage war was planned. The regimental headquarters was located in Berlin.
The saboteurs were trained in methods of capturing and destroying various objects, terrain orientation, covert movement and camouflage, and silently killing the enemy. The geography of action was very extensive: from India to Finland. After the first operations, the Brandenburg fighters gained fame as one of the most brutal units in the history of the Second World War. In their actions, the saboteurs did not disdain anything: they intimidated and killed civilians, violated international law, and disguised themselves as wounded and refugees. Brandenburg fighters almost always penetrated enemy territory before the official declaration of war.
At the end of 1942, the Brandenburg regiment was deployed to 800th Special Purpose Division. The situation on the fronts was changing more and more every day: the rapid German offensive was replaced by positional battles. Under these conditions, the 800th Division began to be used against partisans - actions behind enemy lines gave way to actions in their own rear. And by December 1944, all units subordinate to the Abwehr were united into a motorized infantry division, which inherited the name “Brandenburg”. By that time, the most experienced fighters of the division had already transferred to separate sabotage companies subordinate to the SS.
The creation of these units began in 1943, when the German command, having lost its strategic initiative, declared the doctrine of “total war.” One of the elements of this doctrine was the conduct of many sabotage operations around the world. The organizational side of the issue was entrusted to the commander department "C"(sabotage and terror) Otto Skorzeny.
The saboteurs for the new detachments were trained in the strictest secrecy at Friedenthal Castle near Berlin. The requirements for potential saboteurs were perhaps the most stringent in the entire history of German special forces. They took only reliable people, mostly Germans who had extensive experience in sabotage and terror. Each saboteur was trained according to an individual program. Particular attention was paid
technical support - the latest developments of German scientists first came to the disposal of the SS.
Until the very end of the war, SS saboteurs inflicted considerable damage on the Allies. The triumph of Skorzeny's wards was Operation Thunder, aimed at the Allies who landed in Normandy and carried out on December 16, 1944. In parallel with the large-scale offensive of German troops, more than 40 specially trained saboteurs penetrated into the rear. They caused confusion in the ranks of the retreating enemy, destroyed warehouses, mined roads and even rearranged road signs. Within a few days, the Allies were disorganized and retreated tens of kilometers back. However, they soon came to their senses and launched a counter-offensive. Operation Thunder was one of the last German victories in World War II.

Great Britain. Victory over conservatism

For many years after the First World War, the command of the British army was considered one of the most conservative in the world. Senior officials were extremely suspicious of the proposed innovations, believing that Great Britain was capable of defeating any enemy using traditional methods of warfare and economic sanctions.
Prime Minister Churchill unexpectedly found himself in opposition to the army command. He was very interested in the experience of using special forces units both during the First World War and later during the German attack on Poland and Norway. Churchill used all his influence to put pressure on senior officers in the army, air force and navy. On June 22, 1940, an order was issued to begin the formation of several special forces units. The Ministry of Defense gave these units a common name: Battalions special service . By a curious coincidence, this name was abbreviated as SS (SS - Special Service), which made it unpopular both among unit soldiers and among civilians. The public preferred the term " commando", derived from the name of the Boer cavalry units of the early 20th century, which used the tactics of fleeting strikes followed by retreat. The first is
the name began to be used by the lieutenant colonel Dudley Clark- author of the concept of creating special forces. Clark's plan was approved by Churchill, and already in June 1940 he was tasked with recruiting the first volunteers into a sabotage unit intended to attack German coastal positions. Due to the difficult condition of the British regular army, at first recruitment was carried out in civil defense units. The first combat experience that the commandos received just a few weeks after the start of formation turned out to be unsuccessful - the groups sent to the territories occupied by the Germans for reconnaissance purposes suffered losses and returned with nothing. However, the British immediately learned lessons from the defeats and began to reorganize the not yet fully formed special forces on the fly. Was involved in working on this Roger Case(naval admiral, veteran of the First World War), who headed the newly created Joint Operations Directorate, under whose leadership she moved Special Forces Brigade. By 1941, the final structure of the brigade had been formed - 11 commando squads, each of which had 6 platoons of 65 people. A little later, uniform standards for the selection and training of personnel were developed - their author was the commander of one of the detachments, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Newman. The document received the unofficial name "Catechism" and consisted of 18 rules. It outlined the main purpose of commandos - effective combat against the enemy anywhere in the world. To achieve this, commando training had to meet very stringent requirements. Each fighter had to have a high fighting spirit and independently think through his actions, be able to kill the enemy both with his bare hands and with the help of various weapons, and have perfect command of any vehicles. Each of the commandos had to prove their professional suitability both at the selection stage and during training - any soldier who could not cope with the workload was immediately fired.
Until the fall of 1941, commandos were used in the “small war” - conducting reconnaissance and sabotage raids behind enemy lines. A number of successful actions (for example, it was thanks to the commandos that the British got
components of the latest German encryption machine) proved high level preparing Case's pets. Despite this, there was no rush to involve commandos in major army operations - there was confusion over defining the role of special forces in such actions, and the army leadership was constantly throwing a spoke in the wheels. The escalation of the conflict led to the fact that in October 1941, Admiral Case was removed from his post. He was replaced by a captain of the 1st rank Louis Mountbatten, who began to ensure that the commandos could operate together with the marines and navy. The results were not long in coming - starting in 1942, commandos were actively involved in participating in major military operations. These included famous victories, such as the destruction of the dry dock at Saint-Nazaire, and crushing defeats, such as the failed attempt to capture Tobruk.
In addition to units recruited from British residents, there was also the 10th Inter-Allied Commando Detachment, which, in addition to the British, accepted the French, Norwegians, Dutch and Poles. Thanks to Mountbatten, commando units began to be formed from the Marine Corps, which had previously been exclusively engaged in guarding ships and performing colonial service. To ensure successful operations, commandos began to be created special purpose auxiliary units. The first such units were units designed to ensure the landing of commandos from watercraft, and air force guidance units, correcting the actions of aviation.
At the end of 1943, commando units underwent another reform and were consolidated into four brigades. With this composition, the commandos ended the Second World War. The 1st and 4th brigades took part in the Normandy landings, the 2nd brigade operated in the Mediterranean, and the 3rd was transferred to Far East. In 1946, the commando units were disbanded - post-war Britain did not want to support special forces units. The exception was the 3rd brigade, renamed Marine Commando Brigade.
Already at the beginning of World War II, other special forces units began to separate from the commandos. One of these parts was Special Air Service(CAC
). Its ancestors were 11th SAS Battalion(created on the basis of the 2nd Commando Battalion) in the UK and a small squad "L"(created from the remnants of the combined commando squad "Layforce") in North Africa.
The SAS was an airborne unit consisting of many separate battalions scattered throughout the theater of operations - from Europe to the Pacific. The unit specialized in reconnaissance and sabotage operations deep behind enemy lines. SAS fighters were also involved in the formation of resistance units on enemy territory. A set of requirements for SAS soldiers, developed by the commander of detachment "L" Lieutenant Colonel David Sterling, resembled the requirements for commandos. An interesting detail - the list of required items included a sense of humor. Two French and one Belgian SAS regiments were created, operating jointly with the English regiments.
The British special forces turned out to be so fierce and brutal in battle that in October 1942, Hitler issued an order according to which all captured commando and SAS soldiers were to be shot on the spot.
Beginning in 1944, when the strategic initiative completely passed into the hands of the Allies, the SAS, like commando units, began to be actively used to support army operations. Until the end of the war, most SAS units operated in the French rear, supporting the opening of a second front.
In addition to the SAS and commandos, the British military command created several small special forces to wage a “small war” - like special purpose boat squads And long-distance search groups(Shindits). The first fighters specialized in carrying out daring landings and sabotage with the help of sea and river boats. The second were organized in 1940 in North Africa. They were equipped big amount fast SUVs and were used for patrol and sabotage operations behind enemy lines.

USA. Rangers and Normandy

The United States of America met the Second
world with a very weak and unprepared army for new conditions. After the removal in the 20s of General Mitchell- the author of the landing plan on Belgian territory in 1919 - even the creation of airborne troops was slowed down. The first parachute units began to form only in 1940, but by the end of World War II they were already considered the most combat-ready units of the American army.
A similar situation developed with special-purpose units. The first such parts began to form in Office of Strategic Services, created in 1941 under the CIA. The competence of the Directorate included intelligence and organization special forms waging war on enemy territory. The special forces under the Directorate were distinguished by their diversity - their structure and training varied significantly depending on the intended tasks. For example, task forces included 34 people and were intended to organize and supply the Resistance in occupied countries. In addition, these groups were often involved in sabotage and reconnaissance operations. They were usually delivered to the site by sea or by air. So called teams, consisting of only three people, were intended to establish contact and subsequently ensure communication with the Resistance units. Due to the wide geography of operations, residents of those countries on whose territory they were supposed to fight were willingly recruited into the Department’s detachments.
On June 20, 1942, the Americans, together with the Canadians, began to form 1st Special Forces Group- the first regular army special forces unit. When preparing the group, the intended area of ​​​​its operation was taken into account - mountainous terrain with a cold climate - therefore, in addition to standard skills, the special forces were trained in the tactics of fighting in the mountains and the use of skis. The unit existed for a little more than two years, during which, however, it carried out several successful operations.
In May 1942, it was decided that America, whose main enemy was still island Japan, would continue to actively participate in European operations. This required units with amphibious assault skills. Whatever
strange, but in the early 40s even the American Marines did not know this tactic. Moreover, instead of training, their command began to form parachute and sabotage units.
Therefore, by order of the American Chief of Staff, General George Marshall the creation of special-purpose units began, called rangers- in honor of Robert Rogers's units operating in the Hudson Valley during the Seven Years' War (1756-63). The Rangers were supposed to be used for sea and airborne landings, reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines. The formation of such units began simultaneously in Great Britain, where volunteers were recruited from stationed American units. 1st Ranger Battalion, and in the United States, where it was formed 2nd Ranger Battalion. Later they were joined by the 3rd and 4th battalions created in North Africa.
According to the tactics developed by the American military, together with the rangers, it was planned to use sapper units to clear the coastline and provide engineering support for the landing force, as well as coastal battalions to quickly unload the landing force. When training rangers, the schemes and methods used by the British commandos were initially used. Often British and American special forces trained together.
The Rangers' combat path during World War II was littered with failures. Despite good preparation and coordinated actions, the rangers suffered huge losses. For example, during Operation Pebble at the beginning of 1944, the 1st and 3rd battalions were almost completely destroyed. It was even worse for the Rangers during the landing in the Omaha sector (the opening of the second front in Normandy). According to the landing plan developed by the American command, the first echelon rangers were assigned a special role - capturing coastal heights and destroying heavy pillboxes. Of the landing soldiers, half died before they reached the German positions. In total, during the landing at the Omaha site, the Ranger units lost about two-thirds of their personnel. Despite this, the actions of the rangers were more effective compared to the others
in parts. In some areas, the successful completion of the landing can be considered entirely the merit of the rangers.
After the landing in the Omaha sector, the Rangers were used to support the offensive in Europe. Besides, 6th Ranger Battalion participated in battles in the Pacific.

Special forces units in other countries participating in the war

Naturally, special forces units during World War II were created not only in Germany, Great Britain and the USA. Almost all countries by World War II already had airborne units - or were actively working on their creation. At the same time, almost all parachute formations had the attributes of special forces - strict selection, quality training, tailored to one or another sphere of action. However, subsequently, small airborne units, as a rule, were deployed into larger ones and lost these characteristics - like, say, the German 7th Air Division, which I described in the first chapter.
Sabotage units were also popular, like Separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes of the NKVD of the USSR or Japanese suicide saboteurs. Many units were created in the image and likeness of the British commandos. The reason is simple: many political bodies of the countries occupied by the Germans, including military departments, were evacuated to British territory. Commando units were created from nationals of countries such as France, the Netherlands; in addition, there were units that operated together with other British units (for example, the Greek "Sacred Squad" under the leadership of the SAS) or as part of them ( 5th SAS Regiment was entirely staffed by former soldiers of the Belgian army).
* * *

Second World War became an important stage in the development of special forces units. Probably, if not for the experience gained during this war, the current special forces would be completely different.
It is the special forces of our time that the continuation of the material will be devoted to in the next issues of “Gaming”. We advise you not to miss it.

Special forces units during the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War

1st Volunteer Partisan Detachment of the Institute physical culture them. P.F. Lesgaft (1st DPO IFK named after P.F. Lesgaft) intelligence department of the Northern Front.

Formed on June 29, 1941 by the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District from students and teachers of the IFC named after. P.F. Lesgafta.

On June 23–28, 1941, at the institute’s sports base in Kavgolovo, reconnaissance commanders of the LVO briefly familiarized volunteers with small arms (machine gun, self-loading rifle) and the technique of using explosives. Classes were also conducted on the tactics of raids on “headquarters, vehicles, columns of troops and other objects.”

On June 29, 1941, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, brigade commander P.P. Evstegneev signed secret order No. 005 on the formation of the 1st DPO (volunteer partisan detachment) numbering 254 people (some sources indicate the number of the detachment at 300 people).

The detachment was divided into 12 independent groups of 20–25 people each (later the groups began to be called detachments and received the corresponding numbering from 1 to 12), had 6 walkie-talkies.

Group (detachment) commanders:

No. 1 E.V. Mironov;

No. 2 K.P. Vlasenko;

No. 3 V.N. Zimerberg;

No. 4 M.I. Nemchinov;

No. 5 D.F. Kositsyn;

No. 6 V.M. Wenzel;

No. 7 F.M. Ermolaev;

No. 8 E.S. Bogdanov;

No. 9 V.M. Shamin;

No. 10 A.D. Seleznev;

No. 11 N.K. Ponomarev;

No. 12 I.F. Artamonov.

On June 29, 1941, all groups of the 1st DPO set off in cars along the route Leningrad - Luga - Strugi Krasnye.

The main tasks of the detachment:

“... b) Upon arrival in the specified areas, first of all, secretly locate the groups’ supply bases in the forests of the specified areas, ensuring proper storage of both food and ammunition.

c) When the enemy is detected in the areas where they are located, the groups begin active combat operations by committing minor sabotage - disabling vehicle engines and drivers with armor-piercing bullets, attacking single following vehicles and destroying them, seizing documents from messengers - messengers on motorcycles, etc. - to cause panic in the moving parts of the enemy, to force them to slow down the pace of movement at every step, especially as a result of violating road structures - bridges, gates and creating artificial obstacles - rubble, mining, burning tanks, etc.

d) When large enemy forces are detected, through local Soviet and party organizations, seek to involve the entire local population in the work - collective farmers, employees and workers, who will be used to create artificial obstacles on a large scale - rubble, wolf pits, ditches, etc.

3. Upon receiving information about the enemy and the areas of his advance, it is necessary to urgently inform the center about the areas of concentration, the number of vehicles (tanks) and the direction of the columns. Radio communication - twice a day..."

On June 30, 1941, soldiers of the 1st DPO settled in the forests in the area north and north-west of Pskov and with further advancement fascist troops remained in their rear.

Group No. 1 – Sloboda district;

Group No. 2 – area northeast of Pskov, 5 km;

Group No. 3 – Patrovo-Terekhovo district;

Group No. 4 – Maromorka district;

Group No. 5 – Voshkovo district;

Group No. 6 – Zarechye district;

Group No. 7 – Kotseritsa area;

Group No. 8 – Panfilovka district;

Group No. 9 – Pokhony district;

Group No. 10 – Ludoni region;

Group No. 11 – Chatkovitsa area;

Group No. 12 – Zapolye district.

In July–August 1941, Group No. 5 operated in the Pskov–Porkhov–Novoselye triangle.

In July–September 1941, combat groups of the 1st DPO attacked the enemy next losses(according to incomplete data):

over 40 attacks were carried out on columns of tanks, armored vehicles, motorized infantry, convoys, airfields and enemy garrisons;

over 150 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed, 1 tank, 17 trucks, 3 passenger cars, 16 motorcycles, 1 handcar, 2 ammunition depots were blown up (one of them with 6.5 thousand shells), 5 bridges, 5 were derailed trains with manpower, equipment and ammunition, 4 tanks, 1 armored personnel carrier, 2 passenger cars were destroyed, 3 soldiers were captured (handed over to the headquarters of the 41st Corps);

Numerous blockages have been created on the roads, telephone and telegraph communications and the railway track have been damaged in many places;

a group of 200 fighters from the 4th division was withdrawn from encirclement people's militia and the 519th GAP (howitzer-artillery regiment);

Valuable intelligence data was transferred to the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northern Front (from August 23 of the Leningrad Front) (until July 16, regular radio communication was carried out with 6 groups, on July 21, radio communication was regularly maintained with one group, and through delegates, personal contact was established with two groups).

According to incomplete data, the losses of the combat groups of the 1st DPO amounted to 56 people killed and missing, 3 people captured.

On July 2, 1941, the intelligence department of the Northern Front sent the 2nd DPO (53 people) to the southwestern regions of the Leningrad region, and on July 10 - the 3rd DPO (100 people), a significant part of the personnel of which were students and teachers of the Institute. Lesgafta. There is no data on the actions of these units.

By the end of September 1941, most of the groups of the 1st DPO left the front line due to heavy losses. The remaining fighters were used by the Leningrad Front RO for reconnaissance and sabotage in small groups or joined army units.

2nd special brigade of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the North-Western Front

One of the first long-term raids on enemy rear lines was carried out by the 2nd Special Brigade. When it appeared in the Velikiye Luki region in January 1942, the Nazis decided that several strong partisan detachments were operating there. But it was one raiding brigade, formed in September 1941, in the midst of the retreat Soviet troops, on the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front N.F. Vatutin and the head of the intelligence department of the front headquarters K.N. Derevianko. The brigade commander was Major Alexey Litvinenko, the assistant was a career intelligence officer, senior lieutenant Alexander German. They met people emerging from encirclement, checked them, selecting fighters for themselves. They were trained by Senior Lieutenant Belash, Chief of Staff of the 2nd Special Forces. The head of communications was Lieutenant Klimanov, the detachment commanders were Lieutenants Tarasyuk and Zagorodnyuk. The headquarters was located in Ostashkovo, Kalinin region. The partisan detachments of the nearest areas were placed at the disposal of the brigade.

In October 1941, the 2nd Special Brigade was sent behind the front line and by November 7 reached the Penovsky district (Kalinin region). The brigade did not set up forest camps; the partisans stopped for the night in villages, having previously knocked out the Germans from them. Soon the brigade was joined by a detachment named after Chkalov, where there were about a hundred soldiers who were surrounded.

Until the end of 1941, the brigade raided the Kalinin and Leningrad regions. The partisans destroyed bridges, weapons depots, posts, and committed sabotage on railways.

“During October - December 1941, it destroyed about 1 thousand people. enemy, captured 39 of his soldiers and officers, destroyed over 50 trucks, 39 motorcycles, 3 ammunition warehouses, 2 fuel warehouses.”

In addition to battles and raids on enemy garrisons, the partisans were engaged in reconnaissance, monitored the movements of troops, reported the situation in the area to the front headquarters and gave recommendations on the organization of reconnaissance, reported information on traitors, and sometimes carried out trials and reprisals themselves. They reported information about fascist defense along the banks of the Lovat, Volga and Western Dvina rivers.

A warehouse of shells with toxic substances was discovered near the city of Kholm. During the raid, local underground party organizations and partisan detachments came under the command of the brigade.

After the liberation of the Ostashkovsky district, the brigade again went behind the front line, this time to the area of ​​the Novosokolniki railway station. She struck at Art. Nasva on the Novosokolniki - Dno section in the Pskov region, then - at Maevo station on the Riga - Moscow line. At this time, the brigade consisted of about 350 partisans, divided into mounted, ski and fire groups. The Nazis took it for a cavalry corps.

In February 1942, the 2nd special unit operated in the German rear in the Kalinin region. Among the daring exploits of the partisans was such as holding a solemn parade in honor of Red Army Day on February 23, 1942 in the village of Churilovo, when 300 brigade soldiers solemnly marched in front of the assembled peasants. And the enemy was in a neighboring village, but the road was such that the Germans were never able to reach the partisans.

However, the punishers soon pinned them down. The headquarters of the security forces of the German Army Group North sent several regiments against the brigade. The partisans, who by that time had almost no ammunition and medicine, evaded the fighting and left, the Nazis followed them, and on the heels of the Nazis was one of the detachments of the 2nd brigade, which had previously completed a special task. Now they were looking for their own and decided that the easiest way to find them would be to follow the punishers.

On March 3, the brigade fought its last major battle, and at the end of March crossed the front line. For this raid, Major Litvinenko was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was recalled to the active army and reached Berlin. He celebrated the victory as the commander of the 20th Guards Mechanized Brigade.

The chief of staff of the brigade, Alexander Viktorovich German, remained with the partisans - on the basis of the 2nd Special Brigade, the 3rd Leningrad Partisan Brigade was formed, German became its commander, and died in battle in 1943. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (1944).

3rd Special Purpose Regiment of the Intelligence Department of the Northern Front Headquarters

Commander: Makovkin I.A., captain.

He acted on the communications of the 4th Tank Group - the Plyussa - Lyady highway and other communication routes west of Luga (Leningrad Region).

88th separate rifle brigade (88th OSB).

It began to be created in mid-1941 for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind Japanese troops.

The brigade was formed on the basis of two special camps: Northern, or camp “A”, located near the city of Voroshilov (now the city of Ussuriysk, Primorsky Territory), and Southern, or camp “B”, located on the outskirts of the city of Kerki (Turkmenistan), where interned Chinese and Korean communists, active participants in the guerrilla movement against the Japanese occupiers in Northeast China. The brigade's personnel were also recruited from Soviet citizens of Chinese and Korean origin from various areas Soviet Union, Russians and representatives of national minorities.

By mid-1942, one unit of the 88th OSB was formed in the Southern camp. It consisted of three separate rifle battalions, a separate sapper company, a separate anti-tank rifle company, a separate auto delivery company, one mortar and two artillery battalions, a separate reconnaissance company, a separate communications battalion, a separate machine gun company, a separate air defense platoon, a separate NKVD platoon, a medical sanitary company, field postal station and unit control.

At the same time, another part of the 88th OSB was formed in the Northern camp. The combat composition of this unit consisted of a headquarters and administration, a political department, four separate rifle battalions, a separate company, a battalion of machine gunners, a separate artillery battalion, a separate reconnaissance company, a separate communications battalion, a separate sapper company, a separate auto delivery company, rear services and a military prosecutor's office.

All combat training of the unit was aimed at practicing the tasks of preparing small reconnaissance and sabotage detachments for operations in the Japanese rear. Soldiers and commanders systematically carried out forced marches, parachute jumps, and studied radio communications and demolition. During almost the entire Great Patriotic War, the personnel of the 88th OSB, based on two camps - Southern and Northern - were actively preparing to participate in the fight against the Japanese occupiers. However, for a number of objective reasons of a political nature, the 88th OSB was not involved in hostilities.

In October 1945, the brigade was disbanded.

For political purposes, a group of Chinese consisting of 378 people was sent from the disbanded brigade to Manchuria. Another group consisting of Koreans, led by the former commander of the 1st battalion of the brigade (North Camp) Jing Zhicheng (aka Kim Il Sung, the future leader of the DPRK) was sent to North Korea for the same purposes.

In 1946, with the outbreak of the Third Civil War in China, almost the entire Chinese composition of the former 88th RSF returned to their homeland and took an active part in the battles against the Kuomintang. Together with them, the Korean brigade departed to Manchuria, and later, with the formation of the DPRK, to Korea.

9903rd military unit of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front.

In reconnaissance and sabotage work on the Western Front, a special unit “military unit 9903” (later the 3rd (sabotage) department of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters), formed in June 1941, played a huge role. Then it was a small group of seven commanders: the head was Colonel A.E. Svirin, comrade-in-arms of Y.K. Berzina, a participant in the war in Spain, Major A.K. Sprogis, captain A.Ya. Azarov, senior lieutenants I.N. Banov, F.I. Kovalenko, I.I. Matusevich, A.K. Shrew. The command staff of the unit was staffed by students of military academies. The unit was supposed to engage in active reconnaissance, sabotage - explosions on railways and highways, destruction of bridges, warehouses, communications, and the creation of partisan detachments.

It was difficult to work. In the chaos of the retreat, there was no point in even thinking about maintaining stable contact with the sabotage groups - they had to be released “in a free search.” There was no experience of reconnaissance work behind enemy lines. In the summer, several groups were prepared and sent to the German rear, but contact was maintained with only three.

At the end of August 1941, Major Sprogis was appointed commander of the unit, and regimental commissar N.D. was appointed military commissar. Dronov. They managed to restructure the work. First of all, the problem of personnel was solved by recruiting Komsomol volunteers from Moscow and the Moscow region. About three thousand people went through the selection commission, of which two thirds were enrolled in the unit.

During the Battle of Moscow and the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops, military unit 9903 trained more than 45 combat units for operations in the German rear. In total, during this time, 86 trips to the German rear were made, some groups went behind the front line two or three times. In September 1941, 8 exits took place, in October - 11, in November - 36, in December - 14, in January and February 1942 - 17.

In the fall of 1941, four special forces units, each consisting of 100–120 people, also operated in the German rear.

Particularly distinguished were the groups of Mikhail Ostashev, operating in the Dorogobuzh region, Grigory Sizakov and Matvey Gusakov in the Mogilev region, Korneev in the Gomel region, Ilya Shary in the Kalinkovichi region, Boris Krainov in the Polotsk region, Fyodor Morozov in the Glusk region. These groups derailed an average of 10–12 enemy trains and helped local partisans.

Operations center under the command of I.F. Topkin, who operated in the Brest region, united around himself and led the activities of several partisan detachments. Some groups themselves became detachments. And Grigory Sazonov’s group became a partisan brigade with several hundred people.

After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, military unit 9903 began to engage in slightly different activities - it trained groups of 10-12 people, usually equipped with radio communications, which were transferred by plane to deep behind enemy lines. In August–September 1942, four operational centers of 35 people each were prepared and sent to the German rear.

In December 1942, unit 9903 was transferred to the disposal of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, and in the summer of 1943, several groups and detachments again came under the control of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front.

For heroism shown behind enemy lines, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, Lela Kolesova, Ivan Banov, Grigory Linkov, Nikita Dronov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, about 500 people were awarded orders and medals.

"Arap" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Deployed behind enemy lines in April 1944.

"Arthur" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

Landed in September 1944 on the territory of East Prussia.

"Ataman" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

The group commander is captain Fedor Filimonovich Konnik.

Number of people: 9 people.

"Boris" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander: Boris Grigorievich Emchenko, captain.

Number of people: 7 people.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1942.

It operated in the area of ​​the city of Luga, the Warsaw railway and the Kyiv highway (Leningrad region).

She stayed in the occupied territory for over a hundred days.

"Brook" - operational intelligence center

In the summer of 1943, an operational intelligence center of the Intelligence Directorate was created, headed by A.P. Brinsky (“Brook”), operating in the area of ​​​​the cities of Kovel and Kamenets-Podolsky. An extensive intelligence network was formed here, which regularly sent valuable information to the Center about the groupings of German troops and their transfers. Brinsky's information was important, for example, for the planning and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation of 1944. Here are just some of the messages he sent to the Center:

“11/15/43. From Korosten to Shepetovka, the Nazis are transferring one infantry regiment from the 339th Infantry Division... Brook.”

“7.12.43. During December 5–7 this year. The 24th Division was transferred by rail from Rovno to Kovel. During this time, 189 tanks, more than 180 guns, 426 cargo and passenger cars, about 70 motorcycles. 182 carriages with personnel were noted... Brook.”

"1.2.44. Tank and motorized units are being transferred along the highway from Kolka to Vladimir-Volynsky. In Lutsk, a large concentration of enemy troops was noted, which are expected to be transferred to the Vladimir-Volynsky area. The movement of troops along the Rivne-Kovel railway stopped... Brook.”

Vasilyeva Yu.V. reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northern Front

In July - August 1941, it operated in the Tsapelka - Dvorki - Podborovye area of ​​the Leningrad region.

In August 1941, as a result of an ambush on a highway organized by the detachment's fighters, the commander of the SS police division, Police General Mühlerstedt, was killed.

In October 1941, she continued to be behind enemy lines.

"Vol" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergeant Major Valuev Pavel Mikhailovich.

"Voronkin" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

Landed behind enemy lines in August 1944 on Polish territory.

"Groza" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

The group commander is Sergeant Major Vasily Semenovich Korotkov.

Number of people: 13 people.

"Jack" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Number of people: 10 people.

Commanders: Captain Krylatykh Pavel Andreevich (“Jack”) - died on July 30, 1944; Lieutenant Shpakov Nikolai Andreevich ("Hedgehog") - died in September 1944, foreman Melnikov Ivan Ivanovich ("Mole") - was removed by order of the Center from command of the group due to his inability to read topographic maps, from November 13, 1944, Lieutenant Morzhin ( "Gladiator") - sent from behind the front line.

Tasks of the group: “Jack” was instructed to monitor railways and highways, establish the level bandwidth transport, determine the state of communication lines, their saturation and branching, identify the presence of fortified enemy defensive lines, the number of garrisons and their weapons, discover places of concentration of aircraft, equipment, warehouses and headquarters of German troops, reveal the enemy’s preparations for use chemical weapons, as well as find out his plans for the further conduct of hostilities, analyze the mood of the local population and the level of discipline in military units.

Area of ​​activity: rear of the East Prussian group of enemy forces. And to be absolutely precise, the area where Adolf Hitler’s “Wolf’s Lair” headquarters was located at that time.

Landed behind the front line on the night of June 26-27, 1944 in the area of ​​the Koeningsberg-Tilsit (now Sovetsk) highway.

In mid-November 1944, she received permission from the Center to enter Poland. On December 27, 1944, "Jack" was surrounded and almost completely destroyed. In fact, the group ceased to exist as an independent unit. At the end of January 1945, only two scouts from the “Jack” group were able to reach the Soviet rear.

Sabotage and reconnaissance companies (DRR) of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front

Formed by order of the army commander, Major General K.I. Rakutin dated July 28, 1941.

The main tasks of the DRR:

sabotage and reconnaissance activities behind enemy lines;

assistance to army units in combat operations.

Sabotage and reconnaissance companies were formed from among volunteers of the 19th, 120th, 103rd, 106th, 105th divisions of the 24th Army. The composition of the companies was 120–150 people, armed with machine guns or self-loading rifles, light machine guns at the rate of one per three people, grenades, signal flares, two or three rounds of ammunition, dry rations designed for a couple of days.

The combat activities of the DRR began simultaneously with the Elninsky offensive operation of the troops of the 24th Army of the Reserve Front (August 30 - September 8, 1941).

During the attack on the city of Yelnya, the actions of the DRR were highly praised by the command of the divisions and the 24th Army. During the battle for height 251.1, in the area of ​​​​the villages of Dubovezhye and Vyazovka, reconnaissance saboteurs in a captured German armored vehicle burst into the enemy’s location, where they set fire to four enemy tanks with combustible bottles. A daring raid by reconnaissance saboteurs contributed to the capture of an important height by Soviet troops.

In turn, the commander of the Reserve Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov repeatedly pointed out to the command of the 24th Army the enemy’s poor reconnaissance during the offensive.

"Doc" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group size is 8 people.

Landed on October 13 (according to other sources), October 24, 1944 in the Insterburg area. All members of the group are missing.

"Iskra" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - ml. Lieutenant Gushchin Konstantin Ivanovich.

Number of people: 7 people.

"Kashtan" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - Art. Lieutenant Misnik Nikolai Martynovich.

Number of people: 11 people.

Kivshika I.F. - reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Northern and Leningrad fronts

Commander - Kivshik I.F., lieutenant.

Number of people: 250 people.

From a message from the Sovinformburo dated August 12, 1941: “The partisan detachment under the command of Comrade. Kivshika tracked down and captured two enemy tanks that had lagged behind his unit, and destroyed 7 German motorcyclists.”

In July–August 1941 he operated on the Gdov–Slantsy road in the Leningrad region.

In August 1941 he returned to the Soviet rear.

The detachment was withdrawn from the front line for the second time in September 1941. Main task: to discover the headquarters of Major General Andrei Nikitich Astanin; commander of the Southern Operational Group, which was surrounded. Kivshik’s group complied with the command’s order. The headquarters was provided with radio communications, and possible routes to escape the encirclement were reported.

"Klen" - reconnaissance group (later operational center "Onegin") of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Shorokhov N.P.

"Klen" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergeant Major Konstantin Aleksandrovich Tsepkov.

Number of people: 11 people.

"Fang" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is captain Nikolai Ivanovich Petrov.

Number of people: 7 people.

"Cross" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Major Mikhail Ivanovich Mednikov.

Number of people: 9 people.

"Los" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - Art. Lieutenant Ugarov Ivan Trofimovich.

Number of people: 11 people.

"Lvov" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

Deployed behind enemy lines in April 1944 on Polish territory.

"Leonid" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Lesnikovsky S.F.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1944.

"Maxim" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Commander - Major Vladimir Ivanovich Maksimov.

Number of people: 20 people.

The area of ​​deployment is East Prussia.

Only five people returned from the mission.

Medvedev reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander – Sergey Andreevich Medvedev, associate professor.

The number of members of the unit is 29 people. It was staffed by students of the Leningrad Mining Institute. All fighters had practical experience drilling and blasting operations during educational practice. Unlike most similar units that were withdrawn behind enemy lines in the first months of the war, about a month was spent on special training for the fighters of this unit.

In September - October 1941 he operated in the Luga and Tosnensky districts of the Leningrad region.

In October 1941, an ambush destroyed a headquarters convoy and killed a Wehrmacht colonel. Documents were confiscated from him containing data on “the situation of the Nazi troops (18th Army of the Wehrmacht. – Note auto.), their composition and grouping on a huge front from Moscow to Leningrad. Tables of call signs of associations, formations and other documents were no less valuable.”

The detachment was withdrawn to the Soviet rear in December 1941.

"Michigan" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

It was withdrawn into the territory of East Prussia behind enemy lines in September 1944.

“Moroz” is a reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

Group commander - Art. Lieutenant Pavlov Joseph Artemyevich.

Landed on the night of July 25, 1944 at 02.30 near the village of Rosenwalde with 14 people. The main task - to establish contact with the station located in the occupied territory - was completed.

"Moroz" - reconnaissance and sabotage group

Commander: Tarasov A.F..

“Morskaya” - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 2nd Baltic Front

Commander - Rosenblum Sh.P..

"Neman" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

Group commander - ml. political instructor Pavel Petrovich Nikiforov.

Number of people: 10 people.

"Ovin" - reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 4th Belorussian Front

Commander - Bratchikov Gennady Ivanovich (“Gadfly”), major.

Operated in the rear of the 2nd German Army.

"Om" - reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Skripka I.I.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1944.

Omega - Operations Center

Since January 1943, in the detachment N.P. Fedorov, the operational center of military intelligence "Omega" began to operate. He controlled the areas of Pripyat, Kyiv, Piryatin, Bakhmach and promptly sent information to Moscow about the groupings of German troops in these areas.

It was his intelligence officers who operated in the Minsk region on the basis of the special military intelligence detachment “Dima” under the command of D.I. Keimakh, participated in the liquidation in 1943 in Minsk of the General Commissioner of Belarus, Wilhelm Kube. The direct executors of the action are E.G. Mazanik, who worked as a servant in the Kube house, and M.B. Osipova, who handed her the mine. The mine was placed under the mattress of the Gauleiter's bed, and at 2:20 a.m. on September 22, 1943, Kube was killed. For this feat, Mazanik and Osipova were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and Fedorov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

After this operation, Fedorov was sent to Rovno with the task of destroying the Reich Commissioner of Ukraine Koch. However, the operation did not take place. Then Fedorov led a special forces detachment in the Kovel region, where, in cooperation with other partisan detachments, he established control over the railway lines. (In 1943, partisan detachments controlled such railway junctions in Ukraine and Belarus as Luninets, Zdolbunov, Korosten, Kovel, Brest, Sarny.) His people not only sent him to the Center important information, but also committed numerous acts of sabotage behind enemy lines.

In 1944, Fedorov’s detachment crossed the Western Bug and reached the Lublin region, where, having established contact with Polish partisans, they began to carry out sabotage on railways and highways. April 17, 1944 N.P. Fedorov died in battle. On November 21, 1944, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

"Orion" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front

Commander - Captain Denisov Vladimir.

Number of people: 10 people.

In September 1944 it operated in East Prussia.

Only three remained alive.

Special detachment of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander – Usmanov A.M.

Sent to enemy lines on September 9, 1941. He was behind the front line for 30 days.

Separate mountain rifle detachments (OGSO) of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front

They began to form in August 1942 by order of the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, Army General I.V. Tyuleneva.

The formation of the detachments was entrusted to the commander of the 46th Army, Lieutenant General K.N. Leselidze. Since August 15, 1942, formations and units of the army fought defensive battles to hold the passes in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range.

The personnel of the OGSO were recruited from volunteers of reserve units and internal troops of the NKVD. Each detachment had experienced climber-instructors. Specially armed and equipped detachments consisting of a company-battalion (50–150 people) were intended to conduct combat operations in isolation from the main forces in the most difficult areas in the mountains.

By the end of 1942, 12 OGSOs were formed in the 46th Army. During the same period, in accordance with the order of the USSR NGO a large number of The climbers were recalled from the units where they served and sent to the disposal of the Transcaucasian Front. Work to send climbers to the Caucasus was also carried out by the All-Union Committee for Physical Education and Sports and the Moscow NKVD Troops Station (1st NKVD Regiment). In total, more than 200 highly qualified climbers were concentrated in the Caucasus. The climbers were used by the command to organize and conduct mountain training in mountain rifle units, and worked as instructors in the school of military mountaineering and skiing created on the Transcaucasian Front. They participated in the development of special instructions on warfare in the mountains, compiling reference books and memos about the natural dangers of the mountains. They were entrusted with the organization and control of the security service against avalanches and rockfalls in the area where the troops were located. Climbers were used by the command as terrain consultants when planning combat operations in the mountains. They took a personal part in these operations (as part of the OGSO or in individual mountaineering groups), conducted ground and air reconnaissance in the mountains, participated in the evacuation of the population of Nalchik and mountain villages, and in the transfer of troops through the Donguz-Orun and Becho passes in the winter of 1942/43 .

Since December 1942, OGSO took part in special operations in Klukhor (Klukhor pass), Elbrus (southern slopes of Mount Elbrus, Khotyu-Tau, Chiper-Azau passes), Marukh (Marukhsky pass), Sanchar (group of Sanchar passes), Umpyr (passes Umpyrsky, Aishkha, Pseashkha) and Belorechensky (Belorechensky pass) directions in the central part of the Main Caucasus Range.

In the period January 5–12, 1943, fearing encirclement due to the successful offensive of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, the enemy began to leave the passes of the Main Caucasus Range and fight to withdraw its units in the Khadyzhe-Apsheron direction.

At the end of January - beginning of February 1943, most of the OGSO were transformed into separate battalions of machine gunners, which became part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front.

Special Forces Detachment No. 1 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander - Nikita Vasilievich Radtsev, senior political instructor.

Squad structure:

headquarters (8 people):

chief of staff;

military paramedic;

medical instructor;

two radio operators;

Five platoons (including reconnaissance and sapper).

The number of the detachment is 115 people.

Formed on the basis of the 273rd airfield service battalion of the 20th air base area.

First brought behind the front line on September 10, 1941 north of the city Andreapol near the village of Moscow, Kalinin region.

During October and until November 10, 1941, the detachment carried out missions in the areas of Toropovets - Andreapol - Kholm - Velikiye Luki (the junction of the Novgorod and Kalinin regions).

The second time behind the front line was in November - December 1941 (Istra - Novopetrovskoye region, Moscow region).

Special Forces Detachment No. 2 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander - Shevchenko Alexander Iosifovich, captain.

Squad structure:

headquarters (8 people):

chief of staff;

military paramedic;

medical instructor;

four radio operators;

The number of the detachment is 93 people.

Manned by soldiers of the 57th Tank Division.

Place of deployment of the detachment: north-west of the Smolensk region.

From December 12 to 18, 1941, the detachment was behind the front line for the second time, now in the Novopetrovsk area (Moscow region).

Special Forces Detachment No. 3 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander - Andrey Alekseevich Alekseev, captain.

Squad structure:

headquarters (8 people):

chief of staff;

military paramedic;

medical instructor;

four radio operators;

Three platoons. Each platoon has three sections of 9 people.

The total number of the detachment is 94 military personnel (7 officers and 87 privates).

The detachment was formed in the Uvarovka area from personnel of the 17th Tank Division.

He was withdrawn behind enemy lines on October 4, 1941, near the city of Bely. He returned to the Soviet rear on December 20, 1941.

Special Forces Detachment No. 4 of the Intelligence Department of the Western Front Headquarters

Commander – Khudyakov Pavel Nikolaevich, captain.

The total number of the detachment is about 100 people.

Formed in August 1941 in Yukhnov from the ground personnel of the bomber regiment, which suffered significant losses, and some other units.

The task of the detachment: “Cross the front line and march to the area of ​​Velikie Luki, Kholm, Toropets, where to begin carrying out combat missions in cooperation with local partisans.”

The detachment returned to the Soviet rear in the second half of November 1942.

“Sergey” – reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Ukrainian Front

Commander – Petrov I.P.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in the summer of 1944.

Svetov reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander - Svetov.

Skorodumov reconnaissance group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Leningrad Front

Commander - Skorodumov.

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in September 1941.

"Spartak" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Karelian Front

Commander – Nazarov V.V.

"Falcon" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergei Yakovlevich Prokhorov.

Number of people: 8 people.

Special battalion of miners of the 56th Army of the Southern Front

Formed in January 1942 for reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines in the defense zone of the 56th Army.

The initiator of the creation of the special battalion was the head of the operational engineering group (OIG) of the Southern Front, Colonel I.G. Starinov.

Commander of the special battalion - Art. Lieutenant N.I. Moklyakov.

The unit was formed from JIU volunteers and the 26th Brigade of the 8th Engineer Army. The total strength of the battalion is 500 people, of which 26 people. - Spanish internationalists, participants in the Spanish Civil War (at the insistence of Starinov, the Spaniards pretended to be Uzbeks). The battalion units were stationed in Yeisk, populated areas Shabelskoye and Port Katon.

In February - March 1942, fighters of the special battalion (combat groups of sailors of the Azov military flotilla took part in some operations) made 110 forays behind enemy lines (the northern shore of the Taganrog Bay); laid 744 mines on enemy communications; killed over 100 soldiers and officers; 56 vehicles and 2 tanks were disabled; 74 telegraph poles, 2 bridges, 2 barges and 4 searchlight installations were blown up.

As a result of the actions of the special battalion, she was disabled important communication Mariupol - Rostov-on-Don. The enemy was forced to deploy two infantry divisions on the northern coast of Taganrog Bay to defend their rear areas.

In the second half of March 1942, the special battalion was disbanded.

Tatarinova I.V. reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Northern Front

Deployed behind enemy lines in July 1941.

"Steel" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Sergeant Major Ignatov Semyon Konstantinovich.

Number of people: 4 people.

"Tiger" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is captain Radyuk Alexander Ivanovich.

Number of people: 9 people.

Tretyakova N.A. reconnaissance and sabotage group of intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Northern and Leningrad fronts

Commander - Tretyakov Nikolai Aleksandrovich, sergeant.

It was deployed behind enemy lines for the first time in early August 1941. She was parachuted from the wing of an R-5 aircraft north and east of Lake Syaberskoye.

At the end of September 1941, she was parachuted behind enemy lines in the Vyritsa area (Leningrad region).

"Ural" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front

The group commander is Vladimir Nikolaevich Dokshin.

Number of people: 10 people.

"Charon" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the 1st Baltic Front

The group commander is foreman Matvey Tikhonovich Shiryaev.

Number of people: 11 people.

"Chaika" - reconnaissance and sabotage group of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front

It was withdrawn behind enemy lines in August 1942. It operated in the occupied territory of Belarus until 1944.

"Yuri" - raid detachment of the reconnaissance department of the Northern Front headquarters

Commander – V.S. Znamensky, captain.

From a message from the Sovinformburo dated August 12, 1941: “The partisan detachment under the command of Comrade. Znamensky made a bold raid on the headquarters of the fascist unit. The detachment's soldiers destroyed an enemy tank, 5 soldiers and 4 officers and captured 2 staff vehicles. In the village of M., the partisans killed 20 German soldiers and captured two trucks and two heavy machine guns.”

He was withdrawn to the Soviet rear in August 1941.

From the book Penal Battalions and Barrage Detachments of the Red Army author Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Chapter 3 Formation of penal units and units during the Great Patriotic War Penal units, like barrage detachments, appeared in the Red Army during the Civil War. In the article “Disciplinary Unit”, included in the third volume of “Military

From the book The Truth about Penal Battalions - 2 author Daines Vladimir Ottovich

Chapter 4 Combat use of penal formations during the Great Patriotic War Order No. 227 required the use of penal battalions and companies in the most difficult sectors of fronts and armies. The Order and the Regulations on penal formations did not specifically define

From the book Technology and Weapons 1999 10 author Magazine "Equipment and Weapons"

IN. Daines Penal formations during the Great Patriotic War Penal formations first appeared in the Red Army during the Civil War. One of the first documents that became the basis for their creation can be considered order No. 262 of the chairman

From the book Show on Restante author Okulov Vasily Nikolaevich

From the book Encyclopedia of Misconceptions. War author Temirov Yuri Teshabayevich

From the book The Great Patriotic War Soviet people(in the context of World War II) author Krasnova Marina Alekseevna

Was there any cooperation between the Soviet and American Air Forces during the Great Patriotic War? In the article devoted to Lend-Lease, it was mentioned that Soviet historians did not really pay attention to issues of military and military-technical cooperation between the USSR and

From the book The German Trace in the History of Russian Aviation author Khazanov Dmitry Borisovich

The Communist Party and the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War “The Party acted as the organizer of the partisan movement in enemy-occupied territory” - this is the interpretation of the party’s role in the development of the partisan and underground movement in

From the book Submariner No. 1 Alexander Marinesko. Documentary portrait, 1941–1945 author Morozov Miroslav Eduardovich

16. MAIN INDICATORS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE USSR DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR National economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945: Statistic collection. – M., 1990. – S.

From the book Crimea: Battle of Special Forces author Kolontaev Konstantin Vladimirovich

Study of captured Luftwaffe aircraft during the Great Patriotic War and in the first post-war years After the German attack on the Soviet Union, interest in German aviation technology increased many times, many questions moved from purely theoretical to the field

From the book Heroes of the Black Sea Submarine author Boyko Vladimir Nikolaevich

From the book North Sea Submariner Israel Fisanovich author Boyko Vladimir Nikolaevich

Appendix No. 6 Commanders submarines Red Banner Baltic Fleet that hit two or more targets during the Great Patriotic War 1 The period of command of the submarine M-79 on Lake Ladoga is not taken into account. 2 The period of command of submarines is not taken into account

From the book Tragedies of the Northern Subplav author Boyko Vladimir Nikolaevich

Part I. Naval special forces of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War Introduction Until now, one of the most poorly studied topics in the history of the second heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941–1942, in the history of the combat operations of coastal forces and reconnaissance of the Black Sea Fleet during the years

From the author's book

Part III. Marine Corps of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War Chapter 1. Formation of new units of the Soviet Marine Corps after the start of the Great Patriotic War By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War among the citizens of the USSR who were subject to conscription

From the author's book

Actions of submarines of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 At the beginning of the war, the Submarine Forces of the Black Sea Fleet were consolidated into two Brigades and one Separate Training Division. The 1st Brigade consisted of four divisions, including 22 large and medium

From the author's book

Operations of submarines of the Northern Fleet during the Great Patriotic War

From the author's book

Operations of Northern Fleet submarines during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 In the Arctic, the enemy's main sea communications ran along the coast of Northern Norway. Nickel was exported from the Varangerfjord region to Germany, and iron ore from the Kirkenes region.

In 1923, the state of the USSR appeared, although its creation was officially announced at the end of December 1922. It replaced the one that existed during the revolution Soviet Russia and became V. Lenin’s new project as a temporary peaceful state.


All pre-war activities of intelligence and state security agencies in the Secular Union are rather interwar, since they developed precisely between the two global cataclysms: World War I, which developed into the Civil War on Russian territory, and World War II, which in the USSR was called the Great Patriotic War.

Almost immediately, the country began creating special military units. In the 1930s this process reached its peak: in Soviet army powerful airborne troops and professional sabotage units were created. But it must also be said that the process of formation of Soviet special forces took place in difficult conditions. His units were often disbanded - not only because they were ineffective, but very often at the whim of the command. Thus, before the start of World War II, the Soviet special forces were going through hard times - previously disbanded units had to be recreated, while losing a large amount of material and human resources. Moreover, after the end of the war, most of these special forces were disbanded again. That is why the process of creating modern special forces, which began in the second half of the last century, had to start almost from scratch.

Before talking about the special forces of Soviet intelligence, it is necessary to debunk the myth about special forces, which developed thanks to the means mass media. So, when you hear the word special forces, almost every person imagines a group of pumped-up guys with exotic face paint in camouflage uniforms. But this is not his defining characteristic.

The special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate are units of the regular army that have undergone special training to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines.

Officially, the GRU special forces began in 1951, when the first sabotage and reconnaissance formations appeared in the Soviet army. But in fact, the formation process began much earlier, even at the beginning of the emergence Soviet power. Therefore, the predecessors of special forces should include such units as partisan detachments of the Red Army, which operated on enemy territory during the Civil War, special formations of the Western Front during the Soviet-Polish War (illegal military organization), rebel groups that carried out reconnaissance in Eastern Europe in the 1920s, partisan special forces, which were created in the 1930s in case of the outbreak of hostilities on Soviet territory, special forces in the Spanish Republican Army in 1936-1938 (they were created on the initiative of Soviet advisers), as well as reconnaissance, partisan and sabotage units that operated during the Second World War.

The partisan detachments of the Red Army were, in fact, the prototype of modern special forces. Note that both the Reds and the Whites had such formations, but they were significantly different from each other. So, if the Whites used mainly regular units that carried out raids on the flanks or near rear of the RKA, then the Reds mainly used those partisans who were already behind enemy lines. These partisan groups were subordinate to a special unit created within the Operod.

To complete their tasks, the partisans were supplied with explosives, ammunition, experienced personnel and money. It should also be noted that, by special decree of V. Lenin, a special school for demolitions was created. Its leader was A. Kovrigin, who very quickly established effective work schools.

Partisans were specially selected to study at the demolition school. The course of study emphasized special, military and political training. The theory was taught at a school established in the Operod building, and for practice they traveled outside the city. To conduct practical classes, students could use pistols, rifles, special equipment, and field guns.

The work of this intelligence department was controlled by V. Lenin himself.

The losses suffered by the enemy as a result of the activities of partisan detachments were enormous.

Until the beginning of 1920, Poland became the most powerful enemy of the Soviet Union. Until this time, the Polish army occupied most of the Belarusian territory. To carry out sabotage behind enemy lines, an illegal military organization was formed at the end of 1919, initiated by Joseph Unshkhtit (remember, he oversaw intelligence).

We also note that the role of this person in the activities of the Soviet intelligence services is practically unknown to anyone. He was eclipsed by Dzerzhinsky, whose deputy Unshkhtit was at one time. Despite this, it was he who was to lead Poland in the event of the victory of the Soviet Army. And it was he who, until 1930, oversaw the activities of Soviet intelligence abroad, and also led the illegal apparatus of the Comintern.

The creation of an illegal military organization was the result of agreements reached between the command of the Western Front and the Belarusian Social Revolutionaries. In December 1919, a meeting was held in Smolensk, during which the parties signed an agreement on joint actions against Poland. At that time, the Belarusian revolutionary socialist party had about 20 thousand members. In addition, the party controlled the trade unions of telegraph employees, railway workers and teachers. There were also partisan detachments. The Communist Party on Belarusian territory had only 2 thousand people, and most of them were not indigenous people. However, in fairness, it should be noted that already in 1920 another pro-Soviet organization was formed in Belarus, which was called the “Belarusian Communist Organization”.

The unification of all these forces made it possible in a short time to form the People's Military Self-Defense, which at its core was a rebel army operating behind enemy lines. Later it became the basis for the creation of the Illegal Military Organization.

The main goal of the organization was to carry out terrorist acts and sabotage in the rear of the Polish army. But both the organization itself and its activities were classified to such an extent that the front commander did not even know about it. The NVO served several divisions of the Western Front - the 8th, 56th and 17th. 4 NVO members were sent to each of them, each of whom had one assistant and 20 couriers.

At the end of its activity, the organization included 10 thousand partisans.

Since the spring of 1920, graduates of paint committees acted as leaders of partisan detachments. The detachments were tasked with directing their activities to damage telegraph and telephone communications, railways and train wrecks, explosions of bridges, roads and warehouses. In addition, they had to engage in intelligence activities.

The leaders of the NVO were the same people who controlled the intelligence of the front - B. Bortnovsky, A. Stashevsky, S. Firin. The responsible leader of the organization was A. Stashevsky, who three years later, under the name Stepanov, organized a similar structure on German territory, in which there were about 300 groups of partisans.

In general, the activities of the Illegal Military Organization were so effective that even after the end of the Soviet-Polish war, it did not cease to exist, but became the basis for the creation of active intelligence.

After the conclusion of a peace treaty with Poland in 1921, the Intelligence Directorate began organizing and transporting detachments of specially trained soldiers to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to resist the Polish authorities. All this was undertaken so that a nationwide partisan movement would break out in these territories, which would subsequently lead to the reunification of these lands with the USSR. This activity was called “active reconnaissance.” And, just like the HBO, its activities were kept in the strictest confidence.

In Belarus, the partisan, or more precisely, sabotage movement, arose in the summer of 1921. In 1922-1923 alone, two such detachments carried out a number of operations, among which one can highlight the destruction of a police station in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha region, the seizure and burning of the estates “Good Tree” and “Struga”, the destruction of three landowner estates, the burning of the palace of Prince Drutsko-Lubetsky, explosion of two locomotives, a railway bridge and a railway track on the Lida-Vilno line.

In 1924, partisan detachments carried out more than 80 operations, among which the most famous is the operation in the city of Stolbtsy. During its implementation, more than 50 partisans destroyed the garrison, the village elder, the railway station, the police station and the police department, and also captured the prison and freed S. Skulski (the head of the military organization of the Communist Party of Poland) and P. Korczyk (the head of the Communist Party of Western Belarus).

In the activities of “active intelligence” there were also mistakes. So, in November 1924, 25 partisans attempted to seize a train on the Brest-Baranovichi line, killing one policeman. A chase of 2 thousand people was sent after them. As a result, 16 partisans were arrested, 4 were shot, and another 4 were sentenced to life imprisonment.

As a result of the activities of partisan detachments, the situation on the Polish border became very tense. However, despite all the successful operations, their activities were curtailed in 1925, and the units themselves were disbanded.

The leadership of the Intelligence Directorate, after the disbandment of the partisan detachments, did not abandon the idea of ​​having specially trained saboteurs who could operate behind enemy lines in the event of war. The Soviet command thought about this back in the late 1920s. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1928-1929, preparations began in the western military districts for guerrilla warfare in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union. The same commanders who acted in active reconnaissance were involved in it.

On the territory of Belarus, 6 detachments of 500 people each were trained. In addition, special sabotage groups were trained at railway junctions. On Ukrainian territory, they trained at least 3 thousand partisan specialists and commanders. There were also large reserves of weapons and ammunition. A special school for training partisans was created in Kharkov, two schools in Kyiv, and special courses in Odessa.
Partisan detachments took part in both combined arms exercises and special ones. Thus, in 1933, everything was ready to carry out a surprise operation in the event of an attack on the USSR and paralyze all communications in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Bessarabia.
But, despite such preparations, in 1938-1939 all partisan detachments were disbanded. To a large extent, the reason for this was the new military doctrine, which provided that all fighting in case of war will be conducted on enemy territory. The repression of former partisans caused great damage to the defense capability.

When war began in Spain in 1936, only the USSR came to the aid of the rebels. In the same year, the first volunteers arrived in the country, followed by Soviet advisers who arrived in Spain to help the IRA in the fight against the Nazis. At the end of 1936, the first special forces detachment was created in the country, the instructor of which was the experienced demolition man I. Starinov. The Spanish government was very skeptical about the possibility of waging guerrilla warfare. Therefore, at first the detachment consisted of only five elderly Spaniards, unsuitable for military service. But soon 12 more fighters were sent to the detachment, this time young and experienced. In the suburbs of Valencia, a house was allocated for the detachment, where a school was organized to train fighters.

The detachment carried out its first operation in December 1936, blowing up communication lines and a railway bridge in the Teruel area. After several more successful operations, the number of the detachment increased to 100 people. Soon he was sent to the Southern Front.

The most successful operation of the partisan detachment was the destruction in 1937 of a train containing the headquarters of the Italian air division. The train was derailed from a 15-meter height using a powerful mine. After this operation, the detachment was renamed a special forces battalion.

Later, other, no less successful acts of sabotage were carried out, for example, the detonation of an ammunition train, which picked up a mine and exploded in the tunnel. Such successful activity very soon turned the battalion into a brigade, and then, in 1938, into the 14th Partisan Corps, which numbered more than 5 thousand people. There was a special school in the corps, in which soldiers were taught the intricacies of reconnaissance, sniper work, and mining. Since the corps members had to operate in extreme conditions, they were given double rations and the same salary.

It should be noted that during the entire period of its activity the corps lost only 14 people.

When the Republicans were defeated, part of the corps’ fighters captured the ship and crossed first to Algeria and then to the Soviet Union, while another part crossed the Franco-Spanish border and were interned. When the French authorities decided to hand them over to the Phalangists, they all fled to the mountains.

With the beginning of the Second World War, partisan and reconnaissance and sabotage units again became relevant. Thus, in June-August 1941 alone, more than 180 sabotage groups were sent into enemy territory. The activities of such units were very successful, as evidenced, for example, by the raid of I. Shirinkin’s sabotage group, which in September-November 1941 covered more than 700 kilometers through the territories of the Vitebsk, Smolensk, Novgorod and Pskov regions, conducting reconnaissance and sabotage. For the successful completion of assigned tasks, the commander and commissar were awarded the Order of Lenin.

In the same 1941, on the Western Front, military unit 9903 was created to carry out sabotage activities, which, during the Battle of Moscow, threw N. Galochkin, Z. Kosmodemyanskaya, P. Kiryanov behind enemy lines. In general, by the end of the year, 71 sabotage groups, consisting of about 1,200 people, were thrown behind enemy lines.

The activities of the partisan detachments were not entirely successful. So, for example, out of 231 detachments with a total number of 12 thousand people, abandoned on Belarusian territory in 1941, by the end of the year only 43 detachments with 2 thousand fighters remained. The situation was even worse in Ukraine. In December 1941, 35 thousand partisans were transferred there, of which only 4 thousand remained by the summer of 1942. The result of this state of affairs was mass repression the end of the 30s, when the best personnel and partisan bases were destroyed.

In 1942 the situation improved slightly. After the reorganization of the Intelligence Directorate, an intelligence and sabotage department appeared in the GRU. In the same year, special battalions of miners were organized on each front, which carried out sabotage on important routes of communication and objects.

In 1943, another reorganization of intelligence agencies was carried out. As a result, management of sabotage activities passed to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff. This form of leadership remained until the end of the war.

In the post-war period, the main attention of Soviet intelligence was aimed at identifying the enemy’s possible preparations for nuclear war. Moreover, it was necessary to prevent even the slightest possibility of using nuclear weapons, and also interfere with work behind enemy lines.

For this purpose, in 1951, the first sabotage and reconnaissance units were created as part of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. IN as soon as possible 40 special forces companies were created, each numbering 120 people.

Temporary special-purpose reconnaissance detachments were formed from regular units. The special forces were armed with such types of weapons as machine guns, pistols, grenade launchers, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, grenades, knives, parachutes, containers for landing radio stations, as well as landing backpacks.

At the beginning of 1950, the Ministry of Defense G. Zhukov came up with a proposal to create a special-purpose corps, but was met with a decisive refusal from the state leadership. After this, the marshal was removed from his post.

However, individual sabotage detachments were united first into battalions, and later into brigades. This is how the GRU brigades appeared.
In 1957, separate special battalions were created, and in 1962, special forces brigades were created.

In total, during the heyday of the USSR, 13 brigades of naval and army special forces operated on its territory. Its total number was approximately 15-20 thousand people.

With the beginning of the Afghan war, a new stage began for the GRU special forces, which became a serious test of strength. The “Muslim battalion”, which later stormed Amin’s palace, included mainly representatives of eastern nationalities - Uzbeks, Tajiks, who knew the local language well. The Slavs were present only in the crews of the ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”.

It is worth noting that this battalion was not the only one. At the end of December, the 1st special forces detachment, numbering 539 people, was introduced into Afghanistan. And in January 1980, the head of the GRU, Ivashutin, announced the need to create two more detachments of 677 people each.

In March 1985, as the situation in Afghanistan became more complicated, it was decided to introduce additional special forces units into Afghan territory, on the basis of which two brigades of 4 battalions of 3 thousand people each were created.

The activities of the special forces alternated between victories and defeats. For example, in 1986, special forces seized 14 tons of opium that was being transported from Pakistan, for which local drug dealers sentenced brigade commander Gerasimov to death. In October 1987, one of the groups, carrying out an operation to intercept weapons, was surrounded and suffered heavy losses, then 14 out of 26 people died.

Combat swimmers became another type of GRU special forces units. Their appearance was the result of the successful activities of Italian underwater reconnaissance saboteurs during the Second World War.

Until 1952, such detachments appeared in almost all NATO member countries; in the USSR, the need to create a special detachment of swimmers was thought about only in 1956, after combat swimmer L. Krabs died in England during an examination of the Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze.

However, consideration of the need to create such a detachment was delayed. It was only in 1967 that a decree was signed on the creation of the “Education and Training Squad of Light Divers.” During the exercises, combat swimmers not only conducted reconnaissance of the coastal waters, but also went ashore and undermined communications and warehouses of the mock enemy. The results impressed the officers so much that this detachment became the first unit to combat underwater sabotage means and forces.

Combat swimmers were almost never left without work. In 1967-1991 they worked in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cuba, Korea, and Nicaragua.

Marine animals were often used to conduct combat operations. The first, of course, were the Americans, who, with the help of dolphins, killed more than 50 saboteur swimmers during the Vietnam War. In the USSR, the first special unit for working with animals appeared in 1967 in Sevastopol. The experiments involved 70 dolphins, who were taught to detect underwater and surface objects, guard them and give signals in the event of strangers approaching.

Animals were also used as living torpedoes, which were aimed at submarines, aircraft carriers and destroyers. The dolphins remained at sea with mines attached to them for weeks, and when the enemy approached, they attacked him.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation changed for the worse. There was no money to maintain the dolphinarium, so the management turned to business. As a result, only 6 trained dolphins remained.

Today in Russia there are only 4 special-purpose brigades, and 2 of them were transferred to the Airborne Forces back in 1994.

Military intelligence special forces have always guarded the interests of the state. The special forces were always the first to enter battle and the last to leave it. Therefore, modern fighters have something to be proud of and something to strive for.

Special Forces. Direction "A"

Direction “A” - this is how the leadership of Soviet military intelligence in the twenties of the last century called the organization of reconnaissance and sabotage activities on the territory of a possible enemy. In fact, in 1919, the GRU leadership made prototypes of the special forces of the Fourth Directorate (reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines) of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR (headed by Pavel Sudoplatov), ​​which operated during the Great Patriotic War; special forces divisions (formed in the mid-fifties of the last century) and the KGB Vympel special forces. The GRU made the base and trained personnel for the upcoming special forces of the NKVD and the First Directorate (foreign intelligence) of the KGB. True, this fact is carefully kept silent. The film will for the first time tell about the birth of the GRU special forces, about its military affairs in the twenties and forties of the last century.

Ctrl Enter

Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter

On July 5, 1941, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, a Special Group was created under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, which was headed by senior state security major Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov. The group was given very specific and especially important tasks - “to destroy Nazi invaders and their minions in the enemy rear." Due to the fact that there was no time to recruit and train a huge number of fighters, the idea arose of creating a special military unit that would be engaged exclusively in reconnaissance and sabotage work. Only volunteers were enrolled. They included there were over 800 athletes - the entire flower of Soviet sports.

After special training, the fighters operated as part of units in small groups and individually behind enemy lines. On October 3, 1941, the units formed by the Special Group were consolidated into the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON) consisting of two regiments, and on the basis of the Special Group the 2nd Department was formed, which was then transformed into the 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, the head of which was also Pavel Sudoplatov. In addition to intelligence activities, OMSBON was called upon to become the core of the unfolding partisan movement, provide it with comprehensive assistance, and create an underground in the cities.

The main tasks include: collecting intelligence and information of a military, economic and socio-political nature; destruction of strategic railways and highways and other communications in the front-line zone and deep behind enemy lines, disabling important transport hubs; disruption of rail and road transport of enemy personnel and equipment to the front; destruction of bridges and station structures; any obstacle to the export to Germany of Soviet citizens, equipment and the national property of the Soviet people and property of citizens looted by the Germans; the defeat of military, gendarmerie and police garrisons; disabling industrial enterprises, power plants, and communications equipment.

The results of OMSBON's military operations on the fronts amaze everyone's imagination - not a single formation of the Red Army had such successes. Using the example of the first unit from the OMSBON - the Mitya detachment, under the command of Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev, abandoned behind German troops in early September 1941. The detachment, consisting of 30 fighters, operated until January 1942 in the Smolensk, Bryansk and Mogilev regions. The detachment carried out over 50 major operations: three railway and seven highway bridges were blown up, nine enemy aircraft were destroyed, the railway track was severely destroyed in 13 places, and three enemy military echelons were derailed. The detachment's fighters destroyed several garrisons and police posts, destroyed six telegraph points, disabled six factories that carried out military orders, and killed two generals, 17 officers, and more than 400 German soldiers. Just retribution befell 45 traitors to the Motherland.

In 1941-1943 alone, the Omsbonovites prepared 128.5 kilometers of railways, highways and highways for destruction, dug 11,564 high-explosive craters on them, manufactured and reloaded 8,998 mines, laid 2,057 landmines, blew up 71.5 kilometers of highways and highways. , laid 49,252 minefields, blew up 350 bridges, laid 94 kilometers of minefields, disabled more than 36 industrial enterprises, trained 2,469 demolition workers from among workers and employees of local enterprises, etc.

Soviet military historians tried not to mention the existence of these units; fighters of these units are not shown in films; denunciators of the “mediocre Stalin” keep silent about them.

Probably, the fighters of these units owed such ignorance to the fact that they did not fit into the popular image of the Soviet “liberator soldier”?

And indeed, in the minds of Soviet people, the Red Army soldiers of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty greatcoats who run in a crowd to attack after tanks, or tired elderly men smoking rolled-up cigarettes on the parapet of a trench. After all, it was precisely such footage that was mainly captured by military newsreels.

Probably, the main task for people filming newsreels was to show a soldier of the workers' and peasants' army, who was torn from the machine and the plow and, preferably, unsightly. Like, look what our soldier is - one and a half meters tall, and he defeats Hitler! This image perfectly corresponded to the exhausted, muzzled victim of the Stalinist regime.

At the end of the 1980s, film directors and post-Soviet historians put the “victim of repression” on a cart, handed him a “three-line gun” without cartridges, sending him towards the armored hordes of fascists - under the supervision of barrage detachments.

Of course, reality was somewhat different from what was captured in newsreels. The Germans themselves entered the Soviet Union on 300 thousand carts. The ratio of weapons also differed from official Soviet data. In terms of the number of machine guns produced, fascist Europe was inferior to the USSR by 4 times, and in the number of self-loading rifles by 10 times.

Of course, in Lately views on the Great Patriotic War have changed.

Society got tired of exaggerating the topic of “senseless victims”, and daring crews of armored trains, ninja scouts, border guards-terminators, and other hyperbolic characters began to appear on the screens.

As they say, from one extreme to another.

Although it should be noted that real scouts and border guards (as well as marines and paratroopers) were indeed distinguished by excellent training and physical fitness. In a country where sports were compulsory for the masses, “jocks” were much more common than they are now.

And only one branch of the military was never noticed by the screenwriters, although it deserves the greatest attention.

It was the assault engineer brigades of the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that were the most numerous and powerful among the Soviet special forces units during the Second World War.


During the course of the war, most of the belligerents began to realize that classical infantry was simply incapable of performing many specific tasks. This was the impetus for the creation of “commando” battalions in Britain, in the United States - detachments of Army Rangers, and in Germany, part of the motorized infantry was reformed into “panzergrenadiers”. Having launched its great offensive in 1943, the Red Army was faced with the problem of significant losses during operations to capture German fortified areas, as well as in street battles.

The Germans were great at creating fortifications. Long-term firing points, often made of steel or concrete, covered each other, behind them were self-propelled guns or batteries of anti-tank guns. All approaches to the bunkers were surrounded by barbed wire and heavily mined. In cities, everyone turned into such firing points sewer hatch or basement. Even ruins were turned into impregnable forts.

Of course, to take such fortifications, it was possible to use penalties - it was pointless to kill thousands of soldiers and officers, bringing joy to future denouncers of “Stalinism.” One could throw oneself at the embrasure with one's chest - of course, a heroic act, but absolutely meaningless. In this regard, the Headquarters, which began to realize that it was time to stop fighting with “hurray” and the bayonet, and chose a different path.

The very idea of ​​the ShISBr (assault engineering brigades) was taken from the Germans, or more precisely, from the Kaiser’s army. In 1916, during the Battle of Verdun, the German army used special sapper assault groups that had special weapons (backpack flamethrowers and light machine guns) and had undergone a special training course. The Germans themselves, apparently counting on the “blitzkrieg,” forgot about their experience - and then for a considerable time they trampled around Sevastopol and Stalingrad. But the Red Army adopted it.

The first 15 assault brigades began to be formed in the spring of 1943. The engineering and sapper units of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army served as the basis for them, since the new special forces required mainly technically competent specialists, since the range of tasks assigned to them was quite complex and wide.

The engineering reconnaissance company primarily explored enemy fortifications. The soldiers determined the firepower and “architectural strength” of the fortifications. After this was compiled detailed plan, indicating the location of bunkers and other firing points, what they are (concrete, earthen or other), what weapons are available. The presence of cover, the location of barriers and minefields are also indicated. Using this data, an assault plan was developed.

After this, assault battalions entered the battle (there were up to five per brigade). The fighters for the ShISBr were selected especially carefully. Slow-witted, physically weak and soldiers over 40 years old could not get into the brigade.

The high requirements for candidates were explained simply: an attack fighter who carried a load that was several times greater than that of a simple infantryman.

The standard soldier’s kit included a steel breastplate, which provided protection from small fragments, as well as pistol (machine gun) bullets, and a bag containing a “explosive kit.” Pouches were used to carry increased ammunition for grenades, as well as bottles with Molotov cocktails, thrown into window openings or embrasures. Since the end of 1943, assault engineer brigades began to use backpack flamethrowers.

In addition to traditional machine guns (PPS and PPSh), soldiers of the assault units were armed with light machine guns and anti-tank rifles. Anti-tank rifles were used as large-caliber rifles to suppress gun emplacements.

To teach the personnel to run with this load on their shoulders and to minimize its possible losses, the soldiers were given rigorous training. In addition to the fact that the SHISBr fighters were running on the obstacle course in full gear, live bullets were whistling over their heads. Thus, the soldiers were taught to “keep their heads down” even before the first battle and to consolidate this skill at the level of instinct. In addition, the personnel were engaged in training shooting and demining and explosions. In addition, the training program included hand-to-hand combat, throwing axes, knives and sapper blades.

The training of the ShISBr was much more difficult than the training of the same intelligence officers. After all, the scouts went on the mission light, and the main thing for them was not to be discovered. At the same time, the attack fighter did not have the opportunity to hide in the bushes, and he did not have the opportunity to quietly “sneak away.” The main goal of the SHISBr fighters was not drunken single “tongues”, but the most powerful fortifications on the Eastern Front.

The battle began suddenly, quite often even without artillery preparation, much less shouts of “Hurray!” Detachments of submachine gunners and machine gunners, whose main goal was to cut off German pillboxes from infantry support, quietly passed through pre-prepared passages in the minefields. Flamethrowers or bombers dealt with the enemy bunker itself.

Laid in vent the charge made it possible to disable even the most powerful fortification. Where the grate blocked the way, they acted witty and ruthlessly: several cans of kerosene were poured inside, after which they threw a match.

The fighters of the ShISBr in urban conditions were distinguished by their ability to appear suddenly from a side unexpected for German soldiers. Everything was very simple: assault engineering teams literally walked through the walls, using TNT to pave the way. For example, the Germans turned the basement of a house into a bunker. Our fighters entered from the side or behind, blew up the wall of the basement (and in some cases the floor of the first floor), and then fired several jets of flamethrowers there.

The Germans themselves played an important role in replenishing the arsenal of assault engineering brigades. In the summer of 1943, the Nazi army began to receive “Panzerfaust” (Faust cartridges), which the retreating Germans left behind in huge quantities. The SHISBr fighters immediately found a use for them, because the Faustpatron could be used to break through not only armor, but also walls. Interestingly, Soviet soldiers came up with a special portable rack that made it possible to fire salvo fire from 6 to 10 faust cartridges simultaneously.

Also, ingenious portable frames were used to launch Soviet heavy 300mm M-31 rockets. They were brought into position, positioned and released with direct fire. For example, during the battle on Lindenstraße (Berlin), three such shells were launched at a fortified house. The smoking ruins that remained of the building buried everyone inside.

All kinds of amphibious transporters and companies of flamethrower tanks came to support the assault battalions in 1944. The efficiency and power of the ShISBr, the number of which by that time had increased to 20, increased sharply.

However, the successes of the assault engineering brigades shown at the very beginning caused real dizziness among the army command. The leadership had the wrong opinion that brigades could do anything and they began to be sent into battle on all sectors of the front, often without support from other branches of the military. This became a fatal mistake.



If German positions were covered by artillery fire, which was not previously suppressed, the assault engineer brigades were practically powerless. After all, no matter what training the soldiers received, they were just as vulnerable to German shells as recruits. The situation was even worse when the Germans recaptured their positions with a tank counterattack - in this case, the special forces suffered huge losses. Only in December 1943 did the Headquarters establish strict regulations for the use of assault brigades: now the ShISBr was necessarily supported by artillery, auxiliary infantry and tanks.

The vanguard of the assault engineering brigades were mine clearance companies, including one company of mine-detecting dogs. They followed the ShISBr and cleared the main passages for the advancing army (the final clearance of the area fell on the shoulders of the rear sapper units). Miners also often used steel breastplates - it is known that sappers sometimes make mistakes, and two-millimeter steel could protect them from the explosion of small anti-personnel mines. This was at least some kind of cover for the stomach and chest.

The golden pages in the history of the assault engineering brigades were the battles in Konigsberg and Berlin, as well as the capture of the fortifications of the Kwantung Army. According to military analysts, without the engineering assault special forces, these battles would have dragged on, and the Red Army would have lost many more soldiers.

But, unfortunately, in 1946, the main composition of the assault engineering brigades was demobilized, and then they were disbanded one by one. At first, this was facilitated by the confidence of the military leadership that the Third World War would be won thanks to the lightning strike of the Soviet tank armies. And after the appearance of nuclear weapons, the USSR General Staff began to believe that the enemy would be destroyed atomic bomb. Apparently, it did not occur to the old marshals that if anything would survive a nuclear cataclysm, it would be underground forts and bunkers. Perhaps only assault engineering and sapper brigades could “open” them.

The unique Soviet special forces unit was simply forgotten - so that subsequent generations did not even know about its existence. Thus, one of the most glorious and interesting pages of the Great Patriotic War was simply erased.