Stairs. Entry group. Materials. Doors. Locks. Design

Abstract on the history of Russia

The XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in March 1939, determined that the USSR had entered the period of completing the construction of a socialist society and the gradual transition from socialism to communism. The congress formulated the main economic problem: to catch up and surpass the main capitalist countries in terms of production per capita. It took 10-15 years to solve this problem. At the congress, the third five-year plan (1938-1942) was reviewed and approved.

The decisions of the congress were met with enthusiasm. New enterprises were put into operation, and much attention was paid to increasing the activity of the masses. However, the moral and psychological state of society remained contradictory. On the one hand, Soviet people were proud of their labor successes, which were constantly reported by the media, and believed in a bright distant future, but on the other hand, mass repressions gave rise to a feeling of fear and uncertainty about the future. In addition, a number of harsh measures were taken aimed at strengthening labor and production discipline. Thus, in 1940, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued decrees on the transition to an eight-hour working day, to a seven-day working week and on the prohibition of unauthorized departure of workers from enterprises and institutions, on the prohibition of unauthorized departure from work of tractor drivers and combine operators working in machine and tractor stations, according to which criminal liability was established for absenteeism and leaving an enterprise without permission from the administration. Thus, the state actually attached workers and employees to the enterprise. Production standards were raised, prices were reduced, and failure of collective farmers to fulfill the minimum workdays could lead to criminal prosecution. However, the attempts of the country's leadership to achieve their goals by developing the enthusiasm of the masses and at the same time using the method of intimidation did not give the desired result. The three-year plan of the third five-year plan was not fulfilled.

Due to threat of war great importance was attached to the development of military production, especially in the east of the country. In the Volga region, the Urals, and Siberia, there was intensive construction of defense enterprises based on the local fuel and metallurgical base. The pace of development of the defense industry was high. If in three years of the third five-year plan the growth industrial production was generally 13.2% per year, then in the military industries - 39%. Particular importance was attached to the creation newest types military equipment. Research organizations were consolidated, design bureaus and experimental workshops were created at leading defense plants; Closed design bureaus were active, where repressed specialists worked (in particular, the famous aircraft designers Tupolev and Sukhoi). Promising models of military equipment were developed: the KV heavy tank, the T-34 medium tank; aircraft: Yak-1, LaGG-3, MIG-3 fighters; Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-2 bomber; rocket launchers on cars (Katyushas), etc. However, it was not possible to organize the production of new equipment on a mass scale by the beginning of the war.

Since the late 30s and especially after the war with Finland, which revealed many of the weaknesses of the Red Army, intensive measures aimed at increasing the combat effectiveness of the armed forces. Their total number by June 1941 was 5.7 million people; In addition, rifle, tank, aviation, and mechanized divisions were formed, airborne troops, and engineering and technical units were increased; The network of military schools expanded, and 19 military academies operated. However, to make up for the monstrous losses from mass repression 30s, when 80% of higher education was destroyed officers army failed. The professional level of command personnel was low, advanced methods of armed struggle were not mastered, Soviet military doctrine was based on an offensive nature and practically did not imply long-term defensive actions. All this predetermined the major defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

Our Fatherland. Experience of political history. T. 2. pp. 381-392. The fateful day of June 22, 1941, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, was preceded by 22 months of “friendly relations” between the aggressor and the victim. They officially took shape on August 23, 1939. On that day, in the Moscow Kremlin, German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov signed a non-aggression treaty... Having concluded a non-aggression treaty on August 23, 1939, the governments of the USSR and Germany pledged to resolve disputes and conflicts between the two countries “to resolve.. . exclusively peacefully in the order of a friendly exchange of views." The treaty isolated the USSR from the forces fighting against fascist aggression. "In the event that one of the contracting Parties,” stated the second article, “becomes the object of military action on the part of a third power, the other contracting party The party will not support this power in any form.” In practice, this meant that the USSR would not condemn fascist aggression or help its victims. Ratification of the treaty took place a week later—that’s how long it took for an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to convene. At the suggestion of A.S. Shcherbakov, Stalin’s special confidant, first secretary of the Moscow regional and city committees of the CPSU (b), the deputies did not discuss the Soviet-German treaty “due to exhaustive clarity and consistency foreign policy Government of the USSR". It was hidden from the deputies that the non-aggression treaty had an annex - a “secret additional protocol”, which reflected the imperial ambitions of its authors. The language and spirit of this document were reminiscent of those times when the destinies of nations were decided behind their backs, by the right of the stronger. It spoke about the delimitation of “spheres of influence” in Eastern and Southeast Europe, where the “interests” of the USSR and Germany met. It was envisaged that in the event of a German-Polish armed conflict (in the language of the document: “territorial and political transformations” in Poland), German troops could advance east no further than the Narev, Vistula, and San rivers. The rest of Poland, as well as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Bessarabia, were recognized as the “sphere of influence” of the USSR. The “spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR” were separated by the northern border of Lithuania. The authors of the secret protocol agreed to resolve the fate of the Polish state “by way of friendly mutual consent.” The day after the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ratified the Soviet-German treaty, German troops attacked Poland without declaring war. Following this, the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, began to insist on accelerating the “Soviet military intervention” in Poland. On September 9, Molotov assured the German ambassador that “Soviet military operations will begin within the next few weeks. a few days." However, the next day he stated that “the Soviet government was taken completely by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid German military successes.” In this regard, Molotov introduced a significant change in the Soviet position. According to the German ambassador, Molotov told him that, given the political side of the issue, “the Soviet government intended to take advantage of the further advance of German troops and declare that Poland was falling apart and that, as a result, the Soviet Union should come to the aid of the Ukrainians and Belarusians who were “threatened by » Germany. This pretext will make the intervention of the Soviet Union seem plausible in the eyes of the masses and will give the Soviet Union the opportunity not to look like an aggressor.” Having notified the German government, on the morning of September 17, Red Army troops crossed the Polish border and deployed fighting. Under attacks from the west and east, Poland as a state ceased to exist. The results of its military defeat were enshrined in the new Soviet-German treaty “on friendship and borders,” signed on September 28 by Molotov and Ribbentrop. In secret annexes to it, the winners specified the areas of their ideological cooperation and new “spheres of influence” of the USSR and Germany. The secret protocol of August 23 was corrected to take into account that “the territory of the Lithuanian state passed into the sphere of influence of the USSR” in exchange for the Lublin and part of the Warsaw voivodeship, which “went into the sphere of influence of Germany.” ...In accordance with secret protocols and other secret agreements that supplemented the Soviet-German treaties, Stalin received Hitler’s consent to enter Soviet troops to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bessarabia, and in the future even to Finland. With neighboring, especially small, countries, he began to communicate in the language of threats and ultimatums. In a great-power manner, Bessarabia was returned to the USSR, Northern Bukovina was annexed, and Soviet power was restored in the Baltic republics. The USSR government broke off diplomatic relations with the governments of countries that found themselves victims of fascist aggression and found refuge in England. But with the pro-Hitler governments of Vichy France and the puppet Slovak state, relations were established at the ambassadorial level. The alliance with Hitler pushed Stalin to war against Finland, which, according to the secret additional protocol to the treaty of August 23, 1939, was included in the “sphere of influence” of the USSR, which, as stated above, was subject to “territorial and political transformations.” Negotiations with the Finnish government regarding such “transformations” began in March 1939. The proposals of the Soviet leadership, as clearly affecting the sovereignty of Finland, were then rejected. Both sides began to prepare for military action: Finland for defensive action, the USSR for offensive action. At the beginning of March 1939, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal K.E. Voroshilov instructed the newly appointed commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, Army Commander 2nd Rank K. A. Meretskov, to study the theater of future military operations of the district as carefully as possible in different seasons, and also “try to analyze in detail the state of the troops and their preparedness in case of war conflict, the danger of which was rapidly growing due to the sharp deterioration of the international situation.” Following these instructions, Meretskov immediately began combat training of troops, building roads and fortified areas near the border with Finland. Relations between the two countries were already quite tense and aggravated when, in October-November 1939, new negotiations took place at the initiative of the Soviet side. As before, the Finnish government rejected all Soviet proposals, including the lease of the port of Hanko and the exchange of Finnish territory on the Karelian Isthmus for part of the territory in the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Both sides showed no desire to seek mutually acceptable political solutions. They looked at each other through the "rifle sight" and accelerated military preparations. The Soviet government took a course towards a forceful method of solving the problem. The “reason” for the start of hostilities by the Soviet troops was the “incident” near the village of Maynila, 800 meters from the border. On November 26, 1939, between 15:45 and 16:50, seven cannon shots were fired at her location, resulting in casualties. Within a few hours, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note stating that the Soviet side did not intend to “inflate this outrageous act of attack by units of the Finnish army.” The Soviet government demanded that the Finnish government “immediately withdraw its troops away from the border on the Karelian Isthmus - 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.” In a response note, the Finnish government stated that it “urgently carried out a proper investigation” and established that “the hostile act against the USSR ... was not committed by the Finnish side.” The Finnish government proposed a joint investigation into this incident and expressed its readiness to “start negotiations on the issue of mutual withdrawal of troops to a certain distance from the border.” This reasonable proposal was rejected. In the response note of the Soviet government dated November 28, 1939, the note from Finland was characterized as a document “reflecting the deep hostility of the Finnish government towards the Soviet Union and designed to bring to the extreme a crisis in relations between both countries. The note stated that from this date the Soviet government “considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the Finnish government.” At 8 a.m. on November 30, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border of Finland, having received orders to “defeat the Finnish troops.” The tasks assigned to them went far beyond ensuring the security of the Soviet border. In the order to the troops of the Leningrad Military District, its commander K.A. Meretskov and member of the military council A.A. Zhdanov argued: “We are coming to Finland not as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of landowners and capitalists.” This flawed view of the situation was then shared by the entire party and state leadership in the USSR. ... The League of Nations condemned the actions of the Soviet Union as an attack on the sovereignty of Finland and on December 14 at the initiative of a number of countries Latin America expelled him from its membership. The Soviet-Finnish or winter war, as it is called in Finland, lasted from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940. The decision to begin hostilities against Finland was made personally by Stalin, together with his closest advisers, Voroshilov and Molotov. The war broke out so hastily that even the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B.M. Shaposhnikov did not know about this; he was on vacation. The “brilliant” commanders Stalin and Voroshilov had no doubt about the rapid defeat of the Finnish troops. Therefore, the Red Army soldiers fought the “winter war” in summer uniforms, as a result, many thousands of them died from severe frosts or received serious frostbite. The total number of Soviet troops involved in the war against Finland was about 960 thousand people (against about 300 thousand Finnish troops, including the formations of the "Schutzkor" - a paramilitary organization of civilians). They had 11,266 guns and mortars (against about two thousand Finnish), 2,998 tanks (against 86 Finnish), 3,253 combat aircraft (against about 500 Finnish, of which 350 were received during the war from England, France and other Western countries). The actions of the Soviet ground forces were supported by the Baltic and Northern fleets and the Ladoga military flotilla. Although it was clear from the very beginning that the Finns could not avoid defeat, instead of an impressive victory, it turned out to be a protracted war. The combat effectiveness of the Red Army, as shown by the recent experience of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, was low. It should be taken into account that the Soviet command had comprehensive information about Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (“Mannerheim Line”). During the 105 days of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Red Army lost 289,510 people, of which 74 thousand were killed, 17 thousand were missing (mostly those captured by Finns), the rest were wounded and frostbitten. According to official Finnish data, Finnish losses amounted to 23 thousand killed and missing and about 44 thousand wounded. For comparison, we point out: the German Wehrmacht defeated Polza in 36 days, the Anglo-French troops in May 1940 - in 26 days, Greece and Yugoslavia - in 18 days. The military prestige of the Red Army was greatly shaken. As the German general K. Tippelskirch noted, “the Russians throughout the war showed such tactical clumsiness and such poor command, suffered such huge losses during the fight for the Mannerheim Line that an unfavorable opinion was formed throughout the world regarding the combat capability of the Red Army.” Tippelskirch believed that Hitler's decision to attack the USSR "undoubtedly had a significant influence later on." ... The Soviet government promptly offered peace to Finland. Victory in the “winter war” made it possible to resolve controversial issues between the two countries in favor of the USSR. According to the peace treaty signed on the evening of March 12, the entire Karelian Isthmus, the Vyborg Bay with its islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga and other small territories went to the USSR. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border increased from 32 to 150 kilometers. All this could not but affect the relations between the two countries in the future. In June 1941, Finland opposed the USSR on the side of Germany. From school textbooks History of Russia from antiquity to the present day: A guide for applicants to universities. Ed. M.N. Zueva. M., 1996. S. 472, 476-480. Faced with a deadlock in negotiations with democracies,... The Soviet leadership moved towards rapprochement with the Germans. During the preliminary secret negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union, there were agreements that led to the signing in Moscow on August 23, 1939 by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov non-aggression pact. The additional secret protocol to the treaty delimited the “spheres of interest” of Germany and the USSR in Eastern Europe. According to it, Poland became the German “sphere of interests”, with the exception of the eastern regions, and the Baltic states, Eastern Poland (that is, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus), Finland, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (part of Romania) became the “sphere of interests” of the USSR. Thus, the USSR returned those lost in 1917-1920. territory of the former Russian Empire . At dawn on September 1, 1939, the troops of the German Wehrmacht suddenly launched military operations against Poland... At the same time, in accordance with the secret articles of the Soviet-German Pact (dated August 23, 1939), the Red Army troops, almost without encountering resistance, from 17 until September 29, they occupied areas of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. On September 28, 1939, the first campaign of the Second World War was completed. Poland ceased to exist. On the same day, a new Soviet-German treaty “On Friendship and Borders” was concluded in Moscow, cementing the division of Poland. Of course, the signing of this treaty, which defined the border between the USSR and Germany approximately along the “Curzon Line,” was necessary. However, the mention of the word “friendship” in his text sounded clearly cynical. New secret agreements gave the USSR the opportunity for “freedom of action” in creating a “security sphere” on its western borders, secured the annexation of the western regions of Belarus and Ukraine, and allowed the Soviet Union to conclude agreements on “mutual assistance” on September 28, 1939 with Estonia, on October 5- with Latvia, October 10 - with Lithuania. According to the last treaty, the city of Vilna (Vilnius) and the Vilna region, seized by Poland in 1920, were transferred to Lithuania. According to these treaties, the USSR received the right to station its troops in the Baltic republics and create naval and air bases on their territories, which was stipulated in specially concluded military agreements conventions Moreover, as a sign of respect for the interests of the German “ally,” Stalin agreed to transfer into the hands of the Gestapo many hundreds of German anti-fascists hiding in the USSR from the Nazis, and also carried out the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Poles, both former military personnel and civilians. "At the same time, the Stalinist leadership increased pressure on Finland. On October 12, 1939, it was asked to conclude an agreement “on mutual assistance” with the USSR. However, the Finnish leadership refused agreements with the USSR, and the negotiations were unsuccessful. Using the agreements contained in secret protocol of August 23, 1939, the Soviet leadership took active steps to expand the “security sphere" in the north-west. On November 28, 1939, the USSR unilaterally denounced the non-aggression treaty with Finland of 1932 and on the morning of November 30 began military actions against the Finns, which lasted almost four months. The next day (December 1) in the village of Terijoki, the “government of the Democratic Republic of Finland” was urgently proclaimed. Counting on a quick victory, the troops of the Leningrad District, in the winter cold, without sufficient preparation, launched an assault deep echeloned defensive "Mannerheim Line", but, having suffered significant losses, were soon forced to suspend the offensive. Only after a month of preparation in February 1940, having broken the resistance of the Finnish troops, the group of the Soviet North-Western Front, many times superior to the enemy, reached the approaches to Vyborg. On March 12, 1940, a Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed in Moscow, which took into account the territorial claims made by the USSR. The Soviet Union suffered enormous human losses during the war: the active army lost up to 127 thousand people killed and missing, as well as up to 248 thousand wounded and frostbitten. Finland lost just over 48 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. Politically, this war caused serious damage to the Soviet Union. On December 14, 1939, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution to expel him from this organization, condemning the actions of the USSR directed against the Finnish state and calling on member states of the League of Nations to support Finland. The USSR found itself in international isolation. The results of the “winter war” clearly showed the weakness of the “indestructible” Soviet Armed Forces, their actual inability to conduct effective combat operations in a modern war, and the commitment of the top military leadership to the cliches of the civil war. In the midst of the Wehrmacht's victories in France, the Stalinist leadership of the USSR took steps for further “territorial and political reorganization” on the western and southwestern borders. On June 14, 1940, the government of the USSR, in an ultimatum, demanded from Lithuania the formation of a new government, “which would be able and ready to ensure the fair implementation of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance agreement” and consent to the immediate deployment of the contingent of Soviet troops necessary to ensure security in Lithuania . Similar ultimatums followed on June 16 to Latvia and Estonia. Sandwiched between two “friendly” powers (USSR and Germany), the Baltic republics agreed to peacefully comply with Moscow’s demands. Within a few days, “people’s governments” were created in these republics, which “established” Soviet power in the Baltic states. Following this, on June 28-30, 1940, after mutual consultations between the USSR and Germany, the regions of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, occupied by Romania back in 1918, were annexed to the Soviet Union. Before this, the Karelo-Finnish SSR was formed in March 1940. As a result of the German pacification policy in the northeast and east of Europe, territories with a population of 14 million were included in the USSR. people, and the western border was pushed back by 200-600 km. At the VIII session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 2-6, 1940, these territorial “acquisitions” were legally formalized by the laws on the formation of the Moldavian SSR and the admission of the three Baltic republics to the Union. Political history: Russia-USSR- Russian Federation. T. 2. P. 400-408. ... Restructuring the military industry to produce new types of military equipment in 1939-1940. was carried out slowly. In the first half of 1941 it was sharply accelerated. But there was little time left. Thus, in the aircraft industry, new types of combat aircraft began to be produced only in 1940 in very small quantities, but in the first half of 1941, about 2 thousand new types of fighters, about 500 bombers and 250 attack aircraft were already manufactured. In total, in 1939 - the first half of 1941. 18 thousand combat aircraft were produced. A similar situation existed in tank building. During the same time, industry gave the Red Army more than seven thousand tanks, but only 1,864 new types. The production of new types of weapons had been established and was gaining momentum, but they specific gravity remained small. Priority was given, as before, to quantitative indicators. In 1940 - first half of 1941. The USSR surpassed Germany in the production of weapons and military equipment (airplanes, tanks, guns and mortars), but the lag in quality remained. Insufficient means of mechanized traction were produced. The scientific and technical lag behind Germany was reflected in the weak development or absence of production of the latest radar, optical equipment, etc. At the beginning of the war, the country did not have an approved industrial mobilization plan. The only part of the plan concerning ammunition and intended to be implemented within a year and a half was approved only 16 days before the start of the war. Industry continued to concentrate in historically established centers. The eastern regions in 1940 provided approximately a third of the output of basic industries. And although the need for their accelerated development was recognized, capital construction there, according to the third five-year plan, it was planned to spend only 34.2% of investments, and in fact the volume of work did not reach even a quarter. Defense factories continued to be built near the western borders. By the summer of 1941, less than 20% of military factories were concentrated in the East. In the defense industries, as well as in the entire economy, qualified technical management was not provided, there was mismanagement and overwriting, downtime and rush jobs, and violations of labor discipline. ... Of course, the decisive factor determining the country’s defense capability on the eve of the war was the state of its armed forces and the degree of their readiness to conduct hostilities. The state leadership has always paid industrial attention to the construction of the armed forces. After the outbreak of World War II, their development was accelerated. In September 1939, the Law on General military duty, which abolished all class restrictions on conscription. The period of active service of privates and non-commissioned officers of the ground forces and aviation, as well as the period of time in reserve, was increased. At the same time, the deployment of all types and branches of troops began. By 1941, the number of rifle and divisions and almost doubled the number of aviation regiments. By mid-1941, the total strength of the army and navy had almost tripled. In May-June 1941, covert mobilization was carried out, and the concentration of troops in the western border districts (in the first strategic echelon), especially in Kiev and Odessa, increased. However, the accelerated deployment of the armed forces was interrupted by the war. The state of the country's defense capability was invariably rated extremely highly in the speeches of its leading figures. On May 5, 1941, at the graduation of students from military academies, Stalin gave a 40-minute speech, from which the next day Pravda quoted only one phrase: “The Red Army has reorganized itself organizationally and seriously rearmed itself.” As the recording that has reached us testifies, the speech was full of praise for the power of the Red Army, its armament with the latest technology and offensive potential. Stalin spoke disparagingly about the military thought, technical capabilities and morale of the German army. And six months later, when he had to explain why the enemy was standing at the gates of Moscow, he referred to our lack of tanks and aircraft. How did things really stand? ... The Red Army was inferior to the Wehrmacht both in the total number of armed forces (5.7 million versus 7.3 million in Germany - Ed.) and in the troops located near the border (3.0 million versus 3, 5 million USD in Germany). This is explained by the fact that Germany, although it had almost half as much manpower as the USSR, mobilized its army and moved about half of it to its eastern borders to attack the USSR. In terms of military equipment, the Red Army had a significant superiority over the aggressor army (tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts 23.2 thousand against 6.0 thousand in Germany, combat aircraft 22.0 thousand against 6.0 thousand, etc. ). The advantage was especially great in such cases (almost four times in business and 3.4 times in the first echelon). Moreover, in western districts there were about 600 heavy tanks (KV), and the Wehrmacht did not have them at all. The Wehrmacht had 1.7 times more medium tanks than the Red Army, but in the western districts the majority were T-34- tanks best tanks Second World War. In terms of light cannon tanks, the Red Army was 8 times superior to the Wehrmacht, and their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to the German ones. The numerical superiority of the Red Army was also great in terms of combat aircraft (3.6 times), and in terms of its qualitative characteristics best samples superior to the Germans. However, the bulk of the Air Force consisted of outdated types of vehicles. Soviet artillery was superior to German in quantitative and qualitative terms, but inferior to it in anti-aircraft artillery. The Red Army also had an advantage in machine guns. The Wehrmacht's superiority in automatic weapons was noticeable (almost doubled in general, and almost a quarter in the first echelon) and, to some extent, in vehicles. In the Red Army there was a shortage of communications equipment, repair equipment, and engineering weapons. The beginning of the war showed that the Red Army lacked the ability to use and dispose of enormous advantages in technology and weapons, its combat effectiveness turned out to be lower than that of German army. This was due to a number of reasons. By professional level The command staff of the Red Army was inferior to the Wehrmacht. The leadership of the Soviet armed forces was weakened by repression. Particularly affected High Command . All commanders of military districts, 80% of division command staff, and over 90% of regiment commanders were removed. 75 out of 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, 14 out of 16 army generals, and 90% of corps army generals were repressed. Less trained personnel were hastily appointed to replace those repressed. In 1939, displacement affected about 70% of the entire command staff. In general, the command cadres of the Soviet armed forces were much less prepared than the German ones. Top and middle command posts were occupied mainly by poorly educated and inexperienced yesterday's junior officers. And platoon and company commanders usually had six-month training courses. As a rule, they had no combat experience. The level of combat training of the Red Army soldiers was low, which is understandable given the level of command personnel at that time. There was a large proportion of untrained recruits who, by the beginning of the war, did not even have time to complete the young fighter course. Theoretical views and ideas about the beginning of the war largely did not correspond to reality. Stalin, in his speech on May 5, 1941 in the Kremlin, emphasized that the Red Army had become so strong and strong that it could move from defense to offense. Characteristic was an overestimation of one's own strengths and an underestimation of the enemy's forces. It was believed that the aggressor would be defeated in the first battles and the war would be transferred to its territory. In terms of political studies with conscripts for June-September 1941, it was recommended, in particular, to study the following issues: “The Red Army is the most offensive army in the world. To defend one’s own land on foreign soil” and “The Red Army will march before the enemy enters our land.” Thus, the personnel were accustomed to the idea of ​​an easy victory in a rapid offensive, while the theory of heavy defensive battles against a strong enemy was almost not studied. It should be noted that overestimating one's own strength and underestimating the enemy was also typical for the Wehrmacht, where plans were prepared more carefully. The Wehrmacht was aimed at winning a lightning war (blitzkrieg) within five months, but was not ready for a protracted war. On the eve of the war, the Soviet armed forces were in the stage of organizational and technical restructuring. The increase in the size and combat power of the Red Army, its reorganization and deployment took place at a rapid, even hasty pace. Organizational activities were sometimes contradictory and generally unfinished. The German army, on the contrary, was, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, mobilized, re-equipped, deployed and prepared for an attack on the USSR. During the two years of war in Europe, she gained extensive experience in conducting large-scale maneuver operations. To this it should be added that many German generals also had experience of the First World War. At the same time, the experience of combat operations of the Red Army in Finland was limited, and the experience of the Franco-German war of 1939-1940. was not studied, its lessons were not taken into account. And finally, the surprise factor played a huge role in the beginning of the war. Both sides were intensively preparing for war, but Germany took the initiative. As a result, the war came as a surprise to everything Soviet people, misinformed, moreover, by the TASS statement of June 14, which “refuted” rumors about the imminence of war between the USSR and Germany, and for the army. Meanwhile, the Stalinist leadership had more than enough information from intelligence agencies, defectors, and through diplomatic channels about the impending aggression. But until the last hours, the necessary measures were not taken to bring the Red Army to full combat readiness. The miscalculations of Stalin and the top military leadership cost the country huge losses and defeats. The enemy had the opportunity to seize the strategic initiative. V.N. Kiselev. Stubborn facts the beginning of the war. Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? M., 1995. pp. 77-81. One of the reasons that forced the Soviet political and military leadership to hesitate in making a decision to bring the troops covering the state border of the USSR into full combat readiness to repel the aggression of Nazi Germany is usually called the desire of I.V. Stalin would not give the aggressor a reason to attack the Soviet Union and delay the war. L This point of view was firmly established in Soviet historiography, including in fundamental military historical works. Meanwhile, an analysis of archival documents and activities carried out in the Armed Forces of the USSR on the eve of the German attack casts doubt on the correctness of such a concept. Facts indicate that the Soviet High Command, having learned about the preparations of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht for an attack on the Soviet Union, developed “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Constructed Forces of the Soviet Union” in the event of war with Germany, which were reported to the Chairman of the Council in a document dated May 15, 1941 People's Commissars of the USSR. According to this plan, it was planned to defeat the main forces of the Nazi army, concentrated for an attack on the Soviet Union. The operational deployment of troops intended to repel aggression was planned to be protected from a possible surprise attack by the enemy with the strong defense of the first echelon armies of the western border districts. There is no documentary evidence of the approval of the plan, but there is reason to believe that it was accepted. One of the compelling arguments in favor of this assumption is that the measures requested by the High Command in the document dated May 15 were carried out. The plan, in particular, proposed “the timely deployment of consistent covert mobilization and covert concentration of, first of all, all reserve armies of the Tlavny Command and aviation.” Other proposals concerned the People's Commissariat of Railways and the defense industry. As you know, it was in mid-May that the 16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd armies began to move out of the Transbaikal, North Caucasus, Volga and Ural military districts. The reserve armies of the High Command moved, maintaining camouflage, along the railway, which continued to operate on a peacetime schedule, and were supposed to concentrate on the Western Dvina-Dnieper line no later than July 10. The 20th, 24th and 28th armies were also preparing to move from the depths of the country to the upcoming theater of operations. In the first half of June, the hidden mobilization of troops began. It was carried out under the guise of large training camps, as a result of which the combat units, primarily in the western border districts, received about 800 thousand reinforcements. Since mid-June, strategic deployment has gained even greater scope. In accordance with the directive of the General Staff, 32 rifle divisions of the reserve of the western border districts moved to the border. Most of the formations advanced under their own power. They had to march 5-10 night marches and by July 1 concentrate 20-80 km from the state border. Thus, the measures outlined in the “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union” dated May 15, 1941 began to be implemented in life, which would have been impossible without their approval by the political leadership, that is, Stalin. The preparation of the Red Army for the offensive is also evidenced by the discussion by the Main Military Council of the immediate tasks of party political work, which was held in May-June 1941. At the council meeting on May 14, It was recognized as necessary to revise the content of military propaganda and educational work in the army. The draft directive of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army proposed directing political propaganda to prepare personnel for waging an “offensive and all-destructive war.” “All personnel of the Red Army must be imbued with the awareness that The increased political, economic and military power of the Soviet Union allows us to implement an offensive foreign policy, decisively eliminating hotbeds of war on our borders,” the document said. The draft directive was discussed at a council meeting on June 4, chaired by A.A. Zhdanov. He emphasized: “We have become stronger, we can set more active goals. The wars with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already embarked on the path of an offensive policy.” It was proposed to finalize the project and discuss it at the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Having approved the directive on June 20, the council entrusted its final editing to S.K. Timoshenko, G.M. Mishchenkov and A.I. Zaporozhets. However, the war interrupted this work. So, documents of the General Staff and the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army show that the Armed Forces of the USSR were preparing for an offensive, in the interests of which the above measures were carried out. However, the strategic deployment of the Red Army was carried out without bringing the covering troops into readiness to repel the pre-emptive strike of the aggressor. Meanwhile, the likelihood of an attack in June 1941 increased every day. By the beginning of June, 40 German infantry divisions had taken up their starting position for the offensive, 7-20 km from the state border of the USSR. On June 10, the advance of tank formations began. The General Staff of the Red Army had reliable information that up to 122 German divisions were concentrated near the borders, including 27 tank and motorized divisions, and up to 32 divisions and 10 brigades of the Allies in Germany. Despite this, no decisive measures were taken. Can the untimely bringing of the covering troops into full combat readiness be explained by the desire not to provoke a war? It seems that the occupation of defense by formations of the first echelon of armies covering the state border (42 divisions in total) gave the aggressor less reason for an attack than the movement of reserves from the depths of the country or, for example, the deployment of front-line control points, which began on June 14-19. At the same time, it is obvious that the occupation of defense is much easier to conceal than a march from the depths of large reserves and headquarters (in total, 86 divisions were advanced). The attempt to explain the delay by the desire to delay the war also does not stand up to serious criticism. From mid-June 1941, both sides launched their war machine in such a way that it was almost impossible to stop it. Moreover, as can be seen from the plans and actions of the parties, there was no such desire. Both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were preparing for the offensive. We did not plan strategic defense, and this is generally accepted. Only covering troops had to defend in order to ensure the deployment of the main forces for the offensive. Judging by the timing of the concentration of reserves of the border military districts, the reserve armies of the High Command and the deployment of front-line command posts, the offensive of the Soviet troops to defeat the aggressor preparing for the invasion could begin no earlier than July 1941. However, this issue requires additional research, the study of all documents planning military operations on the eve of the war . The offensive plans of the Soviet command remained a closed topic until recently. It was believed that preparing a preemptive strike against the enemy allegedly did not correspond to the nature of the Red Army, and most importantly, it justified Hitler’s statements about a preventive war against the USSR. However, it is precisely the possible offensive of the Red Army for defeat. troops of the aggressor concentrated for attack would be retaliatory, preventive and drastic measure, with which the political and military leadership was hopelessly late. The Wehrmacht forestalled the Red Army in its strategic deployment. If by the end of June 21 the aggressor had completely mobilized and concentrated forces for the offensive, then the Soviet troops were in a state far from being ready not only to attack, but even to defend. The main reasons for this state of the USSR Armed Forces were as follows. Firstly, the Wehrmacht began deployment in February 1941, i.e. three and a half months earlier than the Soviet side. Secondly, throughput railways the aggressor was three times higher than that of the USSR. In addition, Germany switched them to a maximum traffic schedule from May 25, while Soviet roads operated as usual. And finally, thirdly, the Soviet leadership, steadily following Stalin’s instructions and trying not to give Hitler a reason to attack, acted extremely carefully. Stalin mistakenly believed that Germany would not dare to violate the non-aggression pact in the near future in the absence of any reasons on our part. Excessive caution led to the indecisive nature of the preparation of troops in the western border districts to repel the attack. The true reason for the untimely readiness of the covering troops to repel the aggressor should be sought not in the desire to delay the war, which in the summer of 1941 was obviously no longer possible, but in the miscalculations of the political and military leadership, and the insufficient experience of the strategic command itself. The common mistake of the political and military leadership in these miscalculations was an incorrect assessment of the state of the Armed Forces, which consisted in exaggerating their capabilities. This is evidenced, for example, by the task formulated in “Considerations...” - to defeat 100 German divisions with the forces of 152 divisions of the Southwestern and Western Fronts. The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that such superiority was not enough. In our opinion, this is most fully evidenced by Directive No. 3, issued by the Main Military Council on the first day of the war. As is known, it demanded that the troops of the North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts encircle and destroy enemy strike forces and capture the Suwalki and Lublin areas by the end of June 24. Obviously, these tasks were not an improvisation of the General Staff, but stemmed from the military action plan developed before the war. Without going into an analysis of the reality of the tasks of the fronts, which were required to prepare strikes in two days and advance to a depth of 100 km or more, it is absolutely clear that the High Command exaggerated the combat capability of the troops beyond any measure. An incorrect assessment of the capabilities of the field army led to an unreasonable demand to attack, which made it difficult to create a stable rotation of fronts. The transition to strategic defense was carried out from June 25 to the end of the month. However, the thought of launching a counteroffensive did not entertain the High Command Headquarters for several more months. Attempts to seize the strategic initiative were made during the Battle of Smolensk. Only on September 27, the Supreme High Command Headquarters came to the conclusion that the troops were not ready for serious offensive operations and ordered the Western Front to switch to a “tough stubborn defense.” Unreasonable attempts to conduct offensive operations in the absence of the necessary conditions, they made it difficult to create a stable defense on the fronts and were one of the reasons for our failures not only in 1941, but also in 1942. Only in 1943 did our Supreme High Command get rid of this shortcoming. Thus, the presentation in Soviet military-historical works of the reasons for the untimely bringing of covering troops to full combat readiness is at odds with the facts, ultimately justifying the mistakes and indecisiveness of the political and military leadership, which overestimated the combat capability of the Red Army, strictly demanding offensive actions from the fronts, which made it difficult the ability to create a stable defense to repel enemy attacks led to tragic results. ... We’ll be the last to go.” From the diaries of Sun. Vishnevsky.// Saint George the Victorious. M., 1994. No. 17-18. The writer Vsevolod Vitalievich Vishnevsky (1900-1951), like his works, was closely connected with the army. By June 1941 for him. There were four wars (World War I, Civil, Spanish, Soviet-Finnish). On May 13, 1941, Vishnevsky wrote in his diary: “There is no place for the Hitler system! Without hesitation, even in a simple chain, I will go to a new war. This will be my fifth...” The diaries of Vishnevsky, a man close to the command of the Armed Forces, who headed the “defense commission of the Writers’ Union, editor of the Znamya magazine,” are of undoubted interest. 1941 January 31 International situation continues to become more complicated... The position of the USSR is wait-and-see: if it is appropriate, we will be able to throw our weight on the scales of war. The hint that Germany “sees all conceivable options” (i.e., the USSR’s action) was given in Hitler’s speech. Yesterday I listened to his speech (on the radio from Berlin - Ed.). The voice is rough, squealing and wheezing in places. The Nazi assembly hummed, roared, shouted “Heil” many times, etc., etc. An alien world... With all your being you resist it, you become angry, no matter what considerations are given here. Yes, this is an old neighbor and enemy... Evening of March 3 The Germans are moving through Bulgaria. Undoubtedly, they violate our interests in the Balkans. Relationships are likely to become more strained. But, probably, we will wait until Hitler gets seriously bogged down in a big fight in the West... On the afternoon of April 9... For a day, two - rise, expectations, nervous excitement among people, a lot of questions: how to understand our pact, how to evaluate our relations with Germany in a new situation... Rumors about our preparations in the south... We do not leave the radio, we catch Belgrade, Berlin, London, Beirut, etc. - all sorts of news. You feel, however, after waiting a little, after weighing, that the hour of our intervention has not yet come. We need to spend the spring time, we need to carry out the program, study, work, press... And no matter how the heart beats, no matter how alarming the news from the Balkans is (the Germans are persistently and methodically dividing the allied armies and penetrating deep into Yugoslavia and Greece in southern sections), no matter how gloomy all these German broadcasts sound, our job is to wait and prepare. How will events turn out? It is absolutely impossible to guess. Economic and other calculations are clearly insufficient. There are millions of factors at work, sometimes subtle ones. But I painfully want to gain time, let the enemies get bogged down deeper, get the opportunity to put our 2,950 new enterprises into operation, the opportunity to deploy all forces, to complete the cycle of military training of the USSR. Let the matter drag on until winter - then both the defense of England and powerful pressure The USA, and our readiness - and the German people will move from obediently carrying out Hitler's will to reflection, criticism, resistance... Then our time will come! But this is the maximum program, these are hopes, these are dreams. How will everything turn out in reality? The coming months will decide. We're reaching a breaking point Soviet history. You feel it all clearly. April 12, 5 p.m. I have just returned from the Kremlin: I visited Voroshilov. The conversation about the film and the script for “The First Horse” lasted three hours. They began to talk about the war: “The Germans are taking the Balkans. They act boldly. The British, by sending their troops to the Balkans, seemed to tease the Yugoslavs and Greeks and pulled them in.” We moved on to the topic of Hitler: the man turned out to be much smarter and more serious than we expected. Great mind, strength. Let them reproach him: a maniac, uncultured, expansive, etc., but in his work he is a genius, a force... He repeated this. We listened carefully. A sober assessment of a possible enemy. This is a serious quality... We talked together about how Hitler was getting more and more bogged down. In Norway there is an 80-point order: executions on the spot, without trial, executions after two days, etc. - at a rate, for all violations of German rules. Incredible cruelty. In Poland the population is dying. In Warsaw there is a ghetto of 350 thousand, Jews are dying out. Everything is exported from the occupied countries: all types of weapons, machines, raw materials, means of production. The Germans live by robbery... “There are rumors, launched indirectly for now, that Hitler will move to Ukraine and the Caucasus. Either they are frightening, or maybe (he said thoughtfully, carefully), and in fact... But with the Red Army it will be difficult for him.” Voroshilov has no doubt about our strength. But once again he spoke about the complete unreliability of the British.*. I said, by the way, about the mood of the masses: they hope for changes in the West, readiness to act, anti-fascist sentiments, nurtured in past years, are strong..., April 14 A German attack against us and our response (or a preventive strike) is inevitable. When we came to the pact, we planned: let them start a fight, weaken each other, reveal their strengths and weak sides, if possible, get stuck; we will skillfully encourage them, push them aside, etc., and if necessary, according to Lenin’s formula, we ourselves will go on the attack... We will have reserves: the peoples of the occupied countries, where there is anger against the Germans, an incredible desire for peace, for liberation. The truth is coming out. The temporary agreement with Hitler is coming apart at all the seams. May 5... And again the question: what will happen next? Will there be a compromise between the capitalist powers? Or the winner (the Germans have a chance) will eventually hit us. Or we will manage to find the moment and start a revolutionary war, breaking down the highest planned phase of capitalism, because we ourselves are even higher. May 13 Stalin's military speech in the Kremlin at the graduation of the academies... A speech of enormous significance. We are launching an ideological and practical offensive. It's about about the world struggle: Hitler is miscalculating here. America comes into play, its readiness for 1942. And we will say the word: we are closer to Europe, in particular to the Slavs, than anyone else. We have freshness, unspent strength, experience. The idea of ​​peace and resolution will undermine Germany's strength. Our offensive can break them. There will be a feeling of collapse, panic (internal). This must be achieved inexorably and harshly. Ahead is our journey to the West. There are opportunities ahead that we have long dreamed of. May 21... Something big is up. Germany, with its 250 divisions, cannot waste time and be “downtime.” She chooses the direction... Abroad they see and understand that we are winning, accumulating strength, taking the path state tradition Russia, we are rearming the army (the process is in full swing) - and we can become, if those at war prolong the bloodletting, a super-arbiter in Europe and Asia. Hitler understands that we are heading towards hitting him in the back of the head, preferably when Germany is exhausted, like in 1942... We, I think, should wait a little longer, further increase the production of military products, complete the summer and autumn cycle of classes in the army and navy. But do events provide these special reprieves? Frontline in "Red Star" - information about the mobilization of a number of reserve classes (“hundreds of thousands”). It is published as an article about the training of substitutes. Modestly... In the coming days there will be a series of articles about the development of the revolutionary policy of France (Napoleon) into an aggressive one. Analrgy: Germany in 1939, the struggle against Versailles, the restoration of the country, the escalation of the war into an aggressive one. June 2... Concentration of troops. Preparation of relevant literature. In parts there are anti-fascist films (!): “Mamluk”, “Oppenheim”, etc. New events are felt... June 6... Maybe the real threat of the USSR coming out in a new combination will advance the cause of peace? But we are accustomed to a direct anti-fascist train of thought and feeling (although history has made amendments) and we believe that if necessary (for example, in 1942), having isolated Germany from Japan, the USSR would strike Germany and move forward. In the evening of June 11 In the afternoon, about three o’clock: “You are being summoned to the Kremlin to see Comrade Voroshilov.” We talked about different things. I started about the war. Voroshilov: “The war can drag on for years. They will, like in China, provinces die out. The Germans are supporters of intimidation of lower races... The Germans do not yet have signs of a revolutionary movement, they are disciplined. They hold a huge army against us, rattling their tongues just in case. The Germans are not fools; they won’t do this at all. However, the war may unexpectedly acquire a new course, a denouement.” (I didn’t ask which one, it’s inconvenient). “Our people, we understand this, desperately want to know about the war, forces, situation, etc. But we cannot reveal everything. We have to maneuver and keep silent. Then they will understand: we win peace, the opportunity to work, to develop.” I was talking about the play against the Germans. He spoke directly. Voroshilov is careful: “All capitalists are our enemies... Whichever way it turns out.” And at the end he said: “Write.” I understand: he approves. Whatever it is, you have to write it. Maybe it will come in handy... June 21...I, weighing the information, think: maybe, due to Germany’s refusal to consult, etc. began a “quiet” pressure on Germany. Our pressure is hindering Germany's ability to act in the West. Here it is, the Russian front - only in potential!

Results and consequences of the war.

The main stages of the Great Patriotic War.

Causes of the war. Plans and goals of Germany and the USSR in the war.

Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

The Great Patriotic War.

At the beginning of 1939, the last attempt was made to create a system of collective security between England, France and the Soviet Union. However, Western states did not believe in the potential ability of the USSR to resist fascist aggression. Therefore, they delayed the negotiations in every possible way. In addition, Poland categorically refused to guarantee the passage of Soviet troops through its territory to repel the expected fascist aggression. At the same time, Great Britain established secret contacts with Germany in order to reach agreement on a wide range of political problems (including the neutralization of the USSR in the international arena).

On April 17, 1939, the USSR proposed that Great Britain and France conclude a tripartite agreement, the military guarantees of which would apply to the entire Eastern Europe from Romania to the Baltic states. On the same day, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin informed the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry about the desire of the Soviet government to establish the best possible relations with Germany, despite mutual ideological differences.

Two weeks later, M. M. Litvinov, who headed the NKID of the USSR and made a lot of efforts to ensure collective security, was dismissed; his post was transferred to V. M. Molotov. There was a change in the course of Soviet foreign policy towards improving Soviet-German relations. In May, the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, was tasked with preparing negotiations with the Soviet Union in connection with Germany's decision to occupy Poland. Soviet diplomacy simultaneously continued to negotiate with France and Great Britain. Each of the negotiators had their own hidden goals: Western countries, striving, first of all, to prevent Soviet-German rapprochement, they delayed negotiations and tried at the same time to clarify Germany’s intentions. For the USSR, the main thing was to achieve guarantees that the Baltic states would not end up in the hands of Germany one way or another, and to gain the opportunity in the event of war with it to transfer its troops through the territory of Poland and Romania (since the USSR and Germany did not have a common border). However, France and Great Britain avoided resolving this issue.

Seeing that the negotiations had reached a dead end, the British and French agreed to discuss the military aspects of the agreement with the USSR. However, representatives of England (Admiral Drake) and France (General Dumenk), sent by sea on August 5, arrived in Moscow only on August 11. The Soviet side, represented by People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov, was dissatisfied that their partners were low-ranking officials who had (especially the British) minor powers. This excluded the possibility of negotiations on such important issues as the passage of Soviet troops through the territories of Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries or the obligations of the parties on a specific amount of military equipment and personnel to be mobilized in the event of German aggression.

On August 21, the Soviet delegation postponed negotiations to a later date. By this time, the Soviet leadership had already finally decided to conclude an agreement with Germany. A trade agreement was signed (it provided for a loan of 200 million marks at a very low interest rate). On August 23, 1939, the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty was concluded for a period of 10 years. The “Non-Aggression Pact” (“Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”) included a secret protocol, a photocopy of which was later discovered in Germany, but the existence of which was nevertheless denied in the USSR until the summer of 1989. The protocol delimited the parties’ spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. The fate of the Polish state was diplomatically passed over in silence, but in any case, the Belarusian and Ukrainian territories included in its composition under the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, as well as part of the “historically and ethnically Polish” territory of the Warsaw and Lublin voivodeships should have been after Germany’s military invasion in Poland will go to the USSR.

Eight days after the treaty was signed, Nazi troops attacked Poland.

Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. However, they did not provide real military assistance to the Polish government, which ensured Adolf Hitler a quick victory. The Second World War began.

In the new international conditions, the leadership of the USSR began to implement the Soviet-German agreements of August 1939. On September 17, after the Germans defeated the Polish army and the fall of the Polish government, the Red Army entered Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. On September 28, the Soviet-German Treaty “On Friendship and Border” was concluded, securing these lands as part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the USSR insisted on concluding agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, receiving the right to station its troops on their territory. In these republics, in the presence of Soviet troops, legislative elections were held, in which communist forces won. In 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became part of the USSR.

In November 1939, the USSR began a war with Finland. The goals of the war: firstly, the creation of a pro-communist government in it, and secondly, the need to ensure the military-strategic security of Leningrad (by moving the Soviet-Finnish border from it in the Karelian Isthmus region). Military operations were accompanied by huge losses on the part of the Red Army. Stubborn resistance of the Finnish army was ensured by the Mannerheim defensive line. Western states provided Finland with political support. The USSR, under the pretext of its aggression, was expelled from the League of Nations. At the cost of enormous efforts, the resistance of the Finnish armed forces was broken. In March 1940, a Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the USSR received the entire Karelian Isthmus.

In the summer of 1940, as a result of political pressure, Romania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. Significant territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR, and the country's borders were expanded (to a distance of 300 to 600 km).

Thus, at the end of the 30s. Soviet state entered into an agreement with fascist Germany, whose ideology and policies it had previously condemned. Such a turn, on the one hand, was made under forced conditions (the USSR found itself without allies); on the other hand, it could only be carried out under the conditions of the state system, all internal means of propaganda of which were aimed at justifying the actions of the government and the formation of a new attitude of Soviet society to the Hitler regime.

At the beginning of 1935, when the soil itself Hitler's Germany and abroad turned out to be sufficiently prepared, the German imperialists officially refused to implement the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles. On March 13, 1935, the Nazi government announced the creation military aviation, and three days later, on March 16, he issued a decree on universal conscription. At the same time, the size of the Nazi army was increased to 12 corps, numbering 36 divisions.
Despite unilateral aggressive acts on the part of Germany, which caused alarm and indignation among wide public circles, on June 18, 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed, which virtually eliminated any restrictions on the growth of the German naval forces.
The reluctance of France to do anything against this agreement finally gave the German warmongers a free hand.
On March 7, 1936, Nazi troops occupied the Rhineland demilitarized zone. This operation was undertaken with a specific purpose: to find out how the victorious countries would react to the final rupture of the Versailles and Locarno treaties. Still not confident in the successful outcome of the operation, Hitler ordered it to be carried out under the guise of “training,” indicating that if France mobilized in response to this or brought its army into the Rhineland, then German troops, without accepting battle, will have to immediately retreat to their territory. The unpunished seizure of the Rhineland showed the reluctance of the governments of England and France to resist the aggressive actions of Nazi Germany, which further inspired the German fascists. Taking advantage of complete impunity, they moved to open training new imperialist war. At the end of 1936, the Nazi regular army already numbered 700-800 thousand people, at least 1.5 thousand tanks and 4.5 thousand aircraft. The naval construction program was hastily implemented.
By 1937, aggressive fascist Germany already had a powerful, armed modern weapons an invading army.
In preparation for a big war, Hitler consolidated all aggressive forces. In November 1936, he concluded the so-called “anti-Comintern Pact” with the Far Eastern aggressor - Japan, which, having captured Manchuria, had been waging a war of conquest against China for the fifth year. A year later, fascist Italy joined this pact, pursuing an aggressive policy on the African mainland, as a result of which Abyssinia was captured and enslaved in 1935. With the active support of the ruling circles and all reactionaries of the USA, England and France, Hitler and Mussolini organized a military intervention against the Spanish Republic in 1936. By force of arms they established a fascist dictatorship in Spain and turned the Iberian Peninsula into their outpost, blocking the entrance and exit from Mediterranean Sea. Thus, under the leadership of Hitler’s Germany, the notorious “axis” Berlin - Rome - Tokyo was created.
The “Anti-Comintern Pact” was only a cover for a secret military alliance created for the armed seizure of foreign territories.
The most convincing evidence of the feverish preparation of the aggressor countries for war was the growth of their military budgets.
Since 1932/33, the military allocations of Germany, Italy and Japan have increased continuously. In four years, Germany's military budget increased eight and a half times, Italy's - doubled. Japan's military spending has also doubled in five years. In 1937/38, these countries already spent from half to three quarters of all their funds on war preparations.
During the five years preceding the Second World War, Nazi Germany spent more than 30% of its total national income, or about two-thirds of the state budget, annually on war preparations. Such colossal military expenditures would not have been possible without extensive financial assistance from the United States. This assistance especially increased after Hitler and his fascist clique came to power. During the period from 1933 to 1939, American monopolists invested more than 90 billion marks in the German economy. Most of this money was used in heavy industry, that is, in enterprises with military significance, or directly in the military industry. From 1933 to 1936, Germany built over 300 new military factories.
The new economic crisis, which began in the second half of 1937, when the capitalist world had not yet recovered from the severe consequences of the previous crisis, led to a further aggravation of imperialist contradictions. At first, the crisis gripped such economically powerful countries as the USA and England, which had not yet switched to the war economy, and then other capitalist countries; it threatened the aggressive countries - Germany, Italy and Japan - with the most severe consequences. Their economy, put on a war footing and resulting in an ugly, one-sided development, would not have been able to cope with the crisis that was inexorably approaching. Only the acquisition of new markets, new sources of cheap raw materials and labor could save these countries from economic disaster.
But under capitalism, as we know, peaceful redistribution of raw materials and markets is impossible. Not a single capitalist country will give up even the slightest piece of its colonies for free. Consequently, the question of redividing the world in favor of Germany, Japan and Italy could only be resolved by force. And if the intensification of the struggle for markets after the crisis of 1929 resulted in the seizure of Manchuria and Northern China by Japan, and Abyssinia by Italy, then a new crisis, unfolding in a more difficult situation for the capitalist world, inevitably led to a new world war. On November 5, 1937, Hitler, having gathered especially trusted persons, announced to them that a powerful military machine had been created and that the time had come to put it into action. According to him, the question was not about colonies, not about trade successes, but first of all about the seizure of territories in Europe, and then about world domination.
Adventurous at its core Hitler's plan the conquest of world domination provided for the consistent development of aggression with the goal of defeating opponents separately. First of all, it was planned to capture and annex to Germany or include in its orbit the countries of Central, South-Eastern and Western Europe, which were supposed to give Nazi Germany the resources and territory necessary to strike the Soviet Union.
By the beginning of 1938, the fascist aggressors had basically completed preparations for war. Nazi Germany mobilized and kept its military apparatus in combat readiness.
Tanks and planes were undergoing their final tests in battles against the Spanish people. Germany and Italy, using the treacherous policy of “non-interference” of England, France and the United States in the affairs of Spain, openly and freely sent numerous aviation and motorized units to help Franco. Fascist submarines pirated the Mediterranean Sea without hesitation.
The financial magnates of the United States of America and England were very approving of the Nazis' plans for a campaign against the Soviet Union. They increased their investment in Germany, hoping to speed up the outbreak of war against the USSR.