Considering the foreign policy situation on the eve of the Second World War, two political trends could be traced in international relations: the joint position of England and France, aimed at supporting Germany’s territorial claims at the expense of Eastern European countries, which was supposed to avert the threat of German aggression against Western states, the so-called policy of “appeasement” and line of the USSR, which aims to create a reliable and effective system collective security.
The struggle of these two directions on the world stage can be traced when considering such key, fateful international events in Europe as the Munich agreements, the Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations and the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR.
The implementation of the policy of "pacification" began with the destruction of geographical map Europe, the sovereign and independent state of Czechoslovakia.
September 30, 1938 upon request Hitler's Germany The leaders of England and France agreed to transfer the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany and, together with Hitler and Mussolini, signed Chamberlain and Daladier. In accordance with the signed agreement, England, France, Germany and Italy guaranteed the new borders of Czechoslovakia, subject to its renunciation of treaties with the USSR and France, as well as the settlement of issues regarding the Polish and Hungarian minorities. Czechoslovakia, whose fate was being decided at this conference, and the USSR, which has a mutual assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia, were not invited.
The day after the signing of the Munich Agreement, Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia and, according to W. Churchill, Poland “... with the greed of a hyena, took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state,” tearing away the Tishin region from it. Hungarian troops occupied Transcarpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia.
The conditions under which England and France agreed to sacrifice Czechoslovakia also became known. These were promises from Hermia not to attack these Western countries, which was formalized in the Anglo-German declaration and a similar Franco-German declaration, which were considered as non-aggression pacts.
Before leaving Munich, Chamberlain met with Hitler and said: “You have enough aircraft to attack the USSR, especially since there is no longer the danger of basing Soviet aircraft on Czechoslovak airfields.” This was a kind of blessing for Hitler in his policy directed against the USSR.
The reprisal against a sovereign country, the betrayal of England and France by their Czech friends and allies had dire consequences for Czechoslovakia and the destinies of Europe. Munich destroyed the USSR-France-Czechoslovakia treaty system to prevent German aggression in Europe and created in its place conditions for the “canalization” of territorial aspirations to the east, towards the USSR.
In conversations with F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill already during the war, J. Stalin said that if there had been no Munich, there would have been no non-aggression pact with Germany.
Only six months passed after the signing of the Munich agreements and on March 13, 1939, the “independence” of Slovakia was proclaimed, which immediately turned to Germany with a request to recognize it as an independent state and place it on its territory German troops.
The last point in the fate of Czechoslovakia was set on March 15, when German troops entered Prague and the next day the remnants of the once independent state were included in German Empire called "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia". On March 16, the “guarantor” of Czechoslovakia’s independence, Chamberlain, stated that due to the collapse of Czechoslovakia, the guarantees of the post-Munich borders had lost their force.
If England and France continued to condone Hitler’s aggression, then the USSR, understanding the danger of the emerging international situation, put forward a proposal on March 18, 1939 to convene a conference of six states in Bucharest: the USSR, England, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey to create a “peace front” "against German aggression. Chamberlain rejected the Soviet initiative on the grounds that it was “premature.”
Given the lack of opposition from Western states, Hitler decided to continue his aggressive policy in an eastern direction.
On March 21, Germany demanded that Poland, in an ultimatum, transfer Danzig and the extraterritorial strip through the Polish corridor to the Reich to connect Germany with East Prussia.
On March 22, under the threat of air attack, the Lithuanian government was forced to sign an agreement with Germany on the transfer of Klaipeda and the surrounding area to Germany. On March 23, Hitler triumphantly arrived in Klaipeda (Memel) aboard the battleship Deutschland and greeted the residents of the “liberated” city.
In April, under pressure from public opinion and the parliamentary opposition led by William Churchill, Chamberlain was forced to begin Anglo-French-Soviet political negotiations to discuss the international situation emerging in Europe.
On April 17, on the first day of negotiations, the USSR made specific proposals to counter Hitler’s expansion, the essence of which boiled down to the following:
– The USSR, England and France enter into an agreement for 5-10 years on mutual assistance, including military assistance;
– The USSR, England and France provide assistance, including military assistance, to the states of Eastern Europe located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR.
Only three weeks later did London formulate its answer. The USSR was required to unilaterally assume obligations in the event of involvement of England and France in hostilities. No obligations of England and France were envisaged towards the USSR. On May 14, the Soviet government stated that this position of Western countries does not contribute to the creation of a united front of resistance to Hitler's aggression. Nevertheless, the Soviet government proposed holding Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow. On June 23, England and France accepted the Soviet proposal to send their military delegations to Moscow.
The possible positive results of a rapprochement between England and France and the USSR aroused serious concern in Berlin. On July 26, the Soviet Ambassador to Germany Astakhov was offered a program of Soviet-German cooperation in three areas:
– economic sphere – conclusion of credit and trade agreements;
– respectful political relations in the field of press, science and culture;
- recovery good relations in the political sphere, including the conclusion of a new agreement that takes into account the vital interests of both sides.
On July 29, the Soviet government gave Germany a completely neutral answer: “Any improvement political relations between the two countries would, of course, be welcomed."
On August 12, Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations began in Moscow. Composition of the delegations: from the USSR - People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov, Air Force Commander A. Loktionov, from England - Commandant of Portsmouth Admiral Drake, from France - General Dumenk.
At the beginning of the meeting, K. Voroshilov presented to the heads of the Western delegations his powers to negotiate and sign a military treaty and asked his Western colleagues in the negotiations to present their powers. The delegations of England and France did not have such powers from the governments of their countries.
During the first day of meetings, the Soviet delegation proposed three possible options for joint actions by the armed forces of the USSR, England and France.
The first option is when a bloc of aggressors attacks England and France. In this case, the USSR will field 70% of the armed forces that England and France will send against Germany.
The second option is when aggression is directed against Poland and Romania. In this case, the USSR will field 100% of the armed forces that England and France will field directly against Germany. At the same time, England and France agree with Poland, Romania and Lithuania on the passage of Soviet troops and their actions against Germany.
The third option is when the aggressor, using the territories of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, directs its aggression against the USSR. In this case, England and France must immediately go to war with the aggressor. Poland, bound by treaties with England and France: must oppose Germany and allow Soviet troops through the Vilna corridor and Galicia for military operations against Germany.
The main question K. Voroshilov raised at the negotiations on August 14 was whether Soviet troops would be allowed to pass through Vilna and Polish Galicia for combat contact with the Wehrmacht. If this is not accomplished, the Germans will quickly occupy Poland and reach the USSR border. "We ask for a direct answer to these questions... Without a clear, direct answer to them, it is useless to continue these military negotiations."
General Dumenk telegraphed to Paris: “The USSR wants the conclusion of a military pact... It does not want to sign a simple piece of paper...”.
When considering the brewing military conflict in Europe, one cannot ignore or fail to assess Poland’s policy and its role in the emerging explosive situation. Back on May 11, 1939, on behalf of the Polish government, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow made a statement to V. Molotov, which was a response to the proposal of the Soviet government: “Poland does not consider it possible to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR...”. On August 18, when less than two weeks remained before the attack on Poland, the British and French ambassadors in Warsaw asked Polish Foreign Minister Beck for an answer regarding the passage of Soviet troops and joint military operations. Beck told the ambassadors that Soviet troops “have no military value” and that he “didn’t want to hear about it anymore.” The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, Field Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly, in a conversation with the French ambassador, said with military directness that Poland has always considered Russia, no matter who rules there, as its “enemy number one.” “And if the German remains our enemy, he is still at the same time a European and a man of order, while the Russians for the Poles are a barbaric, Asian, destructive and corrupting force, any contact with which will turn into evil, and any compromise will turn into suicide.” .
In two weeks, the Poles will meet German Europeans on the battlefield, who will establish German “order” in Poland.
While the British and French representatives created the appearance of negotiations, the Soviet government received reliable information about the actual attitude of the British government towards the Moscow negotiations. So, on August 3, when the British delegation was still packing its bags, the Soviet government learned that in government circles “the power of the Red Army is regarded low and that England’s war against Germany can be easily won.” Therefore, there is no particular need for England to conclude an agreement with the USSR and negotiations with it should be delayed until November and then interrupted. The secret instruction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the British delegation at the negotiations in Moscow also became known. Clause 15 reads: “The British Government does not wish to undertake detailed obligations that could tie its hands under any circumstances. Therefore, an attempt should be made to limit the military agreement to as general terms as possible.”
On August 21, due to the lack of a response from their governments, Admiral Drake asked to announce a break in the work of the delegations until they received answers about the passage of Soviet troops. There was no response from the British government. Therefore, the Soviet delegation expressed its regret at the lack of response and believes that responsibility for the prolongation of the negotiations and their interruption falls on the British and French sides.
During the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, London made attempts to come to an agreement with Germany on all major international issues. Negotiations with Chamberlain were to be conducted by Goering, and on August 23, a Lockheed A-12 plane from the British special services had already arrived at one of the German airfields for the “eminent guest.” However, due to the USSR's agreement to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow, Hitler canceled Goering's agreed visit to London.
The Soviet government's knowledge of Anglo-German behind-the-scenes negotiations was one of the most important factors in deciding to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany. J. Stalin was not so afraid of aggression from Germany as he was of a conspiracy between Germany and England and a new Munich at the expense of Poland.
The Moscow Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow forced Hitler to intensify his eastern policy. He demanded that Ribbentrop take measures to probe the USSR's position on the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact. Ribbentrop first made such a proposal to Astakhov on August 3. But the Soviet government rejected it, awaiting the arrival of the Anglo-French delegation and the results of the negotiations. Following Hitler's instructions, Ribbentrop again, through Astakhov and the German Ambassador to the USSR Schulenburg, returns to this issue, declaring that England is trying to push the USSR into a war with Germany.
On August 14, when the Soviet delegation at negotiations with Western countries came to the conclusion that the negotiations were reaching a dead end, a telegram was sent from Ribbentrop to V. Molotov, which stated that he was ready to go to Moscow to meet with Stalin and solve all problems in space between the Baltic and Black Seas. On August 16, V. Molotov responded to Ribbentrop about the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact, and Ribbentrop announced his readiness to arrive in Moscow any day after August 18 to sign a non-aggression pact and guarantees to the Baltic republics.
Let us note in this regard the lack of results in the negotiations with the Anglo-French delegation, including their reluctance to guarantee the independence of the Baltic countries in the face of possible German aggression.
The negotiation process with Germany was entering the home stretch. On August 19, Germany signed an economic agreement beneficial for the USSR as one of the conditions for the normalization of German-Soviet relations, and the Soviet government agreed to Ribbentrop’s visit to Moscow on August 26-27. But Hitler personally intervened in the negotiation process. On August 21, he sent a telegram to Stalin saying that a crisis could break out in relations between Germany and Poland every day, in which the USSR would be involved. “Therefore,” Hitler concluded, “I once again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, or at the latest on Wednesday, August 23.”
After K. Voroshilov's report to I. Stalin about the lack of response from Western governments in the negotiations, I. Stalin informed Hitler of his agreement to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 22. At the same time, the Soviet government was forced to take into account the available information about the upcoming German attack on Poland on August 26 with the subsequent advance of German troops into the Baltic republics, which already posed a direct threat to the security of the USSR.
Thus, the Soviet government had two alternatives: to sign the non-aggression pact proposed by Germany and thereby exclude possible cooperation of Germany with England and France against the USSR, or to remain in conditions of complete international isolation before Germany attacked Poland, its inevitable defeat and the exit of German troops to western border of the USSR.
Having weighed the position of Western countries and the fierce battles at Khalkhin Gol, the Soviet government, in the interests of the security of its country, was forced to agree to the arrival of Ribbentrop and the signing of a non-aggression pact and protocols. These documents are more often referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
A military-political assessment of the pact today, when many events that occurred after its signing are known, shows that it provided the USSR with a number of serious political and military advantages, which played an important role in the first unfavorable months of the Great Patriotic War for the Red Army.
Firstly, thanks to the pact, the Red Army was able to advance the front line of defense of the vital political and economic centers of the USSR hundreds of kilometers to the West. Germany was forced to renounce its claims to the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia and agree to the inclusion of Finland in the sphere of interests of the USSR.
Secondly, the pact allowed us to gain almost two years to prepare the country to repel German aggression in 1941.
Thirdly, the threat of a Japanese attack was eliminated.
Fourthly, Western countries failed to create an Anglo-Franco-German alliance directed against the USSR.
Fifthly, the pact allowed the USSR to restore historical territory Russian Empire and placed the USSR among the great world powers.
The assessment of the pact by political and military leaders and contemporaries of those years is of undoubted interest.
I. Stalin: “If we had not come out to meet the Germans in 1939, they would have occupied all of Poland up to the border. We could not defend Poland because it did not want to deal with us.”
W. Churchill: “In favor of the Soviets, it can be said that it was vitally necessary for the Soviet Union to push the starting positions of the German armies as far west as possible in order to gather forces from all corners of their huge country. If their policy was coldly calculating, then it was at that moment highly realistic."
Hitler: “Indeed, the Reich government, having concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia, significantly changed its policy towards the USSR... Moreover, it pacified Poland, which means, at the cost of German blood, it contributed to the Soviet Union achieving the greatest foreign policy success during its entire existence.” .
G. Zhukov: “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government proceeded from the fact that the pact did not relieve the USSR from the threat fascist aggression, but made it possible to use time in the interests of strengthening our defense, and prevented the creation of a united anti-Soviet front."
The Chief of the German General Staff, Halder, upon learning of the signing of the pact, said: “A day of shame for the German political leadership.”
The head of German military intelligence and counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris: “The Reich has embraced the citadel of communism, forever quarreled with all of Europe, and for this he will be an appendage of the vast Asian Russia, and Hitler will be the satrap of the Kremlin tsar.”
Not all politicians and historians agree with the positive assessment of the pact. Moreover, the attitude towards the pact became a kind of watershed between supporters of strengthening the national security of the Soviet Union on the basis of active foreign policy actions, as was the case in 1939, and supporters of the Western line aimed at weakening the Soviet Union. The Western movement is initiated and receives political and financial support from Western politicians, influential anti-Russian circles, Western media and finds support from some leading domestic political figures, historians, and the media.
On June 2, 1989, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union instructed A. Yakovlev's commission to give "a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23, 1939." At the Second Congress, A. Yakovlev submitted a commission report to the congress for approval, which was approved by the congress in the following wording: “Clause 5. The congress states that the protocols signed with Germany in 1939-1941, both in the method of their preparation and in content are a departure from the Leninist principles of the Soviet foreign policy. The delimitation of the “spheres of interest” of the USSR and Germany and other actions taken in them were, from a legal point of view, in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of third countries.” The resolution was adopted unanimously.
If we leave moral assessments aside and take a legal point of view, it should be emphasized that, according to international law, it is possible to recognize an international treaty as illegal or invalid only if the treaty was the result of violence against the state that signed it. As is known, nothing like this happened with the participants in the pact between Germany and the USSR. In addition, the text of the pact did not contain any requirements for territorial or political changes addressed to third countries, as was the case in the Munich agreements of 1938.
As we see, criticism of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, begun by the “architects of perestroika” M. Gorbachev and A. Yakovlev, served as the beginning of a revision of the history of the USSR in order to highlight international events of the past in accordance with anti-Soviet historiography under the dictation of Western politicians and ideologists. The first step towards the collapse of the Soviet Union was the justification for the withdrawal of the Baltic republics, which, in accordance with the pact, were “occupied by the USSR.” Not only the results of the diplomatic victory of the USSR in August 1939 were presented, but also the results of Russian history over the past three hundred years.
Critics of the pact argue that it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that pushed Germany to attack Poland and thereby triggered World War II. There is an opinion that without the signing of a pact between Germany and the USSR, World War II might not have started.
Such statements do not correspond to historical facts. Back on April 3, 1939, Hitler ordered the German command to prepare a plan for the military defeat of Poland. On April 11, the plan was prepared under the code name "Weiss" and reported to Hitler. On April 28, Germany broke the non-aggression pact with Poland and the German General Staff began final stage development of operational documents. On June 15, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Brauchitsch, signed a directive to attack Poland, and on June 22, Hitler approved the Weiss plan.
On August 22, Hitler gave the last orders to the leadership of the Armed Forces: “First of all,” he said, “Poland will be defeated. The goal is the destruction of manpower... If war even breaks out in the West, we will first of all deal with the defeat of Poland.” Hitler gave these orders at a time when Ribbentrop had not yet arrived in Moscow.
By August 26, the first date for the attack on Poland, all German military preparations were completed and whether the pact was signed or not, the attack on Poland was predetermined and the Wehrmacht did not need Soviet help to defeat the Polish Armed Forces.
The war with Poland began on September 1, 1939 with massive air strikes and attacks by ground forces.
Foreign and some domestic historians consider September 1 to be the day the Second World War began. If you follow the facts, and not political and ideological predilections, the German-Polish war began on September 1. On September 3, England and France declared war on Germany, but beyond the formal declaration of war, no specific actions were taken in accordance with political and military agreements with Poland. At a time when German troops were wreaking death and destruction in fighting Poland, England and France fought a war “without military action,” a “strange war” as it went down in history, and tried to avoid any military action against Germany.
Not a single shot was fired on the German-French border, not a single French or English aircraft took off to support the Polish Air Force in Polish airspace or carry out air strikes on military targets on German territory, not a single English or French ship came to assistance to the Polish Navy. France and England stood idle during the weeks when the German war machine destroyed Polish troops and civilians. Poland was thrown by its allies under the tracks of German tanks.
The Soviet government closely monitored the development of the German-Polish military conflict and the approaching complete defeat of the Polish troops and Polish statehood. At the same time, the leadership of the USSR could not ignore that historical fact that the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus were not Polish territories that were torn away from Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus in 1920, as a result of the Soviet-Polish war, which was unsuccessful for Soviet Russia, they were forcibly annexed to Poland, which was ethnically alien to them.
Thus, 8 million Ukrainians and 3 million Belarusians could have been under German occupation. In addition, by September 15, the military defeat of Poland and the ability of the German army to as soon as possible There was no doubt about completing the occupation of all Polish territory and reaching the approaches to Kyiv and Minsk.
Having information that the Polish government had lost control of the country and left Polish territory, the Soviet government on September 17, 1939 ordered the High Command of the Red Army to cross the Soviet-Polish border and take under protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, in this In the military-political situation, the Red Army entered Poland not on the side of Germany as its ally, but as an independent third force, acting in the interests of the security of the USSR from possible attacks from the West and the protection of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus from German occupation.
According to the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” concluded in Moscow on September 28, 1939, the demarcation between the USSR and Germany took place approximately along the so-called “Curzon Line,” defined by the Entente in 1919 as the eastern border of Poland. Former Prime Minister Great Britain during the First World War, Lloyd George wrote in the fall of 1939 that the USSR occupied “...territories that are not Polish and which were taken by force by Poland after the First World War... It would be an act of criminal madness to put the Russian advance on one board with the promotion of Germany."
After the destruction of Poland, the Western powers still hoped that the next victim of Hitler's aggression would be the USSR and continued to adhere to the strategy of a “strange war,” as if giving Hitler the “green light” to move to the east and guaranteeing peace in the west. The intensity of the fighting on the Western Front, more precisely on the western border of Germany, since there was no front, can be judged by German data on their losses for almost 8 months: 196 people killed and 356 people wounded. This is, at best, a local border conflict, but nothing like World War II. The “Strange War” confirmed the correctness of the Soviet government’s assessment of the position of England and France - they did not want to fight Germany, but still wanted to involve it in a war with the USSR.
The “Phantom War” ended on April 9, 1940 with the German attack on Denmark and Norway, and it was from this date that the Second World War began. Let us just note that in in this case The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did not play any role and all accusations against the USSR that the USSR was to blame for the outbreak of World War II together with Germany are unfounded and have one goal - to justify Munich, the policy of “appeasement” and remove the blame from Western countries for supporting aggressive policies of Hitler's Germany, which ultimately led to the Second World War, and to use the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to discredit the foreign policy of the USSR in the ongoing anti-Soviet campaign.
To confirm this interpretation of international events of 1939-1940. In the West and in Russia, books are published in large print runs, articles by historians and political figures are published, and serial films are released on television. There is an information war for the minds and hearts of people in a new international situation, characterized by the US struggle for world domination and the associated information attack on our country in order to prevent the revival of a strong Russia.
The words of the poem “Hearts” by the poet Vasily Fedorov, written by him almost 50 years ago, involuntarily come to mind, but these lines still sound modern today:
Having experienced everything,
We know ourselves
What on days of psychic attacks
Hearts not occupied by us
Without hesitation, our enemy will occupy
He will borrow, settling the same scores,
He will occupy, he will sit down,
They broke us...
Hearts!
Yes, these are heights,
Which cannot be given away.
In conclusion of the article, it is necessary to emphasize once again, although it follows from the text, that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did not provide for cooperation between Germany and the USSR in the defeat of Poland, the pact was not the cause of the “freak war” between Germany, England and France, the pact had nothing to do with to the German attack on Denmark and Norway and, therefore, was not the cause of World War II. These are the facts of history that refute the accusations against the USSR that have been current for many years and repeated year after year in the anti-Soviet, anti-Russian campaign against the USSR for starting World War II together with Germany.
(1938-1939)
THE POLICY OF “PACIFICATION” OF THE FASCIST AGGRESSORS CONDUCTED BY THE WESTERN POWERS
Despite the growing danger of German and Japanese aggression, the ruling circles of England, France and the USA tried to use Germany and Japan to fight against the Soviet Union. They wanted to destroy or at least significantly weaken the USSR with the help of the Germans and Japanese and undermine its ever-increasing influence. This was precisely one of the main reasons that determined the policy of “appeasement” of the fascist aggressors by the ruling circles of the Western powers. The reactionary governments of England and France, with the support of the United States, tried to come to terms with Nazi Germany at the expense of the USSR, as well as states Southeast Europe. England was the most active in this regard.
The British government sought to conclude a bilateral Anglo-German agreement. To do this, it was ready to provide Germany with long-term loans and agree on the delimitation of spheres of influence and sales markets. For this purpose, a sounding was made on the instructions of the British Foreign Office by the English industrialist Rickens on February 9, 1937. In a conversation with von Papen, Rickens announced the possibility of providing Germany with a large loan with a low interest rate for a period of 40 years 1 . England would also agree to a customs union between Germany and Austria. The question of such a union, Rickens said, “while maintaining Austrian autonomy should be assessed in the most positive way” 2 .
The course towards collusion with Hitler became especially intensified in England after the government of N. Chamberlain came to power. In November 1937, the British Prime Minister sent his closest collaborator, Lord Halifax, to Germany. Recording of Galya's conversation
1 IDA USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Recording of the conversation between the German Ambassador to Austria Papen and the English industrialist Rickens on February 9, 1937 (partially published in the journal: History of the USSR, 1962, No. 3, pp. 5-6).
fax with Hitler in Obersalzberg on November 19, 1937 3 indicates that the Chamberlain government was ready to provide fascist Germany“free hands in Eastern Europe”, but on the condition that Germany promises to reshape political map Europe in its favor “peacefully” and gradually. This meant that Hitler would undertake to coordinate with England his aggressive plans regarding Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig 4 .
Soon after this conversation between Halifax and Hitler, the British government invited the French Prime Minister Chautan and Foreign Minister Delbos to London. The latter stated that the support that France considers due to Czechoslovakia under the Mutual Assistance Pact goes far beyond what is approved in England. Thus, the Chamberlain government began to put pressure on France to abandon its obligations under the mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia 5 . In London, not without reason, it was believed that the mutual assistance pacts that Czechoslovakia had with France and the USSR strengthened its international position and therefore the Chamberlain government pursued a policy aimed at undermining these pacts.
Speaking at a government meeting at the end of January 1938, Henderson bluntly stated that “Czechoslovakia will need to get rid of its agreement with Soviet Russia” 6 .
The policy of connivance and complicity with Hitler's aggression in Europe was aimed not only at “pacifying” Hitler and directing the aggression of Nazi Germany to the East, but also at achieving the isolation of the Soviet Union.
At the end of April 1937, Henderson, one of the most active supporters of the agreement with Nazi Germany, was appointed British ambassador in Berlin. His appointment was new evidence of the British government's persistent desire to make a deal with Hitler. This is confirmed by A. Ideas in his memoirs 7.
GERMANY'S CAPTURE OF AUSTRIA. THE USSR'S STRUGGLE FOR COLLECTIVE RESPONSE TO AGGRESSORS
On January 26, 1938, Hitler's Foreign Minister Neurath told the new British ambassador that Germany would not allow England to interfere in the settlement of its relations with Austria 8 . The Chamberlain government did not respond to this
3 Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. M., 1948, vol. 1, p. 10-48.
6 PRO, Cab. 27/623, p. 41.
7 The Eden Memoirs. The Reckoning. London, 1965, p. 447.
8 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Ser. D. Washington, 1949, vol. 1, p. 190 (hereinafter referred to as DGFP).
a frequent statement by the Nazis. A new aggressive action by Germany soon followed: And in February, the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was summoned to see Hitler. The head of the Austrian government was presented with demands in the form of an ultimatum, the implementation of which would reduce Austria to the position of one of the regions of the Reich. However, this step of the aggressor did not cause protest from the governments of England and France. After this, Hitler became completely insolent. On February 20, he publicly announced his intention to decide the fate of 10 million Germans living in Austria and Czechoslovakia and to seek “the unification of the entire German people.”
In his speech on February 28, Chamberlain hypocritically stated regarding Hitler's demands on Austria that in this case he did not see any violations of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, although it contained guarantees of Austrian independence. Chamberlain made a similar statement at a meeting of the House of Commons on March 2.
It gradually became more and more clear that the Chamberlain government set as its main goal in the field of foreign policy the achievement of mutual understanding and agreement with the fascist powers and, above all, with Nazi Germany. Describing this policy of the British government, the Soviet plenipotentiary in London reported to Moscow on March 8, 1938: “Chamberlain has staked both his reputation and the fate of his office on one card - the card of a deal with the aggressor” 9 .
The US government also showed no interest in the fate of Austria. Characterizing this attitude, the USSR plenipotentiary representative in Washington Troyanovsky wrote to the People's Commissar in Moscow on March 2, 1938: “The fate of Austria does not cause much concern here. Isolationists of all persuasions are generally ready to reconcile themselves with all the fascist takeovers, as long as America does not begin to actively participate in international affairs, does not enter into any agreement with England, and does not run the risk of participating in the war.”10
Hitler felt even calmer when he received a message from Chamberlain through Henderson on March 3, which contained proposals for the settlement of Germany’s colonial claims 11 . Now Hitler had no doubts about England's position, and he immediately began to implement his plan to seize Austria.
While the Anschluss was being carried out, Ribbentrop was in London, where he met with many officials, including Foreign Minister Halifax. After a meeting with him on March 11, Ribbentrop, in his report to
9 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939. M., 1979, p. 42.
10 Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1977, t. 21, p. 109.
11 Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. M., 1948, vol. 2, p. 173.
Berlin confirmed that no serious obstacles should be expected from England in implementing the Anschluss of Austria. He wrote: “I am fundamentally convinced that England, for its part, will not do anything against this at the present time and will have a restraining influence on other powers” 12. On March 12, German troops entered its borders, and a day later Austria was included in the German Reich.
The Soviet government clearly understood the great danger to the cause of peace in Europe that the seizure of Austria by Germany brought with it. This, in particular, is evidenced by the letter of the NKID to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated March 14, 1938. “The seizure of Austria,” this letter says, “seems greatest event after the world war, fraught greatest dangers and not least for our Union” 13.
The Soviet Union strongly condemned Hitler's aggression against Austria. In a statement to representatives of the press, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Soviet government, noted that “this time violence was committed in the center of Europe, creating an undoubted danger not only for the 11 countries now bordering the aggressor, but for all European countries, and not only European ones."
The Soviet government emphasized that first of all there was a danger for Czechoslovakia, and then it threatened to grow and cause new international conflicts. “The current international situation,” the statement continued, “raises all peace-loving states, and especially the great powers, the question of their responsibility for further destinies the peoples of Europe, and not only Europe.”
The Soviet Union declared its readiness “to participate in collective actions that would be decided jointly with it and that would have the goal of suspending further development aggression and eliminating the increasing danger of a new world massacre.” The Soviet government agreed to “enter immediately into discussions with other powers in the League of Nations or outside of it as practical measures dictated by circumstances. “Tomorrow may be too late,” the statement indicated, “but today the time for this has not yet passed if all states, especially the great powers, take a firm, unequivocal position regarding the problem of collective salvation of the world” 14.
On the same day, the text of this statement was sent to the governments of Great Britain, France, the USA and Czechoslovakia. However, the United States did not respond, and England and France rejected the Soviet proposals. In his official response dated March 24
12 DGFP, Ser. D. vol. I, p. 263.
14 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 60.
1938 Great Britain expressly refused any negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to creating a united front against the fascist aggressors on the pretext that the adoption of “concerted action against aggression would not necessarily have, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, a favorable effect on the prospects of European peace.” . France also reacted negatively to the Soviet proposal. All this confirmed that the governments of England and France did not want to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressor, although, as MacMillan admits in his memoirs, “after Austria it was clear that Czechoslovakia was next on the list of victims” 15.
THE USSR'S FIGHT IN DEFENSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AGAINST FASCIST AGGRESSION AND MUNICH POLICY OF THE WESTERN POWERS
Having barely finished with Austria, the Nazi government began preparing the seizure of Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet government considered it necessary to protect Czechoslovakia. In the critical months of 1938, when the fate of Czechoslovakia and its peoples was being decided, only the Soviet Union showed itself to be its true friend.
Even before the crisis in German-Czechoslovak relations arose, on March 15, 1938, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.P. Potemkin in a conversation with the Czechoslovak envoy to the USSR Z. Fierlinger regarding possible consequences The Anschluss confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the mutual assistance pact in the event that it was attacked by a Nazi aggressor. “As for the Soviet Union,” he assured the Czechoslovak envoy, “no one has ever been able to reproach it for evading the international obligations it has assumed” 16. On the same day, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs confirmed this statement at a meeting with American correspondents. “When asked by American journalists what the USSR intended to do in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia,” Fierlinger reported, “Litvinov said yesterday that, of course, the USSR would fulfill its allied obligations” 17 .
Some time later, on March 28, 1938, the Soviet military delegation, which was at that time in Czechoslovakia, in turn confirmed to the chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army that the USSR would provide assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack on it 18. In April, the Soviet government decided, together with France and Czechoslovakia, to take all measures to ensure
15 Macmillan H. Windy Change. 1914-1939. New York, 1966, p. 491.
16 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 54.
17 Ibid., p. 57.
18 Ibid., p. 76.
As the USSR embassy in Paris reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in July 1938, “French politicians understand perfectly well that the fate of the post-Versailles redistribution of the world is now being decided in Czechoslovakia. They are aware that the fall of the Sudetenland to Germany and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia will ensure Germany’s seizure of decisive strategic positions in a future war and a hegemonic position throughout Central Europe.” The vast majority of French people agree that present-day France is no longer capable of withstanding a single combat with Nazi Germany. France's natural ally is the USSR. “And yet - and this is an indisputable fact - the current government is least of all building its Czechoslovak policy with the expectation of help from the USSR. Not a single decision that has so far been taken on the Czechoslovak issue... has ever been discussed or agreed upon with us in advance and was brought to our attention (and even then not always) only after the fact. Despite the existence of the Soviet-French pact, the presence of parallel pacts with Czechoslovakia... the leaders of French foreign policy never seriously (except for Bonnet’s fragmentary conversations) suggested starting
19 Ibid., p. 87.
20 Kalinin M. I. About the international situation. M., 1938, p. 14
joint and practical discussion of the issue arising from our pacts" 21.
This position of the French government was determined to a large extent by the ever-increasing pressure of the Chamberlain government, which was pursuing a policy of “pacifying” Nazi Germany at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the Soviet government then decided to draw the attention of the Chamberlain government to the destructiveness of its policy towards Czechoslovakia. To this end, it instructed its plenipotentiary to visit Halifax and make a corresponding statement to him. On August 17, the plenipotentiary met with Halifax and told him that the Soviet Union was “increasingly disillusioned with the policies of England and France, that he considers this policy weak and short-sighted, capable only of encouraging the aggressor to make further “leaps,” and that thereby the Western countries bear the burden of responsibility for approaching and unleashing a new world war.” All actions of England and France in connection with the threat to Czechoslovakia from Germany “essentially boil down to attempts to curb not the aggressor, but the victim of aggression” 22 .
This danger of Chamberlain's policy was also seen by many of Chamberlain's political friends - influential politicians of the Conservative Party, including Macmillan. In this regard, he writes: “I was firmly convinced that the only hope of avoiding war, now or later, was a bold and firm policy with the help of which Hitler could be stopped” 23.
It was precisely this policy of repelling the aggressor that the Soviet Union pursued. In contrast to London and Paris, who tried to come to terms with fascist Reich, The Soviet government clearly and definitely declared to the Hitler government that the USSR would fulfill its allied obligations to Czechoslovakia 24 .
On August 22, 1938, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs told the German Ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg that “the Czechoslovak people as one person will fight for their independence, that France, in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, will oppose Germany, that England, whether Chamberlain wants it or not, will not will be able to leave France without help and that we will also fulfill our obligations to Czechoslovakia." These words were calculated to deter the Nazis, forcing them to think about the consequences of their aggressive actions.
The People's Commissar directly stated to Schulenburg that “Germany is not so much concerned about the fate of the Sudeten Germans as it is striving for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia as a whole. She wants to take over this country."
21 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 152-153.
22 Ibid., p. 171.
23 Macmillan H. Op. cit., p. 549-550.
24 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 175.
If it comes to war, the People's Commissar continued, the Soviet Union, which promised Czechoslovakia support, “will keep its word and do everything in its power” 25 .
On September 1, the French government for the first time officially addressed the Soviet government with a request whether the USSR could provide assistance to Czechoslovakia and what kind of assistance if Poland and Romania objected to the passage of Soviet troops through their territory (the Soviet Union, as is known, at that time did not have common border with neither Germany nor Czechoslovakia). In response to this question, the Soviet government on September 2 confirmed its intention to fulfill its treaty obligations and proposed to take the necessary measures to influence Poland and Romania through an appropriate decision of the League of Nations. At the same time, it was again proposed to convene a meeting of representatives of the Soviet, French and Czechoslovak armies, as well as a meeting of all states interested in maintaining peace. “We believe,” the People’s Commissar told the French charge d’affaires, “that at the moment such a meeting with the participation of England, France and the USSR and the issuance of a common declaration, which will undoubtedly receive moral support from Roosevelt, has a better chance of keeping Hitler from military adventures than any other measures" 26 .
Regarding Soviet assistance, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Crofta told the American envoy in Prague Kerr on September 18 that while the situation was such that the initiative should come from France, “but they were privately given to know that in case of emergency the USSR could come to the aid of Czechoslovakia independently from France" 27.
On September 19, shortly after receiving the Anglo-French demands, Benes personally addressed the Soviet government through the plenipotentiary with the following questions: 1. Will the USSR, according to the agreement, provide immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia if France remains faithful and also provides assistance? 2. Will the Soviet Union help Czechoslovakia as a member of the League of Nations on the basis of Articles 16 and 17, which provided for military sanctions against the aggressor in the event of an attack by Germany? 28
On September 20, 1938, the Soviet government gave a positive answer to Benes's questions in the clearest and clearest form. Deputy People's Commissar V.P. Potemkin instructed the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Czechoslovakia S.S. Aleksandrovsky to inform E. Benes the answer to the first question, “whether the USSR, according to the agreement, will provide immediate and effective assistance to Czechoslovakia?”
26 Ibid., p. 188.
27 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938. Washington, 1955, vol. 1, p. 615.
28 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 232.
Slovakia, if France remains faithful to it and also provides assistance, you can give an affirmative answer on behalf of the government of the Soviet Union.
You can give the same affirmative answer to another question from Benes, whether the USSR will help Czechoslovakia, as a member of the League of Nations, on the basis of Art. 16 and 17, if in the event of an attack by Germany, Benes appeals to the Council of the League of Nations with a request for the application of the mentioned articles” 29. This meant that the USSR would provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France, provided that Czechoslovakia itself would defend itself and ask for its help.
On September 21, the Soviet representative stated at the plenum of the Council of the League of Nations about the need for urgent measures to support Czechoslovakia. He demanded that the issue of German aggression be raised in the League of Nations, reaffirmed the USSR’s readiness to fulfill its obligations and participate in a military meeting of three states, as well as the need to convene a meeting of the European great powers and other interested states “to develop a collective demarche” 30. On September 23, at the Political Committee of the League of the USSR, he again confirmed that he was ready to fulfill his obligations.
In a conversation with Fierlinger on September 22, 1938, Potemkin answered positively to the envoy’s question about “could the USSR government, in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, provide assistance to the latter without waiting for the decision of the Council of the League of Nations.” He stated the following: “I answered this question with reference to Art. 1 of the Protocol for the signing of the Soviet-Czech Treaty on Mutual Assistance, providing for the provision of this assistance by the parties in cases where, for one reason or another, the League Council does not make the recommendation they require or does not come to a unanimous decision” 31.
Thus, the Czechoslovak government could not doubt that the USSR would fulfill its obligations under the pact with Czechoslovakia - it would provide it with military assistance in the event of a German attack. The Soviet Union did not limit itself to statements. He moved 30 rifle divisions to his western border and put aviation and tank units on alert. Only in two military districts - Belorussian and Kiev - 246 bombers and 302 fighters were concentrated.
This was also reported to Paris. Therefore, on September 8, 1938, when the US Ambassador in Paris Bullitt asked Bonnet whether the information that “the Russians are concentrating large military forces on the border with Romania” was correct, Bonnet confirmed the correctness of this information 32 . September 23 Soviet government
29 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 240.
30 Ibid., p. 261.
31 Ibid., p. 264.
32 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, vol. 1, p. 583.
The government warned the reactionary government of Poland, which was looking for a deal with Hitler for the sake of participation in the division of Czechoslovakia, that if Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia, the USSR would consider this an act of aggression and would denounce without further warning the non-aggression pact with Poland of July 25, 1932 city 33
Continuing its struggle to preserve peace, on September 28, 1938, the Soviet government declared that “it sees the most effective means of preventing further aggression and preventing a new world war in the immediate convening of an international conference” 34 .
So, at all stages of the Czechoslovak tragedy that ended in Munich, the Soviet Union was ready to fulfill its treaty obligations. Moreover, he agreed to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia even without the participation of France, on the only condition that Czechoslovakia itself would resist the aggressor and ask for Soviet help. This fact was even recognized by Benes in 1939 in a conversation with the daughter of T. Mann. Absolutely clear and convincing evidence on this issue is available in the article by K. Gottwald, published on December 21, 1949 in the newspaper “For lasting peace, for people's democracy." Other Czechoslovak figures also highly appreciated the position of the USSR and its desire to assist Czechoslovakia throughout the Czechoslovak crisis. The editor-in-chief of the Prager Press newspaper, Laurin, in a conversation with the USSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Prague S. S. Aleksandrovsky on July 29, 1938, noted that Foreign Minister Croft “spoke in warm terms about the restrained and worthy position of the USSR, which is extremely helping Czechoslovakia in its struggle against general pressure" 35. On October 15, 1938, an employee of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cermak, stated that “the behavior of the USSR was impeccable and its voice should have been listened to more carefully... Not a single honest Czechoslovak can blame the USSR and will always be only grateful to it for its good will and willingness to provide assistance Czechoslovakia" 36.
Unfortunately for Czechoslovakia, the Western powers did not support the Soviet Union's efforts to save Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, they sold it to Nazi Germany.
The British government used German claims to Czechoslovak lands for its own selfish purposes - for secret negotiations on the conclusion of an Anglo-German agreement that would guarantee the security of England and the inviolability of
33 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 269.
34 Ibid., p. 311.
35 WUA USSR. Recording of a conversation between the USSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Czechoslovakia and the editor-in-chief of the Prager Press newspaper Laurin on July 29, 1938.
36 WUA USSR. Recording of a conversation between the USSR Plenipotentiary Representative in Czechoslovakia and an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Cermak, on October 15, 1938.
the newness of her colonial possessions. At the same time, the intention was to pay Hitler by handing over Czechoslovakia to him.
Chamberlain, Halifax and G. Wilson (Chamberlain's closest adviser on economic issues) took part in these negotiations on the English side, and on the German side - Dirksen, Cordt (adviser to the German embassy in London) and others. At the same time, the English side indicated that a solution to the Czechoslovak problem could to be achieved by the Germans only with the consent of England. The British government made it clear that it objected to unilateral German seizures not sanctioned by it. The Chamberlain government conditioned its consent to these German conquests on the conclusion of an Anglo-German agreement, according to which it wanted to receive firm guarantees from Germany that Hitler, after satisfying its aggressive plans in Central and Eastern Europe, would not act against Great Britain.
Kordt emphasized in his letter to Dirksen dated August 11, 1938 that the British government would agree to meet German demands only if Hitler agreed to conclude a broad agreement with England. “The British,” Kordt wrote, “consider any further strengthening of Germany’s power, which occurs without their approval or even against their will, as a threat to themselves” 37. “They see this as a threat to the British world empire,” Kordt further wrote, “since accession is not accompanied by guarantees that would exclude the possibility of using all the forces of this colossal Central European space under German leadership against the British Empire. They consider this opportunity the greatest danger imaginable” 38.
According to Kordt, Wilson said that if England and Germany managed to come to an agreement, then the Czechoslovak problem could be resolved even despite the resistance of Czechoslovakia and France. In his letter to Dirksen dated September 1, 1938, Cordt quotes the following words from Wilson: “If the two of us - Great Britain and Germany - agree on a settlement of the Czech problem, then we will simply eliminate the resistance that France and Czechoslovakia itself might have to this solution of the issue” 39 .
Previously secret archival documents from the British Foreign Office, which have recently become available to researchers, make it possible to make significant additions to the picture of the preparation of the Munich Agreement, which Chamberlain and his closest
37 IDA USSR MFA. Letter from the Counselor of the German Embassy in London, Kordt, to Ambassador Dirksen, dated August 1938.
39 Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War, v. 2, p. 48.
advisors were keeping a deep secret long before this deal was made. The now unveiled "Plan Z", the plan to hand over Czechoslovakia to Hitler, was developed by Chamberlain, Halifax, J. Simon and S. Hoare. In a secret memorandum from Chamberlain's trusted associate Horace Wilson, dated August 30, 1938, submitted to the British government's Foreign Policy Committee, the plan was reported as follows: “There is a plan that can be called “Plan Z” and which is known and should be known only to the Prime Minister. -the Minister, the Minister of Finance (Sir John Simon), the Foreign Secretary (Lord Halifax), Sir Neville Henderson (British Ambassador in Berlin) and myself" 40. This plan is also mentioned in the secret memoranda of G. Wilson dated August 31 and September 9, 1938. “The success of the plan,” he writes, “if it is carried out, depends on its complete surprise and therefore it is extremely important that nothing is said about it " N. Chamberlain informed other government ministers about this plan only on September 14, 1938, when, according to “Plan Z,” the issue of a meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler in Berchtesgaden, scheduled for September 15, 1938, had already been agreed upon. “The main bait for Hitler in the proposed negotiations “,” it was noted at a meeting of the internal cabinet, “it should be possible to ensure better relations between Germany and England” 41.
Its essence boiled down to the following: the English Prime Minister was waiting until fascist Germany created a very tense situation around Czechoslovakia, so that, under the guise of “saving the world,” he would personally come to Hitler for negotiations on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. As a result of this visit, Chamberlain hoped to reach an understanding with Hitler, which was to become the basis for achieving a broad Anglo-German agreement. That is why the Chamberlain government throughout the summer of 1938 put enormous pressure on the Benes government, seeking from it complete capitulation to Hitler. This is confirmed by Benes himself in his memoirs “Days of Munich”. “The English Ambassador Sir Basil Newton,” writes Benes, “warned me that in the event of war the Czechoslovak Republic would find itself in a position worthy of regret..., and added a warning from the British government: it is more than doubtful, they say, that even in the event of a victorious end to the war it would be possible to restore Czechoslovakia to the size it currently has."
Characterizing the British secret documents concerning the Munich deal that have become available, such a bourgeois
41 Ibid.; Ovsyanyi I. D. The mystery in which the war was born. 2nd ed., M., 1975, p. 204-214
the newspaper, like the Guardian, concluded that “the main goal of the British government was to assist Hitler in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia” and that N. Chamberlain “personally took steps to hide this fact from Parliament” 42.
On September 15, 1938, the prime minister flew to Germany, to Berchtesgaden, where Hitler’s residence was located. During the meeting, the leader of the German fascists stated that the western and northwestern regions of Czechoslovakia should be torn away from it and transferred to Germany. Chamberlain, acting in accordance with Plan Z, agreed to the separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and its transfer to Nazi Germany.
Then the British prime minister returned to London, where on September 18, 1938, together with the French ministers, he formulated the terms of the Anglo-French ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. England and France insisted that Czechoslovakia agree to satisfy Hitler's demands, that is, give him border areas and terminate the mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. The next day, September 19, the ultimatum was handed to the Czechoslovak government.
The Anglo-French ultimatum caused an explosion of indignation among the people of Czechoslovakia. On September 22, a general strike began in the country, which took place under the slogans: do not recall Czechoslovak troops from the borders, declare general mobilization, block the road to German troops in the Sudetenland. Crowded demonstrations took place throughout Czechoslovakia. The demonstrators sent their delegations to the Soviet embassy in Prague. On the night of September 22, the Soviet plenipotentiary received delegations even at 4 am. The plenipotentiary representative assured the delegates that “the USSR values the Czechoslovak Republic and the interests of its workers, and therefore is ready to help defend against attack. The path to providing assistance is complicated by the refusal of France, but the USSR is looking for ways and will find them if Czechoslovakia is attacked and forced to defend itself” 43. At this critical moment for the fate of the country, the Czechoslovak communists called on the government to take the path of decisive resistance to the Nazi aggressors, firmly believing that Soviet country will provide Czechoslovakia with the necessary assistance. “We know,” L. I. Brezhnev noted, “that in friendship with the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak working class and its vanguard - the Communist Party - have always seen the path to ensuring lasting independence and freedom of the Czechoslovak state. In the tragic days of Munich, the Czechoslovak communists called on the country to firmly rely on the Soviet Union, which clearly demonstrated its loyalty to its allied duty” 44.
43 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 263.
44 Brezhnev D. I. Lenin's course: Speeches and articles. M., 1973, vol. 3, p. 13.
The readiness of the Soviet Union to fulfill its obligations towards Czechoslovakia is forced to be recognized by Benes in his already mentioned memoirs: “I myself never had any doubt about the actions of the Soviet Union,” he writes. “I was sure that he would fulfill his obligations!”
But the Benes-Goji government remained deaf to this call and did nothing to organize the defense of the country. It was more concerned about how to cover up its capitulatory position. Moreover, it acted not in the interests of the Czechoslovak people, but in the narrow class interests of reactionary circles of the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie. Therefore, it was afraid to call on the people to resist Nazi Germany and did not turn to the USSR for help.
Moreover, the Benes government was preparing for capitulation in deep secrecy. As German Charge d'Affaires in England G. Cordt reported in his telegram to Berlin on August 30, 1938, the Czechoslovak government agreed to accept Henlein's Carlsbad demands and expressed its readiness to “discuss its foreign policy ties with Soviet Russia.”
However, the government did not dare to openly speak about its true position, knowing the patriotic sentiments and extreme excitement of the working people of Czechoslovakia.
On September 21, there was a repeated ultimatum from the British and French governments demanding submission.
So, Benes and Goxha, having taken the path of surrender, did not consider it necessary to seek Soviet help. Hiding behind a new Anglo-French ultimatum, they handed the country over to Hitler. The Munich Conference, convened on September 29, 1938, was intended to give legal formality to this shameful deal with the aggressor. At the conference, Daladier and Chamberlain, without the participation of representatives of Czechoslovakia, signed an agreement with Hitler and Mussolini. This meant betrayal of Czechoslovakia and a death sentence for the Czechoslovak state.
According to the Munich Agreement, Hitler achieved the fulfillment of all his demands that he then presented to Czechoslovakia, that is, the dismemberment of this country and the annexation of the Sudetenland to Germany. The Munich Agreement also provided for the satisfaction of territorial claims in relation to Czechoslovakia on the part of the reactionary governments of Horthy Hungary and “sanation” Poland.
The Munich Agreement contained an obligation for England and France to participate in “international guarantees” of the new Czechoslovak borders, the determination of which was the responsibility of an “international commission”. Hitler, for his part, accepted the obligation to respect the inviolability of the new borders of the Czechoslovak state. As a result of the dismemberment, Czechoslovakia lost almost 1/5 of its territory and about 1/4 of its population,
and the German border began to pass 40 km from Prague. Czechoslovakia lost half of its heavy industry. The Munich Agreement was a cynical betrayal of Czechoslovakia by England and France, for whom Czechoslovakia was only a bargaining chip in a great imperialist game when concluding a deal with Hitler.
The French government abandoned its ally and did not fulfill its allied obligations.
The English diplomat Kirkpatrick, who participated in the Munich conference as part of his country’s delegation, characterizes the French position in his published memoirs as follows: “The French, including Daladier, decided to reach an agreement at any cost. They were a funny group of people who did not feel the least bit of shame about participating in the dismemberment of their ally." 45
After Munich, it became obvious that the obligations given by the then France under the alliance treaties were not worth the paper on which they were written. This applied to both the Franco-Polish alliance and the Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty of 1935. What grounds were there for hoping that the Third Republic would fulfill its obligations after it failed to fulfill them in relation to Czechoslovakia?
When Chamberlain, returning to England from the disgraceful Munich Conference, landed at Croydon airfield, he made a bombastic speech in which he assured that “peace is now assured for a generation.” He quoted Shakespeare's "Henry IV": "From the nettles of danger we will draw the flowers of salvation."
The Soviet newspaper Izvestia then reminded the self-confident and limited English prime minister that immediately after the phrase he quoted from Shakespeare, the following is said: “The undertaking you have undertaken is dangerous. The friends you listed are unreliable, the timing is bad. And your whole plot is too frivolous to outweigh such serious difficulties.”
Events confirmed these words of the great English playwright as applied to the plans of the Munich people.
Not only was the death warrant for the Czechoslovak state signed in Munich. There, an advance was also given to Hitler to further encourage German aggression, subject to preliminary coordination of the actions of the German government with England and France. At the same time, Munich, as noted by the head of the CPSU (b) delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern D. Z. Manuilsky in his speech at the XVIII Party Congress, “... was a conspiracy of reaction against the international working class, against the anti-fascist movement of all countries, against the world
45 The Sunday Times, 1959, May 31, p. 12; Kirkpatrick. The Inner Circle. London, 1959, p. 128.
and freedom of all peoples" 46. But first of all, it was directed against the USSR. This was the essence of Munich. In the Appeal of the Communist Parties of 10 European countries, as well as Canada and the USA, dated October 9, 1938, a real assessment was given of this Munich deal between Chamberlain and Daladier and Hitler. It said: “The Munich betrayal did not save the world, but only endangered it, for it dealt a blow to the alliance of the forces of peace in all countries and encouraged the fascists to aggravate their demands all the more because they now feel supported by the reactionary circles of various countries” 47 .
The prominent English historian Wheeler-Bennett was forced to admit that “the meaning of the Munich Agreement was to destroy Czechoslovakia as an independent military, political and economic factor and to prepare the conditions for further expansion of Germany towards Poland and Russia” 48 .
In their desire to “channel” the Nazi aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union, the Chamberlain government, as well as the Daladier-Bonnet government, which followed in the wake of its policies, did not want to notice that the Munich agreement on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia also meant a serious weakening of the position of England and France. Meanwhile, this simple truth was then seen by Chamberlain’s political like-minded people - prominent conservative politicians, including Eden, Churchill and others. As one of these conservative politicians, Harold Macmillan, writes in his memoirs, among this group of conservatives there was a clear understanding of the great danger and perniciousness consequences of the “betrayal of the Czechs” 49. Eden and Churchill “also understood the colossal changes in the entire strategic situation in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the virtual destruction of the Czech ability to resist German expansion. The West was accordingly weakened, and the relative strength of the French army diminished, as the forty Czech divisions that had threatened Hitler's eastern front were demobilized and disbanded, huge fortifications were surrendered, huge arsenals and warehouses fell into German hands, and the French elaborate structure of defensive alliances was actually undermined" 50 .
The Soviet press resolutely opposed the Munich agreement between the Western powers and the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia. Here is what, for example, Pravda wrote about the Munich Agreement: “The whole world, all peoples clearly see: behind the veil of graceful
46 XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party(Bolsheviks) March 10-21, 1939: Transcript. report. M., 1939, p. 55.
47 Communist International, 1938, No. 10, p. 125-126.
49 Macmillan H. Op. cit., p. 562.
50 Ibid., p. 563.
phrases that Chamberlain allegedly saved world peace in Munich, an act was committed that in its shamelessness surpassed everything that took place after the first imperialist war" 51 . French and English ruling circles spread false rumors that the USSR agreed with the Munich Agreement. The Soviet government exposed this slander. A TASS report dated October 2, 1938 stated: “The Paris correspondent of the United Press agency reports to New York that the USSR government allegedly authorized Daladier to speak at the Four Powers Conference in Munich on behalf of the USSR. TASS is authorized to report that the Soviet government, of course, did not give any authority to Mr. Daladier, nor did it have and does not have anything to do with the conference in Munich and its decisions. The United Press report in question is a preposterous fabrication from start to finish.”
The governments of England and France carried out their agreement with Hitler in Munich with the support of the US government, which approved their policy of condoning fascist aggression and the shameful Munich deal. US diplomatic representatives sympathetically assessed the actions of London and Paris in committing the Munich betrayal. This is confirmed by the American President sending congratulations to Chamberlain on the occasion of the signing of the Munich Agreement.
In Munich, Hitler finally agreed to sign (September 30) a bilateral Anglo-German declaration, which was essentially a non-aggression pact. It spoke of “the desire of our both peoples to never again wage war against each other, to eliminate any reasons for disagreement.” Chamberlain was triumphant. He was confident that he had achieved his goal - an agreement with Hitler.
On December 6, 1938, in Paris, Bonnet and Ribbentrop signed the Franco-German Declaration. In it, the French and German governments stated that they would make every effort to develop peaceful and good neighborly relations between their countries, that there would be no territorial disputes between them, and that both governments would maintain contact and consult with each other in the event of a threat of complications in international relations. It was essentially a non-aggression pact between France and Germany.
After the signing of the Franco-German Declaration of December 6, 1938, the ruling circles of France pursued an active policy of collusion with Hitler, while hoping that Germany would eventually attack the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that in an official notice to all French ambassadors, Bonnet stated that as a result of negotiations in Paris with Ribbentrop, he had the impression that “German policy will henceforth be directed towards the fight against Bolshevism” 52 .
52 Rounaud P. La France a sauve l'Eugore. Paris, 1947, vol. 1, p. 575.
Pushing Nazi aggression towards the USSR, the Daladier-Bonnet government was ready to sacrifice the interests of France in Eastern Europe for this. After Munich, during negotiations in Paris, Bonnet told Ribbentrop: “France renounces all political interests in Eastern Europe and specifically agrees not to influence Poland against the conclusion of an agreement with Germany, according to which Danzig would be returned to Germany and Germany would receive an extraterritorial corridor from East Prussia to Reich, through the territory of the Polish Corridor" 53.
This was also confirmed by Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of England Sargent in his letter dated December 22, 1938 to the British Ambassador in Paris Phipps. “We are inclined to suspect,” Sargent wrote, “that Ribbentrop may have left Paris with the impression that Bonnet had given him a free hand in Eastern Europe without French intervention, just as Mussolini concluded from Laval’s position in January 1935 in Rome that as far as France is concerned, he has freedom of action in Abyssinia” 54.
After Munich, it became obvious that the French government was not fulfilling its obligations under the alliance treaties. In negotiations with Ribbentrop regarding the Franco-German Bonnet Declaration for reasons domestic policy did not dare to openly renounce the mutual assistance pact with the USSR, the alliance with Poland and other allied obligations, which Ribbentrop sought. It was necessary to make up for this omission. L. Noel (former French ambassador in Warsaw) writes in his memoirs that Bonnie was going to “completely and immediately denounce all agreements concluded by France: he meant the Franco-Polish agreements and the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact” 55 . In Paris they did not even hide their efforts to pit Germany against the Soviet Union.
Such plans were hatched even more actively in London. Chamberlain hoped that after Munich Germany would direct its aggressive aspirations against the USSR. During the Paris negotiations with Daladier on November 24, 1938, the British Prime Minister said that “the German government may have the idea of starting the dismemberment of Russia by supporting the agitation for an independent Ukraine” 56 . Chamberlain was concerned that France would not allow itself to be drawn into the fight against Germany. Foreign Minister Bonnet completely reassured him on this matter. Halifax and the French ambassador in London also spoke about Hitler's anti-Soviet plans in their conversations.
53 Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1940, vol. 1. General, p. 53.
54 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Third Series, vol. 3, p. 366. Footnote (hereinafter referred to as DBFP).
55 Noel L. L "aggression Allemande contre la Pologne. Paris, 1946, p. 259.
56 DBFP, Third Series, vol. 3, p. 306-307.
Corbin in December 1938 57. Counselor of the British Embassy in Germany Ogilvie-Forbes reported to Halifax on December 6, 1938: “In both Nazi and non-Nazi circles there seems to be a unanimous opinion that the next goal, measures for the implementation of which can be taken as early as 1939, will be the creation, with or without the assistance of Poland, of an independent Russian Ukraine under German tutelage” 58 . Ogilvy’s report, however, also expressed concern: lest it happen that the “tiger” would make its next leap not to the East, but to the West... Such fears prompted the British rulers to further intensify their policy of collusion with Hitler .
AFTER MUNICH
Some facts seemed to confirm the post-Munich hopes of reactionary circles in the West that the fascist beast would now rush not to the West, but to the East.
On November 2, 1938, on orders from Berlin, a puppet state, “Carpathian Ukraine,” was created in Transcarpathia, which previously belonged to Czechoslovakia. At the head of the new “state,” Hitler put Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists - traitors to the Ukrainian people who were completely dependent on German fascism. The creation of “Carpathian Ukraine” was used by the German press to organize a noisy campaign for Soviet Ukraine to join the “independent” “Carpathian Ukraine”. The Nazis hoped to create a large center of subversive activities against the USSR in Transcarpathia. Anti-Soviet plans of this kind were generously described by the French bourgeois press. At the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in March 1939, the Report of the Central Committee exposed plans to “attach the elephant, i.e., Soviet Ukraine, to the booger, i.e., the so-called Carpathian Ukraine.”
With their Munich policy of complicity with fascist aggression, France and England in every possible way encouraged Germany's desire to take possession of Ukraine. That is why, after the signing of the Munich Agreement, the English and French press began to devote a lot of space to the “Ukrainian issue.” At the same time, both London and Paris made it clear to Hitler that this issue did not affect the interests of either England or France. It seemed to the Munich residents that the political course they had chosen was triumphant: Hitler, they thought, was about to launch a campaign against the Soviet Union.
But several months passed, and the complete failure of the short-sighted calculations of the creators of Munich policy became clear to the whole world.
A big shock for the Munich people was Hitler’s refusal of his Ukrainian-Carpathian venture: in March 1939 he was liquidated
57 DBFP, Fhird Series, vol. 3, p. 436.
58 Ibid., p. 387.
val "Carpathian Ukraine", giving it to the Hungarian dictator Horthy. Hitler allowed him to capture “Carpathian Ukraine”, where Hungarian troops were sent. Hopes for Hitler's campaign against Soviet Ukraine were dimming. Soon the whole tragedy of the crime committed in Munich became clear from the point of view of the fate of not only Czechoslovakia, but also of all humanity.
On March 15, 1939, Hitler very expressively demonstrated that he did not take into account either England or France, or the obligations that he had accepted before them. The meaning of the Munich Agreement was for Germany to carry out its aggression, the robbery of Czechoslovakia, only with the consent of England and France. According to Hitler's commitment, Germany had to respect the new Czechoslovak borders. And now German troops suddenly invaded Czechoslovakia, completely occupied it and liquidated it as a state. The Czech Republic was turned into a province of the German Reich - the “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”. Slovakia was separated from the Czech Republic and turned into a puppet republic. Its southern part was given to Horthy Hungary back in November 1938.
In the very first days after the Nazis captured Czechoslovakia, Hitler's diplomats in London and Paris sent reassuring messages to Berlin regarding the position of England and France. Noting anti-German sentiment in England and the decline in the prestige of the Chamberlain government, Dirksen at the same time emphasized: “The annexation of the Czech Republic to Germany will not lead to an increase in tension to such an extent that it threatens war.” He wrote: “It would be wrong to create illusions that fundamental changes have occurred in England’s attitude towards Germany” 59 . From Paris, the German ambassador reported: “France will actually do nothing in the situation created by German actions in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia” 60.
The Soviet Union was the only great power that did not stain itself with the Munich betrayal. The USSR has now resolutely come out in defense of the Czechoslovak people and condemned the new Hitlerite aggression.
In its note dated March 18, 1939, the Soviet government angrily condemned the lawlessness and violence committed by the Nazis. It stated that the actions of the German government "cannot but be considered arbitrary, violent, aggressive." The Soviet Union, it was further said, “cannot recognize the inclusion of the Czech Republic into the German Empire, and in one form or another also of Slovakia, as legitimate and in accordance with the generally recognized norms of international law and justice or the principle of self-determination of peoples.” Finally
59 DGFP, Ser. D. vol. 6, p. 38.
60 Ibid., p. 23.
The Soviet government pointed out that the actions of the German government increased the danger to world peace, disrupted political stability in Central Europe, increased the elements of the previously created state of alarm in Europe and dealt a new blow to the sense of security of the peoples 61 .
As soon as the march of the Nazi invaders to Prague ended, the unleashed fascists committed new acts of aggression: on March 22, 1939, Germany occupied Klaipeda, which belonged to Lithuania. On March 23, Germany imposed an enslaving economic agreement on Romania, which placed the country's economy under German control. On March 21, the German government, in an ultimatum, demanded that Poland agree to transfer Danzig (Gdansk) to Germany and provide it with an extraterritorial highway and railway, cutting the “Polish corridor”. On April 28, Germany, as a threat, annulled the German-Polish non-aggression pact of January 26, 1934, making it clear that from now on it did not exclude war against Poland.
To top it all off, Germany, following the violation of the Munich Agreement, dealt another slap in the face to the British government and Chamberlain personally, terminating the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 on April 28. Then Germany laid claim to its former colonies, taken from it by England and France under the Treaty of Versailles.
The impunity of Hitler's aggression pushed fascist Italy to the same actions. On December 22, 1938, she terminated the Convention on Mutual Respect for the Territorial Integrity of States in Central Europe and the consultative pact with France, concluded on January 7, 1935, and subsequently presented territorial claims to France; on April 7, 1939, Italian troops invaded Albania and soon captured her. The international situation became more and more tense.
In such conditions, fraught with a military threat, the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) took place. In the political report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the congress, which was delivered by J.V. Stalin, a description of the current situation was given. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks branded the fascist aggressors and revealed the essence of the Munich policy of the Western powers, pursued under the guise of “non-intervention” and “pacification” of aggression. “The policy of non-intervention,” the report said, “means condoning aggression, unleashing war... The policy of non-intervention reveals a desire, a desire - not to stop the aggressors from doing their dirty deed, not to stop, say, Japan from getting involved in a war with China, and even better with the Soviet Union, not to prevent, say, Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union, allowing all participants in the war... to weaken and deplete each other
61 Documents on the history of the Munich agreement. 1937-1939, p. 427-428.
friend, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to appear on stage with fresh forces, to act, of course, “in the interests of peace” and dictate their terms to the weakened participants in the war. And cheap and cute!”
SOVIET-ANGLO-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS IN THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1939
The systematic connivance of fascist aggression on the part of the governments of England and France, as well as the United States, the refusal of England and France to cooperate with the USSR, and France's violation of its allied duty to Czechoslovakia could not but raise doubts in the Soviet government about the readiness of the Western powers to oppose the fascist aggressors. The Soviet government, of course, took into account the sad experience of Munich and the policy of “non-intervention” in Spain. But it did not want to miss a single chance to organize a collective resistance to the aggressors.
On March 18, 1939, in connection with information about the German threat to Romania, the Soviet government proposed convening a conference of the most interested states - the USSR, Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland and Turkey in order to determine a position regarding the new German aggression. This proposal was made through the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador. It came in response to the ambassador’s question about the position of the USSR in the event of violence against Romania by the Hitlerite Reich, it followed with exceptional speed, on the same day that the ambassador asked this question.
But the British government replied that it considered the convening of the conference “premature” 62. The British government clearly sought to encourage the USSR to speak out in defense of Romania and thereby become involved in a conflict with Germany, but did not want to convene a conference or take any collective measures.
The famous American journalist and historian W. Shirer, who never had any sympathy for the USSR, admits, however, that the governments of England and France “by their refusal to accept the Soviet proposal to immediately convene a conference with the aim of creating an anti-Hitler coalition, deliberately ignored the opportunity to attract Russia to their side » 63.
62 The USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of the Second World War (September 1938-August 1939): Documents and materials. M., 1971, p. 246, 247 (hereinafter referred to as the USSR in the struggle for peace...).
63 Shirer W. The Collapse of the Third Republic. An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York, 1970, p. 424.
Nevertheless, leaving the Soviet initiative without consequences was obviously considered tactically inconvenient. Therefore, on March 21, 1939, the British government sent a new proposal to Moscow to sign a declaration with the participation of England, the USSR, France and Poland, providing for immediate consultation of its participants on measures for joint resistance to aggression against any European state 64. The Soviet government considered this measure insufficiently effective. Nevertheless, the very next day it agreed.
However, on April 1, the initiator of the proposal - the British government - suddenly announced that it considered the question of a declaration to be no longer relevant. It is easy to understand that such a discouraging statement did not inspire hope for the possibility of an agreement with England on a joint rebuff to the aggressor.
Subsequent offers made to the Soviet Union from the British side were also not encouraging. On April 14, 1939, the British government invited the Soviet government to make a public statement that “in the event of an act of aggression against any European neighbor of the Soviet Union that would resist (aggression.- Ed.), it will be possible to count on the help of the Soviet government, if it is desired, which assistance will be provided in the way that will be found most convenient” 65.
This proposal did not provide for any obligations of England and France in the event of a direct German attack on the USSR, although in relation to each other both Western powers were already bound by obligations of mutual assistance.
Moreover, the proposed wording of the declaration contained something provocative. According to the English project, the Soviet Union was supposed to provide “assistance,” that is, it was obviously obliged to fight against the aggressor in the event of an attack on any of the USSR’s European neighbors, provided that Soviet assistance “proved desirable.” The European neighbors of the USSR were Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. The last two states had guarantees from England and France, and, therefore, by providing assistance to them, the Soviet country could count on fighting against the aggressor in alliance with two other great powers. However, in the event of a fascist attack on Finland, Estonia or Latvia, the British proposal did not give the Soviet Union any reason to count on support from England and France. Meanwhile, for the USSR, Germany’s attack on the Baltic countries due to their geographical location was no less dangerous than its attack on Poland and Romania. By binding the Soviet Union with an obligation to help the Baltic states
64 USSR in the struggle for peace..., p. 264; DBFP, Third Series, vol. 4, p. 436.
65 USSR in the struggle for peace..., p. 331, 333; DBFP, Third Series, vol. 5, p. 206.
In other words, the English proposal left England and France with their hands free. The British proposal provided for an extreme inequality of obligations: a lot was assigned to the Soviet Union, and much less to the Western powers.
If the Anglo-French-Soviet agreement had taken place on the basis proposed by the British, it would have indicated to Hitler the strategic direction of his aggression that he should choose in order to force the Soviet Union to fight in a state of isolation. This direction was the Baltic - from the sea or from East Prussia through Lithuania to Latvia, Estonia, and also through Finland, in both cases with access to the approaches to Leningrad.
Special attention deserves a caveat English project: “...if it (i.e. Soviet help.- Ed.) will be desirable...” From these words it is clear that in the event of aggression against one of the European neighbors of the Soviet Union, he will be obliged to fight if the neighbor says that Soviet help is desirable to him. But the USSR would have to refrain from opposing the aggressor if a neighboring state decides that assistance is undesirable. In other words, the Soviet Union would be tied up in the event of a German attack on its neighbors, but the neighbors would retain complete freedom of action: they could not accept help from the USSR, but, for example, surrender into the hands of Hitler, as the boyar-bourgeois government did a little later. Romania and bourgeois Finland, allowing German troops into their territories.
On the same day, April 14, the French government invited the Soviet Union to agree to an addition to the Franco-Soviet treaty of May 2, 1935, according to which the USSR would undertake to come to the aid of France if it found itself in a state of war with Germany due to assistance provided to Poland and Romania 66. This proposal also had serious shortcomings. It did not concern the case of aggression against the Baltic states and a direct attack by Germany on the USSR. Under the influence of London, the French government soon itself
Stabilization in the field of international relations in the 20s. was replaced by a global economic crisis (1929 – 1933). The solution is increased government intervention in the social and economic life of a number of countries in Europe and the USA.
In Germany in 1933, as a result of democratic elections, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) led by A. Hitler came to power:
- economic policy - to expand living space, achieve world domination;
- ideological support - propaganda of the idea of racial exclusivity of the German nation, chauvinism;
— social base National Socialism - small owners, the unemployed, part of the intelligentsia, workers and youth.
Changes in German policy with the advent of the Nazis: withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), abandonment of the Geneva Disarmament Convention, growth of militarism.
Military-political cooperation of extremist regimes:
October 1936 - “Axis Berlin - Rome” - agreement between Germany and Italy, recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia, development of a unified line of behavior regarding the war in Spain. November 1936 “Anti-Comintern Pact” - cooperation between Germany and Japan directed against the Comintern. In 1937, Italy joined this pact.
By 1939 - expansion of the Anti-Comintern Pact to include Hungary, Spain, Bulgaria, Finland, Romania, Siam, Manchukuo, Denmark, Slovakia, Croatia. Britain and France adopted a policy of "Non-Intervention" when the fate of Spain was being decided.
Thus, the growth of militarism and revanchism in Germany, the aggressive actions of Japan and Italy with the connivance of Great Britain and France led to a sharp aggravation of international relations, to the emergence of three centers of military tension.
Steps taken by the USSR to prevent war:
1. Geneva International Conference on Disarmament - from 1932 to 1935. with the participation of representatives from 63 countries. She did not support the USSR's idea of complete and general disarmament.
2. Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties on mutual assistance (1935).
3. The USSR's proposal to create a system of collective security and protect independent countries that were threatened by aggression. However, this initiative was perceived as an attempt to impose communist ideas on the West; Stalin's repressions, which undermined the international authority of the USSR, also played a negative role.
4. “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” - a Soviet-German agreement for a period of 10 years (August 23, 1939), as well as a secret additional protocol “on the issue of delimitation of mutual interests in Eastern Europe.” The treaty did not make Germany and the USSR allies, either formally or in fact, and there were no articles on military cooperation between the two countries.
Under the influence of the reactionary regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan, an aggressive bloc is being created. The USSR initiative to create a collective security system did not find understanding from Great Britain, France and Poland. As a result, the Soviet Union was faced with an alternative: face the threat of war in the west and east or sign the non-aggression pact proposed by Germany. The last option was chosen.
This topic of classes is completely focused on working with primary sources - documents and materials.
Last year before the outbreak of World War II, which turned out to be extremely eventful in the field of international relations, is assessed by many as a “year of crisis.” There are many reasons for this assessment.
The Sudeten-German crisis, which developed rapidly after the Anschluss of Austria in April 1938, ended with the infamous Munich Agreement, signed on the night of September 30, 1938 by the prime ministers of England, Germany, Italy and France. Regarding this apogee of the policy of pacifying Nazi Germany by Western politicians, W. Churchill wisely noted that England in Munich had to choose between shame and war. She chose shame in order to get war in the future.
Indeed, according to the unanimous recognition of both contemporaries and scientists, in the fall of 1938 the “Third Reich” was not ready for a big war. The West's determination to defend the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia would not only prevent the balance of power in Europe from being shaken in favor of Germany, but could also lead to the general opposition opposing Hitler. But the British and French governments preferred, ignoring the interests of Czechoslovakia and the opinion of the population of this country, to transfer the Sudetenland to the Reich.
In preparation for the first seminar, it is necessary, first of all, to identify what tactics the Nazis chose in solving the Sudeten problem and what role the unresolved national question in the Czechoslovak state played in the success of this tactic. Since many domestic authors reproached the President of Czechoslovakia for excessive compliance with the Sudeten Germans, it is also necessary to find out how justified these reproaches are and whether E. Benes had the opportunity to pursue a different policy. To do this, first of all, it is necessary to analyze the position of the British government on the German question in the spring-summer and especially in September 1938. The most informative here are the recordings of Chamberlain’s conversations with Hitler on September 15 and 22-23, respectively, in Berchtesgaden and Godesberg, as well as materials on the Anglo-French demands placed on the Czechoslovak Republic, and about the methods of Western pressure on Czechoslovak leaders. The details of the Munich Agreement, which differ from the content of Hitler’s Godesberg Memorandum, do not deserve attention, since the transfer to Germany of about 20% of the territory of the Czechoslovakia will occur without any plebiscite, and the “forms of evacuation” of this territory will be established in detail not by an international commission, but by the Nazis.
According to some authors, in March 1939, Western governments, primarily the British, put an end to the policy of appeasement of Hitler's Germany, since they entered into contacts with the government of the USSR, and then into negotiations with it with a view to stopping the further expansion of Hitler's aggression.
The course of the trilateral Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in August 1939 on military issues is well covered in literature in Russian, which cannot be said about the stage of trilateral diplomatic contacts and negotiations that preceded these negotiations. political issues. As a result, the focus of the second and third seminars is on the diplomatic correspondence between the governments of the three great European states of the period March-June 1939 and the tripartite political negotiations in Moscow in June-July.
The importance of familiarizing yourself with documentary materials on these historical subjects is reinforced by the numerous falsifications of the history of international relations on the eve of World War II, designed to convince that the main responsibility for the outbreak of the war was not even Hitler, but Stalin. Thus, the publicist I. Bunich, in a two-volume book claiming to be a historical chronicle, claims that on March 21 “... the government of England invited Stalin to accept a declaration of the USSR, England, France and Poland on joint resistance to Hitler’s expansion in Europe. There was no answer. On March 31, England and France announced guarantees to Poland. Stalin grinned, but remained silent."
A professional historian can determine his attitude to this kind of pseudo-history only by knowing well the specific picture of the development of Anglo-French-Soviet contacts and negotiations in the spring-summer of 1939.
More large quantity The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 gives rise to various kinds of speculation. The authors of pseudo-scientific works depict Stalin’s plans this way: dreaming of a world revolution that could be accelerated by a new war, he pushed Hitler to aggression, and remaining out of the military conflict in 1939 , was preparing to conquer both Germany and all of Europe. Similar statements are found in literature that purports to be scientific: “The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany was concluded... as a fully conscious agreement on the unpunished attack of Germany on Poland by the USSR and with the prospect of the division of Poland between the USSR and Germany, and most importantly - with the prospect of war between Germany, on the one hand, and France and England on the other... In other words, the pact gave Germany a free hand and provoked it to start the Second World War.”
Some people are even trying to prove that Hitler was “raised” by none other than Stalin. Hoping to use the Fuhrer of the NSDAP as an “icebreaker”, clearing the way for the world proletarian revolution with the help of the war in Europe, Stalin supposedly, starting in 1933, sought to collude with the Nazi dictator, never seriously thinking about the possibility of anti-fascist cooperation with countries of liberal democracy .
In an effort to make maximum use of theoretical knowledge, which is sometimes distantly related to the subject of their research, historians involved in international relations of the late 1930s every now and then also consider them through the prism of the theory of totalitarianism. They often associate the origin of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 with the fact that “the Stalinist regime was politically and morally more prepared to collude with Hitler.” It would, however, be completely wrong to infer the Soviet-Nazi rapprochement from the kinship of the two political regimes. A unique historical phenomenon requires clarification not of sociological, but of historical causality - one without which it is impossible to understand why in the war of 1914-18. authoritarian Russia fought on the side of liberal democratic countries against the same authoritarian Germany, and in World War II the USSR, despite its totalitarianism, fought side by side with the “democracies” against the totalitarian “Third Reich.”
When Stalin and Molotov made the decision to agree to a pact with Hitler in the midst of Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, information about the secret Anglo-German negotiations in the summer of 1939 could have been decisive.
The purpose of the fourth seminar is to reconstruct from documents the most significant plot of these Anglo-German contacts - negotiations between the ministerial director of the Goering Office for the implementation of Germany's four-year plan, Helmut Wohlthat, and the chief adviser to the British government on industrial development, Horace (Horatio) Wilson. When working with sources, it is necessary to compare two versions of the Wilson-Wolthatu meetings on July 18 and 21, 1939, one of which belongs directly to the negotiator Wohlthatu himself, and the other to the German ambassador to Great Britain von Dirksen.
Foreign policy of leading states before the war. The Versailles system finally fell before the outbreak of World War II, for which Germany was quite thoroughly prepared. So, from 1934 to 1939.
Military production in the country increased 22 times, the number of troops increased 35 times, Germany took second place in the world in terms of volume industrial production etc.
Currently, researchers do not have a common view on the geopolitical state of the world on the eve of World War II. Some historians (Marxists) continue to insist on a two-polise characterization. In their opinion, there were two socio-political systems in the world (socialism and capitalism), and within the framework of the capitalist system of world relations, there were two centers of a future war (Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia). A significant part of historians believe that on the eve of the Second During the World War, there were three political systems: bourgeois-democratic, socialist and fascist-militarist. The interaction of these systems, the balance of power between them could ensure peace or disrupt it. A possible bloc of bourgeois-democratic and socialist systems was a real alternative to World War II. However, the peace alliance did not work out. The bourgeois-democratic countries did not agree to create a bloc before the start of the war, because their leadership continued to view Soviet totalitarianism as the greatest threat to the foundations of civilization (the result of revolutionary changes in the USSR, including the 30s) than its fascist antipode, which openly proclaimed a crusade against communism. The USSR's attempt to create a collective security system in Europe ended with the signing of treaties with France and Czechoslovakia (1935). But these treaties were not put into effect during the period of Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia due to the counteracting “policy of appeasement” pursued at that time by most European countries towards Germany.
Germany, in October 1936, formalized a military-political alliance with Italy (“Berlin-Rome Axis”), and a month later the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed between Japan and Germany, to which Italy joined a year later (November 6, 1937). The creation of a revanchist alliance forced the countries of the bourgeois-democratic camp to become more active. However, only in March 1939 did England and France begin negotiations with the USSR on joint actions against Germany. But the agreement was never signed. Despite the polarity of interpretations of the reasons for the failed union of anti-fascist states, some of which shift the blame for the unbridled aggressor onto capitalist countries, others attribute it to the policies of the leadership of the USSR, etc., one thing is obvious - the skillful use by fascist politicians of contradictions between anti-fascist countries, which led to grave consequences for the whole world.
