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» The main provisions of the tripartite pact. Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan

The main provisions of the tripartite pact. Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan

The very first and most important event that was carried out on the basis of the “Program of Measures in accordance with the Change in the International Situation” was the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. This pact was a further development of the Japanese-German agreement of 1936.

In solving this issue, the main driving force there was an army. Since its traditional mission was to ensure the protection of the northern borders, it was naturally most anxious to ensure that the forces of the Soviet Union were distracted by the actions of German forces. IN in this case both states - Japan and Germany - in the face of the strengthening of Soviet power in the east and west, entered into mutually beneficial relations.

Subsequently, after the occurrence of the Chinese incident and especially after it became protracted, the need to strengthen international situation Japan, its position in relation to the USA and England. All this along with the situation on the European fronts, with the demands determined by the desire to resolve the problem of the southern directions, significantly accelerated the signing of the pact. This set the course from joint defense to a military alliance.

On September 7, Special German Ambassador Stammer met with Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Tokyo. During the meeting, the goals of the proposed military alliance were determined. In that important point naval Minister Yoshida was hospitalized on September 3 due to heart disease and resigned from his post. Admiral Oikawa Koshiro was appointed in his place.

Negotiations on the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were successfully completed. On September 16, the Cabinet of Ministers and on September 19


In September, a meeting in the presence of the emperor decided to conclude a pact. Tripartite Pact was signed in Berlin at 20:00. 15 minutes. September 27, 1940. The following is the text of the pact:

“The Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy, recognizing as preliminary and a necessary condition lasting peace, giving every nation the opportunity to take its place in the world, considers as a fundamental principle the creation and maintenance of a new order necessary to enable the peoples of the Greater East Asia and European regions to reap the benefits of coexistence and mutual prosperity of all nations concerned , express their determination to mutually cooperate and take concerted action in the specified areas regarding efforts based on these intentions1.

The Governments of the Three Powers, eager to co-operate with all nations that are making similar efforts throughout the world, are eager to demonstrate their unyielding will for world peace, for which purpose the Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy have entered into the following agreement:


Article 1 Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe.

Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leadership in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to enter into mutual cooperation based on the stated course if one of the three contracting parties should be attacked by any power not presently participating.

1 These provisions at the very beginning of the pact determined the aggressive nature of the coalition. Here the term “ new order“, meaning the claim of these states to the forcible subjugation of the peoples of the world.


not in the European war and in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the three countries undertake to provide mutual assistance with all political, economic and military means at their disposal1.

Article 4. For the purpose of implementing the present pact, a mixed commission appointed by the Government of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy shall be established without delay.

Article 5. Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above articles do not in any way affect political status, currently existing between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union2.

Article 6. This pact comes into force from the moment of its signature. The validity period of the pact is ten years from the date of entry into force. The contracting parties, at the request of one of the powers that have concluded the pact, will discuss the question of revising this treaty at any time before the expiration of this period.”

On September 27, 1940, the Pact of Germany, Japan and Italy was signed, which represented a preliminary agreement on the division of the world between these countries. “The governments of these countries recognize,” the pact stated, “that a prerequisite for lasting peace is that each nation receives the space it needs.” According to the pact, Germany was to receive the “Euro-African space”, Italy - the Mediterranean, Japan - the “East Asian space”.

On September 30, Pravda published an editorial, “The Berlin Pact of the Triple Alliance,” written, as recently discovered in the archives, by Molotov. The article stated that “the pact is not particularly unexpected for the Soviet Union... because the Soviet government was informed by the German government of the impending conclusion of the Tripartite Pact even before its publication.” The article stated that the signing of the Tripartite Pact meant a further escalation of the war and an expansion of its scope, and the position of its participants was interpreted as almost defensive, because it was seen as an obligation to mutually protect their spheres of influence “from attacks by other states and, of course, first of all on the part of England and the United States of America, which cooperates with it.” Thus, the article actually indicated that of all the great powers, only one remains neutral Soviet Union, whose attitude towards each of the opposing military-political blocs was characterized very unambiguously. The article stated that " important feature The pact is constituted by the clause in it about the Soviet Union. The pact states: “Germany, Italy and Japan declare that this agreement does not in any way affect the political status currently existing between each of the three parties to the agreement and the Soviet Union.” Pravda pointed out that “this clause must be understood as a confirmation of the strength and significance of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany and the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Italy.”

Realizing that this article was of an official nature, Goebbels wrote in his diary the next day after its appearance: “Stalin publishes a statement in Pravda about the Three-Power Pact. Very positive. They say that Russia was oriented in advance and has no fears... Stalin’s statement was received by the Fuhrer with satisfaction.”

Soon after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, the German leadership made an attempt to involve the Soviet Union in it, and therefore Molotov was invited to Berlin for negotiations with Hitler. On this occasion, Ribbentrop wrote to Stalin on October 13, saying: “I would like to state that, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, the clear historical mission of the four powers - the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan and Germany - is to accept the long-term policy and direct further development peoples in the right direction by delimiting their interests on a global scale.” For these purposes, Molotov’s early visit to Berlin was “welcomed” in order to “clarify issues that are so decisive for the future of our peoples and in order to discuss them specifically.” “I would like to convey to him [Molotov] the most cordial invitation on behalf of the Reich government...” wrote Ribbentrop. “His visit would give the Fuhrer the opportunity to explain to Mr. Molotov personally his point of view regarding the future forms of relations between our countries.”

Treaty of Military Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, signed in Berlin on behalf of their governments by German Foreign Minister J. Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister G. Ciano and Japanese Ambassador to Germany S. Kurusu.

The conclusion of the pact was preceded by lengthy negotiations between the three aggressors, which began even before the outbreak of World War II. The first draft of the agreement, entitled “Pact of Consultation and Mutual Assistance,” was prepared by Ribbentrop, agreed upon with the then Japanese Ambassador to Germany H. Oshima and submitted to the head of the Italian government and leader of the Fascist Party of Italy B. Mussolini and G. Ciano in September 1938. Its main content boiled down to the acceptance by Germany, Italy and Japan of an obligation to provide military assistance to each other in the event of an attack on any of them by one or more states. This project was rejected first by the Italian and then by the Japanese leadership. B. Mussolini, during negotiations with Ribbentrop, who arrived in Rome in October 1938, saw the drawback of the project in that it was of a defensive nature, while Germany, Italy and Japan were not threatened and they needed another treaty, which “should change geographical map peace." The Japanese government approved the project in early March 1939, but demanded that it include a clause stating that the military alliance was directed exclusively against the USSR and had no force in a war against other states. The need to include such a clause in the text of the pact was motivated by the fact that Japan was not yet ready to “wage an effective war at sea” against such powerful naval powers as Great Britain and the United States, as well as Japan’s reluctance to spoil Japanese-American relations and, as a result, to lose exports from the United States strategic materials needed to wage war with China. The reservation proposed by Japan was unacceptable to Germany and Italy. Their leadership wanted to conclude an alliance that, depending on the situation, would have power in the war, both against the USSR and the Western powers. Such an alliance between Germany and Italy was concluded on May 22, 1939 (“Pact of Steel”). He had, however, another drawback. Before signing the union treaty, Mussolini informed Berlin that he planned to complete Italy’s preparations for participation in a pan-European war only in 1942, and it would not enter it before that date. The German leadership accepted this condition. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland and thus began World War II. On the same day, Hitler notified Mussolini that Italy would not require military support for Germany, after which the Italian government hastened to declare its “non-participation” in the war. When England and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, it further strengthened its decision not to engage in hostilities, and the Japanese government on September 4 declared “disinterest” in the war in Europe and intended to concentrate on “conflict resolution” in China. After the defeat of Poland, the German government began to seek Italy's entry into the war against England and France, as well as Japan's consent to conclude a military alliance directed against England. Italy declared war on England and France on June 10, 1940, as soon as it became clear that France was suffering a crushing defeat at the hands of German forces. At the same time, she hoped to take advantage of the defeat of the Anglo-French coalition to seize dominance in the Mediterranean. Japan in July 1940 announced its intention to establish close relations with Germany in order to take advantage of its support and victory in Europe in the interests of expanding its dominance in Asia. The path to concluding an alliance with Japan against England, which Germany had been striving for since the beginning of the war, was open. Meanwhile, on July 31, 1940, a decision was made in Berlin to prepare an attack on the USSR in the spring of next year. Hitler and his military leaders hoped to defeat him, like France, in one lightning campaign. Therefore, they considered it unnecessary to involve Italy and Japan in their anti-Soviet plans. They assigned these countries a supporting role in advance: Italy was supposed to shackle the forces of England in the Mediterranean, and Japan - the forces of England and the United States, which sympathized with it, in the Asia-Pacific region. Ambassador-at-Large H. T. Stahmer was sent to Tokyo to conduct secret negotiations on concluding a military alliance between Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other. Negotiations began on September 9, 1940. On September 19, Ribbentrop presented the text of the treaty, already approved by the Japanese government, for consideration by Mussolini. He completely approved of it. After this, the Three Power Pact was signed in Berlin. In the preamble, the contracting parties stated the decision taken cooperate with each other for the purpose of "realizing their aspirations in the great East Asian space and European areas" and extend this cooperation "to other nations in other parts of the world who are inclined to act in the same direction." The treaty stated that Japan “recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in creating a new order in Europe” (Art. 1), and Germany and Italy “recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in creating a new order in the great East Asian space” (Art. .2). Germany, Italy and Japan declared their intention to cooperate on the above basis and pledged to "support each other by all political, economic and military means in the event that one of the three contracting countries should be attacked by any power not presently participating" in a European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict (Art. 3). To implement these provisions, the creation of “technical commissions” was envisaged, the composition of which was to be determined by the governments of Germany, Italy and Japan (Article 4). The Pact contained a clause that “this agreement shall in no way affect the political status which currently exists between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia"(Article 5). Thus, Germany, Italy and Japan openly announced their claims to establish at their own discretion a “new order” in the vast expanse of Europe and Asia and beyond. They pledged to jointly use all means, including military ones, so that the USSR and the USA, which at that time did not participate in the war of Germany and Italy against England and Japan against China, would not be able to prevent the establishment of dominance by the three aggressive powers in Europe and Asia. The reservation that the Pact of Three did not affect the political relations that had developed at that time between Germany, Italy and Japan with the USSR was doubtful, since, despite the conclusion by Germany of a non-aggression treaty with the USSR in 1939, the one concluded in 1936-1937 remained in force . between Germany, Japan and Italy the Anti-Comintern Pact, which had a clearly anti-Soviet ideological and political orientation. In fact, this clause was included in the treaty by the German government in order to disguise the preparations that had begun for an attack on the USSR, which it began in July 1940. For this reason, the German leadership, striving to achieve surprise in the attack, hid its anti-Soviet intentions even from its allies . At the same time, in order to further strengthen and expand its positions before the upcoming “march against Russia”, it achieved the involvement of a number of states in the military alliance of the three powers South Eastern Europe. The Three Powers Pact was joined by Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Bulgaria (March 1, 1941), as well as the puppet state entities- The Slovak Republic (November 24, 1940) and the Independent State of Croatia (June 16, 1941), created by Slovak and Croatian separatists at the direction of Berlin during the liquidation of the Czechoslovak Republic (1938-1939) and Yugoslavia (1941). Together with Germany, its allies under the Three Power Pact took part in the attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941: Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, while Bulgaria played the role of Germany’s outpost on the Balkan Peninsula. Without concluding a formal alliance with Germany, Finland also participated in the attack on the USSR. Japan in July-August 1941 took measures to build up the forces of its Kwantung Army in Manchuria, threatening the USSR with an attack on it from the East. At the same time, she continued preparations for a war against England and the United States with the aim of seizing dominance in Asia. Attack Japanese fleet to the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, marked the beginning of the war on Pacific Ocean. On December 11, 1941, Germany, Italy and Japan signed an agreement on the joint conduct of the war and committed themselves not to conclude either peace or armistice with the United States and England without mutual consent; to bring the fight against them to a victorious end in order to achieve “a new order in the spirit of the Three Powers Pact signed on September 27, 1940.” As a sign of solidarity with Japan and its allies, a state of war with the United States and England was declared on December 16, 1941 by the puppet government of Manchukuo, on January 25, 1942 by the government of Thailand, and on November 30, 1943 by the Chinese collaborationist government of Wang Jingwei.

Historical sources:

Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. T. 1-2. M., 1981.

Parties

Germany Germany
Kingdom of Italy Kingdom of Italy
Empire of Japan Empire of Japan

Hungary Hungary
Romania Romania
Slovakia Slovakia
Bulgaria Bulgaria
Kingdom of Yugoslavia Kingdom of Yugoslavia
Croatia Croatia
Manchukuo Manchukuo
Republic of China Republic of China
Thailand Thailand

Berlin Pact of 1940, also known as Three Power Pact of 1940 or Tripartite Pact(German: Dreimächtepakt, Italian: Patto Tripartito, Japanese: 日独伊三国同盟) - an international treaty (pact) concluded on September 27, 1940 between the main Axis powers - the countries participating in the Anti-Comintern Pact: Germany (Joachim von Ribbentrop), Italy ( Galeazzo Ciano) and Japan (Saburo Kurusu) for a period of 10 years.

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The essence of the agreement

The parties agreed on the following:

“The Government of the Greater Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy, recognizing as a preliminary and necessary condition for lasting peace the provision of every state with the opportunity to take its place in the world, consider as the basic principle the creation and maintenance of a new order necessary for the peoples in the regions of Greater East Asia and Europe can reap the benefits of coexistence and mutual prosperity of all interested nations, express their determination to mutually cooperate and take concerted action in the specified areas regarding efforts based on these intentions. The Governments of the Four Powers, eager to co-operate with all nations making similar efforts throughout the world, are eager to demonstrate their unyielding will for world peace, for which purpose the Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy have entered into the following agreement.

Article 1 Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe.

Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leadership in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to carry out mutual cooperation based on the stated policy that if one of the three contracting parties should be attacked by any power not presently participating in the European war and in the Sino-Japanese conflict, then the three countries undertake to provide mutual assistance by all political, economic and military means at their disposal.

Article 4. For the purpose of implementing the present pact, a mixed commission appointed by the Government of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy shall be established without delay.

Article 5. Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above articles in no way affect the political course existing at the present time between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union.

Article 6. This pact comes into force from the moment of its signature. The duration of the pact is ten years from the date of entry into force. The Contracting Parties, at the request of one of the powers that have concluded the pact, will discuss the issue of revising this treaty at any time before the expiration of this period.”

The Berlin Pact provided for the delimitation of zones of influence between the Axis countries during the establishment of a new world order and mutual military assistance. Germany and Italy were destined for a leading role in Europe, and the Japanese Empire - in Asia. Thus, Japan received the formal right to annex French possessions in Asia, which it took advantage of by immediately invading French Indochina.

The Pact also took into account the right of the contracting parties to have their own relations with the Soviet Union, with which Germany already had serious economic and military-technical cooperation and a Non-Aggression Pact, and Japan later concluded and adhered to the Neutrality Pact.

At the end of September 1940, Hitler sent a message to Stalin, informing him of the upcoming signing of the Berlin Pact, and later invited him to take part in the division of the “British inheritance” in Iran and India. On October 13, Stalin received a letter from German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, which contained an invitation to the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov to come on a visit to Berlin. In this letter, Ribbentrop also emphasized that “...Germany is determined to wage war against England and her empire until Britain is completely broken...”.

On November 12-13, negotiations between Ribbentrop and Molotov took place in Berlin, at which the Soviet leadership was once again invited to join the Tripartite Pact and engage in “dividing the inheritance of England,” thus convincing the USSR that war with England is the primary task for Germany in the coming years The meaning of these proposals was to induce the USSR to shift the center of gravity of its foreign policy from Europe to South Asia and the Middle East, where it would clash with British interests. Molotov responded that “the Soviet Union can take part in a broad agreement between the four powers, but only as a partner, and not as an object (and yet the USSR is only mentioned as such an object in the tripartite pact).” At the end of the negotiations, an official statement was published in the press that “... the exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and established mutual understanding on all the most important issues of interest to the USSR and Germany.” In fact, the positions of the parties clearly did not coincide. The Soviet delegation, not wanting to be drawn into a conflict with England, limited its task to clarifying German intentions regarding European security and problems directly affecting the USSR, and insisted on Germany's implementation of previously signed agreements. In addition, the Soviet delegation insisted on discussing the situation in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Poland.

During the negotiations, Molotov did not give any definite answer to the proposals received. The USSR's response was conveyed to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, on November 25. Formally, readiness was expressed “to accept the draft pact of the four powers on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance,” but at the same time a number of conditions were put forward that essentially excluded the USSR from joining the Tripartite Pact, since these conditions affected the interests of Germany and Japan. Thus, the Soviet Union demanded assistance in concluding a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assistance agreement, creating a favorable regime for the USSR in the Black Sea straits, and for this, providing guarantees for the creation of a Soviet military and naval base in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles area on a long-term lease. Further, recognition of the “zone south of Batumi and Baku in general direction towards the Persian Gulf" "the center of the territorial aspirations of the USSR." The USSR also demanded the immediate withdrawal German troops from Finland and influence Japan to give up its concessions in Northern Sakhalin. The Soviet leadership thus made it clear that it intended to strengthen its positions in the Balkans and in the Black Sea straits. In addition, the conditions put forward blocked Hitler’s path to the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East, preventing him from using both these areas and the territories included in the Soviet “sphere of interests” against the USSR itself. Both the response of the Soviet leadership and the course of negotiations in Berlin meant that the Soviet Union refused to accept Germany's proposals and intended to defend its interests in European politics. There was no response to the Soviet conditions, but Hitler gave the order to speed up preparations for war against the USSR.

The pact was not a treaty of alliance in full meaning of these words. As part of its global strategy, Japan sought to achieve a leading position in the Pacific Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the eastern Indian Ocean. However, it provided itself with complete freedom of action and the possibility of starting a war against both the USA and the USSR.

Other participants

The German-dependent governments of Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Slovakia (November 24, 1940), and Bulgaria (March 1, 1941) also joined the Berlin Pact.

On March 25, 1941, the Berlin Pact was joined by

75 years ago, in November 1940, negotiations took place in Berlin on the division of the world and the accession of the USSR to the Tripartite Pact. There is an idea in Western literature that this was the turning point of Hitler's policy, the point of his choice - whether to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union or defeat it. But such statements are just a manipulation of the facts. From the very beginning, Hitler's plans were a modification of the Schlieffen Plan, which played out in the First World War. Crush Western opponents, and then transfer all forces to the east. But Schlieffen and Moltke based their plans on calculations of the timing of mobilization in different countries, bandwidth railways. Hitler found more reliable means- diplomatic deceptions. He spoke to those close to him about successive attacks, first to the west and then to the east, back in the early 1930s.

Before the start of the war with Poland, having signed an agreement with the USSR, he again explained at a meeting of military leaders: after the victory over the Western powers, Russia’s turn would come. Almost immediately after the surrender of France, on July 31, 1940, Hitler set the General Staff the task of developing an attack on the USSR with the aim of “destructing vitality Russia." The date of the operation was determined - spring 1941. Halder's diary testifies that the German generals seized upon the preparations for a new war with great enthusiasm. Already on August 9, 1940, the head of the OKW operational department, Warlimont, issued the first directive to prepare a strike against the USSR, codenamed “Construction in the East.” On August 14, Goering instructed the head of the OKW economic department, General Thomas, that deliveries to Russia should only be considered until the spring of next year. On August 26, the transfer of divisions from France to the East began.

But the Nazi victories changed the situation throughout the world. European borders were shifting. The Soviet Union, taking advantage of the agreement with Germany, annexed Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic republics, and Bessarabia. He defeated Finland and forced him to cede a number of regions. The Finns then sharply reoriented towards Berlin. And the difficulties and serious losses of the USSR in the war with the Finns played a cruel joke on the Germans. They concluded that the Russians were a weak enemy and would be easy to defeat. They themselves swallowed state after state. Not a single German military leader expressed fears about a war with the Soviet Union.

The situation in the Balkans has also become tense. When Russia returned Bessarabia, taken from it during Civil War, Hungary and Bulgaria became excited. After World War I, their regions were also given to Romania. Now they set out to fight, to recover their losses. In Berlin they were alarmed: what if the USSR intervenes and destroys all of Romania with its oil fields. On August 28, the crisis deepened so much that Hitler ordered five tank, three motorized divisions, and parachute units to be put on alert.

But still, the situation was resolved peacefully. Germany joined forces with Italy and set themselves up as the supreme arbiters. At negotiations in Vienna, they dictated a compromise solution to the three countries: Romania gives half of Transylvania to Hungary, Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. The Romanians were forced to agree, but it cost their king Carol the throne. There was nationwide indignation, he abdicated in favor of his son Mihai, grabbed his mistress Magda Lupescu, 10 carriages of valuables and drove off to Switzerland. General Antonescu, who was very sympathetic to the Germans, became the real ruler. They immediately sent a military mission to prepare the Romanians “if war with Russia is imposed.” And Hungary and Bulgaria, having received generous handouts, entered the wake of German politics.

On top of everything else, the collapsed France and the broken England were gigantic colonial empires. Their possessions spread throughout to the globe. In Berlin they were aware that Germany itself was simply not able to “digest” such volumes. Here it was necessary to somehow share with the allies. Oh, they were willing to connect. Mussolini glanced with appetite at the French colonies in Africa, approached the Fuhrer, and begged. But in this case, Hitler refused. Italy showed itself disgustingly in the war and made no contribution to the victory. And the French government of Pétain-Laval became obedient puppets of Germany. It was unwise to alienate such useful slaves. Therefore, Hitler hinted to the Duce that the British had many rich colonies. If the Italians want it, let them conquer it themselves.

Well, Japan rolled its lips at French Indochina (it included Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). She turned to her German friends, and Hitler treated her more favorably than Italy. He reasoned that Japan needed to be tied more tightly to the alliance and drawn into a war with the Western powers. And Indochina is located quite far away, as it were local authorities did not spread to the British. It would be better if they were under supervision. German and Tokyo diplomats together approached the Vichy French government, and it did not dare to object. An agreement was signed - 6 thousand Japanese soldiers were allowed to be stationed in Vietnam. The official pretext was to protect the railway so that cargo for Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese troops would not be transported through Vietnam.

The Japanese sent more troops than agreed, took control not only railway, but also cities and ports. The Vichy government protested. However, the Japanese did not listen to him, and he could only come to terms with it. The commanders of the occupation units began to behave in much the same way in Vietnam as in Manchuria or China. French colonial officials were assigned their own advisers, whose instructions became mandatory.

These changes have inspired the neighboring kingdom, Thailand. IN late XIX century, the French took Laos and Cambodia from him. Now Thailand is also eager to take advantage of the defeat of the colonialists and regain its lands. Not so! The French in their homeland stood at attention in front of the Germans, in Vietnam in front of the Japanese, but the claims of the Thais were perceived as a national insult! The colonial command mobilized its units. Serious fighting broke out on the border. A squadron of French ships remaining in Vietnamese ports rushed at the Thais and sank their entire fleet - two old coastal defense battleships.

But... the peacekeepers intervened. None other than the Japanese. They pointed at both of them and ordered them to sit down at the negotiating table. And the results were determined by the Japanese themselves: they ordered to give Laos and Cambodia to the Thais. The French had nowhere to go, they gave it away. In Thailand, the first ever victory over a European power was celebrated magnificently. The local dictator Plek Pibunsongram was delighted to promote himself from major general to field marshal. And he paid for Japan’s support by entering into a secret alliance with it.

The Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) aroused even greater interest in Tokyo than Vietnam. There were oil fields there that Japan needed so much. The Netherlands no longer existed, why not take over their colony? But in this case the situation was different. The escaped Dutch queen and government sat in London, and the colonial administration continued to obey them. England became the patroness of the Dutch and their possessions. British colonies lay nearby: Singapore, Burma, and behind it huge India.

Now the British were in an unenviable position, gathering all their forces to defend their own islands. In Tokyo they thought it would be possible to thoroughly pluck them. But Japanese politicians were sure that in this case the United States would inevitably intervene. How will the Soviet Union behave? If you turn towards English and Dutch possessions, you will provide him with your rear.

In Japan, unlike Germany, they very respectfully assessed the combat power of the Red Army - they tried it on their own skin at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. Therefore, they came to the conclusion: for the development of the “British inheritance”, the military resources of the USSR would come in handy. In the summer of 1940, at a meeting of the Japanese leadership - Prime Minister Konoe, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Tojo, Oikawa and others, a project was put forward that seemed to promise enormous gains. Attract Stalin to an alliance against England. And in order to interest him, allocate an independent sector of interests for the USSR.

On August 1, this project was transferred to the German Ambassador Ott. It proposed "an attempt to force the Soviet Union to extend its influence in a direction in which it would have the least direct impact on the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, namely in the direction of the Persian Gulf (it is possible that, if necessary, it will have to agree with the expansion of the Soviet Union towards India)". Another option explicitly provided for “recognizing India, for present purposes, as part of the living space of the Soviet Union.”

Berlin liked the project, it received historical literature name "Ribbentrop Plan". Although they looked at it from a different angle than in Tokyo. The project was an excellent way to fool Stalin when an attack was being prepared. A wedge was being driven in that prevented a rapprochement between the USSR and Great Britain; they were pushed together. Soviet armies would have been transferred to Central Asia. They would be stuck in Afghanistan and India for a long time. Russian defenses in the west were weakening, which was what was required. In general, there were clear benefits on all sides.

On September 27, 1940, as part of the proposed redivision of the world between Germany, Japan and Italy, the Tripartite Pact was signed, providing for the creation of a “new order” in Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union was invited to join the pact. Moscow, in principle, did not object - but only on the condition that it would be an equal partner in the coalition. In addition, the Russians wanted to understand and clarify what the “new order” meant.

Meanwhile, new circumstances arose that complicated the relationship between our country and Germany. In October, the Germans entered into an agreement with Finland and sent their troops there. Stalin was alarmed and outraged by this. Through Molotov, he pointed out to Berlin the violation of previous agreements on spheres of influence and demanded the withdrawal of German contingents. And on October 28, Mussolini attacked Greece. True, the Italians were smashed to smithereens in just a week. But Hitler got involved, sent additional forces to Romania, and negotiations began with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the introduction of German units and a joint war with the Greeks. Hitler was increasingly exploring the Balkans, and the USSR also took this extremely painfully.

Finally, they agreed to meet to resolve the accumulated issues, and on November 12, 1940, a delegation led by Molotov arrived in Berlin. But on the same day, Hitler issued a secret directive to his generals. He informed them that “political negotiations have begun in order to clarify Russia’s position in the near future.” It was explained with utmost frankness: they must continue preparing the operation against the USSR regardless of the results of the negotiations!

And before Molotov, the Fuhrer unfolded the “Ribbentrop plan” to transform the “Pact of Three” into a “Pact of Four” with corresponding projects for the division of the “bankrupt estate” of Great Britain. A quadripartite treaty with Germany, Japan and Italy was proposed for a period of 10 years. The parties committed themselves not to join “any combination of powers” ​​directed against any of them, and promised to provide each other with economic assistance. The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol on spheres of influence. For Japan - East Asia south of the Japanese Islands, for Italy – North and North-East Africa, for Germany – Central Africa, for the USSR – “south of the national territory in the direction of the Indian Ocean”. And the final territorial redistribution of Europe was postponed until the end of the war.

Although the Soviet side was not flattered by the “pies in the sky”. Molotov again raised the issue of German troops in Finland and Romania. He stated that the Soviet Union had not yet received all the desired territorial concessions from the Romanians - in addition to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, he pointed to Southern Bukovina. Hitler and Ribbentrop tried to convince us that all these were “trifles” and had no significance compared to the global prospects that were opening up. But Molotov firmly stood his ground. Said that “the great problems of tomorrow cannot be separated from the problems today and from implementing existing agreements.” They argued for a long time, repeatedly, and only agreed on the fact that Germany confirmed: Finland belongs to Russia’s zone of interests, the Fuhrer in this country will not interfere with Stalin’s policies (this agreement remained purely declarative, Hitler did not intend to implement it).

And the draft agreement on the division of the world was sent to Moscow for further study and approval. Stalin treated him extremely carefully. He realized that the German proposals smacked of a large-scale provocation. On his instructions, Molotov conveyed an evasive answer, without refusing or agreeing, and asked for additional time for work.

On November 26, through the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, the Soviet government submitted its counterproject. It was indicated that the USSR was ready to join the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions were proposed somewhat different. First of all, the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland was required. Bulgaria was recognized as a sphere of Russia’s interests; within a few months, the USSR was supposed to conclude a “mutual assistance pact” with it - with the right to host military units on its territory. In addition, the Soviet Union, on the basis of a long-term lease, was required to provide a base in the Bosporus and Dardanelles area. Japan had to give up its rights to the oil and coal fields of Sakhalin. And the center of Soviet claims was supposed to be the regions south of Baku and Batumi and in the direction not of India, but of the Persian Gulf.

Pay attention to the fundamental differences between a project and a counterproject. If the German version was aimed at a collision between the USSR and England, then in the Soviet version Stalin retained the ability to maneuver and avoided entering into big war. At the same time, Joseph Vissarionovich returned to the geopolitical and strategic tasks that Russian empire tried to decide before the revolution. Bulgaria was being pulled from under German patronage to Russian. This would affect the situation in Romania, it would also begin to slide under the control of the Soviet Union, and our country would begin to play a dominant role in the Balkans. The base on the Bosphorus consolidated this position and opened the way to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Japan's interests in Sakhalin were limited. And the strategic claims of the USSR shifted from India to Northern Iran, eastern part Turkey, Iraq, Syria - in the very direction in which the Russian Empire had previously extended its influence.

However, such conditions could not please Berlin. They had already included Romania and Bulgaria in their own “assets” and expected to soon establish themselves thoroughly there. They set their sights on Iran, Iraq and the Middle East themselves. Numerous pro-German organizations were already operating there, and agents were working widely. Negotiations were held with local leaders who were ready to cooperate with the Nazis, some were bribed, some were played on the ambitions of others, and they were promised help. And Turkey, at the expense of which Soviet interests should be satisfied, was diligently courted by Berlin. They cast bait about an alliance, but the Turkish government greeted them more than favorably and expressed its readiness for further rapprochement. Those around Hitler already considered her a de facto ally, they were sure that she would join Germany in the same way as in the First World War.

But the Soviet Union agreed to be an equal partner in the Tripartite Pact. If he is truly recognized as equal, let the other parties “make room”, sacrifice some interests for the sake of supposed friendship, Moscow’s consent to the implementation of other plans and its support. However, our government probably asked for “the maximum” - it believed that the usual diplomatic mechanisms would operate, the Germans and their allies would disagree with something, and there would be an opportunity to bargain.

Although Hitler saw things differently. If Stalin, annexing the fallen national outskirts and pondering geopolitical demands, restored the former empire and its spheres of influence, then the Fuhrer set himself the same goals that she achieved German Empire in the First World War. Hegemony in Europe, colonization of the Balkans, drawing Turkey into the orbit, and with its help expansion in Asia. The same goals that once already led to a clash between Germany and Russia. However, the idea of ​​“Lebensraum”, that is, “living space” in the East, in Russia, was common among the ideologists of the Kaiser’s Germany and the Nazis.

There was no response to the submitted project at all. But Moscow’s proposals actually did not interest Hitler too much. All that remained was to regret that it was not possible to fool the Soviet leadership and lead them by the nose. Now the Fuhrer used the Russian conditions in order to once again justify to his subordinates the need for a strike on the USSR. It was from this angle that he undertook to comment on the document: “Stalin is smart and cunning. He demands more and more. This is a cold-blooded blackmailer. The victory of Germany has become unbearable for Russia, so it is necessary to bring it to its knees as soon as possible.”

Well, the military, according to the Fuhrer’s directive, continued preparations for the coming war, regardless of any “Ribbentrop’s plans,” negotiations, or Soviet responses. In November 1940, General Paulus had already completed the development of a plan for an attack on our country. At the same time, Goering approved the plan for deploying the Air Force for the upcoming war. Hitler studied them and discussed them with his advisers. On December 18, 1940, he signed Directive No. 21, which received symbol"Otto's plan" Later they found it necessary to come up with a louder, as if historical name - the “Barbarossa” plan.

Valery Shambarov